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The concept of coercive diplomacy has been used as a framework for analyzing various 
cases of confrontation between two or more states. Coercive diplomacy is the use of threats 
by a state to force an adversary to concede to certain demands.. Formulated by Alexander 
L. George, this concept has been used to understand a diverse group of case studies, such 
as the initial stages of the Vietnam conflict, the conflict in Laos, as well as the Cuban 
missile crisis.  
 
This dissertation studies four cases from the post-9/11 period and analyzes them 
through components of coercive diplomacy. These cases are (a) Operation Parakram 2001-
2002 India-Pakistan crisis, (b) U.S. coercion on the Taliban September-October 2001, (c) 
U.S. coercive diplomacy against Saddam’s Iraq prior to the March 2003 invasion, and (d) 
Coercive diplomacy and the North Korean nuclear crisis, 2002-2006. 
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1.0  THE PRACTICE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AFTER 9/11 
INTRODUCTION 
The events of September 11, 2001 constituted a turning point in the way most states 
perceive international security threats, especially threats linked to terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
symbolized this view when he stated that everything that changed and that the U.S. now 
perceived all potential threats differently.1 Thus, from the U.S. perspective, earlier 
strategies of containment of threats, whether state or non-state were simply not enough. 
Other states, such as India also felt that it was time to take more stern measures against 
such threats. These measures included the application of coercive diplomacy, under which 
a state threatens its adversary with the use of force, or takes limited military action to 
achieve its objectives. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The key aim of this dissertation is to examine the circumstances under which coercive 
diplomacy (CD) succeeds or fails in the post-9/11 period. Despite structural changes in the 
security framework in the contemporary period, (such as the rise of non-state actors and 
the spread of nuclear weapons) states have continued to apply coercive diplomacy to 
achieve strategic objectives. Using four prominent case studies from the post-9/11 period, 
this dissertation examines factors that strengthened and weakened coercion in each 
                                                 
1 Ron Huisken, ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case of Intelligence Following Policy,’ Global 
Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 2006, pg. 28. 
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instance. From the policy perspective, it helps highlight key elements of the international 
security system which impact on successful or failed CD. These conditions cover 
characteristics of the contemporary international security structure mentioned above – the 
rise of non-state actors, threat from weapons of mass destruction, and the rise of ethnic and 
sectarian conflict. Keeping this mind, this dissertation concentrates on the following broad 
questions:  
• What factors strengthened or weakened coercive diplomacy in each case? 
• How did the objectives of the coercer and the target impact on the target’s decisions?  
• On what perceptions were these objectives based? 
• How did the coercer, target, as well as third parties, perceive the situation, which then 
lead to their positions in the coercive equation?   
• What role did regional actors and other third parties (such as terrorist/separatist groups) 
play in the particular cases? 
So why is this research relevant? The international security framework during the Cold 
War was built around concepts and strategies such as deterrence and mutually assured 
destruction (MAD). Such a global arrangement was replicated regionally, influenced by 
the superpowers’ desire to expand their areas of influence. According to one scholar, 
research centered around Cold War-period concepts such as deterrence, compellence, and 
coercive diplomacy have focused mainly on the role of states, especially the U.S.2 
Conditions that permitted the viable application of such strategies no longer exist in their 
entirety. Confrontation during the Cold War was structured around symmetric warfare,3 
while the paradigm today is asymmetric warfare.  
In the absence of the Cold War framework, it is pertinent to ask – Can strategies, 
built around certain structural characteristics of the international political system, be 
applied in the contemporary period, when the same characteristics have been diluted or 
discarded? In other words, given the rise of non-state actors and the threat from WMD, can 
coercive diplomacy be applied effectively by states? 
                                                 
2 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), pg. 110. 
3 Even when asymmetric confrontation took place during the Cold War, such as in Vietnam and Laos, it was 
always under the larger framework of the superpower rivalry, see Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, not 
Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003, pg. 110. 
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Roadmap of dissertation 
As stated, this dissertation is based on four cases of CD in the post 9/11 period. The bulk 
of the dissertation (chapters 2-5) covers an analysis of these cases. While I use analytical 
variables (contextual variables and variables favoring success) developed by Alexander 
George, I study them under five broad variables – perceptions, objectives, credibility of 
threats, internal factors, international strategic environment. In essence, no new variables 
are being created; this dissertation simply integrates the original ones under broad 
variables. In each case study, the factors referred specified by George will be referred to 
for analytical purposes throughout (see Tables 1 and 2 at the end of chapter 1 for a 
complete list of the original variables – contextual and variables favoring success).  
The following sections in chapter 1, I briefly describe the concept of coercive 
diplomacy, after which I summarize some of the characteristics of the post 9/11 period in 
the international security system which are relevant to the conduct of CD. Following that I 
examine some of the literature on coercive diplomacy which demonstrates the factors that 
have been highlighted in the study of past cases and helps frame this dissertation’s cases in 
the broader context.   
The final section of chapter 1 describes the methodology used in this dissertation, 
including the cases selected as well as a summary of the cases excluded. It specifies the 
criteria for case selection in the form of ‘bench marks.’ The methodology section also 
includes a description of the five variables used to study the cases. The final chapter 
concludes the dissertation with a comparative analysis of the issues that the individual 
cases highlighted. It will help understand the qualifying factors of each of the conclusions 
reached from the case studies.  
Defining Coercive Diplomacy 
Coercive diplomacy (CD) is defined as the use of threats and limited force to make an 
adversary halt a course of action it has embarked on, or undo what has been done already.4 
It is differentiated into defensive and offensive uses. Defensive CD covers “efforts to 
                                                 
4 Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), pg. 4. 
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persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action,” while in the offensive variant, 
“coercive threats can be employed aggressively to persuade a victim to give up something 
of value without putting up resistance.”5  My dissertation, while mainly focusing on the 
defensive uses of the strategy, goes beyond this limitation. In cases such as the South 
Asian and the U.S.-Taliban confrontation -  movement of troops in an aggressive manner 
were hardly defensive maneuvers. Force, when applied, is used for the purpose of 
threatening the opponent. The use of force as part of this strategy is limited however, and 
restricted to demonstrating to the adversary a willingness to employ larger doses of force if 
it does not concede to the demands.6  
The defensive variant of coercive diplomacy is, in turn, divided into three types – 
(1) Persuading an adversary to stop short of a goal – Type A, (2) Persuading an opponent 
to undo an action, (3) Persuading an opponent to make changes in the government – Type 
C.7 George also formulated coercive diplomacy as involving two levels of impacting 
variables. The first is a set of contextual variables – global strategic environment, type of 
provocation, image of war, multilateral or coalitional diplomacy, and the level of isolation 
of the adversary. The second level involves a narrower set of factors related specifically to 
the clash between the two states, such as asymmetry of motivation, clarity of objective, 
leadership, international support, fear of escalation, and clarity of settlement conditions. 
Other alternative models can be considered to analyze these cases. Prominent 
among these are the concepts of deterrence and compellence. A closer examination 
however reveals that components of these models do not quite fit the cases under question. 
Coercive diplomacy includes both offensive and defensive variants, while this distinction 
is not made in compellence. Coercive diplomacy is also more flexible, relying as it does on 
both threats and concessions, (i.e., a carrot and stick approach), while compellence relies 
mainly on threats of force.8 Similarly, deterrence is different because it deals with 
preventing a state from pursuing a course of action, while in coercive diplomacy, the 
pursuit has already begun, and the state using CD seeks to stop it.  
                                                 
5 Alexander L. George, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,’ in Alexander L. George & 
William E. Simons (ed.) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pg. 7. 
6 Ibid, pg. 11, ftn. 3 
7 Ibid, pg. 9. 
8 Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion, pg. 5. 
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Defining success/failure of coercive diplomacy 
It is important to specify how we measure success/failure of coercive diplomacy. CD is 
termed a success if the target state concedes to the demands, without the use of force as the 
main tool. This implies that threats have been credible and successful. Similarly, coercive 
diplomacy is termed a failure if the episode leads to a full-fledged war or if the coercer 
backs down without the demands being fulfilled. If, in the process of carrying out the 
threats, the coercer fails, or does not prevail, that would also be termed as a failure of 
coercive diplomacy. The point here is that threat implementation is crucial and has to be 
successful, especially if the implementation of the threat is integrally linked to the stated 
objectives/demands (such as regime change). 
Success and failure is also dependent upon the number and type of objectives that 
the coercer has. With multiple objectives, first the hierarchy must be established and then 
through process-tracing the success or failure of each objective must be established. As a 
subsequent section specifies, with multiple objectives there is generally a hierarchy and 
priority among the demands. If there is a single, clear demand, deciphering success/failure 
is usually not difficult.  
Post-9/11 period and Coercive Diplomacy: Characteristics and Rationale 
In the post 9/11 period, the possibility of the use of force and the threat to use force have 
increasingly become part of the U.S. government’s repertoire of policy options, 
Simultaneously, other states also bandwagoned with the U.S. in order to deal with pressing 
security concerns, especially terrorism and separatist insurgencies. These states, including 
India and Britain, supported a more forceful policy against sources of these threats. Other 
countries, such as Russia, Thailand and Kazakhstan, saw this as an opportunity to act more 
forcefully against their own internal militant movements.   
A second security threat is the prospect of WMD proliferation. Since 2001, 
increasingly the international community, spearheaded by the U.S., has focused on would-
be nuclear weapon states, such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. For 
influential sections of the Bush administration, the only solution to these threats from the 
so-called ‘rogue’ states was to overthrow these regimes. It was a reflection of the view that 
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traditional strategies of containment and deterrence are ineffective against terrorists and 
rogue states.  
Such a conclusion was based on a calculation that the nature of the adversary had 
changed. Contemporary adversaries, especially terrorist groups (but also ‘irrational’ 
dictators such as Kim Jong Il and Saddam Hussein) were perceived as being willing to take 
the punishment and even martyr themselves for a larger cause. Paradoxically this decreases 
the possibility of success of coercive diplomacy because the objectives of the targets are so 
non-negotiable (whether martyrdom or nuclear acquisition). Nevertheless, as this 
dissertation shows, coercive diplomacy has been applied by states,  
This was reflected in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy which endorsed 
proactive efforts to deal with terrorism and WMD proliferation. According to the 
document, ‘given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer 
rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, 
the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused 
by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option.’9 Indeed some experts 
have conceded these policy recommendations now constitute a ‘grand strategy’ that is very 
different from strategies followed in the pre-9/11 period and the Cold War period.10  
In such a scenario it is but natural that the U.S. government has increasingly 
considered coercive measures, whether through full-scale military action or through 
threats. This was combined with an attitude in the Bush administration that the U.S. would 
not negotiate with their enemies – the Axis of Evil members, as well as other potential 
targets such as Syria. However, the accompanying paradox here is that with such an 
intransigent approach, coercion is weakened because there is very little room for 
reassurances and ‘carrots’ or concessions to be offered to the target state.  
Keeping this in mind, to what extent can the strategy of coercive diplomacy explain 
some key cases of confrontation in the post 9/11 period. Preliminary research shows that 
coercive diplomacy and its explanatory components can still be employed to explain 
                                                 
9 ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ September 2002, 
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html  
10 G. John Ikenberry, ‘America’s Imperial Ambition,’ Foreign Affairs, September-October 2002. 
  6
certain cases of state interactions, even when the process includes non-state actors like 
terrorist groups.  
Archetype approach 
As this brief summary of CD research demonstrates, such a policy has been applied across 
a broad range of issues, ranging from Cold War ideological conflict in peripheral areas, to 
territorial aggression, terrorism and nuclear proliferation. In order to demonstrate the 
relevance of this theory for present day conflict situations, this dissertation focuses on an 
archetype approach in which key issues related to security threats are present in the case 
studies under consideration. The following table highlights this framework: 
Table 1. Archetypes 
Case Archetype issue(s) Strategic position Can the case be 
replicated elsewhere? 
South Asia Terrorism  
Nuclear 
Proliferation/deterrence 
CD between mid-ranking 
nuclear powers 
Yes, for example, Middle 
East, and Northeast Asia 
Taliban Terrorism 
State-sponsorship 
CD on Fundamentalist 
regime 
Yes, for example, Iran 
Iraq WMD proliferation CD on Regional 
dictatorship 
Yes, for example, Syria 
Iran (though Iran is not a 
dictatorship, it is nevertheless 
applicable) 
North Korea WMD proliferation CD by a ‘rogue’ state on 
U.S. 
Yes, for example, Iran 
 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY RESEARCH  
Coercive diplomacy can be seen as a successor to the theory of compellence, propounded 
by Thomas Schelling. This section starts with a broad discussion of the concept of 
compellence and subsequently talks about coercive diplomacy and its relation to this 
dissertation’s objectives. Research on coercive diplomacy has centered on the application 
of this theory to numerous cases of confrontation ranging from the Pearl Harbor attack to 
the first Gulf War. These cases have highlighted several issues that are salient to this 
dissertation. 
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Coercion and Compellence  
It would be useful to place the concept of coercion in terms of international relations 
theory. Neo-realist notions of international relations theory are rooted in the anarchic 
nature of international politics.11 This implies a Hobbesian self-help system where, 
theoretically, all states are on their own and are solely responsible for their security and 
prosperity. And in pursuing their interests, states use a variety of variants of force. 
Coercion is one of them. Coercive diplomacy and other forms of coercion come under the 
overall rubric of the functions of force. Military force can be deployed for many reasons. 
According to one prominent scholar, force has four functions – (a) defense, (b) deterrence, 
(c) compellence, and (d) swaggering.12 This dissertation deals with the practice of coercive 
diplomacy mainly from a compellent perspective.  
It is important to distinguish compellence from other uses of force, especially 
deterrence. Deterrence is a strategy used to dissuade an opponent from undertaking a 
course of action. On the other hand, coercive diplomacy is conducted as a reaction to an 
activity already undertaken. Compellence is similar to coercive diplomacy. According to 
Schelling, compellence means forcing an opponent into a course of action.13 Compellence 
involves using the threat of force or its limited use to make the opponent refrain from 
doing something that he has already undertaken or persuade him into a course of action 
that it has not yet begun.14  
Deterrence also differs from compellence because it “involves setting the stage – by 
announcement, by rigging the trip wire, by incurring the obligation, and waiting.”15  On 
the other hand, “compellence usually involves initiating an action (or an irrevocable 
commitment to action) that can cease or become harmless, only if the opponent 
responds.”16 Crucially, compellence is also different from deterrence because it is 
generally clearer when an adversary has been compelled into adopting a course of action.17 
                                                 
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 102-128. 
12 Robert J. Art, ‘To What Ends Military Power,’ International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, Spring 1980, pg. 5. 
13 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1966), pg. 69. 
14 Art, ‘To What Ends Military Power,’ pg. 7. 
15 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, pg. 71. 
16 Ibid, pg. 72. 
17 Robert Art, ‘To What Ends Military Power,’ pg. 8. 
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This level of certainty does not accompany deterrence, because it is difficult to 
demonstrate why something did not happen.18  
Compellence is also more difficult to achieve than deterrence. This is because 
compellence requires that a state modify its behavior as opposed to simply stopping a 
course of action, which is the characteristic a of a successful deterrence threat. For an 
adversarial state it is much easier to deny that it has acquiesced to a deterrent threat than a 
compellent threat. Modifying policy involves a loss of face, because of the unambiguity of 
the act. This explains why a state might adopt a more rigid stance in the face of compellent 
threats, making this process more difficult than deterrence. Thus, ‘compellence is 
intrinsically harder to attain than deterrence, not because its objectives are vaguer, but 
because it demands more humiliation.’19 Compellence thus directly impacts on the 
‘passions of the target state’ more than deterrence, due to the suffering and humiliation 
inflicted on the target.20 This, in turn, increases the popularity of the target regime and 
allows mobilization of domestic support to resist the coercer, making compellence more 
difficult. 
In terms of timing, compellence tends to be definite, as opposed to deterrence 
which can extend indefinitely.21 Compellent threats require a certain amount of time 
during which the target state has to concede to the demands. This period cannot be too 
much or too indefinite, otherwise it becomes an empty threat. According to Schelling, 
compellence involves threats that are vaguer in their magnitude than deterrent threats.22 
This is usually to avoid self-imposed constraints when it is time to actually carry out the 
threat. But, according to Robert Art, there is no reason why a compellent threat has to be 
clearer than a deterrent threat.23 It depends on how clear a state wants to be in issuing 
demands rather than on any inherent characteristic of either strategy (compellence or 
deterrence). Nevertheless, from the perspective of the ‘compeller,’ it can also be 
advantageous to have clear objectives, especially if they are limited in nature.  
                                                 
18 Art, ‘To What Ends Military Power,’ pg. 8. 
19 Ibid, pg. 10. 
20 Robert J. Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know,’ in Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin (ed.) The 
United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), pg. 362. 
21 Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 72-73. 
22 Ibid, pg. 73. 
23 Art, ‘To What Ends Military Power,’ pg. 9. 
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The role of assurances is also an important contrasting feature of compellence and 
deterrence.24 It is easier to convey to the adversary that if it does pursue a policy, there 
would be punitive retaliation. On the other hand, persuading the adversary to retrace its 
steps, and that if it does so, no action would be taken, is a lot more difficult to achieve. It is 
also important that a fight to the finish not be inevitable. Coercion and warfare short of a 
general all-out war also have to be on the table. According to Schelling, conflict postures, 
whether deterrence or compellence, are all about how threats are deployed and how one 
side can adopt behavior patterns in the context of the adversary’s behavior.25
For the purpose of this analysis, three of the four functions of force outlined at the 
beginning of this section are important. Two of them, compellence and deterrence, have 
been discussed briefly. The fourth, swaggering, involves demonstrating a state’s military 
potential through military exercises and acquisition of the latest weaponry.26 Swaggering 
can easily have a coercive effect on a state and does not require specific threats. 
 All these functions of force and the accompanying conflict scenarios can be 
characterized as part of a bargaining process.27 Part of a state’s aim is to increase its 
bargaining power through stated commitments to defend or use force in some form and 
also for the coercer to position itself in a rigid posture which then places the responsibility 
for a skirmish or a conflict on the target state.28 Threats, both in compellence and 
deterrence are an exercise in risk manipulation, the possibility for which rises through 
limited war and crisis situations.29 The essence of risk manipulation is to create in the 
minds of the target state’s policymakers the possibility that the situation might degenerate 
beyond control of the coercing state.30  
Schelling’s work in the sixties can be seen as the precursor to the model of coercive 
diplomacy that was introduced in the following decade. Indeed, he pointed out that the 
contrast between ‘brute force’ and ‘coercion’ is the “difference between unilateral 
                                                 
24 Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 74-75. 
25 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.  
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‘undiplomatic’ recourse to strength and coercive diplomacy based on the power to hurt.”31 
The crucial point here is that brute force is effective when it is actually employed, while 
the potential power to hurt is effective only when it is kept as a reserve.32  
Some of the conditions that constitute successful compellence are also valid for 
coercive diplomacy. For example, the compellence model underlines the importance of a 
clear deadline for the opponents to concede to the demands.33 But a crucial area of 
difference is that Schelling’s model allows for a general nature to the demands. His 
opinion is that ‘compellent threats tend to communicate only the general direction of 
compliance, and are less likely to be self-limiting, less likely to communicate in the very 
design of the threat just what, or how much is demanded.’34 The objective of the coercer in 
this model is also to provide a range of options to itself in case of future changes in the 
situation. There is thus a difference in the nature of demands in the two models. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Lawrence Freedman, Schelling’s understanding of coercion 
and coercive diplomacy differs from George’s. Schelling focuses more on different types 
of force as opposed to George, who is concerned with both force and diplomacy.35
Coercion is also understood as being part of the practice of crisis management. 
Crisis management refers to actions by governments to prevent a crisis situation from 
spilling into a war. However, even though such a goal is paramount, the respective 
leaderships seek to advance their interests, or at the very least minimize losses.36 An 
additional theoretical perspective is that the same conflict might have both coercive and 
purely military war-fighting dimensions. The coercer will apply the pressure tactics while 
the target state would respond in an ‘all-out’ manner. The Algerian conflict in the fifties 
and sixties demonstrated this aspect of coercion.37
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Coercion and accommodation are two contrasting elements of crisis management, 
each having separate goals and constraints. The goal of coercion is to maximize gains for 
one’s side, while the constraint is that the goal has to be accomplished without resorting to 
war. Similarly, the goal of accommodation is to ensure that a crisis settlement is reached, 
with the constraint that this must be achieved without conceding too much.38
In context of this study, a brief note on the effects of nuclear weapons on coercion 
would be in order. Writing in the sixties, Schelling’s view of nuclear coercion remains 
frighteningly relevant. Comparing the Vietnam War and a possible conflict in Europe, he 
stated that if a war was going badly for one side, it might consider a strategy of coercion 
rather than pure combat.39 And if nuclear weapons were available, as was the case in 
Europe, they might manifest themselves as a coercive rivalry instead of merely as a 
battlefield competition. Another relevant point (especially in the light of recent proposed 
modifications to make nuclear weapon use more flexible) is that even if tactical nuclear 
weapons are used as part of battlefield strategy, they do have a coercive effect on target 
populations and their leadership.40
Regardless of these potential consequences of nuclear coercion, one prominent 
view is that nuclear weapons have ruled out physical nuclear compellence, strengthened 
deterrence, and not had any clear effect on peaceful nuclear compellence.41 This is due to 
several reasons. One is that the use of nuclear weapons can lead to an escalation42 to the 
level of a general nuclear war between two nuclear armed adversaries, as was the case 
during the Cold War and in the present day context, the India-Pakistan and the China-India 
dyads.  
Contemporary security developments have qualified the way nuclear coercion (or 
compellence) can be applied. But the traditional concept of compellence as propounded by 
Schelling has its own problems. For example, the notion that states can indulge in risk 
manipulation does not focus adequately on the reality that in doing so, the coercing state 
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creates risk for itself.43 Awareness of this mutual risk poses self-imposed constraints on the 
coercer. This is especially so when nuclear weapons are involved in the dispute, as is the 
case in South Asia. A further issue is that of relative weightage of interests on both sides, 
something that was ignored by Schelling’s theory of compellence.44 As the next section 
shows, the model of coercive diplomacy did cover this drawback by incorporating the 
‘asymmetry of interests’ variable. 
This leads to another issue, that of context.45 It is difficult to examine a coercive 
interaction without considering various global and regional issues. When compellence as a 
concept was enunciated by Schelling, global and regional issues were much different than 
today. In the sixties, the overarching security issue was the Cold War ideological rivalry. 
All other global and regional constraints were subsumed under this framework and 
considered only in context of this rivalry.  
Contrast this with the contemporary period. The security situation is defined not by 
an underlying rivalry between states, but instead, interlinked issues that make a contextual 
analysis imperative. These issues include WMD proliferation, terrorism, ethnic and 
religious conflicts, energy disputes. In the Cold War, such issues were superseded by the 
U.S.-Soviet Union dispute, but now they are the disputes and are interconnected. South 
Asia and the Middle East are good examples. In these cases, territorial disputes, terrorism, 
religious and sectarian rivalries are combined with energy disputes, and last, but not least, 
nuclear proliferation. Therefore, global and regional contexts are important in determining 
a state’s motivations, interests, and capabilities when analyzing its compellent or deterrent 
posture. 
Regardless of these drawbacks in the practice of compellence, it retains its 
influence as an important theoretical framework. As the next section shows, the coercive 
diplomacy model shares several basic characteristics with the compellence doctrine. From 
a policy perspective too, the ideas generated by compellence are likely to be relevant, 
given the continuing deployment of coercive diplomacy.  
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Coercive Diplomacy: Theoretical Basis 
Coercive diplomacy refers to the use of threats and limited force to make an adversary stop 
a course of action it has embarked on, or undo what has been done already.46 It requires a 
credible threat and/or the use of a limited amount of force to convince the opponent of the 
credibility of the threat.47 The objective of coercive diplomacy is to achieve one’s demands 
without resorting to a full-scale war, by making the adversary realize that the costs of not 
complying are higher than the path it has chosen. In the words of Alexander George, the 
aim is “to create in the opponent the expectation of costs of sufficient magnitude to erode 
his motivation to continue what he is doing.”48
According to George, coercive diplomacy has to be distinguished from 
compellence because the latter does not focus on the offensive and defensive variants of 
coercive threats. Coercive diplomacy is also more flexible, i.e., it involves diplomacy and 
accommodation, whereas compellence relies almost exclusively on heavy threats of 
force.49 Coercive diplomacy is also different from compellence as it is concerned mainly 
with reactive threats, which narrows its areas of focus.50
So what kind of threat would induce the opponent to comply with the demands? 
According to George, it depends on the demands of the coercive power and the resistance 
of the adversary to comply with these demands.51 The point to be made here is that 
demands of a lesser magnitude would have a greater chance of persuading the target to 
concede. On the other hand, massive demands would strengthen the adversary’s resistance, 
making successful coercion less difficult. Furthermore, the nature of the demand 
determines the motivations of the parties and the asymmetry/symmetry of interests 
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between them.52 Motivation refers to the importance each party attaches to the issue, what 
exactly is at stake for both, and how fundamental the issue is for the two sides.  
If the coercive power’s demands are much more important to it than they are to the 
opponent, then the former is at an advantageous position in this asymmetry of interests. 
But if these demands go beyond this and/or encroach upon the fundamental interests of the 
target, then the asymmetry of interests is tilted toward the latter and makes coercion more 
difficult. It is therefore important for the coercer to make sure that the demands involve 
only its most fundamental objectives, and not those demands that reflect higher ambitions, 
which are not necessarily important to its vital interests. 
Relatedly, perceptions of the other side’s motivation and the asymmetry of interests 
have a bearing on the general dynamics of coercive diplomacy. But within such a strategic 
interaction, the possibility of inadequate information and problems arising out of 
assumptions of rationality are also high.53 Coercion can also be applied through a carrot 
and stick approach, where threats may be combined with positive inducements in the event 
that the adversary complies. According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy (along 
with deterrence) is part of a larger theory of influence, where coercive strategies have to be 
combined with inducements and other diplomatic moves.54  
We also have to consider that the strength of the political establishment in the 
target state varies. In case of a weak state, the coercer might apply three kinds of indirect 
strategies: (a) use a third party to bring around the leaders of the weak state, (b) support 
dissidents or moderates in a state with a deeply divided political establishment, (c) support 
elements of the target regime’s constituency to pressurize the leadership.55
A sense of urgency often increases the coercive power. This can be conveyed 
through verbal threats or through moves such as deployment of military forces. Similarly, 
the threat of punishment in the case of noncompliance is also communicated through 
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verbal actions or military/diplomatic steps.56 Thus, threats and demands have to be closely 
related to communication, which involves negotiating, bargaining and signaling.57  
Two main variables affect the credibility of the coercing power – determination and 
ability to inflict damage. For effective credibility, both determination (will) and ability to 
harm must be present. It is not enough to have one without the other. Historical cases 
suggest convincingly that in the absence of one variable, even when the other is present, 
coercive moves are not successful.58
Rationality of the opponent is extremely important to consider while formulating 
such a policy.59 It has to be understood that rationality can be colored by misperceptions 
and miscalculations as well as by psychological and cultural factors.60 Instead of merely 
being treated as a rational actor, the target can be seen in context of an ‘actor-specific’ 
behavioral model involving analysis of costs and benefits from the opponent’s point of 
view and estimating the weightage it attaches to these costs and benefits.61 This implies 
that it is not adequate for the coercer to be assured that its threats are credible enough, but 
in fact, what is more important is the target’s view about the potency of the threats.62
Assumptions of a unitary actor can also be risky. Labeling the opponent unitary 
means the target regime is homogenous and that there is unanimity among its leaders.63 
Once the weaknesses of a unitary actor approach are considered it can lead to policies that 
are tailored specifically at dissident groups and other influential elements of the regime 
that differ at a very basic level from the leadership in the opponent state. 
Strategies of coercion and deterrence come under the overall rubric of bargaining.64 
Throughout history, strategic thinkers and philosophers like Machiavelli and Hobbes have 
stressed how force can be used as a tool of policy in pursuit of successful bargaining.65 But 
with the reality of nuclear weapons in the last six decades, the risks of use of force or 
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threats to do so are obviously a lot higher. This affects the possibility as to whether or not a 
limited conventional or nuclear war can be fought. In context of coercive diplomacy, it 
impacts on the need to make credible threats. 
In terms of purpose, coercive diplomacy can be divided into defensive and 
offensive strategies.66 Defensive coercive moves have the objective of forcing the 
opponent to reverse an encroachment that it has already begun, while the goal behind 
offensive coercion is to force the opponent to give up what it possesses already.67 The 
defensive variant is further divided into three types: (1) Persuading an opponent to stop 
short of a goal – Type A, (2) Persuading an opponent to undo an action – Type B, (3) 
Persuading an opponent to make changes in the government – Type C.68  
The strategy of coercive diplomacy and its success is also affected by some other 
variables. Prominent among them is the global strategic environment.69 Demands made on 
the opponent and following through on the threat is often conditioned by global factors that 
affect the overall strategic interests of the coercer, or those of concerned third parties. It is 
thus extremely context-dependent,70 which means that policymakers cannot ignore the 
eccentricities of each case. 
Also important when analyzing coercive diplomacy are the cost-benefit 
calculations of a state that is contemplating challenging the deterrent threats of an 
opponent.71 According to George and Smoke, when deterrence is being challenged, (say, 
by the U.S. against North Korea, or India against Pakistan), the initiator can have a range 
of options available rather than a simple ‘attack’ or ‘not to attack’ choice.72 The logic 
behind this conceptual modification is that sometimes the initiator applies pressure that 
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falls shot of the more riskier attack approach but nevertheless, involves ‘limited probes,’ or 
‘controlled pressure.’73
 A crucial factor is the type of provocation that persuades the aggrieved party to 
mount a round of coercive diplomacy.74 Something which is a clear act of aggression, for 
example, an invasion, is easier to prove and accords the coercer some legitimacy in the 
international forum. On the other hand, an act of covert aggression, like sponsorship of 
terrorism is harder to prove, and therefore, the task of the coercer is that much more 
difficult. The image of war is also a deciding factor. The more deadly this image comes 
across, the more chance there is of one or both parties restraining themselves. 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY CASE RESEARCH 
In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, one opinion was that with the decline of the 
use of force among major powers since 1945, coercive diplomacy as an instrument of 
foreign policy was less relevant now.75 However, as recent cases have shown, states do use 
coercion as a prominent element of their foreign and security policy. The crux of the issue 
is that despite the increased importance of non-state actors in international politics, the 
relevance of states has endured. And even though since the end of the Cold War, most wars 
fought have been ethnic and religious in nature, they have also resulted in the formation of 
newer states. Since most states do not have an infinite capacity or inclination for war, 
coercion of an adversary is a frequent policy option; as a trip wire for actual hostilities. 
Keeping that in mind, this dissertation looks at a few relevant themes that resonate in the 
chapters ahead. 
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Objectives: Magnitude and manipulation 
As stated earlier and throughout, a cardinal rule of coercive diplomacy is that the higher 
the magnitude of objectives, the greater is the target’s propensity to resist, especially if 
these demands contradict its (target’s) national interests. In the face of high demands, the 
target frequently has no choice but to resist, leading to failure of coercive diplomacy. It 
follows that moderated objectives will then have a greater chance of successful CD. 
Coercion in the Laos crisis of 1960-61 demonstrated the importance of 
modification and flexibility of objectives. Soon after President Kennedy took office in 
January 1961, he scaled back U.S. objectives to the establishment of an ‘independent, 
peaceful, uncommitted Laos,’76 from the Eisenhower administration’s larger goal of 
preventing the spread of communism in the area. Limited objectives can also aid in 
infusing flexibility in future policy-making. The Johnson administration’s coercion of 
North Vietnam in 1964-65 was driven by a need to maintain such a flexibility in terms of 
Southeast Asia policy.77
But even if the coercer limits its objectives, its impact on the coercive process will 
be felt only if the target also believes that the objectives are indeed limited, and only 
concern the basic interests of the coercer and not the target. It is thus crucial that the 
coercer signal unambiguously its actual objectives. This element was not present in 
China’s attempts to coerce Vietnam into withdrawing its forces from Cambodia in 1979. 
Beijing’s attempts to signal its limited intent were subsumed under ‘diplomatic noise’ over 
skirmishes on the border with Vietnam.78 Furthermore, since Vietnam had much more at 
stake in the crisis, and had, in fact, invested considerable resources into the Cambodian 
campaign, its determination to resist Beijing only increased.79  
The importance of magnitude of objectives was also demonstrated in the pre-Cold 
War period case of U.S. coercion of Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 
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1941. U.S. coercive policy on Japan failed because the main demand – complete Japanese 
withdrawal from China – as well as an oil embargo on Tokyo convinced Japanese 
policymakers that a war was necessary.80 This case underscores the point that if one party 
has accepted that war is unavoidable, and even desirable, coercive diplomacy is not likely 
to work. It also illustrates the varied methods for signaling such as verbal warnings, and 
Allied military conferences, both secret and public. In the planning stages of the oil 
embargo, President Roosevelt’s belief was that such sanctions merely posed bureaucratic 
hurdles (in the form of license requirements from the Treasury department) to the sale of 
oil to Japan. This was ostensibly meant to provide flexibility to the administration to deal 
with future changes in the situation – a useful requirement for coercive diplomacy.81 But it 
demonstrates that the two sides viewed the coercive policy as leading to different 
consequences.  
Recent research has also analyzed the objective of punitive punishment in coercive 
diplomacy through the limited use of force against the target, especially strategic 
bombing.82 Two recent examples that have been cited here are Operation Desert Fox 
(December 1998 U.S./U.K. bombing of Iraq) and Operation Allied Force (19989 NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia).83 In context of this dissertation and in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
U.S. attack on Taliban and  Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan can also be construed as 
having a punishment element. However, in order to increase chances of the target’s 
compliance with the demands, it is beneficial that the punishment objective be subsumed 
under actual demands of behavior change. If punitive punishment is the only publicized 
objective, it is likely to have the effect of increasing the target’s sense of victim-hood and 
hardly likely to ensure compliance in future.   
Frequently, coercers also have to maintain resolve and some rigidity in terms of 
objectives in order to demonstrate to an adversary (whether the same target or a different 
potential enemy) its determination. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy’s 
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emphasis was on showing determination and resolve, integral to successful coercive 
diplomacy. This was because any perceived sign of weakness, whether through a 
willingness to negotiate and bargain, would give the upper hand to Soviet Premier 
Khrushchev.  Since the missiles were already in Cuba, they would have provided 
Khrushchev with a strong bargaining chip if the U.S. preferred to work for a diplomatic 
situation initially.84  
Having said that, it was also clear to Kennedy that some concessions would have to 
be made, though after American resolve and determination had been demonstrated.85  One 
of the prominent objectives behind the bombing of North Vietnam in 1964-65 (apart from 
pushing back North Vietnamese forces) was to demonstrate resolve and determination in 
the face of the Communist expansion, as well as to lay the groundwork for the eventual 
peace talks between the North and South.86 Similarly, U.S. resolve in acting against Al 
Qaeda and its associated entities in Afghanistan and elsewhere was conditioned by the 
need to demonstrate willingness and capacity to combat terror to groups around the globe. 
Thus, varying degrees of objectives and demands have been put to the target in diverse 
cases. In some, there was a degree of willingness on the part of the coercer to moderate 
and/or modify objectives. But as the next section shows, the issue of objectives becomes 
paramount when Type C or regime change CD is in the fray.  
Type C Coercive Diplomacy and Reassurances  
A recurring theme through this dissertation is the application (or the perception of 
application) of Type C (regime change) coercive diplomacy. This is the most difficult  of 
all CD variants because it automatically raises the target regime’s stakes in the crisis to the 
highest level, leading to an unfavorable asymmetry of motivation for the coercer. Despite 
this limitation, such a policy has been applied frequently by coercer states.  
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A prominent failure of Type C CD was the Reagan administration’s attempt to 
dislodge the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s. This objective failed for several 
reasons that are salient in other instances also. There was very little international support 
for Washington’s goal, including in relevant international bodies, such as the UN and the 
Organization of American States.87 The asymmetry of interests against the Reagan 
administration was further compounded by the lack of domestic support for such an 
endeavor within Washington.88 Furthermore, the goal of democracy promotion in 
Nicaragua through Type C coercion, which by itself raises the magnitude of objectives, 
was worsened by the fact that the chosen U.S. proxy, the Contras, were themselves 
significantly anti-democratic.89  
This analysis also highlights an important aspect of successful coercion – the 
concept of reassurances to the target. According to Schelling, “any coercive threat requires 
corresponding assurances,” which have to be credible from the target’s perspective.90 
While reassurances have been analyzed from the perspective of compellence and 
deterrence, they are all the more important for coercive diplomacy, given CD’s emphasis 
on carrots/concessions. Assurances have to be explicit and it is not enough to imply 
rewards in the event of compliance. It is therefore necessary to dispel the ‘perceived 
irrationality of trust’91 which prevents states from cooperating.  
A key essence of reassurances is that targets of coercion are frequently driven by 
insecurity which leads them to brinkmanship as well as resistance to coercive threats.92 
Reassurance policies base the root of “hostility not in an adversary’s search for opportunity 
but in an adversary’s needs and weaknesses.”93 The most direct source of such insecurity 
is fear that their (the target’s) regime is under threat. Therefore, if the coercer is not 
actually pursuing Type C coercive diplomacy, the role of clear, unambiguous reassurances 
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are essential to conveying to the target that its regime is not under threat. This lessens the 
target’s stakes in the confrontation by tilting the asymmetry of interests away from it, and 
making it (the target) relatively more amenable to compromise or concession. 
Unambiguous reassurances are crucial to dispelling any perception gaps between the target 
and the coercer. Such perception gaps can lead to both underestimation as well as 
overestimation of threats.94
Non-state actors 
While non-state actors, especially terrorist groups in their latest avatar have been major 
sources of security threats for decades (e.g., IRA, PLO), it is only in recent years that they 
have begun to dominate the security calculations of policymakers and governments. For 
countries such as the U.S., nuclear deterrence has traditionally been a major mechanism for 
warding off threats from adversaries, especially state actors. However, the effectiveness of 
deterrence against non-state actors has been debated, given that entities such as terror 
groups do not maintain permanent bases that could be threatened with unacceptable 
retaliation. This was recognized by President Bush in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy.95 However, it is unclear how coercive threats (behavior change) strategies would 
work either. Nevertheless, states have applied coercive military strategies against terror 
groups (the U.S. against Al Qaeda/Taliban in 2001, Israel against Hezbollah, summer 
2006). 
According to one opinion, terrorism itself is a coercive strategy directed against 
populations and states.96 Some experts claimed that Spain’s withdrawal of its troops from 
Iraq in the aftermath of the March 2004 Madrid bombings, was such a capitulation to 
Islamic terror groups.97 In fact, documents recovered from an Islamist web site soon after 
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the attack revealed that an Iraqi group had strategized that if Spain was hit by terrorist 
violence it would either force the right-wing Aznar government to withdraw or bring about 
a loss in the parliamentary elections to the opposition Socialists who would then force the 
withdrawal of troops.98 In the event, the latter happened. This shows that non-state actors 
are no longer mere targets of coercion; they can be the coercers also. This particular 
example also shows that terror groups can think strategically in terms of effecting changes 
in the target state’s governing structure – Type C coercion.  
In order to fight back these coercive and punitive effects of terrorist violence, states 
have to deploy some strategy as a response.  These responses can either be a military attack 
or an attempt at coercion. In general, scholars have argued that it is difficult to coerce non-
state actors because “manipulating the target’s incentives short of brute force would appear 
to be difficult.”99 Successful coercion of a non-state actor can only take place if the target 
is convinced that the coercer’s motivation and interest in the matter is more than that of the 
target.100 But this is difficult to achieve against ideologically driven terror groups that 
cannot be deterred. However, it becomes easier to coerce terrorist outfits when they have a 
well established link with a state sponsor.101 In the post 9/11 world though, this scenario is 
less likely as state sponsorship is much less obvious now than it was in the two decades 
before 2001.   
Additionally, in trying to coerce terrorist groups, it is also difficult to assess their 
exact identities, in terms of motivations and hierarchy of preferences, and this impacts on 
the correct analysis of asymmetry of interests between the two sides.102 In analyzing a non-
state target, governments also risk framing the enemy through stereotypes of fanaticism 
and irrationality, which is especially relevant when the crisis involves heinous incidents of 
slaughter and terror (such as 9/11).103  
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Third parties and coercive diplomacy 
Third parties have played a major role in coercive diplomacy, depending on the global 
strategic environment (such as Cold War considerations, and terrorism), as well as the 
relative power potential of the protagonists in influencing third party influence. The 
importance of regional players, acting to either strengthen coercive diplomacy or weaken 
it, has been demonstrated in several cases. The logic here is that these third parties (apart 
from the coercer and the target), in order to further their own specific objectives, can either 
assist the coercer in strengthening pressure on the target, or they can weaken the coercer’s 
pressure by overtly or tacitly assisting the target in its resistance.  The theory of coercive 
diplomacy takes into account such elements by considering whether the coercer has 
international support and if the global strategic environment favors pressure on the target. 
A more direct conceptual approach would be to examine whether such third parties 
play the role of ‘spoilers’ in the coercive process. One argument of contemporary 
relevance is that multiple actors on either side of the coercive diplomacy equation 
compound the problem of effective application.104 This is increasingly important because 
in any coercive equation, apart from the coercer and the target, other actors (state and non-
state) are inextricably involved. This happens because (a) the type of provocation is such 
(e.g., terrorism, nuclear proliferation) that it is a regional, if not a global crisis; (b) these 
actors (regional powers, terror groups, disgruntled elements in political, military 
establishments) see successful coercion or the implementation of the coercer’s threats as a 
danger to their own position or to the stability of the region as a whole. 
In the theory of coercive diplomacy, spoilers come under the rubric of factors such 
as global strategic environment, and international support for the coercer. In its original 
context, spoilers referred to actors (individuals and groups) who concluded that a peace 
process in a particular strife-torn region threatened their interests and power, and therefore 
they sought to undermine negotiations and accord implementation, mainly through 
violence.105 In fact, coercive diplomacy has been used against spoilers who hindered 
                                                 
104 Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know,’ pg. 369. 
105 Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,’ International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 
1997, pg. 5. 
  25
implementation of peace process, the main example being air-strikes by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) against the Serbian leadership in 1995.106  
Within coercive diplomacy, spoilers can be defined as third parties that hinder the 
coercer’s pressure on the target, by directly or indirectly interfering in the process. Recent 
cases have shown that the U.S. has resorted to limited threats against such third parties to 
ensure their compliance in a coercive process. One recent case was the reported threats 
made by then U.S. Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Pakistani President Gen. Pervez 
Musharraf in September 2001 to get Pakistan’s cooperation in the campaign against the 
Taliban.107 In a separate case, Washington made threats of economic retaliation against 
countries that were dithering in their support for pro-U.S. UN resolutions on Iraq prior to 
the invasion in March 2003.108  
Cases of coercive diplomacy in the Cold War period demonstrated the importance 
of third parties, which could act as ‘spoilers’ or could in fact, be provoked into a larger 
struggle. The Laos case was a good example of such a possibility, where U.S. strategies 
were limited by a third party’s potential to act as a spoiler. U.S. reluctance to apply 
military force was partly to avoid a standoff with the Soviet Union.109 Further, within the 
Communist bloc itself, the ensuing rivalry between China and USSR made it harder for the 
latter to encourage a negotiated settlement to Laos.110 Thus, broader objectives of third 
parties hindered peaceful negotiations and highlighted the problem of applying coercion 
against a coalition of opponents. The rivalry between China and the Soviet Union was 
played out in another case of coercive diplomacy – by China against Vietnam in 1979. 
China’s coercive strategy was tempered by the need to avoid a confrontation with the 
Soviet Union which had just concluded a mutual defense treaty with Vietnam.111  
But for Washington, managing the diverse objectives of its own coalition presented 
a further constraint. This persuaded the U.S. to apply coercive diplomacy on its own 
                                                 
106 Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,’ pg. 13. 
107 ‘Bush ‘taken aback’ about alleged threat to Pakistan,’ CNN, September 22, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/22/bush.musharraf/   
108 Martin Bright, Ed Vulliamy, and Peter Beaumont, ‘Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war,’  
The Observer, March 2, 2003. 
109 David K. Hall, ‘The Laos Crisis of 1961-62: Coercive Diplomacy for Minimal Objectives,’ pg. 96. 
110 Ibid, pg. 98. 
111 James Mulvenon, ‘The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War.’ 
  26
Laotian ally – the faction led by General Phoumi Nosavan to persuade it to accept the 
terms of the settlement. This was done by withholding valuable financial aid and 
withdrawal of special forces troops operating with the Royal Laos Army from forward 
positions. This underscores two points. First, coercive diplomacy can be applied on an ally 
to force a settlement. Second, coercive tactics also include withholding of cooperation and 
aid in any form, military, financial, or political.  
As the above example shows, spoilers can also arise from within the coercer’s 
alliance. Another instance was the coercion of North Vietnam in 1964-65, which 
demonstrated that spoiler problems can also result from the lack of allied capacity (or 
willingness, for that matter) to adequately complement the primary coercer’s military 
threats. Due to the instability of the South Vietnamese regime, it was not in a position to 
effectively deal with North Vietnamese-Viet Cong counterattack in response to increased 
military coercion by the U.S.112
While the coercer has to take into account disruptions by possible spoilers, it is also 
possible to follow a proactive strategy here by manipulating the interests of spoilers in the 
target’s camp. In the North Vietnam case, President Johnson attempted to exploit rifts 
within the Communist bloc as a complement to coercing Hanoi. U.S. officials were aware 
that the Soviet Union was wary of increased Chinese involvement in Vietnam if North 
Vietnam-Viet Cong emerged victorious in the South, which would then lead to 
Washington intervening more strongly.113 Possible Chinese intervention was one of the 
reasons why policymakers in Washington did not make any explicit demands of the North 
Vietnamese. The air campaign, which began in full in March 1965, was constrained by the 
desire to avoid widening the conflict.  
In its attempt to coerce Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. 
anticipated significant spoiler problems stemming from the complicated geopolitics of the 
Middle East. Prominent among these was the Israeli-Palestinian dispute which threatened 
to derail the anti-Iraq coalition that had been set up to pressurize Saddam into withdrawing 
from Kuwait. In states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the prospects of internal upheaval 
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against the ruling regimes (that sided with the U.S.) was a major concern.114 Indeed, 
Saddam tried to disrupt the allied coalition by launching missiles at Israel during the 
conflict, in anticipation that reprisals from Israel would break up the largely Arab regional 
coalition. However, one argument holds that Hussein assumed significant levels of support 
from among the Arab states,115 implying that there was an expectation that they would 
play spoilers to U.S. coercive policy. Thus, for a target state, a key element of its counter-
strategy is reliance on third parties, and this can then help shape its response to the coercer.    
Importance of internal factors 
Apart from the role of internal factors as spoilers, domestic political considerations and 
abilities also impact on coercive dynamics. Internal political factors guided the formulation 
of the Johnson administration’s objectives in the bombing of North Vietnam in the initial 
stages of the conflict there in 1964-65. At the time, President Johnson was engaged in 
bringing about the landmark ‘Great Society’ legislation in Congress and needed to avoid 
political polarization.116 This polarization could have manifested in two opposing 
viewpoints – the first favoring massive, punitive attacks on North Vietnam, and the 
second, favoring a withdrawal from the conflict there.117 An interesting point here is that 
domestic politics infused caution into the coercive pressures on Hanoi. This is a contrast to 
the normal impact of domestic political factors, which frequently serve to increase the 
government’s coercion on external parties in an attempt to gain the patriotic high 
ground.118
The crucial role of domestic entities and factors was further stressed in the Pearl 
Harbor case. Ambiguous interpretations by U.S. internal bureaucracies of the extent of 
American coercive policy against Japan forced President Roosevelt to take an inflexible 
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position.119 This then led to hard-line views in Tokyo that U.S. policy would lead to a 
complete oil embargo against Japan, leading to its downfall.120 The previously mentioned 
case of Type C CD against Nicaragua was also beset with domestic problems, which in 
fact led to the illegal arming of the Contra rebels. Thus, the need to maintain a strong 
domestic leadership as well as internal political and bureaucratic process can have 
considerable impact on coercive diplomacy. 
Themes of this dissertation 
This brief review of existing research on coercive diplomacy gives rise to several issues 
that this dissertation’s cases try to illuminate. First, this review suggests that decision-
makers in different instances gave varying degrees of importance to different components 
of coercive diplomacy. For example, in the Laos case, President Kennedy’s emphasis was 
on limiting the objectives to avoid a quagmire from which it would be difficult for the U.S. 
to extricate itself. On the other hand, in the Cuban missile crisis, the overriding objective 
was to demonstrate U.S. resolve to the Soviet Union to prevent the latter from gaining a 
valuable bargaining chip to exploit in other Cold War flashpoints, such as Berlin. Thus, a 
government has to decide which objectives are flexible and which are not. A key issue then 
is to enquire how states can manipulate and moderate their objectives and demands to 
either secure capitulation by the target or to secure a face-saving way out. 
Second, a commonality between past cases and contemporary episodes is the 
influence of non-state actors. In previous cases, especially those set in the 1960s and 
1970s, non-state actors were mainly insurgent groups. Such elements must be 
distinguished from terrorist outfits because of the differences in their objectives and the 
fact that several terror groups do not have as clear a ‘return address’ as several ‘insurgent 
groups’ might have. Nevertheless, in some instances, states do apply coercion by targeting 
other states that have some degree of connection to terrorist groups. Thus, the threat to 
inflict pain on a state can be used by a coercer to try and secure compliance by a terror 
group. 
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Third, increasingly, coercive situations involve weapons of mass destruction as the 
central security threat. The main such case from the Cold War period was the Cuban 
missile crisis, and this study extends this line of research by studying one case (South 
Asia), where nuclear weapons were involved, and two others where the potential threat of 
nuclear weapon acquisition was the main focus (North Korea, Iraq).  
A fourth theme is to investigate how perceptions of Type C coercive diplomacy can 
play a role in ensuring a target’s resistance. Perceptions on both sides of the equation help 
frame the respective objectives and positions and are therefore crucial to understanding the 
coercive process in a particular case study. This element is particularly salient when 
cultural and religious mores influence decision-making. 
It is possible that due to communication and perception gaps, the coercer and the 
target develop contrasting opinions on the variant of coercive diplomacy that is being 
applied. Thus, while the coercer’s demands might suggest Type B CD (behavior change), 
the consequences of such a behavior change by the target might also lead to regime 
change. It is also possible that the coercer might not be aware of such an eventuality, and 
indeed might have to calculate whether Type C CD is in its best interests or not. If Type C 
CD is not in the coercer’s best interests, it implies that some degree of moderation of Type 
B demands would be required to reassure the target that regime change is not an objective. 
Relatedly, a key issue is the role of reassurances in tilting the asymmetry of interests away 
from the target, especially if Type C CD is suspected. 
Finally, it would also be useful to examine more directly how non-state actors, and 
especially spoilers,  impact on coercive diplomacy. While the role of third parties has been 
studied in previous cases, it is crucial to distinguish between the various roles they play, or 
are perceived to play. Themes such as this and others appear throughout the case studies 
and help illuminate the salient points in each episode. 
METHODOLOGY: VARIABLES 
At this juncture, a crucial point regarding the selection of variables needs to be made. The 
five variables used in this dissertation are derived from the original set of contextual 
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variables and variables favoring success in coercive diplomacy as envisaged by Alexander 
George’s original model. Throughout the analysis of the case studies, George’s original 
variables will be referred to for analytical and explanatory purposes. The original set of 
variables are listed in Table 2 at the end of this chapter.  
 
Dependent Variable (DV): Success/Failure of Coercive Diplomacy 
Independent Variable (IV): The independent variables consist of a mix of variables 
derived from the model of coercive diplomacy: 
1. Objectives/Demands  
The objectives variable impacts on the success/failure of coercive diplomacy in three ways. 
First is through the clarity of demands and threats conveyed; second, through the 
magnitude and multiplicity of objectives; the third is through the type of provocation that 
leads to these demands. 
Important components of effective demands are deadlines, timing, and a sense of 
urgency, conditions that are necessary, and in the absence of which the opponent does not 
take threats seriously. If such deadlines are conveyed it also puts pressure on the coercer to 
maintain credibility of its threats. An important process to be considered here is of 
communications and signaling of objectives/threats to the adversary and vice versa.  
This dissertation also takes into account objectives that might not have been 
explicitly specified in the demands of the coercer. ‘Implicit’ objectives can be deciphered 
through public statements of decision-makers, both prior to and during the coercive 
episode. An additional method of isolating such objectives would be to examine changes 
that might have taken place in the coercing state’s relations with the outside world that 
might have contributed to its explicit objectives. 
Hierarchy of multiple objectives: In some cases the coercer has multiple objectives. The 
point here is that not all objectives are equally important. Furthermore, the coercer’s 
objectives can change over time. This was displayed in the Laos case, where Washington 
systematically reduced its objectives, in order to end the conflict. In modifying objectives, 
the role of ‘carrots’ is crucial. It can persuade the target state to consider lesser demands 
more favorably. It is thus important to consider the effect of multiple objectives on the 
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application of coercive diplomacy. In cases with multiple objectives, any modifications 
will be specified at each stage.  
Questions: 
• What was the magnitude of objectives and how did this impact on the asymmetry 
of motivation/interests in coercive diplomacy? 
• Did the objectives show any difference in the way the two sides viewed the 
demands as representing different variants of coercive diplomacy (Types A, B, or 
C)? In other words, did the coercive policy reflect different coercive diplomacy 
consequences for the two protagonists? 
• Did the coercer modify/moderate the objectives? 
• Was there any clarity of settlement conditions? 
Type of Provocation: The provocation that leads a state to apply coercive diplomacy is an 
important tool in understanding this strategy. My dissertation covers cases involving a 
range of provocations, from nuclear acquisition to occupation of foreign territory. An 
activity by the target state that is unambiguously a crime and violation of international 
norms makes it easier for the responding/coercer state to gain international support for its 
efforts. An important issue is thus how the coercer frames its case against the target state 
for the international community. Thus the importance of communication and signaling is 
not merely in context of the target state, but also with regard to the international 
community.   
2. Credibility of threats  
One way of measuring credibility of a threat is by enquiring whether the adversary backed 
down or countered with counter threats or deterrence postures. Credibility can be measured 
through an assessment of capabilities, not just in terms of absolute military strength, but 
through a combination of factors. These factors include past behavior in crisis situations, 
and whether this has introduced a certain kind of reputation that would impact on 
credibility of threats.  
Thus, part of credibility measurement requires us to enquire into the capabilities 
and objectives of the coercer and the adversary. This helps establish whether the coercer 
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actually has the military capacity to carry out its threats. A variant of this approach has 
been termed as the current calculus theory by one scholar, and it regards credibility as 
being dependent on the existing balance of power and a country’s interests.121 Balance of 
power is understood to mean the relative military strength of each side and its allies. 
Current calculus also includes each side’s strategic interests, because that impact on its 
military strength.  
Another approach is the past actions theory, which essentially states that a country 
would examine an adversary’s past behavior to gauge its intentions and capabilities.122 
Such an analysis then provides useful information on the credibility of the adversary’s 
threats. For the purpose of this dissertation, this variable provides a useful reference point 
for the two sides of the coercive equation. In each case under examination, a previous 
episode of conflict, or coercive diplomacy helps to frame their perception of the other side. 
Past actions theory also covers perceptions of the adversary’s overall strategic outlook 
including its behavior against similar adversaries. For example, after the September 11, 
2001 attacks and the global war on terror, the U.S. took recourse to preventive war and 
developed a pre-emptive strategy while assisting other countries in their pursuit of terrorist 
networks. Thus it would be logical for a future adversary to assume that Washington’s 
‘past actions’ suggest a higher propensity to use force unless, of course, the previous use of 
force has been unsuccessful and unpopular.  
In terms of the model, credibility of threats is further affected by the 
determination/resolve of either party, which in turn, is influenced by the nature of the 
provocation and the ensuing demands and objectives. Credible threats and objectives also 
require adequate information about perpetrators of the provocation. In the absence of such 
information, it is unclear who the target would be if the threats have to be carried out.  
Questions: 
• Did the coercer enjoy overwhelming military advantage over the target? 
• Are weapons of mass destruction involved? Did conditions of nuclear deterrence 
exist between the two sides? 
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• Does the coercer have military commitments elsewhere? If yes, would it be 
possible for it to intervene in this specific case? 
3. Internal Factors 
This variable covers domestic institutional factors and public opinion in both coercer and 
target state. Domestic factors provide another possible reason a state might be persuaded to 
make coercive threats or resist such threats from an opponent. Recent research has linked 
domestic factors to flexibility in making coercive threats.123 According to Schelling, 
flexibility can detract from the efficacy of coercive threats as it implies that the coercer is 
potentially open to other options apart from threatening force.124 Domestically, if a 
government’s accountability increases, and if it appears that failure internationally would 
lead to downfall at home, this would decrease the margin of flexibility, resulting in a more 
rigid position while coercing the target.125  
A different perspective, on the other hand, argues that the very nature of a 
democracy can enable threats to be more credible and effective, as they are perceived to be 
backed by strong domestic consensus.126 Through process-tracing, we can judge whether 
there is a strong causal mechanism between domestic issues and the success/failure of 
coercive diplomacy. This variable is divided into three sub-sections which cover the cases 
that have been selected in this dissertation: 
Public opinion: With the explosion of communications technology and increasing global 
awareness, the role of publics in influencing government policy has become a significant 
factor. This is especially so when coercive diplomacy involves at least some measure of 
democracy in at least one of the countries involved. Public opinion can also be a catalyst to 
other coercive policies, i.e., it could persuade a state to ratchet up coercive diplomacy 
against the target state.  
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Political competition: Political competition, defined as rivalry between political parties or 
factions in the ruling regime, can force either the coercer or the target state to be more 
aggressive. Political competition is relevant for both target and coercer. When there is 
competition for political space in the coercer state, the ruling regime has to appear more 
aggressive in acting against the target. If the regime has a right-of-center ideology (as was 
the case in India during Operation Parakram), the chances of a hard-line response increase. 
Simultaneously, opposition groups also have to adopt a more aggressive stance, to narrow 
the gap with the ruling regime. 
Similarly, any concessions by the target state regime weakens its domestic 
credibility vis-à-vis other political and military factions. This hypothesis is applicable in 
regimes that are democratic as well as authoritarian. 
Governance Incapacity:  This issue is a particularly relevant one for the contemporary 
period. In some cases, a target state is incapable of conceding to coercive demands simply 
because it is unable to carry them out. The control of the target regime over its component 
factions, populations, territories might not be adequate enough for its decisions to be 
implemented, even if it gives in to the coercer’s demands. When the target is a failed state, 
coercive diplomacy is less likely to succeed for many reasons. First, there might not be a 
legitimate regime in place, on which coercive demands can be made. Second, as stated 
above, even if the regime wants to it might not be in a position to give in to the demands.  
Questions: 
• How did these internal factors impact on the respective positions of the parties in 
the coercive diplomacy equation? 
4. Perceptions of the adversary 
A prominent limitation of the abstract model of coercive diplomacy is the assumption of 
rationality in the opponent.127 The limitation is that in assuming a ‘rational’ opponent, the 
model assumes that “the adversary will be receptive to and will correctly evaluate 
information that is critical to the question of whether the costs and risks of not complying 
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will outweigh the gains to be expected from pursuing the course of action.”128 In this 
dissertation I deal with this issue through a variable that covers perceptions of the other 
side’s objectives and strategic culture. It might be easier to use the term ‘rationality’; 
however this term would denote that the other side is ‘irrational’ if its actions are not in 
tune with the expected response. In fact, within the confines of its culture and traditions, 
the target’s actions might be perfectly logical and ‘rational.’ Thus, one approach to 
studying coercive diplomacy involves examining an actor’s beliefs and its images of the 
opponent as a way of explaining its actions.129
It must also be noted that it is not just perceptions of the adversary that are crucial 
to coercive diplomacy. Any actor has certain perceptions of oneself and what one’s role in 
the world should be. Thus, in the words of the philosopher William James, “whenever two 
people meet, there are really six people present. There is each man as he sees himself, each 
man as the other sees him, and each man as he really is.” Therefore, for both coercer and 
the target, their self-perceptions of who they themselves are and their self-perceptions of 
their respective global and regional roles impact on how they frame their objectives 
(especially in the case of the coercer) and how they frame their positions and responses to 
coercion (in the case of the target). Perceptions can also be examined in terms of two sub-
variables, which are relevant to the present day system. 
Perceptions-Intentions and Capabilities: The first sub-section covers perceptions about 
intentions and capabilities of the enemy. This is an important variable, especially in cases 
such as the U.S.-North Korea interaction. Here, intentions of both sides are murky and not 
completely defined, which can then lessen the sense of urgency required for coercive 
diplomacy. 
Cultural perceptions: Cultural attitudes can frequently inform a regime’s intentions and 
objectives. A target state’s cultural attitudes can explain differences between a coercer’s 
perceptions of how the target will react and failure of coercive diplomacy.  
Questions:  
• How did perceptions impact on coercive diplomacy? 
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• Did the process of coercive diplomacy proceed in accordance with these 
perceptions? 
• Did the coercer (and target) take into account cultural characteristics of each other ? 
5. International Strategic Environment 
Even though most cases of coercion involve two main parties, there are always other 
concerned actors, including neighboring states, and non-state groups, who have varying 
degrees of interest and influence in the coercive activity. In the post Cold War period, for 
several reasons, other parties are increasingly involved in coercive interactions. First, the 
number and type of actors in the international security and political system have increased, 
with the involvement of non-state groups such as terrorist/insurgent outfits, and the rise of 
ethnic and religious violence. Second, the kind of international security issues that lead to 
such confrontations involve problems that go beyond national and regional boundaries.  
This naturally implies that a larger pool of state and non-state actors would have an 
interest in the dispute that leads to coercive diplomacy. Thus both the coercer and the 
target state would have to take into account the objectives and pressures from other 
concerned actors. On the flip side, it is also possible that in the face of a common threat, 
groups of states would be more inclined to band together to coerce a target. Thus, 
increasingly, the international strategic environment plays a role in the success or failure of 
coercive diplomacy.  
Questions:  
• How does confrontation impact on the interests of third parties? 
• Does the point of dispute impact on other security issues in the region? 
• How does the image of war affect third parties in the region? Do the opposing sides 
possess weapons of mass destruction? 
 
The variables outlined in this section are the basis for analysis in each case study. 
However, it is not necessary that in each chapter they are located in the same order. The 
variations are made for purposes of convenience, in terms of the time-line of events as well 
as for effective analytical flow.  
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METHODOLOGY: CASE SELECTION CRITERIA  
The criterion for case selection is manifold. The most basic condition is that each case 
must be an episode of coercive diplomacy, that took place after September 11, 2001. In 
each case, threats and demands must have been made by one state on another, and any 
force used should have been limited in nature. The four cases occupy a middle ground 
between a sample and the universe of cases. An important issue is that of generalization. 
The cases are varied geographically and cover a wide range of coercers’ objectives. 
The cases selected all involve states, though non-state actors do have important 
roles to play in the conflict situations. This facilitates easier applicability of coercive 
diplomacy as an analytical tool in each instance. It also means that the level of analysis 
remains at the state level, and narrows the number of cases. One prominent limitation of 
case studies is the tradeoff between detailed studies of a few cases and achieving broad 
generalization through a large number of cases.130 This dissertation attempts to bridge this 
divide by examining most (if not all) cases of coercive diplomacy after 9/11 under the 
parameters that I have prescribed.  
In the cases selected, there were varying CD results, but it is not clear which IVs 
were responsible for the individual results. Thus there was variation in both, the DV and 
the IV. Comparative research designs do not lead to law-like theories, but rather, to 
‘contingent generalizations.’ The same holds for this dissertation where an analysis of past 
cases of coercive diplomacy will lead to conditional generalizations on how effectively 
coercive diplomacy as a concept can explain these case studies.  
Case studies can help highlight new issues related to the theory being studied and 
also either reiterate or cast doubt on components of the theory. Case studies contribute to 
theory building through the development of generalized theories. Moreover, they provide 
‘historical explanations of particular cases, that is, explanation of a sequence of events that 
produce a particular historical outcome in which key steps in the sequence are explained 
with reference to theories or causal mechanisms.’131  In this sense, this CD study attempts 
                                                 
130 Andrew Bennett, ‘Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages,’ in Detlef F. Sprinz 
& Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, Models, Numbers and Cases, (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 
2004), pg. 44. 
131 Ibid, pg. 21. 
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to explain certain historical phenomena through testing old hypotheses, as well as 
considering new ones. Case studies use theoretical variables to ‘show that in the particular 
historical circumstances of the case, the outcome was to be expected.’132  
This dissertation uses the structured focused comparison method and process 
tracing within cases to generate relevant data to specify causal mechanisms. The 
structured, focused questions have been specified in the variables section earlier.  
Benchmarks 
This section establishes parameters for the case studies, some of which have been 
mentioned in the preceding section.  
1. Target – State/Non-State actors: The main target has to be a state actor, which may or 
may not be in partnership with a non-state actor (such as a militant group). Virtually all 
previous case study research on coercive diplomacy has involved a state as the target. This 
narrows down the range of cases available, without necessarily compromising on the 
contemporary relevance of the cases. This dissertation, therefore, considers only those 
cases where a state is the main target, but which might be associated with a non-state group 
such as a terrorist outfit. The primary focus of coercion, however, has to be the state entity. 
The two cases chosen which involve non-state actors – coercive diplomacy in 
South Asia (Jaish-e-Mohammed terror group allegedly held responsible for the Parliament 
attack), and coercion on the Taliban (to give up Osama bin Laden) highlight the 
contemporary problems of dealing with terrorist networks. While direct state sponsorship 
of terrorist groups (as in the 1970s and 80s) is on the decline, this does not imply that states 
have no a role to play in fostering terrorist activities. First, with the phenomenon of weak 
and failed states, their territory provides bases for fledgling terror groups.133 Therefore, the 
role and culpability of states and their ruling regimes is important in examining the use of 
coercive tactics in dealing with terrorism.  Second, even though terrorist groups are typical 
non-state actors, some of them do have symbiotic relationships with states. States (e.g., 
Syria in the case of insurgents in Iraq) still use terrorist groups to put pressure on 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 Brynjar Lia, Globalization and the Future of Terrorism, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), pp. 65-66. 
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opponents by using such outfits as proxies while maintaining plausible deniability. In 
return, these groups are given logistical support (and sometimes more direct assistance) of 
various kinds. 
2. Coercer – State: This condition stipulates that the coercer has to be a state actor. With a 
state actor, it is easier to compare threats and their credibility. Having said that, it is true 
that non-state actors such as some terror groups have acquired a high level of credibility in 
terms of the threats that they make – an example could be the Madrid bombing of March 
2004, through which the responsible terror group was able to influence public opinion 
significantly, and subsequently the composition and policies of the next government in 
Spain.  
However, the main problem in allowing coercion by non-state parties is the 
difficulty in figuring out who is applying coercive tactics. In the case of the Madrid 
bombings in March 2004, it was clear that the perpetrators had at least ideological 
connections to the Al Qaeda network, but they were also closely linked, logistically, to 
criminal and drug groups based in North Africa (Morocco, to be precise), as well as 
overlapping networks of lower-level criminal groups within western Europe that had 
connections to terrorist outfits. Therefore, there was no clear sovereign entity that was 
communicating threats. Here, the argument has to be qualified by stating that the terrorist 
network did not clearly specify what its objectives were.  
3. Type of threat and objective: The objective of any coercer must be theoretically 
achievable by the use of threats alone. This would preclude occupation of the target state as 
the main objective. Regime change is covered by George’s model of coercive diplomacy as 
the type ‘C’ variant. This is obviously the most extreme version of this model. 
4. Communication of threat and objective: The coercer has to communicate clearly to 
the target state what the objectives behind the coercive moves are. Thus the target state has 
to be aware of what steps it has to take undertake to satisfy the coercer.  
5. Political-Military Strategy: Coercive diplomacy is essentially the combination of 
political-diplomatic moves with military strategy. A purely military strategy would not 
involve reliance on political and diplomatic moves to achieve the objectives. This 
dissertation covers cases that have the political-military component as the basis for 
coercive diplomacy. The coercer may also apply economic tools, such as sanctions, but 
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that is not the central focus of this study. The reasoning here is that in the post 9/11 period, 
focus on the military element of coercion has increased, though economic strategies retain 
their importance. Given the kind of issues that are the basis of the cases (nonproliferation, 
terrorism, insurgencies, regime change), the military element would seem more salient. 
6. Time period: A useful component of CD is the time allotted by the coercer to the target 
to concede to the demands. If there is a considerable period of time between the 
communication of threat and objective by the coercer, this would imply that the target 
theoretically has the opportunity to agree to the demands. This time period between 
communication and the full-scale use of military force would be coercive diplomacy.  
7. Archetype: The case study selection in this dissertation is also based on an 
archetype/exemplar strategy. Each case is an example of a particular aspect of the 
international system that is pertinent to the practice of contemporary coercive diplomacy. 
These archetypes center mainly around the type of provocation (terrorism, WMD 
proliferation), which leads to coercive activity by the coercer state. 
CASES 
1. Operation Parakram: Indian pressure on Pakistan 2001-2002 
Archetype: CD between non-U.S. nuclear powers  
In the South Asian case, the two main players were India and Pakistan – two non-U.S., 
nuclear powers. Most case studies of coercive diplomacy have involved the U.S. as the 
coercive nuclear power. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons (especially, India and 
Pakistan) and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by states such as North Korea 
and Iran suggest that cases of coercion between nuclear powers might increase in the 
future. Thus the South Asian case can be generalized to other regions, such as Northeast 
Asia and the Middle East. 
In this case, examining the role of objectives is crucial. Ostensibly, New Delhi’s 
objectives were to force Pakistan to put an end to cross border terrorism and the infiltration 
of militants, besides the surrender of certain militant leaders responsible for the attack on 
the Parliament on December 13, 2001. However, an implicit but nevertheless crucial 
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objective was also to force the United States and the international community to apply 
pressure on Pakistan to desist from sponsoring violent activities in Pakistan.  
For several reasons, the U.S. was deeply involved in this episode – the threat of 
nuclear confrontation as well as the distraction caused to the campaign against the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. A useful method of understanding this case is 
through the concept of pivotal deterrence. “Pivotal deterrence involves the manipulation of 
threats and promises in order to prevent war. Like other forms of deterrence, it tries to 
prevent war by making potential belligerents fear the costs, by confronting them with risks 
they do not want to run… The deterrer must hold a ‘pivotal’ position between the 
adversaries, which means that it can more easily align with either side than they can align 
with each other and that it can significantly influence who will win in a war between 
them.”134 Arguably, the U.S. played the role of the ‘pivot’ here in forcing the two 
subcontinental neighbors to step back from the brink of war. 
 
4. U.S. pressure on the Taliban 2001  
Archetype: Terrorism, Coercive diplomacy under conditions of governance incapacity in 
the target state, i.e., CD against a failed state.  
In this particular case, the U.S. sought the surrender of Osama bin laden and elements of 
Al Qaeda. The Taliban regime refused to accede to this demand, following which the U.S. 
launched its offensive against the Taliban. This instance of coercive diplomacy highlights 
the possible importance of perceptions of the adversary and the ‘image’ created, as 
explanatory variables. The Taliban is considered a state actor as it was in control of most 
of the country and was recognized as the legitimate government by several countries. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the Taliban leadership was in a position to give up bin 
Laden even if it conceded to U.S. demands. 
This case is also examined in context of the previous interaction between the U.S. 
and the Taliban regime regarding the surrender of Osama bin Laden. Representatives from 
the U.S. government and the Taliban discussed this in confidential meetings in 1998, 
                                                 
134 Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), pg. 5. 
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following the embassy bombings.135 But eventually, the Taliban refused to surrender bin 
Laden on grounds that such a move would not be tolerated by the Afghan people, 
especially since he had fought alongside the Mujahideen against the Soviets.  
 
3. U.S. pressure on Iraq, 2002-2003 
Archetype: Coercive diplomacy for regime change, counter-proliferation.   
In this case, the U.S. attempted Type C coercive diplomacy, i.e., seeking the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein. An analysis of U.S. pressure on Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom is 
complicated by the multiplicity of competing objectives – connections to 9/11, WMD links 
and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. 
Recent research raises questions over whether or not this case can be classified as 
an instance of coercive diplomacy. One opinion is that after December 1998, the U.S. 
government’s expressed policy towards Iraq was not to coerce it but to bring about regime 
change.136 The argument is that while regime change is accommodated under the model of 
coercive diplomacy (as the Type C variant), it doesn’t refer to situations where regime 
change “would almost certainly be suicidal for the current leadership.”137  However, in  
any instance where the target regime (or ruler) concedes to Type C coercion it would 
probably be political suicide for the regime.  
Further, reports have revealed that Hussein was open to the idea of exile, and had 
agreed to the plan in principle at an emergency meeting of the Arab League in Egypt just 
days before the invasion began.138 Thus, even if it was political suicide, concession by 
Saddam was not an unrealistic option. But the potential deal did not come about for two 
main reasons. First, the Iraqi dictator issued certain conditions, including the Arab 
League’s endorsement for the deal. It is unclear what the conditions were and how they 
impacted on the proposal Second, the deal was brokered by the president of the United 
                                                 
135 ‘U.S., Taliban bargained over bin Laden, documents show,’ CNN, August 19, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/08/19/taliban.documents/index.html  
136 Jon B. Alterman, ‘Coercive Diplomacy against Iraq, 1990-98,’ in Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin (ed.) 
The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2003), pg. 277. 
137 Ibid. 
138 ‘UAE official: Hussein was open to exile,’ CNN, November 2, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/11/02/saddam.exile/  
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Arab Emirates, and this was opposed by prominent members of the Arab League, who felt 
that he (the UAE President) was not influential enough, which then lead to the deal being 
canceled.139
The question to be asked here is why coercive diplomacy against Iraq failed, 
despite the highly credible military buildup and realistic threats by the U.S.? There are 
several interpretations of this issue. First, the U.S. was not really interested in coercive 
diplomacy, but only in preventive war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. But even if this were 
so, there was a considerable period prior to the invasion in March 2003 during which 
Washington presented its case to the international coalition – a clear sign of coercive 
attempt. And in this period, if Saddam had accepted all demands (including the implicit 
regime change demand) this would have undercut Washington’s case for a military attack. 
U.S. policies and statements in the pre-March 2003 time frame thus can be interpreted as 
declaratory and operational signals as part of coercive diplomacy.140  
The key issue here is whether the concept of preventive war is incompatible with 
coercive diplomacy. Preventive war, according to the Pentagon, is “a war initiated in the 
belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would 
involve great risk.”141 Thus, preventive war, like any military action, would have certain 
objectives. If these objectives are achieved through the target backing down, the need for 
preventive war diminishes. The period before a war begins includes a massive buildup of 
military forces, alliance formation, as well as presenting a case for military action to the 
international community. These, by their very nature, are coercive measures, and send an 
explicit signal to the adversary that the coercer is prepared for war. Thus coercive 
diplomacy and preventive war can be seen as being part of a continuum of the use of 
military force. In the first Gulf war also, as military build up around Iraq increased, by 
October 1990 policymakers in Washington (including the President, Defense Secretary, 
and National Security Adviser) were reportedly of the view that retaining the offensive 
                                                 
139 Ibid. 
140 Corall Bell, ‘Iraq, alliances, and crisis management,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, 
No. 2, pp. 224-226. 
141 Jeffrey Record, ‘The Bush Doctrine and War With Iraq,’ Parameters, Spring 2003, pg. 7. 
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option for a preventive war was necessary, while at the same time, all coercive measures 
were being undertaken.142
Thus, if the coercer is serious about going to war and is indeed making all military 
and diplomatic preparations to do so, it should thus send an unequivocal signal to the target 
of the seriousness of the coercer’s threat. Such military preparations should act as a 
credible threat to the target and persuade it to consider conceding to the demands. In this 
case, in the months preceding March 2003, Washington’s ample military preparations, 
public statements by senior officials, as well as the administration’s diplomatic campaign 
would have made its threats as credible as they can be.   
Furthermore, at various points in the run up to the 2003 invasion, senior officials 
hinted that the ultimate objective need not necessarily be war. This was especially so when 
complete denuclearization of Iraq was the main demand. According to then White House 
spokesman, Ari Fleischer, “… arms inspectors in Iraq are a means to an end, and the end is 
knowledge that Iraq has lived up to its promises that it made to end the Gulf War, that it 
has in fact disarmed, that it does not possess weapons of mass destruction.”143
As stated, one view regarding this episode is that Washington had already decided 
on war, and the months before that were spent presenting its case to the international 
community as well as making military preparations for the invasion. This can be viewed as 
an example of a ‘justification of hostility’ crisis, in which “the leaders in the initiating 
nation make a decision for war before the crisis commences.”144 But coercive diplomacy is 
also closely related to crisis management. Crisis management ensures that coercive 
diplomacy doesn’t escalate into a full-fledged war.  
 
4. North Korean coercion of U.S. and regional actors 
Archetype: U.S. nuclear coercive diplomacy; reverse coercive diplomacy by the target.  
                                                 
142 Richard Herrmann, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Crisis over Kuwait,’ in Alexander L. George & William 
E. Simons (ed.) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pg. 243; See also, Bob Woodward, The Commanders, 
(New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1991), pp. 303-307. 
143 Dana Milibank, ‘No Conflict on Iraq Policy, Fleischer says,’ The Washington Post, September 3, 2002. 
144 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 
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In this case, I take the starting point as 2002, when the extent of Pyongyang’s program was 
first revealed. It precipitated the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework deal under which 
North Korea had agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for energy and financial 
concessions. Other developments included the expulsion of nuclear inspectors as well as 
North Korea’s decision to walk out of the NPT. In February 2005, it has officially claimed 
to have acquired a nuclear arsenal, while in October 2006, it tested a nuclear device. 
On the part of the U.S., its coercive measures have included the further isolation of 
North Korea, repeated calls by influential policymakers advocating regime change. This 
case study is also interesting because it presents an example of reverse coercive diplomacy, 
from North Korea. In an attempt to extract further concessions from the United States and 
other concerned parties, Pyongyang has adopted a brinkmanship strategy, under which 
periodically it provides threatening indications of its missile or nuclear program. Since 
there is no unanimity on the extent of North Korea’s nuclear program, perceptions of its 
existence and signaling by the regime there is a crucial causal mechanism.  
This episode of two-way coercion is examined in light of the previous 
confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang in 1993-94 that resulted in the Agreed 
Framework agreement.145 When studying the U.S.-North Korea dyad, it is necessary to 
examine the U.S. deterrence mechanism operating on the peninsula against North Korean 
coercion, as it impacts on Washington’s own coercive tactics. Other variables such as 
objectives of regional powers as well as those of elements of the U.S. government (regime 
change, for example) have to be considered. In recent years, North Korea has also been 
accused of running lucrative criminal networks, especially those centered around 
counterfeit currency.  
Table 2: benchmarks 
 
Cases 
 
 
Benchmark 
South Asia 
Operation Parakram 
U.S. – Taliban   
Sept-Oct 2001 
North Korea - 
U.S. 2002-06 
U.S – Iraq  
2002-03 
                                                 
145 William M. Drennan, ‘Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?’ in Robert J. Art & 
Patrick M. Cronin (ed.) The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, pg. 158. 
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Coercer - 
State or non-state? 
State State State (s) State 
Target –  
State or non-state 
State State State State 
Political-Military 
Strategy involved 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objectives 
theoretically 
achievable by 
coercive diplomacy? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Communication of 
threat and objective 
done? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time period given in 
which the target 
could have 
conceded? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Archetype Terrorism/State-State 
coercion, nuclear 
deterrence 
Terrorism WMD coercion Regime change 
Counter-Proliferation 
 
Cases excluded 
1. Iran: One prominent case excluded is that of Iran. At the outset, the pressure on Iran to 
renounce its nuclear weapons program would seem like a fit case for coercive diplomacy. 
However, in this case, even though the U.S. had been forceful in its opposition to Iran’s 
nuclear program, it has refused to deal directly with Tehran. Instead, the European Union, 
led by Britain, France, and Germany, took the lead in negotiating with Iran. Thus there was 
no clear process of coercive diplomacy from the U.S. or any other party. Furthermore, 
there was no clear end to this episode as of 2006, which made a theoretical analysis 
difficult. If Iran renounced its nuclear weapons program and allows independent 
inspectors, in that case, it could be examined as a case of successful coercive diplomacy.  
 
2. Libya: Another possible case that could have been considered is Libya’s renunciation of 
its nuclear weapons program. After the Gaddafi regime agreed to give up this program in 
late 2003, Libya was touted as a precedent for U.S. coercive policies. Some commentators 
also contended that the invasion of Iraq helped coerce Libya; however this view fails to 
take into account that Tripoli had been involved in discussions over its pariah status for 
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many years. Since the days of the Reagan administration, Libya had been trying to end 
economic sanctions that had been imposed on it for terrorism-related activities. Thus even 
if coercive diplomacy had been in effect, it had been in place for more than a decade. This 
study concentrates mainly on cases after September 2001.  
 
3. Syria: A third possible case was Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in February 2005 
after the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq al-Hariri. It was tempting to see 
this case as an example of successful coercive diplomacy. But on several counts it did not 
fit the requirements of this dissertation. First, there was no clear line of coercive activity, 
whether by the U.S., or the Lebanese government, or any concerned actor. There was 
however, ample evidence, of how public opinion in Lebanon helped influence Damascus’ 
decision to get out of Lebanon. But this does not suggest a clear state actor behind the 
coercive activity. Even though the U.S. was strident in its condemnation of Damascus over 
the assassination as well as Syria’s role in providing logistical support (at the very least) 
for insurgents in Iraq, there was no clear U.S. agenda here. More importantly, this episode 
had not reached its conclusion yet.   
 
4. Pressure on Pakistan after 9/11: The fourth major case excluded was also part of 
Washington’s immediate post 9/11 strategy. Given the close ties between elements of the 
Pakistani political and religious administration and the Taliban regime, the U.S. 
government needed Islamabad’s assistance in its operations in Afghanistan. In this context, 
President Musharraf was given an ultimatum to the effect that he was either ‘with us or 
against us,’ according to Washington. However, this was an extremely short interaction, 
and it is uncertain if clear threats were made.  
 
5. Indian pressure on Nepal 2005: In February 2005, King Gyanendra of Nepal dismissed 
the country’s democratically elected government on the grounds that it had failed to deal 
effectively with the Maoist rebels and for not preparing for elections due that spring. 
Politicians were put under house arrest and the king assumed direct powers, though he 
lifted the state of emergency in April 2005. Throughout the period, the Indian government 
pressurized the King to restore democracy and allow fresh elections. To force the King, the 
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Indian government put the brakes on political, economic and military ties between the two 
countries, a clear sign of coercive diplomacy. However, since this case was still ongoing, it 
would have been difficult to place it in context of the model of coercive diplomacy.  
 
Table 3: Coercive diplomacy (George's model) 
Questions Strategies Contextual variables Variables favoring success 
 
What to demand of the 
opponent? 
1. Ultimatum 
    variant 
1. Global strategic 
     environment 
1. Clarity of objective 
Whether and how to create 
a sense of urgency for 
compliance with the 
demand 
2. Tacit ultimatum  
2. Type of provocation 
 
2. Strength of motivation 
Whether and what kind of 
punishment to threaten for 
non compliance? 
3. Gradual turning 
    of the screw 
 
3. Image of war 
 
3. Asymmetry of motivation 
Whether to also offer 
positive inducements and, 
if so, what ‘carrot’ to offer 
together with the stick to 
induce acceptance of the 
demand? 
 
4. Try and see 
     strategy 
 
4. Unilateral or coalitional 
    coercive diplomacy 
 
4. Sense of urgency 
   
5. Isolation of adversary 
 
5. Strong leadership 
    
6. Domestic leadership 
    
7. International support 
   8. Opponent’s fear of unacceptable
    escalation 
    
9. Clarity of settlement conditions 
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2.0  OPERATION PARAKRAM – INDIA’S COERCIVE 
     DIPLOMACY AGAINST PAKISTAN 2001–2002  
INTRODUCTION 
From December 2001 to October 2002, the Indian subcontinent was yet again on the brink 
of war following an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. 
Since 1947, India and Pakistan have gone to war on three different occasions (1947-48, 
1965, and 1971), apart from one localized conflict (1999 - Kargil) and two decades of low-
intensity warfare (1989-). The December 13, 2001 attack on the Parliament in New Delhi 
provoked India into launching a coercive diplomatic strategy. Its mobilization of troops 
was finally halted in October 2002. In this chapter, I examine the conduct of Operation 
Parakram (as India’s mobilization was termed) through the model of coercive diplomacy 
and examine how various elements of this model explain this episode.  
Archetype 
This case study is an important archetype of a scenario in which two regional powers, 
possessing nuclear weapons, are locked in a dispute stretching back decades. It is also a 
case in which the problem of terrorist and separatist violence plays a major role. Therefore, 
this case study analyzes coercive diplomacy from the perspective of two major threats in 
the international security system – nuclear proliferation and terrorism.  
Scenarios similar to this case can be replicated in other regions, especially the 
Middle East, where Israel and Iran can potentially be involved in a nuclear crisis. This 
conflict situation also involves the threat of terrorist violence. Another possible coercive 
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situation involving regional nuclear powers can arise in East Asia, where North Korea has 
steadily progressed toward manufacturing and testing a nuclear device. It is entirely 
possible that Japan and/or South Korea could consider developing nuclear weapons to 
counter this threat. Therefore, the characteristics of this case study of coercive diplomacy 
in South Asia are present in other regions also, which demonstrates the importance of his 
research. This is also a crucial instance of a state’s particular response to terrorism, which 
has increasingly become a crucial policy issue for many countries, including the U.S.  
It is useful to see the South Asian nuclear dyad in context of the Cold War nuclear 
scenario.  In both cases, the protagonists possessed nuclear weapons and there was a high 
degree of animosity between them. But there were some important differences that 
impacted on coercive standoffs. First, the U.S. and the Soviet Union never shared common 
borders and there was considerable geographical distance between them (although hostility 
took place in peripheral areas through allies). Second, Pakistan’s limited strategic depth 
and its declared first-use policy in the face of conventional successes by India made 
coercive threats by New Delhi less effective.  
Third, the relatively underdeveloped nuclear command and control systems in 
South Asia increase the possibility of instability and escalation.1 Finally, and crucially, 
third parties, especially the U.S. have believed that the consequences of nuclear instability 
in South Asia are much worse than in the Cold War period.2 They point to the fact that 
during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union never directly fought a battle.3 In 
contrast, both India and Pakistan have fought three major wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971), 
besides the restricted Kargil conflict in 1998. Further, the Pakistan-backed insurgency 
since 1989 has provided a constant source of confrontation, especially since the Indian 
armed forces have been directly involved in fighting back the insurgency.  
From the coercive diplomacy perspective, the idea that the South Asian nuclear 
dyad is potentially more serious than the Cold War calculations ensures that the 
international community (especially the U.S. is sensitive to any rise in tensions in South 
Asia. This has persuaded the international community (especially the U.S.) to intervene in 
                                                 
1 Gaurav Kampani, ‘Seven Years After the Tests: Appraising South Asia’s Nuclear Realities,’ Nuclear Threat 
Initiative Issue Brief, June 2005, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_64a.html  
2 For example Strobe Talbott, ‘Dealing with the bomb in South Asia,’ Foreign Affairs, March/April 1989.  
3 Ibid. 
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various crises, such as the Kargil confrontation.4 And as the section on international 
factors shows, Washington’s role in resolving the 2001-02 standoff was extremely crucial.  
This study argues that while nuclear weapons forced each side to reassess its 
aggressive posture, other factors detracted from the credibility of India’s threats. The risk 
of nuclear conflict also forced the U.S. to intervene and pressurize each side (especially 
Pakistan) to back down, and in the case of Pakistan, to offer concessions. However, the 
demands that India had made of Pakistan were too rigid and specific for the beleaguered 
Musharraf regime to concede without a significant loss of face. By making these 
concessions, Musharraf’s rule would have been threatened further from powerful 
fundamentalist groups within Pakistan as well as hard-line military officers. Further, 
India’s threat credibility was also damaged by the less than absolute conventional military 
advantage that it enjoyed over Pakistan. Finally, in order to end the confrontation, New 
Delhi, encouraged by the international community, tacitly modified its objectives. This 
helped justify ending the stand-off even though its objectives had largely not been met.     
This chapter concentrates on the five variables which are the basis of this 
dissertation – perceptions, objectives, credibility of threats, international strategic 
environment, and internal factors. The next section provides a brief background to 
Operation Parakram. Subsequent sections examine Parakram in context of the variables 
and see how contextual variables, especially asymmetry of interests, influenced this 
episode. The concluding sections focus on gains and losses for India from this round of 
coercive diplomacy, and the consequences of Parakram.  
Chronology 
Operation Parakram was sparked off by an attack on the Indian Parliament on December 
13, 2001 by militants owing allegiance to terror groups based in Pakistan, especially Jaish-
e-Mohammed. The Indian government accused Pakistan of sponsoring these groups 
through political and logistical support and issued a list of demands to Islamabad. 
                                                 
4 For a first hand account of American involvement in resolving the Kargil war, see Bruce Reidel, ‘American 
diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,’ Center for the Advanced Study of India, University 
of Pennsylvania, 2002, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/publications/Papers/Riedel_2002.pdf  
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Simultaneously it mobilized its armed forces at the border with Pakistan to carry out its 
threats of military action. During the course of the next ten months, the two countries came 
close to war on at least two occasions as the international community scrambled to defuse 
tensions. Though Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf made two major public statements 
condemning terrorism, Islamabad did not concede to the main demands. Finally, in 
October 2002, New Delhi stood down its troops stating that its objectives had been 
fulfilled.  
Background  
As the attention of the world focused on the war against terrorism launched by the United 
States in the aftermath of 9/11, New Delhi was rocked by a terrorist attack on the Indian 
Parliament on December 13, 2001. The motive was to assassinate top Indian political 
leaders.5 The militants belonged to Jaish-e-Mohammed a Kashmiri militant group with 
close links to the Pakistani Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI).6 This assertion was initially 
made by the Indian government and subsequently verified by a retired head of the 
Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. Gen. (retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi.7 All 
militants as well several security personnel were killed after a brief gun battle.  
 This incident transformed India’s policy of combating terrorism and separatism. 
Since the beginning of the Kashmir8 insurgency in 1989, the Indian government had not 
taken the struggle to the level of a conventional war with Pakistan (Kargil was a defensive 
war to evict infiltrators). The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir began with 
the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Wars between the two have broken out thrice, 
while a low-intensity conflict fuelled by the Pakistan-sponsored militancy in Kashmir 
already claimed thousands of lives since 1989. The two neighbors came close to war on 
several occasions after 1971. In late 1984, in response to intelligence reports that India was 
                                                 
5 As confessed by Mohammed Afzal, who was part of the logistical network behind this attack. See 
‘Militants had instructions to mow down MPs,’ Press Trust of India, December 20, 2001 (Lexis-Nexis). 
6 Davinder Kumar, ‘Tracing a Puppet Chain,’ Outlook, December 31, 2001; 
Praveen Swami, ‘On the Terrorist Trail,’ Frontline, Dec. 22, 2001- Jan. 04, 2002, Vol. 18, Issue 26.        
7 B. Muralidhar Reddy, ‘Jaish behind Parliament attack: ex-ISI chief,’ The Hindu, March 7, 2004. 
8 Kashmir here and throughout this chapter refers to the province of Jammu & Kashmir.  
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planning an attack on Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear laboratories, Islamabad geared up for 
retaliatory strikes on India’s nuclear installations.9  
In 1986-87, a major Indian army exercise, Operation Brasstacks, in the western 
desert, threatened to turn hostilities as Islamabad perceived the exercise to be a prelude to 
an actual invasion. Then in 1990, Pakistan’s suspicions of an impending nuclear strike by 
India caused it to prepare for a pre-emptive attack. Tensions were defused only after 
Washington intervened.10 The last military conflict was the 1999 skirmish in Kargil,11 
which was restricted to a part of Kashmir and prevented from escalating.  
 Relations between the two neighbors are thus replete with animosity that has 
regularly spilled into violence. The situation is all the more risky given the presence of 
nuclear weapons on both sides. It is with this background that India launched Operation 
Parakram, a coercive strategy to force Pakistan to clamp down on militant activities. 
Parakram involved two main periods of tension. The first, in January 2002, came as India’s 
military deployment reached its peak and was defused partly due to Gen. Musharraf’s 
January 12 speech in which he pledged that Pakistan would not be used to foment 
terrorism elsewhere. The second period of heightened tension was in May-June 2002, 
following a massacre at an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Kashmir, in which families 
of soldiers were killed. On this occasion also, Gen. Musharraf, under international 
pressure, made conciliatory statements condemning terrorism and pledged not allow his 
country to be used for terror activities.  
The following sections analyze Operation Parakram through five main variables – 
(a) Perceptions, (b) Objectives, (c) Credibility of threats, (d) International strategic 
environment, and (5) Internal factors. 
                                                 
9 William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 
349-350. 
10 It must be stated that both sides deny this happened. 
11 Kargil is a border district of Jammu and Kashmir. In the summer of 1999, the Indian army conducted an 
operation to flush out Pakistani troops militants that had occupied territory across the Line of Control on the 
Indian side. The operation cost hundreds of Indian lives and was finally defused after the intervention of the 
United States. For a first hand account of U.S. involvement see, Bruce Reidel, ‘American Diplomacy and the 
Kargil Summit at Blair House,’ Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/publications/Papers/Riedel_2002.pdf   
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PERCEPTIONS 
Before examining the impact of India’s objectives on coercive diplomacy, a discussion of 
its perceptions would help understand the issue better. The demands that New Delhi made 
to Islamabad centered around a need to remove the label of a ‘soft state’12 and finally take 
some firm and decisive measures to combat the decade-long militancy. A ‘soft state,’ in 
international security terms, is taken to mean a government that is unable or unwilling to 
strike against the roots of security threats in an assertive and decisive manner. It also refers 
to a state that is unable to implement prescribed policies and “to a large extent explains 
Indian diffidence in asserting power in the international arena.”13
The Parliament attack was seen as a strike at the heart of Indian democracy. 
Political leaders suggested crossing the border (Line of Control-LoC14) and destroying the 
terrorist training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). One of India’s most 
respected diplomats, J.N. Dixit, who was High Commissioner to Pakistan and then Foreign 
Secretary, compared India with Israel, saying, “Just look at how Israel reacts. 
Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem to be in our nature to act.”15 Indeed the comparison with 
both Israel’s actions over the decades, and more importantly, with the United States’ global 
fight against terrorism was at the heart of demands for aggressive action by India. Over the 
years, India acquired the term ‘soft state’16 chiefly because of its inability to decisively 
stamp out militancy in Kashmir. This label stemmed from a belief that India was reluctant 
to go after the roots of terrorism (i.e., Pakistan) and treated the phenomenon simply as a 
law and order problem.17 In fact, Deputy Prime Minister Advani (who was also the Union 
                                                 
12 For a brief description of ‘soft state’ see P.R. Chari, ‘Newer Sources of Insecurity: The Crisis of 
Governance in India,’ Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Policy Studies 3, January 1998, 
http://www.rcss.org/policy_studies/ps_3.html  
13 Baldev Raj Nayar & T.V. Paul, India in the World Order, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 60-61. 
14 Line of Control is the de facto border between India and Pakistan and is the military control line.  
15 Sukumar Muralidharan, ‘The Question of Terror,’ Frontline, Dec. 22, 2001-Jan. 04, 2002, Vol. 18, (26). 
16 Vir Sanghvi, ‘Under Pressure: The Soft State,’ The Hindustan Times, January 12, 2002; Shekhar Gupta, 
‘India’s Pre-Summit Jitters,’ The Indian Express, July 7, 2001. 
17 Brahma Chellaney, ‘India’s New Hardline on Terror,’ The Wall Street Journal Europe, January 3, 2002. 
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Home Minister at the time of the attack) himself admitted this national attitude, saying, 
“We are a soft state when it comes to terrorism.”18
Perceptions are shaped by the coercer’s past behavior in similar situations and this 
helps to either strengthen or weaken credibility of threats. Historically, the Indian 
government has a reputation of being indecisive and not tough enough when dealing with 
these kinds of terrorist incidents. The starting point of present day militancy in Kashmir in 
December 1989 was itself a capitulation by New Delhi in response to the kidnapping of the 
daughter of the then Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed19 by the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). She was released only after five jailed militants were set 
free. That submission encouraged the rise of violence in the state.20  
This pattern was repeated in December 1999 when Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 
was hijacked to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The hijackers, five Pakistan-based militants 
demanded the release of three Kashmiri militants from Indian prisons. The Indian 
government conceded to the demands and released these militants, the most prominent of 
whom was Maulana Masood Azhar. Azhar subsequently founded Jaish-e-Mohammed in 
Pakistan. It was this militant group that carried out the Parliament attack.21 Thus, the 
actions of the Indian government in a previous encounter involving the same militant 
(Azhar) hardly added to the credibility of its threats following the Parliament attack. As it 
was, the same ruling party (BJP) was in power (as a coalition) during the 1999 hijacking as 
well as during the Parliament attack.  
At this point, K.P.S. Gill, former chief of Punjab Police (from 1988-1990 and 
1991-1995), who was credited with clamping down on the Punjab militancy stated that, 
“Our self perception appears no better. All our policies and responses over the past year 
(can we ever forget the disgrace of Kandahar?) have communicated a single, unambiguous 
message to the enemy – that we are exhausted, unnerved and desperate for a ‘solution’ at 
any cost. That we are willing, in other words, to negotiate with just anyone, and on our 
                                                 
18 Vir Sanghvi, ‘Under Pressure: The Soft State.’ 
19 The Home Minister is responsible for overall internal security within the country. Sayeed was later chief 
minister of Jammu and Kashmir from October 2002 to November 2005. 
20 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), pg. 91. 
21 After the Parliament attack, Masood Azhar denied that his group had carried out the attack, ‘Jaish denies 
hand in attack,’ Rediff.com, December 17, 2001, http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/17parl6.htm   
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knees.”22 This also suggested a desire to change the view of India among policymakers 
and experts in Pakistan from that of a weak state to one befitting India’s status as a 
regional power.  
Further, the Indian response to the hijacking was perceived as a capitulation not 
just to militant groups and their sponsors in Pakistan, but also to the Taliban,23 which New 
Delhi had opposed throughout the Afghan civil war in favor of the Northern Alliance. The 
fact that the Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh escorted the militants to Kandahar, 
amidst rumors of a ransom payment that have persisted for years, made this perceived 
capitulation even starker. Consequently, subsequent policy choices were based on the need 
to throw off this reputation of India as a ‘soft state’ and demonstrate to its adversaries that 
it was capable of making tough choices.24
Additionally, it is also important to note that, in the midst of such posturing, the 
BJP-led government also wanted to demonstrate to the domestic audience that it alone was 
capable of safe-guarding the country. As the section on internal factors states, the party had 
decided after 9/11 to use terrorism as a vote gathering tool. The country’s largest province, 
Uttar Pradesh, was due to go to the polls in February 2002, and it was an extremely crucial 
state for the BJP’s future electoral prospects. As it happens, the BJP’s security credentials 
had already taken a beating in the period before 9/11 when the defense minister George 
Fernandes had to step down due to a corruption scandal. Thus, the need to portray an 
image of a strong security-minded political party to the country’s population was one of 
the broader objectives of the BJP government. 
The image of the Indian government, both among the Indian intelligentsia as well 
as militant groups, is therefore, of a weak and indecisive establishment. The counter-
argument to this is that the Kargil episode showed that New Delhi was capable of taking 
                                                 
22 K.P.S. Gill, ‘Kashmir and the defence of democracy,’ The Pioneer, August 19, 2000.  
23 See for example, Brahma Chellaney, ‘The hijack crisis bares India’s political diffidence and diplomatic 
credibility,’ Rediff.com, January 7, 2000, http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/jan/07hijack.htm  
24 On the other hand there are other incidents where New Delhi did not give in to demands of Kashmiri 
militants. The first was the February 1984 kidnapping by JKLF of the Indian diplomat Ravindra Mhatre in 
Britain. The JKLF wanted the release of one of their leaders, Maqbool Butt, from an Indian prison. Mhatre 
was killed by the kidnappers, and within a week, Butt was executed. In second instance militants belonging 
to Al Faran kidnapped six western tourists in Kashmir and demanded the release of Masood Azhar, the chief 
of Harkat-ul Ansar. The government refused and all hostages were killed, though the remains of only two of 
them have been found. Azhar is the same militant leader who was released during the IC-814 hijacking, and 
who founded Jaish-e Mohammed.  
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decisive action when required. However, there is an important distinction between Kargil 
and other major incidents such as the Parliament attack and the IC-814 hijacking. In the 
Kargil episode, Pakistan-based militants and Pakistan Army soldiers occupied actual 
chunks of territory leaving New Delhi with no option but to launch a military offensive. 
Thus the crucial point here is that Kargil was a purely military episode, while the 
Parliament attack and the IC-814 hijacking were terrorist incidents. 
This constituted a crucial contextual variable from the coercive diplomacy model – 
type of provocation – that helped to shape perceptions of the concerned parties. The Kargil 
episode, involving occupation of territory by the adversary, was a tangible one which could 
(and was) demonstrated to the international community, improving the Indian 
government’s position, and in the process contributing to the isolation of the adversary – 
another contextual variable. But these factors were not in New Delhi’s favor after the 
Parliament attack. The Parliament attack (and the IC-814 hijacking) involved terrorist 
violence, in which the possibility of the adversary invoking plausible deniability is high, 
especially since no group took responsibility. 
Further indication of the importance of the type of provocation came during 
Parakram, when Pakistani troops occupied several peaks and positions on the Indian side 
of the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil and Drass sectors. This episode, which took 
place in the period July-September 2002, was met with an aggressive Indian military 
response. Assaults by Indian Air Force Mirage-2000 jets and Indian Army artillery led to 
the recapture of the Loonda Post and Point 5070.25 This counter-action, in the middle of 
Operation Parakram, showed how different provocations were perceived by New Delhi. As 
the model of coercive diplomacy states, a coercer’s demands are perceived as being more 
legitimate when they are a response to the target’s outright territorial occupation than as a 
response to the target’s covert support to terrorist activity.26
While a clear territorial incursion on the lines of Kargil had to be met with an 
immediate military response, there was no obvious response to the Parliament attack as 
there was no clear target which could be struck without the threat of unacceptable 
                                                 
25 Praveen Swami, ‘When Pakistan took Loonda Post,’ Frontline, August 31-September 13, 2002, Vol. 19, 
Issue 18. 
26 Alexander L. George & William E. Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions,’ in Alexander L. George & 
William E. Simons (eds.) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994), pg. 272. 
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retaliation. Ironically, occupation of posts in Kargil by Pakistani troops was hardly of the 
same symbolic importance as the attack on Parliament, the heart of Indian democracy. The 
type of provocation highlights an important issue in India’s varying responses. Defensive 
escalation (i.e., escalating conventionally when there is a territorial incursion) was 
acceptable to the government but there was ambiguity over the effectiveness of offensive 
escalation (taking the fight to the adversary’s territory).  
Similarly, perceptions within Pakistan also help explain the mentality that led to 
resistance to any sort of Indian coercion. According to the broader Pakistani image of 
India, the majority Hindu country has not accepted the reality of a Muslim state, and this 
leads to frequent communal riots targeting Muslims as well as its refusal to let go of 
Kashmir.27 Kashmir is thus seen among the wider populace as a vital national interest.28 
Therefore, in the immediate post-9/11 period, the Musharraf regime assumed that if it 
refused support to Washington in its campaign in Afghanistan, India would take the lead 
and consolidate its relationship with the U.S. at the expense of Pakistan.  
Further, while ending support for the Taliban could somehow be justified to the 
public, ending support to Kashmiri militant and separatist groups would not be condoned, 
especially by the powerful Islamic parties and the military, the single most powerful entity 
in Pakistan’s polity. Therefore, after 9/11, Islamabad tried to prevent the international 
community from acting on their increasing suspicions that Kashmiri militants were from 
the same broad terror network which gave rise to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.29 If the 
international community reached this analytical conclusion, then the pressure on Pakistan 
to desist from supporting the Kashmiri militancy would only intensify. 
More specifically, in context of the Parliament attack, senior Pakistani military 
officials were convinced (at least outwardly so) that the incident was stage-managed by the 
Indian government in order to persuade the international community to pressurize 
Pakistan.30 On the other hand, the Indian government was convinced that the attack was 
                                                 
27 For an explanation of this view see, Feroze Hassan Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of 
Pakistan,’ Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 10 (October 2005), and Samina Yasmeen, ‘Pakistan’s Kashmir 
Policy: Voices of Moderation,’ Contemporary South Asia, (2003) 12(2), pp. 188-189. 
28 Pamela Constable, ‘Pakistanis Seeking Tradeoff on Kashmir,’ The Washington Post, September 29, 2001, 
and Edward Cody, ‘Defining Terrorism Tricky for Pakistan,’ The Washington Post, January 7, 2002. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Steve Coll, ‘The Stand-off,’ The New Yorker, February 13, 2006. 
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approved by the highest levels of the Musharraf regime, and Indian Deputy Prime Minister 
L.K. Advani (also the Home Minister) told U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney that, “a dog 
can’t cross the Line of Control without being confronted by at least three layers of 
Pakistani security.”31
Regarding India’s intentions, Pakistani policymakers and experts were also 
convinced that New Delhi assumed from the limited nature of the Kargil conflict (1999) 
that a limited war could be fought without fear of escalation in the subcontinent.32 Thus, 
there was a desire to dispel India’s perceived conclusion that Pakistan would not escalate 
from a limited conventional level. Therefore, as subsequent sections on objectives and 
threat credibility show, Pakistan signaled its willingness to escalate to a nuclear level 
through missile tests as well as explicit statements.  
In the event, crucial impacting factors were not just perceptions that India and 
Pakistan had of each other, but also the need to manipulate perceptions of the international 
community. Perceptions of one’s national interest, reputation, and perceptions of the 
adversary formed the basis of Indian objectives and demands as well as Pakistan’s 
responses to these demands. Manipulation of international perceptions would impact on 
the way that the U.S. and other major powers intervened in the crisis. 
Implications: 
How did perceptions impact on coercive diplomacy? 
Perceptions of the adversary’s intentions as well as of oneself impact on coercive 
diplomacy by helping frame the kind of objectives that the coercer puts forth as well as the 
response of the target state. In this case, Indian self-perceptions were of a weak state and 
that in the post-9/11 period, decisive action needed to be taken. This is especially so 
because while U.S. policymakers forced the Musharraf regime to cooperate in fighting the 
Taliban, Washington did not want to get involved in the Kashmir issue. In the words of a 
senior adviser to U.S. ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, “we did not treat it as part of 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Zulfqar Khan, ‘Pakistan-India Military Standoff: A Nuclear Dimensions,’ IPRI Journal, Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute, Winter 2003.  
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the global war on terrorism.”33 Further, U.S. policymakers also believed that Musharraf 
was the ‘best bet’ for India because of his relatively moderate views; New Delhi was 
highly skeptical of this approach.34   
Therefore, if New Delhi had not reacted in a forceful manner, the initial separation 
of the Kashmiri militancy from the Al Qaeda-Taliban variety would have continued 
leading to the isolation of India on this issue. Indeed, in the days after 9/11, the fear among 
the Indian intelligentsia and policy circles was that because of Washington’s immediate 
post-9/11 requirements, it would once again tilt decisively in favor of Islamabad. In the 
words of one influential Indian commentator, Kanti Bajpai, the Indian perception was that 
“the U.S. has sold India down the Indus.”35   
 
Did the process of coercive diplomacy proceed in accordance with these perceptions? 
Yes, as the subsequent sections demonstrate, India’s desire to change its self-perception of 
a weak state and to take some decisive steps encouraged the government in New Delhi to 
put forth very high objectives in pursuit of its coercive policy. Throughout the Kashmir 
militancy, the Indian government had never taken action across the Line of Control (LoC) 
into Pakistani territory where terror camps were based. Even during the Kargil conflict, 
New Delhi did not cross the border even though that meant even more casualties among 
Indian troops. Thus, by signaling its willingness to take military action across the border, 
New Delhi sought to remove perceptions of a ‘soft state.’ 
But in order to bring about this paradigmatic change in its status in the region as 
well as to take decisive measures to end militancy and terrorism in India, the resulting 
objectives were very high and extremely elaborate. The only way ‘self-perceptions’ of a 
weak state would have been removed was through an obvious political victory over 
Pakistan, such as through surrender of wanted Kashmiri and Punjabi militants and a 
demonstrated end of terror camps.   
 
 
                                                 
33 Steve Coll, ‘The Stand-off.’ 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kanti Bajpai, ‘India-US ties after September 11,’ The Hindu, September 22, 2001, 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/09/22/stories/05222523.htm  
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Did the coercer (and target) take into account cultural characteristics of each other ? 
For both India and Pakistan, the negative view of each other was couched in religious 
terms which reinforced hard-line perceptions. From the Pakistani perspective, India 
followed an expansionist policy based on the Hindu nationalist concept of Akhand Bharat 
(greater India), which included the colonial territories present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and Myanmar.36 The fact that a Hindu nationalist-led coalition government was in power 
in New Delhi only reinforced this belief. Thus, Pakistani observers also saw Parakram in 
broader terms – as part of India’s eventual objective of subduing Pakistan. 
In both Indian and Pakistani perceptions, the adversary’s mindset displayed a 
considerable element of irrationality. For India, the increase in suicide attacks by fedayeen 
since 1999-2000,37 showed the increase in the perceived irrationality of militant groups, 
which could only be met with a firm response. Similarly, according to Pakistani experts, 
the higher levels of the Musharraf regime regarded Hindu nationalist leaders in the New 
Delhi government as irrational. Therefore, with such expectations of irrationality on the 
part of the adversary, it was safer for decision-makers on both sides to take hard-line 
positions – In the Indian case, it meant a higher magnitude of objectives, while in the 
Pakistani case it lead to a refusal to back down. 
INDIAN OBJECTIVES AND DEMANDS 
This section examines the Indian government’s objectives and sees how the demands made 
in pursuit of these objectives impacted on coercive diplomacy. New Delhi’s objectives can 
be grouped into two groups – explicit and implicit objectives. Explicit objectives are those 
that were stated in public and communicated to the target state. Implicit objectives are 
those that were not unambiguously declared but are understood as being part of the agenda. 
 
                                                 
36 Noor ul Haq, ‘Pakistan and the Indian Quest for Hegemony 1947-2003,’ IPRI Journal, Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute, Summer 2003. 
37 Jim Teeple, ‘Pakistan/Kashmiri Separatists,’ Voice of America, transcript, February 15, 2000, 
http://fas.org/news/pakistan/2000/000215-pak1.htm; and Anthony Davis, ‘A New Kind of War,’ Asiaweek, 
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Explicit Objectives/Demands  
The Indian government’s coercive strategy in the wake of the Parliament attack was 
employed on two levels – political/diplomatic and military. That the objective was to take 
a decisive step in the decade long violence related to Kashmir was clear from the public 
pronouncements of the Indian political leadership. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 
called it an attack on the entire nation, and Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani resolved 
that India would eliminate terrorists wherever they were. Addressing the nation, Vajpayee 
stated that the “battle against terrorism had reached its final phase,” while the heads of 
security agencies told the Cabinet Committee on Security that it was time for 
‘unconventional’ and ‘tougher’ security methods.38
The Parliament attack was thus seen as the last straw in a series of escalating 
insurgent and terrorist violence in Kashmir and the rest of India. This incident came two 
months after a suicide attack by Jaish-e-Mohammed on the Kashmir state assembly that 
killed over thirty people.39 According to one influential Indian analyst, New Delhi’s 
military mobilization was ‘fundamentally an attempt to get out of the box’ in order to 
emphasize to Islamabad that it (India) had military options at hand.40 This has to be seen in 
context of the previous decade and a half in which Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, and 
because of this strategic parity was able to foment militancy in Kashmir, in the process 
‘boxing’ in any conventional military options that India might have had. This was in stark 
contrast to each of the previous conflicts when militant activities by Pakistan-backed 
insurgents was met by conventional offensives by India – 1947-48, 1965 and on the eastern 
frontier in 1971.41  
                                                 
38 Ranjit Bhushan, ‘Shock Therapy,’ Outlook, December 24, 2001. 
39 Jaish-e-Mohammed initially claimed responsibility for the attack, but retracted its statement later, probably 
on instructions from the Musharraf regime; see Celia W. Dugger, ‘India shells Kashmir area, imperiling 
delicate balance,’ The New York Times, October 15, 2001.   
40 Interview with C. Raja Mohan, July 2005, New Delhi. Raja Mohan is a member of the National Security 
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strategic affairs editor of The Hindu. 
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cut off the state from the rest of India. In the third (1971), the two million Bangladeshi refugees pouring into 
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In the wake of the Dec. 13 attack, New Delhi took several symbolic and substantial 
political and diplomatic steps to impress upon Pakistan and the international community its 
resolve to take decisive steps to end the decade long violence in Kashmir once and for all. 
The government recalled the High Commissioner to Pakistan, Vijay Nambiar, and his 
counterpart in India, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, was asked to return home. Indian diplomatic 
representation in Pakistan was cut in half by New Delhi. Pakistani planes were banned 
from over-flying or entering Indian airspace and transportation links between the two 
countries were snapped. Two symbols of the limited cooperation between the countries 
were the Samjhauta (Reconciliation) Express, a train service launched in 1999, and the 
Lahore to Delhi bus service. The Indian government ended both. India also demanded from 
Pakistan that it hand over 20 people accused of various acts of terrorism over the years. 
These included Dawood Ibrahim, the alleged mastermind of the 1993 Bombay blasts in 
which hundreds of people were killed.  
New Delhi further demanded that (i) Islamabad end its support for all terrorist 
groups in Pakistan and POK that were operating against India, (ii) that it should also ban 
such groups and (iii) that it take action against individuals involved in terrorist activities.42 
To maintain its hard-line position, India rejected Pakistan’s offer of a joint investigation 
into the attack on the Parliament.43 The Musharraf regime rejected India’s demands, 
setting the stage for the 10-month stalemate. 
While President Musharraf offered an immediate condemnation for the attack,44 
senior Pakistani officials alleged that this incident had been staged by New Delhi to 
embarrass Islamabad and mobilize the international community against Pakistan.45 In fact, 
Pakistani police officials, in a counter-demand in late January 2002, publicized a police 
First Information Report in Karachi in September 1947 because it named L.K. Advani 
(Indian Deputy Prime Minister, who was then a Karachi activist of the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh – RSS – the parent body of the BJP) in a conspiracy to kill M.A. 
Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. This equivalency of demands was extended further by 
Islamabad in May after the Kaluchak massacre when the Interior Minister stated the 
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government there had prepared a list of 32 ‘wanted elements’ who they would demand 
from India when talks between the two countries were resumed.46  
Pakistan’s response to Indian allegations was that it had no hand in the December 
attack. The view was that even if Pakistan-based organizations conducted the attack, they 
were operating outside the control of the government, but they opposed it (the Musharraf 
regime) for supporting the United States in Afghanistan.47 In response to the list of 20 
people that India wanted handed over, Musharraf said that those who were Pakistani 
citizens would not be handed over, while the cases of the others would be examined.48 The 
fact that the most of the 20 people held Pakistani citizenship meant that India’s demand 
would remain unfulfilled. 
The major Pakistani concession came in the form of two speeches by General 
Musharraf in which he pledged that his country would not be used as a launching-pad for 
terrorism in Kashmir. Both speeches came after strong pressure from the U.S. to make 
some positive steps in response to India’s military mobilization. In the first speech, a 
televised address to the nation in January 2002, Musharraf announced a ban on the 
Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, two of the main militant groups operating in 
Kashmir. He also announced that terrorism had no place in the Kashmiri struggle.49  
In the second speech in June 2002, made in the aftermath of the Kaluchak 
massacre, he repeated this pledge. But fundamental support for the Kashmiri cause 
remained and as later sections show, militant violence and infiltration continued unabated. 
It was clear that these speeches were a temporary palliative. Even after the second speech, 
Musharraf, in context of permanent end to infiltration, said, “I’m not going to give you an 
assurance that for years nothing will happen.”50
Nevertheless, this was accepted by New Delhi along with a secret clause in the 
pledge – that India would have to begin talks with Pakistan on all matters of dispute, 
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including Kashmir.51 New Delhi would not have accepted such a condition publicly, 
especially after the Kaluchak massacre,52 in which families of soldiers serving in Kashmir 
were killed. Musharraf later disowned his regime’s commitment,53 but the immediate 
objective of defusing the May crisis without a loss of face for either party was achieved.  
India’s initial set of demands to Pakistan betrayed a rigidity that ensured Islamabad 
would not concede. The Pakistani political-military establishment had a lot more at stake 
in not conceding to the demands than India had in successful coercion. Since the late 
1980s, Pakistan’s national interest as formulated by its political and military establishment 
was threefold: (a) developing a credible nuclear deterrent, (b) ending Indian rule in 
Kashmir, and (c) maintaining strategic depth in Afghanistan.54  
It was one thing for Pakistan to reverse its support for the Taliban, quite another to 
do the same in Kashmir. Ending support for the Kashmiri separatist movement would be 
disastrous for any regime in Islamabad, let alone a military dictatorship. Domestic support 
within Pakistan for the Kashmir cause was considerable.55 Moreover, if there had been any 
major changes in Kashmir policy, it would have been seen as capitulation to external 
pressure, as the Indian military amassed on Pakistan’s eastern borders.56  
Furthermore, according to Indian intelligence officials, in the months after 9/11, 
Musharraf could not have allowed the escaping Taliban militants to remain in Pakistan; 
they had to be sent to Indian Kashmir because they would have fomented internal 
instability  in Pakistan.57 Thus, even if India did not intend it, Parakram was inadvertently 
an exercise of ‘type c’ coercive diplomacy, which covers regime change in the target 
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state.58 If Musharraf had conceded to the demands, internal opposition would have 
escalated, threatening his hold on power.  
Thus, Kashmir remained a primary national interest. In fact, in an attempt to justify 
his country’s alliance with the U.S. against the Taliban in September 2001, Musharraf 
explained to the Pakistani people that this step was taken to protect ‘the Kashmir cause’ in 
the hope that a tradeoff could be effected in which the Taliban (and with it Islamabad’s 
strategic depth in Afghanistan) would be sacrificed in favor of the Kashmiri militancy.59 
This has been recognized by some Indian military analysts, who stated that to maintain 
some stability in Pakistan, Musharraf needed to allow Kashmiri militancy as a ‘trade-off 
with the jehadis.’60  
According to one Pakistani analyst, speaking after 9/11, “Musharraf has a majority 
of popular support now, but he will face enormous internal opposition if going against 
Afghanistan also means the end of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.”61 At most, the only 
substantial changes that could come about would be a relocation of jehadi organizations to 
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir accompanied by an expulsion of non-Kashmiris from the 
movement. But a complete reversal of the support for the Kashmiri cause would be termed 
a betrayal by the Pakistani populace and a humiliating capitulation to India.62  
Further, Islamabad’s retention of the Kashmiri militancy option has not just been a 
lever against India but also a vital cog in Pakistan’s offense-defense strategy. In the 1947-
48 and 1965 wars, key elements on the Pakistani side included irregulars and tribesmen 
who were sent into Kashmir to provoke the local populace. Given the close connections 
between Kashmiri militant groups and the military establishment there, any war with India 
would include action by militant groups. During Parakram, one senior Pakistani military 
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officer, talking about the militant groups, said “What army in the world can wage war 
when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, center and the back? Once the 
hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in 
Kashmir?”63  
Thus, while the demands made by India were clear, they suffered in two crucial 
ways. To create a favorable asymmetry of motivation (i.e., the motivation of the coercer is 
higher than the target), the coercer should (a) make demands that are concerned only with 
its own vital interests, and do not contradict the fundamental national interests of the 
adversary, and (b) offer carrots/concessions to the adversary.64 India’s demands did not 
satisfy either of these conditions. The demands struck at the root of Pakistan’s national 
interests and objectives and were so specific that there was no room for ambiguity in a 
settlement, which might have given Islamabad room to maneuver for its domestic 
audience. Surrender of any militants wanted by India would have been a very visible defeat 
for the Musharraf regime, especially in front of a hostile domestic audience. 
The way New Delhi’s initial demands had been structured ruled out any 
concessions (or carrots) that could be offered to soften demands. According to Pakistani 
analysts speaking during the crisis, in order to defuse tensions, New Delhi needed to accept 
direct talks on Kashmir.65 The Indian government however, stated at the outset of the 
crisis, that peace talks would begin only when infiltration of militants ended, and when 
Pakistan had dismantled the terror-support network. Even these potential talks were 
unlikely to center on the status of Kashmir, as India had repeatedly asserted that this issue 
was not up for debate as Kashmir was an integral part of India. During Parakram, India 
also rejected proposals from Pakistan for joint patrolling of the LOC to keep a check on 
infiltration. This was a significant confidence building measure that could have fulfilled 
the ‘carrot’ element of coercive diplomacy. Other proposals from Pakistan, such as a joint 
statement to disallow their territories for cross-border terrorism, were also turned down, in 
a bid to project a hard-line, resolute, stance.66  
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Implicit Objectives 
New Delhi’s implicit objective was conditioned by the events of 9/11,67 and it centered 
around bringing the U.S. and the rest of the international community on its side on the 
Kashmir dispute and the accompanying militancy. It saw itself in a favorable position to 
take advantage of the renewed international efforts against terrorism. The Indian 
government portrayed its own fight against militancy in Kashmir as part of the global war 
on terrorism and used the presence of Al Qaeda-related groups in Pakistan to support its 
case. Pakistan’s official backing for these militant groups was supposed to have been the 
clinching indictment.68 Indeed, at one tense point after the May 2002 Kaluchak massacre, 
New Delhi also stated that Al Qaeda was present in Kashmir, a statement with which U.S. 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld concurred.69  
In the period before 9/11, Washington had begun to understand the benefits of 
closer ties with India, now that the Cold War was over and the U.S. did not require 
Islamabad’s assistance in combating Soviet influence in Southwest Asia. India’s large 
economic market and growing regional role were slowly coming into prominence. As one 
author put it, the increasingly cooperative relationship with the U.S. was lead by 
convergence in geo-strategic, economic, and political interests between the two sides.70 
Democracy, the biggest common factor, offered a stark contrast with Pakistan, which was 
highlighted when President Clinton arrived in India for a highly successful trip in March 
2000, but merely stopped for a few hours in Islamabad on the way back.  
After 9/11, Washington needed Pakistan’s assistance once again, this time to 
combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan offered the U.S. military bases, 
logistical support, and military intelligence, in return for which the U.S. softened sanctions 
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and provided Islamabad with $1 billion in aid while facilitating other financial settlements 
with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.71 In effect, this was a throwback to 
the 1980s when U.S. military ties with Pakistan impacted on India’s strategic interests. The 
concern in New Delhi after 9/11 was that Pakistan would be able to leverage its role in 
Afghanistan into an advantageous position on the Kashmir issue.72 And indeed, an 
indication of this was Secretary of State Colin Powell’s statement in Pakistan in October 
2001, in which he said that Washington had a “desire to accommodate the aspirations of 
the Kashmiri people.”73  
While such statements had been made in the past, given the circumstances, this was 
perceived as a major U.S. tilt toward Pakistan. Indian policymakers felt that New Delhi’s 
importance to the U.S. had decreased because of the prominence of Washington’s counter-
terrorism objectives. Thus the period before the December 13 attack was one in which 
New Delhi tried to establish itself as an integral participant in the war against global 
terrorism, and part of this endeavor was to ensure that Washington did not side with 
Islamabad on Kashmir. 
After the December 13 attack, India established Operation Parakram not as a 
regionally isolated exercise, but as one part of the broader campaign against terror 
precipitated by the September 11 attack. This assertion continued throughout the 
deployment. Following the Bali bombing in October 2002, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated 
that the incident was a reminder of the extremists’ threat, and that the international 
community had to combat terror in a united manner as all acts of terror were equally 
dangerous.74  
To mobilize the international community’s support, New Delhi also cited UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373, which was adopted after 9/11. This resolution 
commited states to neutralize logistical networks of terror groups and also to refrain from 
supporting terrorist networks in any way. This argument was accepted by British Prime 
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Minister Tony Blair, and the British, in conjunction with the U.S., pressed Pakistan to shed 
its ambivalence in clamping down on India-specific militant outfits.75
One mechanism for achieving India’s objectives was to convince the U.S. that New 
Delhi was serious in its threats to attack Pakistan. This would make the U.S. put pressure 
on Pakistan to concede to New Delhi’s demands. This kind of indirect coercion or ‘second-
order’ coercion requires that the coercer be able to shape the behavior of the third party in 
such a way that the latter is compelled, in turn, to coerce the target state.76 In this case, 
New Delhi’s escalatory policies and movement of offensive forces to the border were 
partly aimed at convincing the U.S. that the risk of war was high enough for Washington to 
intervene.  
Thus, New Delhi’s aim was not just to ensure that international support (a key 
coercive diplomacy variable favoring success) was in its favor, but to actively manipulate 
this support to coerce Pakistan. If Pakistan still did not agree to reverse its support for 
terrorism, then an Indian attack would be condoned.77 During the two main phases of 
tensions (January and May), senior Indian government and military officials made 
declarations that they were ready to take aggressive action.78 These postures immediately 
led to proactive U.S. activity in the subcontinent, marked by shuttle diplomacy by senior 
U.S. government functionaries. U.S. ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill recommended 
to the State Department that even if there was a one percent chance of a nuclear 
confrontation in a war between India and Pakistan, the U.S. could not afford to take that 
risk.79 (This phase is described in the section on international strategic environment.) 
Other indicators also suggested that at least in May (after the Kaluchak massacre), 
the Indian government was serious about taking military action. The U.S. shifted its 
diplomatic personnel and their families out of New Delhi. An Indian military officer also 
stated that India had assured the U.S. that it would try to avoid American bases at 
Jacobabad, Pasni, and Dalbandin in Pakistan, and simultaneously Washington had started 
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to move its personnel out of Pakistan while formulating contingency plans for an 
emergency evacuation.80 In fact, one influential Indian expert claimed in an interview that 
at one point, the U.S. was so convinced that India would attack that it provided maps of 
Jacobabad air base to New Delhi, so that it could avoid hitting U.S. personnel and 
installations.81 However, this claim could not be confirmed by independent sources.   
Therefore, while India’s threats were aimed at Islamabad, they were also meant to 
signal to Washington that unless the international community pressurized Islamabad to 
clamp down on militancy, war would be inevitable. To a large extent the Bush 
administration did exactly this. Washington announced that the two outfits blamed by India 
for the attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, would be placed on its list of 
banned terrorist groups.82 On at least one occasion, in March 2002, the U.S. also asked 
Pakistan to hand over the 20 wanted militants to India, though this approach remained a 
non-starter.83 U.S. pressure led to the two speeches by Musharraf (January and May 2002) 
in which he renounced cross-border terrorism. 
When tension increased after the Kaluchak massacre, Washington was again 
convinced of the seriousness of India’s threats and it pressurized Pakistan to accept New 
Delhi’s specific objective in May 2002 – a guarantee from Musharraf that Pakistan would 
end cross-border terrorism – conveyed by Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh 
Mishra to his U.S. counterpart.84 This demand was accepted by Musharraf, though the 
pledge was made public not by Islamabad but by the U.S. State department.85   
In the broader scheme of Indo-U.S. relations, this crisis was a landmark in ties 
between the two countries because India allowed the U.S. an active role in defusing the 
situation.86 For years the mantra in New Delhi was that Kashmir was a bilateral issue and 
other powers had no role in it. But 9/11 brought with it an increased focus on the threat 
from radical Islamic terrorist groups. With such changes in global perceptions, New Delhi 
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could now internationalize the Kashmir issue in its favor, and Washington’s pressure on 
Pakistan demonstrated the success of this objective. Even U.S. attempts to balance its 
relations between the two states was a reflection of its concern with the campaign in 
Afghanistan as well as the threat of nuclear war, rather than any fundamental policy 
difference with India over Kashmir and terrorism.  
India’s objectives were also shaped by the power struggle in Afghanistan. 
Historically, New Delhi had supported the Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-backed 
Taliban. In the initial stages of U.S. combat in Afghanistan, the impression given by 
Washington was that moderate elements of the Taliban would be allowed into the new 
government in Kabul. This was opposed by India,87 which wanted a friendly regime in 
Kabul that would take some of the pressure off the Kashmir sector. Therefore, in the pre-
December 13, 2001 period, New Delhi sought to ensure that the strategic changes in its 
neighborhood did not contradict its own national interests.   
The demands that New Delhi made on Pakistan were not necessarily based on a 
correct perception (or image) of the adversary. First, Pakistan’s strategic culture is based 
on a mistrust of India (as is India’s vis-à-vis Pakistan) and its intentions, especially 
regarding Kashmir. In fact one of the main reasons why Gen. Musharraf sided with the 
U.S. immediately after 9/11 was to ensure that India did not get the upper hand by 
becoming the main regional anti-terror ally of the U.S. In a televised speech on September 
19, 2001, he explained his decision to side with the U.S. against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 
saying that, “They (India) have readily offered all their bases, facilities, and logistic 
support to the United States… They want the United States to side with them and to 
declare Pakistan a terrorist state…. I only want to tell them in English: Lay off.”88  
This relatively hawkish position on Kashmir was also reflected in the general 
population, even a year after Parakram ended.89 Furthermore, several members of the 
senior military leadership in Pakistan in late 2001 were hard-line Islamists who 
sympathized with the Taliban. Given the fragile nature of the military dictatorship, its 
motivation to resist Indian threats and demands only increased, and in the process tilted the 
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asymmetry of interests in its favor. Thus India’s choice of objectives impacted in the 
eventual conduct of Parakram. And while the U.S. did pressurize Pakistan it was 
constrained by regional security developments, which are examined in a later section. 
Implications: 
What was the magnitude of objectives and how did this impact on the asymmetry of 
motivation/interests in coercive diplomacy? 
As reiterated earlier, the higher the demands and objectives of the coercer, the greater is at 
stake/interest for the target state and this increases its prospects of resistance. More 
importantly, if the demands strike at the very root of the target’s identity and core national 
interests, the asymmetry of interests tilts in its favor because there is much more at stake 
now. In this episode the list of initial demands that New Delhi put to Islamabad betrayed a 
very high magnitude of objectives which struck at the heart of Pakistan’s identity and 
national interests.  
From the Pakistani perspective, if it had effectively ended its support for the 
Kashmiri militancy, it would have been the biggest change in its foreign policy and would 
have gone against extremely powerful institutions that supported the Kashmiri cause – the 
Pakistani military, political parties, and fundamentalist religious groups. Indeed, since the 
birth of the state of Pakistan, Kashmir provided the ‘core rationale’ for its existence and is 
a crucial element of the identity of the country.90  
Furthermore, Pakistan had fought two wars over Kashmir (1947-48, 1965) as well 
as a localized conflict (Kargil, 1997), besides providing material and political support to 
militant outfits operating in the state. Thus, there was too much a stake for Pakistan to 
concede to India’s demands. Additionally, the surrender of even a few of the 20 wanted 
militants to New Delhi would have been a very public capitulation to India, and this would 
have been the final straw for fundamentalist outfits and groups within the army that were 
dissatisfied over the reversal of Islamabad’s support to the Taliban.  
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Did the objectives show any difference in the way the two sides viewed the demands 
as representing different variants of coercive diplomacy (Types A, B, or C)? In other 
words, did the coercive policy reflect different coercive diplomacy consequences for 
the two protagonists? 
If both sides view the demands as reflecting different CD variants (A, B, or C), it is crucial 
to the eventual result of coercion. Thus, India’s demands ostensibly did not touch upon 
regime change in Islamabad and were restricted to Type B coercive diplomacy, in which 
the objective is to force the target state to undo a course of action. The objective was an 
end to all support by Pakistan to the Kashmiri militancy and surrender of wanted militants 
to India. But as stated in the previous question, the Kashmir issue was of supreme national 
interest to the Pakistani political, military and religious establishment, and had been so at 
least since the late 1980s.91 Any capitulation on this would have been a fatal blow to the 
regime in Islamabad. As it happens, in the aftermath of 9/11 and Pakistan’s policy change 
on the Taliban, Musharraf had removed several senior generals who supported the Taliban 
and other fundamentalist groups and opposed the move to the U.S. camp.92 Thus, there 
already was considerable domestic opposition to Musharraf both within and outside his 
military clique, and he (Musharraf) was seeking to steadily remove these sources of threat 
to his regime. Conceding to Indian demands would once again have put the Pakistani ruler 
on the back-foot.  
Therefore, from the Pakistani perspective, the high magnitude of Indian demands 
effectively meant that the Musharraf regime was facing Type C coercive diplomacy rather 
than Type B. the significance of this analytical point is that Type C regime change CD is 
much more difficult to achieve than Type B or Type A (‘A’ involves persuading a target 
not to begin an action. In Type C coercion, the stakes for the target are at the highest, i.e., 
from its perspective, its fundamental national interests are at stake. Therefore, the 
asymmetry of interests tilts in its favor, and thereby increasing its resolve to resist.  
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In effect, Operation Parakram turned into Type C coercive diplomacy because of the 
eventual consequences of India’s objectives. Importantly, the U.S. government also 
realized that Musharraf was the ‘best bet’ for dealing with India,93 implying that any other 
figure in power would have a negative effect on both South Asian stability as well as the 
broader global campaign against terror.  
Did the coercer modify its objectives? 
As later sections demonstrate, New Delhi did eventually modify its objectives as Operation 
Parakram progressed. By focusing on other priorities and achievements in Kashmir 
(especially the September 2002 assembly elections), New Delhi was able to frame the issue 
differently. In this manner, even though the original demands were not fulfilled, these 
modified objectives were used to justify ending the standoff without a significant loss of 
face.  
Was there any clarity in settlement conditions? 
Clarity of settlement conditions help reassure the target that the concessions (or carrots) 
that it has been promised would be adhered to if it agrees to the coercer’s demands. In  
formulating its demands, New Delhi did not provide any such reassurances regarding 
clarity of settlement conditions. Since the Indian position was that it would not negotiate 
with Pakistan or offer any future concessions till its demands were met, this removed any 
possibility of discussion of post-Operation Parakram confidence building measures.  Thus, 
because there was no clarity of settlement conditions, it made Islamabad’s resolve to resist, 
stronger. 
How did the type of provocation impact on coercive diplomacy? 
The type of provocation that provokes the coercer to launch such a policy is important 
because of the impact on international opinion. A clear violation of territory makes it easier 
to get the international community’s support for coercive activity against the target. This is 
especially so in the case of mid-ranking powers such as India and Pakistan that depend to a 
large extent on great power support for their regional and global aspirations. On the other 
hand, if it is not abundantly clear who the perpetrator of the provocation is, international 
support is less obvious.  
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In this case, unlike the Kargil crisis, militants did not occupy any territory and 
therefore, international support (especially from the U.S.) was not automatic or 
unambiguous.94 Nevertheless, eventually, the U.S. and other major powers did come round 
to India’s position and pressurized Pakistan to make some concessions (resulting in the two 
speeches by Musharraf). But this support from the U.S. had less to do with a complete 
support for India’s position and more to do with avoiding a conflict in South Asia. Such a 
conflict would potentially have had nuclear consequences as well as a grave impact on 
Washington’s campaign against terror in Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, because this was a terrorist attack and not territorial aggression, 
Pakistan was in a better position to claim plausible deniability. During and after the crisis, 
Pakistani experts and policymakers regularly denied any links to the Parliament attack and 
in fact, alleged that New Delhi staged this incident.95 Through such a tactic, Islamabad was 
able to frame the issue differently so that New Delhi had to prove unambiguously that the 
attackers had a clear connection to official Pakistani agencies. 
CREDIBILITY OF INDIAN THREATS 
Along with demands, coercive diplomacy also requires credible threats to force the 
adversary to concede. To establish credibility, the coercer should demonstrate that it is in a 
position to carry out threats. But two realities based on nuclear weapons compromised the 
credibility of India’s threats. The first reality is that nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems were present on both sides, at least since 1998.  
Second, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine includes a first-use policy in the event that a 
conventional war goes against it. Furthermore, New Delhi’s conventional capabilities also 
were not overwhelming enough to support the planned military strategies. This section first 
outlines the conditions of nuclear deterrence in the subcontinent. The next sub-section 
examines conventional capabilities and strategies to argue that even these were not as one-
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sided in India’s favor as was generally assumed. What this suggests is that even if India 
had launched a conventional strike, its existing military posture could have been 
successfully countered by Pakistan’s conventional forces, resulting in a military stalemate. 
Nuclear Deterrence 
The resolution adopted by the Indian cabinet after the attack on Parliament called for the 
liquidation of “the terrorists and their sponsors wherever they are and whoever they are.”96 
This signaled a willingness to cross the threshold to a conventional war in pursuit of terror 
groups. During this crisis, there was a feeling among a growing number of Indian 
policymakers and strategic thinkers that a limited conventional war could be waged 
without either side resorting to nuclear weapons. The belief was that Pakistan would not 
take the war to the nuclear level, simply because the consequences of a retaliatory strike 
would be too devastating.97 Furthermore, Indian officials felt that they could restrict the 
war to levels that would ensure Pakistan wouldn’t launch a nuclear strike.98 The presence 
of U.S. forces in the region would also control the situation. Any conventional war 
between the two countries would be halted within a few days under intense pressure from 
the international community.99  
However, statements by political and military leaders during the crisis, as well as 
the existing nuclear doctrines of the two countries created levels of uncertainty and danger 
in the subcontinent which obliged the international community to intervene. New Delhi 
tried to ensure that the situation did not get out of hand by framing the issue of war 
differently from Pakistan. Its strategy was to ignore nuclear threats by Pakistan, and avoid 
making such threats of its own, while ostensibly sticking to a conventional military 
buildup.100 While the Pakistani leadership responded to India’s military mobilization with 
periodic nuclear threats, India refused to do the same, barring a few exceptions. One such 
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threat from Islamabad came in Gen. Musharraf’s Pakistan Day speech in March 2002, in 
which he stated that a ‘misadventure’ by India would be met with a ‘fitting response.’101 
Even after Parakram ended, he stated that even if one Indian soldier had crossed the 
border, Pakistan would have been ready to use nuclear weapons. In fact, he asserted that 
this message was relayed to Prime Minister Vajpayee via every foreign leader who came to 
Pakistan during the crisis.102   
A second major statement by Musharraf came in April 2002 in the course of an 
interview with a German magazine, in which he said that as a last resort, if Pakistan’s 
existence was threatened, it would use nuclear weapons.103 On the other hand, the only 
prominent threat from the Indian political-military side came in January 2002 by army 
chief Gen. S. Padmanabhan who threatened a severe retaliatory strike against a first strike 
on India.104 Significantly, Islamabad’s threat to escalate to a general war (which would 
presumably have a low nuclear threshold) in the event of an Indian attack was recognized 
by decision-makers in New Delhi.105
But apart from threats and statements by leaders during Parakram, nuclear doctrines 
of the two sides created an additional level of uncertainty. This was regarded by the 
international community as extremely risky and dangerous, forcing it to intervene. India’s 
no-first use policy restricts it from starting a nuclear exchange. This belief and the absence 
of any other options encouraged the biggest mobilization of forces in the western and 
northern sectors since the 1971 war. India’s conventional superiority supported the view 
that it could achieve a clear, decisive victory. However, while India’s strategy was to fight 
a conventional war (whether limited to Kashmir or not), Pakistan’s strategy did not rule out 
the use of nuclear weapons, which are widely assumed to have a first-strike role in its 
military doctrine.106  
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According to Pakistani analysts, Islamabad’s first-strike policy is meant to counter 
not just India’s conventional superiority but also an Indian pre-emptive attack.107 The 
implication is that India’s no-first use policy is not necessarily trusted by Islamabad. In 
fact, it has rejected India’s no-first use policy and the credible minimum deterrence on 
which it is based. Pakistan’s response is that there is simply no credibility to India’s ‘no-
first use’ offer – If India really believed in the no-first use doctrine, then it would have 
taken seriously China’s offer for the same.108 For Islamabad, at least ostensibly, there was 
a threat that India would be the first to use nuclear weapons. American sources also 
suggested that India’s no-first use posture was not taken very seriously, and that the danger 
of Pakistan escalating to the nuclear level was a more crucial issue for India.109  
According to the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistani government, four 
scenarios would lead to a first-strike by Pakistan.110 These were: (a) India conquered a 
large part of Pakistani territory, including Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK); (b) a large 
proportion of the Pakistani armed forces were destroyed; (c) India forced Pakistan into 
political destabilization; and (d) India imposed an economic stranglehold on Pakistan. 
The Indian nuclear doctrine is based on a policy of credible minimum deterrence 
and in the eventuality that deterrence fails, an effective retaliatory capability.111 Threats to 
use nuclear weapons against India would provoke steps to counter these threats. The 
nuclear arsenal is sought to be based on a triad of aircraft, missiles, and sea-based delivery 
vehicles.112 New Delhi has also sought to ensure that the threshold of both conventional 
and nuclear conflict is high, which would involve strengthening conventional military 
capabilities.113  
In response to India’s stated minimalist doctrine, Pakistani analysts have proposed 
that instead of getting into a quantitative competition over the arsenal, nuclear weapons 
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should be integrated with its conventional strategy as part of a ‘one-rung escalation 
ladder.’114 The long standing principles behind Pakistan’s nuclear policy are: (a) Pakistan 
should respond to nuclear threats through its own nuclear arsenal, (b) Nuclear weapons 
should make up for the skewed conventional balance in the subcontinent, and (c) Non-
proliferation should be dealt with regionally.115  
But apart from this, Pakistan’s nuclear policy and its first strike role is shrouded in 
ambiguity, which creates a level of uncertainty regarding its military responses. Command 
and control systems on both sides are not fully secure, and would potentially be vulnerable 
in a full-scale conventional war. In this context, uncertainty arises from the possibility that 
if Pakistan’s nuclear command and control systems are threatened, Islamabad might order 
the use of nuclear weapons.116 Given the limited geographical distance between the two 
sides, they have only minutes to react to a suspected nuclear missile launch before it 
strikes. Further, conventional warfare between them would include air and ballistic missile 
attacks, either in support of armored and infantry forces, or in a strategic role. These are 
dual use systems and at least from the Pakistani perspective, can be assumed as pre-
emptive strikes on nuclear assets.117 Pakistan’s lack of a reliable second-strike capability, 
relative to India, owing to its limited strategic depth, further reinforces this uncertainty. 
Therefore, as one South Asia expert put it, “the key part about nuclear weapons in the 
South Asian context is uncertainty. No one can be sure what would trigger a nuclear 
response.”118
To further make the threats credible, both sides have adequate delivery systems in 
the form of fighter-bombers and missiles to deliver nuclear payloads.119 In fact, to show 
their seriousness, they also test fired nuclear capable missiles during the deployment. 
Considering that Pakistan has problems accessing the latest aircraft and related supplies, 
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the obvious choice for delivery systems was land-based missiles, which it positioned (Hatf 
I, II) soon after India began mobilizing. It possesses several missile systems that can be 
used in a nuclear role. The Hatf-III (Ghaznavi/M-11) has a range of 280 kilometers and can 
carry a payload of 500-800 kilograms, while the Hatf-V (Ghauri – I/No Dong) has a longer 
range of 1,300-1,500 kilometers, with a payload of 700 kilograms.120 It also has the 2000 
km range Ghauri – II.121 Among the aircraft, it has the nuclear capable F-16, and some 
reports say that its fleet of A-5 C planes have the capability to drop battlefield nuclear 
weapons.122  
India had only one deployed missile system – Prithvi I, a single stage, liquid-
fuelled missile with a range of 150 kilometers which can carry a payload of 1000 
kilograms.123 Though this missile has been deployed, the problem of limited battlefield 
surveillance hampers the effective use of the missile at its full range, which could be 
problematic in a conflict with Pakistan.124 To maintain threat credibility, India test fired its 
medium range nuclear capable Agni ballistic missile in January 2002. According to one 
expert, its range, 700 km, was highlighted by the Indian government, a clear reference that 
it was Pakistan-centric (China specific missiles have a longer range, at least 3,000 km).125
The other elements of the delivery mechanism are the nuclear capable aircraft in 
the Indian Air Force’s inventory: MiG-27, MiG-29, Mirage 2000, Su-30, and Jaguar 
aircraft.126 The air force’s role in a nuclear conflict goes beyond delivering nuclear 
payloads; it also involves preventing Pakistan’s nuclear-capable aircraft from successfully 
fulfilling their mission.127 Given the number of strike aircraft available for delivering a 
nuclear payload, it would ostensibly seem that India has an adequate deterrent capability. 
According to one calculation, about 150 aircraft in the Indian Air Force (IAF) can be 
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modified to make them nuclear capable, and even if two thirds of them were assumed to be 
destroyed in a first-strike, there would still be 50 left for retaliatory purposes.128 However, 
these aircraft have qualitative problems that can reduce their reliability for carrying out a 
nuclear mission. They do not have the optimum combination of characteristics for an 
effective nuclear role, whether it is a load carrying capacity, operational radius, or 
defensive weaponry.129 The fact remains that the different aircraft in the IAF are suited 
mainly for tactical strikes rather than for delivering nuclear weapons.  
India’s deterrence capability is also affected by command and control issues. New 
Delhi has established the National Command Authority (NCA) and the Strategic Forces 
Command (SFC) as part of an integrated nuclear command structure. But historically, the 
Indian armed forces have been kept separate from the Ministry of Defense, which has 
restricted their role in the decision-making process. Within the services, there is no single 
point authority to advise the political leadership, mainly due to the rivalry between the 
services over the post of Chief of Defense Staff. This has adversely affected the nuclear 
command and control apparatus.130
There are no confirmed figures on the size of the nuclear arsenals of the two 
countries. One recent estimate suggests that India has a stockpile of 30-35 devices, while 
Pakistan possesses 24-48 such weapons.131 According to a U.S. government report, India 
can deploy a few nuclear weapons between a period of a few days to a week, while 
Pakistan can put together some weapons quickly, though a time period is not specified.132   
So far the discussion has been limited to the strategic use of nuclear weapons. A 
further danger is escalation through the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, though neither 
explicitly threatened to deploy them. The Indian tests of 1998 were partly meant to 
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demonstrate that it had the capacity to manufacture a subkiloton warhead, which could be 
used as a battlefield nuclear device.133 The accompanying tests by Pakistan were also 
supposed to have included such low-yield devices.134 As discussed earlier, India’s draft 
nuclear doctrine outlines a no-first use nuclear retaliatory deterrent. However, 
policymakers’ considerations of the possibility of limited war135 suggests that the use of 
battlefield devices might be considered in a bid to retain strategic nuclear deterrence, while 
maintaining conventional superiority. In the case of Pakistan, indications are that miniature 
nuclear devices are part of its nuclear doctrine.136  
To ensure a quick and decisive conventional victory, the Indian forces might be 
allowed to use battlefield nuclear devices. But given the poor distinction between strategic 
and tactical nuclear use in the South Asian context, the possibility of Pakistan responding 
with a counter-value targeting strategy is almost assured. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine 
suggests that any deep penetration of its territory would probably provoke the use of 
nuclear weapons.137 Since escalation would seem to have reached unacceptable levels 
already, it is likely that Islamabad would adopt a strategic nuclear weapon mode. Both the 
strategic and tactical calculations indicate that deterrence holds between the two sides, and 
the Indian government decided not to risk testing it.  
For Pakistan, tactical nuclear strikes could have come in the form of attacks on 
Indian naval forces as well as Indian ground forces inside Pakistan.138  The possibility of 
use also depends on the duration of a conflict between the two sides. The longer war  
continues (in a conventional manner), the more likely it is that Pakistan would use 
battlefield nuclear weapons, given the fact that Indian conventional superiority is likely to 
prevail in the long-term (though this is by no means assured, as the next section briefly 
speculates). But the problem of escalation through tactical weapons is also very high. Due 
to the close proximity of forces, military installations, and population centers on both 
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sides, the distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear use is reduced, which in turn 
heightens the possibility of escalation.139
The preceding discussion suggests that the presence of nuclear weapons heightened 
uncertainty and the risk of nuclear confrontation, adversely impacting on India’s coercive 
threats. Notwithstanding problems of delivery systems, command and control, it is fairly 
safe to say that both sides possess a perceived nuclear deterrent. But in context of this 
study, Indian policymakers must have considered the deficiencies of its second-strike 
capability, especially when it came to delivery systems. Its nuclear delivery aircraft, which 
are its mainstay, would have to be stationed close to the border due to their inadequate 
range, which would make them vulnerable to a Pakistani first strike. 
The key issue is that India and Pakistan have diametrically opposite views 
regarding a potential military conflict between them. India would prefer to restrict a 
skirmish to a limited war because its conventional superiority bring it eventual victory as 
long as the conflict was restricted. Pakistan would prefer to escalate a conventional conflict 
in order to convince the adversary that its threshold for a nuclear conflict is low, which 
case the latter would back off. What is also crucial is that the U.S. took these nuclear 
postures seriously and intervened on this basis.  
Conventional Balance 
New Delhi’s likely military strategy during Parakram was that instead of a full-scale 
conventional attack, it would launch a limited strike on terrorist training camps in Pakistan 
Occupied Kashmir (POK).140 This would ensure that the conflict was limited and also 
demonstrate India’s objectives – to end terrorism, rather than occupy territory. But the 
buildup of forces on the western desert frontier by India was proof that apart from raids 
into POK, it was expecting a major campaign in other sectors also. Any major 
conventional war between the two sides would be fought on three main land fronts – (a) 
Kashmir, (b) Punjab, and (c) The western desert (Rajasthan and Sind). 
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The Indian Air Force was to play a major role in Operation Parakram given its 
qualitative and quantitative superiority over the Pakistani Air Force.141 In coordination 
with the army’s operations, Mirage 2000 H and MiG 27 fighters would cut off supply and 
communication lines as well as attack terror camps.142 Meanwhile artillery guns would 
target Pakistani troop positions on the LOC in Kashmir. A brigade of army commandos 
(about 5000 troops) would be pushed into POK to dismantle the terrorist network.143 
Furthermore, they would also hold some territory near the Line of Control in Kashmir as a 
buffer and as a bargaining chip over future talks over Kashmir.  
But apart from this stated conventional superiority there was also a belief among 
some Indian policymakers that a limited conventional war could be fought successfully, 
and this helped provide New Delhi with the confidence that its conventional threats would 
be effective. In a March 2000 interview, the then Indian Defense Minister George 
Fernandes had stated that, “Limited wars contained to a geographical area such as we 
witnessed in Kargil are inevitable with a hostile neighbor… The idea that a limited war can 
escalate into something more serious is not on our mind.”144 India’s successful eviction of 
militants and Pakistani troops from the Kargil sector of Kashmir in the summer of 1999 
gave New Delhi defense policymakers the confidence that a conventional confrontation 
with Pakistan could be restricted and prevented from escalating.  
There was thus a widespread belief that India commands a huge lead over Pakistan 
in conventional weaponry, and that as long as the nuclear dimension is avoided, it can 
achieve a decisive victory. But a closer look shows that the qualitative difference between 
the two militaries is not absolute. The superiority that New Delhi currently enjoys is 
probably not overwhelming enough for it to mount a surprise attack on terrorism camps in 
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) before Pakistan can widen it to a larger conventional 
war with a low nuclear threshold. In fact, apart from Pakistan’s counter threats to use 
nuclear weapons, it also threatened conventional retaliation against India. In May 2002, 
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Musharraf said in an interview that, if deterrence between the two sides failed, “we are 
very capable of an offensive defense…. These words are very important. We will take the 
offensive into Indian territory.”145 He also argued that if India had a decisive and 
overwhelming conventional edge, it would have attacked Pakistan, and that therefore India 
had been deterred by Pakistan’s conventional might.146  
Militarily, Pakistan responded to India’s mobilization with Operation Sabit Qadam 
(Steadfast).147 It moved its 11 and 12 Corps from the Afghan border to the eastern sector. 
These formations are trained to fight a mountain war in Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and on 
the border with the Indian state of Rajasthan.148 This indicated Pakistan’s intention to take 
the fight to the rest of the frontier with India. Pakistan’s defensive strategy relies on 
limiting thrusts by Indian forces (whether in the desert sector or in Kashmir) and then 
launching offensives toward strategic objectives in Indian territory.149 By the end of 
December 2001, key elements of Pakistan’s Army Reserve North (ARN) and Army 
Reserve South (ARS) had been moved away from the Afghan border to counter Indian 
mobilization from Kashmir (responsibility of ARN) and the southwestern desert frontier 
(ARS responsibility).150 Apart from the earlier mentioned missile tests, Pakistani infantry 
and artillery units also conducted war games in Kashmir in March.  
From the Indian perspective, the perceived lack of a sense of urgency for fulfilling 
its demands further damaged the credibility of its conventional threats. By the third week 
of January 2002, the Indian mobilization was complete. At this time, a significant 
proportion of Pakistan’s army, such as the two formations mentioned above, were engaged 
in anti-Taliban operations and this would have been an opportunity for Indian forces to 
stage a limited attack in order to show the seriousness of its threats and resolve.  However, 
Indian forces restricted themselves to maintaining an aggressive posture on the border 
without crossing the international boundary. 
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After March, the momentum further slipped away as by July first week, monsoon 
begins in this region of the subcontinent. The soggy ground in Punjab and southern 
Rajasthan then impedes the mobility of mechanized forces.151 Once the sense of urgency 
decreased, the opponent could then assume that either there was enough time for a 
satisfactory compromise solution to be reached or that the coercer was not completely 
confident in its threats. Either way, the credibility of the coercer’s threats was damaged 
once the element of strategic surprise is gone. As India’s operational plans became evident, 
it gave ample time for Pakistan to assemble its own defensive force. In fact according to 
one serving general, quoted in 2003, “Our strengths and weaknesses, equipment and 
formations were exposed. Luckily, there was no war towards the end of the deployment or 
we’d have found the going tough.”152  
According to Indian military analysts, ‘hot pursuit’ of terrorists into their camps in 
POK through surgical strikes was hampered due to lack of doctrinal coordination which 
would have fostered joint warfare concepts as well as lack of advanced equipment which 
would have given the Indian military laser-guided strike capability against terror groups.153 
This state of affairs stemmed from the general neglect of the defense services in recent 
years. The neglect of defense spending in India over the decades has resulted in a weaker 
than assumed conventional deterrent for India.154 In the 1971 Bangladesh war, the 
conventional weapons combat ratio between the two sides was 1.75:1. By 1999, when the 
Kargil war was fought, this ratio had dropped to 1.22:1.155 Though this ratio is slated to go 
up over the next five years through increases in defense spending (raising the combat ratio 
to 1.51:1 by 2008), a large part of the increased funding goes to sectors like salaries, fuel, 
and ammunition, rather than to new systems.156 In terms of relative strength, while India 
has more tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and slightly more guns, Pakistan is ahead in 
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terms of air defense equipment.157 If India had launched an offensive, it would have been 
from a position of relative weakness, given the adversary’s defensive strength. 
The proposed surgical strikes on PoK terror camps that could have limited a 
conflict were thus too risky because of Pakistan’s threats to escalate to unacceptable levels. 
Even an escalation limited to purely conventional levels (at least initially) would involve 
offensive threats by Pakistan based mainly on armored warfare in other sectors, especially 
in the Rajasthan desert in the west. India’s military superiority here is not necessarily 
decisive. It has three armored divisions in comparison to Pakistan’s two. But in an 
emergency, Pakistan could put together an additional division. The terrain further increases 
the parity between the two sides, and besides, Pakistan has made considerable acquisitions 
of night fighting and anti-tank technology. And since it is likely to fight a defensive tank 
battle, this could enable it to hold its ground.158 Thus for the kind of conventional conflict 
that Pakistan would prefer to fight, the capability gap is narrower in formations that are 
best at ‘projecting power’ – armored and mechanized forces.159
Thus, whether India chose to attack through its strike corps in the west or not, any 
conventional conflict would spread there, as Pakistan opened new fronts to divert India 
from Kashmir. A conventional war between the two sides would be fought with a policy of 
strategic defense, whereby the loss of territory in either the two Punjabs or in Kashmir for 
either side is not politically acceptable, resulting in a disproportionately higher reliance on 
forces for defensive measures, which, in turn, results in a status quo. A status quo would 
not be the Indian objective if it is the offensive side. This was especially true in the context 
of the stated objectives and threats that were part of Operation Parakram.160
The Indian armed forces have other problems that hamper conventional operations. 
It has been engaged in a counter-insurgency struggle in Kashmir since 1989, stretching its 
frontline troops. Around 40,000 soldiers from the army’s counter-insurgency force, 
Rashtriya Rifles (National Rifles), are deployed in Kashmir,161 besides the three regular 
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army corps deployed there to man the Line of Control (LOC).162 Any offensive moves by 
India (in any sector), is sure to be followed by a spurt in activity by Pakistan-backed 
insurgents. In Kashmir the Indian army would thus be facing battlefronts both on the LOC 
and also within the state. 
These are just some of the problems facing India’s conventional forces that 
detracted from the advantage that they had on the battlefield. Other factors included 
organizational problems in the forces, which were briefly mentioned in the previous 
section. The separation of the service headquarters and the Defense Ministry created 
bureaucratic hurdles in the way of successful planning. Doctrinal rivalries between the 
army and the air force worsened the situation. The army has traditionally preferred that the 
air force play a more supporting role in battle, while the air force has seen itself as a 
strategic force, capable of mounting independent operations as its primary objective. This 
ensures that joint operations, which is the norm to which most militaries aspire to, has 
historically not been the basis for Indian military operations.  
 
Disconnect between the political and military objectives  
While internal doctrinal issues and capability problems dogged the Indian military, its 
relationship with the civilian political leadership during Parakram also failed to inspire 
confidence. As New Delhi communicated its list of demands to Pakistan and moved its 
forces to the border an important factor was ensuring that the Indian military knew what 
the political objectives were. This is an important factor that impacts on a key variable 
favoring success – strong leadership on the part of the coercer. If the military, which is the 
main instrument of these threats, is not kept aware of the actual political objectives, its 
effectiveness naturally diminishes, especially when it is maintained on high alert for 
extended periods of time (as was the case in Parakram – ten months) 
Two points need to be made here. First, some sections of the military as well as 
Indian military analysts assumed that the armed forces would actually launch strikes rather 
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than just threaten Islamabad. Second, it is logical to argue that if the military is convinced 
that it will be launching an attack, this makes the threat even more credible. But, the 
problem was that the troop deployment stretched for 10 months without any offensive 
action, despite provocations such as the Kaluchak massacre.  
Several senior Indian military officers who had served in Parakram voiced 
dissatisfaction over the government’s plans. By summer 2002, it was not just junior 
soldiers and non-commissioned officers, but regimental and brigade command-level 
officers also who were puzzled why they had been deployed for so long without launching 
any attack.163 Their feeling was that the government did not have the guts to take decisive 
military action. In fact, according to a retired vice-chief of the army, the political 
leadership never gave a clear directive to the military leadership on the objectives of 
Parakram.164  
This indicates that while the government made demands to Pakistan, it did not 
clarify to the military whether or not it would actually go to war. Furthermore, while there 
were aggressive statements from the political leadership, other pronouncements cast doubt 
on the willingness of the government to take military action. About two weeks after the 
May 14 Kaluchak massacre, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes stated that there 
was no danger of war, saying, “For the last nearly six months, our troops are there (on the 
border). Pakistani troops are also there. And there hasn’t been any incident, which has 
triggered any hostilities. Therefore, one need not be worried on this count.”165 While such 
statements helped to reduce tensions, they did not necessarily help in building up 
credibility of military threats. In order to retain credibility, the political and military leaders 
have to convince the adversary that they are willing to carry out threats. 
As it happens, on at least one occasion, in January 2002, strikes had been planned 
on a few terrorist camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, which would have involved 
special forces and the air force in an attempt to neutralize infiltration routes.166 However, 
the plan was canceled at the last moment. The May 2002 Kaluchak massacre of soldiers’ 
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families at an army camp in Kashmir aroused great anger among soldiers and greatly 
increased the chances of war. One senior general stated that, “we will lose face if we do 
not fight after such a build-up and withdraw,” and that it would demonstrate that India can 
only threaten and not act.167 Thus each time, India pulled back from the brink, it added to 
the military’s discomfort about its role in the crisis and actual objectives of Parakram. 
While such ambiguity in conveying objectives can create uncertainty in the minds of the 
adversary, it is not necessarily effective when the coercer’s troops are left deployed in 
extreme conditions for up to ten months. As the next section shows, this added to the 
mounting costs of the deployment.  
Thus, there is a crucial difference in the civil-military set-up of both sides. Strike 
formations of the Indian army operate only at tactical and operational levels, and once the 
offensive is complete, have to wait for orders from the political leadership.168 On the other 
hand, the Pakistan army is presumed to be in the loop right up to the strategic level, 
involving nuclear decision-making. Therefore, civil-military relations is a key issue that 
impacts on strategic decision-making. As one former Indian army chief stated, one of the 
key lessons of Parakram was that the senior military leadership must be involved in all 
decision-making that concerns the defense forces.169 Therefore, the broader context of 
Indian decision-making during Parakram reflected the existing policy-structure, which 
detracted from strong leadership which is a key component of coercive diplomacy. 
   
Costs of deployment 
As part of Operation Parakram, troops were deployed across a vast frontier from 
Kashmir to the Rajasthan desert in the south-west. The armored corps, comprising India’s 
tank forces, were in extended deployment for 10 months in the desert sector, where some 
of the decisive battles between the two countries have been fought. Troops were away 
from families for 10 months, but more than that, morale was damaged because soldiers had 
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no indication of whether (and when) the adversary would be attacked. Even members of 
the quasi-official and influential National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), especially 
those who had served in the military, voiced opinions that the extended deployment placed 
great pressure on soldiers.170 Troops were stationed in far-flung areas on the border, away 
from the families, and many of them had been called up from hard-earned peace-tenures. 
Further, border areas, especially the desert sector, experience great extremes of 
temperature. This got worse as the Indian deployment stretched into the peak of summer.    
Operationally too, the effectiveness of the deployment was not clear because 
militant infiltration continued throughout. In fact, apart from infiltration, regular Pakistani 
army troops also managed to occupy positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control at 
Sangarh and Loonda, as well as peaks in the Kargil area.171 What this suggests is that 
either the mobilization was not effective enough in dealing with infiltration of militants 
and the Pakistani army, or that the long drawn deployment (the positions were occupied in 
the July-Sept. 2002 period, more than six months after mobilization) caused military 
efficiency to be compromised.172
Deployment of troops for 10 months in a state of high alert was also costly in 
monetary and logistical terms. According to one former Indian army chief, the preliminary 
deployment of troops cost Rs. 3000 crores (approximately $625 million) and then about 
Rs. 100 crores ($20.7 million) every subsequent month.173 Other costs included 
compensation to displaced populations of the border areas ($51 million till March 2002 
and $15.5-$16.6 million every month).174 These figures roughly correspond to the price tag 
of Rs. 6,500 crores ($1.3 billion) that was disclosed by media sources after Parakram.175 
The Indo-Pak border, especially along Punjab, is heavily populated and includes large 
tracts of agricultural land for which the compensation would be substantial. In fact, even 
after Parakram had ended, the Indian Ministry of Defence was paying compensation to 
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farmers in the border region for crop losses. For the financial year 2003-2004, the ministry 
set aside Rs 10415.79 lakhs (approximately $22.5 million) as compensation.176
The preceding sub-sections on the costs of deployment and the political-military 
disconnect indicate that as the deployment stretched out, it became more and more difficult 
to maintain resoluteness in terms of demands and threats. This made the importance of the 
international community more crucial, as India would have been less resistant to pressure 
to demobilize. 
Implications: 
Did the coercer enjoy overwhelming military advantage over the target? 
As this section demonstrated, while India enjoys overwhelming conventional superiority 
over Pakistan, other factors detracted from this superiority. The impact of this is 
significant. Overwhelming military advantage would have made India’s coercive threats 
more credible. But New Delhi’s military advantage was decreased by the disconnect with 
the political hierarchy as well as the long period of military alert, which resulted in 
considerable morale problems and reduced military effectiveness. According to one former 
Pakistani army chief, Gen. Jehangir Karamat,  “the outcome of an Indian-initiated strategic 
aggression against Pakistan with conventional forces has to be an outright victory for India 
to be considered a success. Any other outcome – for example a stalemated situation with 
some territorial losses – would be a victory for Pakistan.”177 Thus the efficacy of Indian 
military threats decreased as the deployment went on.  
If the target believes that it can effectively counter the coercer’s implementation of 
military threats (whether through conventional counter-attack or through nuclear strikes), 
successful coercion becomes more difficult. Furthermore, as India’s deployment continued, 
the sense of urgency was reduced as there were no clear deadlines given by New Delhi to 
Islamabad. Thus, in accordance with the model of coercive diplomacy, there were several 
deficiencies in India’s coercive strategy, which decreased the credibility of its threats. And 
since the threats were not credible enough, successful coercion became less likely. 
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 Did conditions of nuclear deterrence exist? 
The importance of this question is that if nuclear deterrence was in effect in the 
subcontinent, it would have significantly dented the efficacy of India’s conventional 
military threat, which was already damaged because of the problems mentioned above. In 
the South Asia case, key components of a credible deterrent from Pakistan were the 
capability as well as the willingness to use this capability. Data from 2001 shows that at 
that point Islamabad possessed 24-48 nuclear weapons as well as required delivery systems 
that could cover most of India (F-16 and Mirage V aircraft and Ghauri I/Ghauri II and 
Shaheen missiles).178
Additionally through testing of missiles during the crisis and through belligerent 
statements Pakistani military officials conveyed their willingness to escalate to a nuclear 
level. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, who was closely involved in 
mediation efforts, stated that he was ‘absolutely convinced’ that the Musharraf regime 
would use nuclear weapons if they concluded that the Indian forces would 
comprehensively defeat Pakistan.179 Thus, a crucial actor, the United States, was also 
convinced of the seriousness of nuclear confrontation, and speeded up its diplomacy in the 
subcontinent, as described in the next section. 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
The 2001-2002 sub-continental crisis cannot be examined in isolation from prevailing 
regional political and military developments for two reasons. First, the crisis impacted on 
U.S. actions in Afghanistan, which depended on Pakistani logistical support. Second, 
nuclear weapons on both sides resulted in the involvement of the international community 
in trying to defuse the crisis. These factors forced the U.S. to put pressure on India and 
Pakistan to defuse tensions.  
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Theoretically, one can examine this issue through the concept of pivotal 
deterrence.180 The process of pivotal deterrence comprises a ‘pivot’ state which can insert 
itself in a dispute between two other states and deter them from going to war with each 
other. In the case in consideration, the U.S. played its part in persuading both India and 
Pakistan that going to war would be too costly for either side, while making sure that it did 
not unambiguously lean toward one against the other. Hence, the role of the United States 
in preventing India from carrying out its threats is significant. 
While the main focus of U.S. pressure was Islamabad, this was tempered by two 
important factors.  First was the vulnerability of the Musharraf regime. After 9/11, 
Musharraf attempted to purge the higher military leadership (including the ISI) of radical 
Islamists with Taliban links.181 In such a scenario, if Musharraf was seen to be conceding 
to India under U.S. pressure then the possibility of internal upheaval or even a coup would 
have been enhanced. In this sense, Musharraf’s perceived vulnerability after 9/11 in the 
face of large scale protests by Islamic groups against the country’s alliance with the U.S. 
strengthened his bargaining position,182 especially vis-à-vis Kashmir. Though ostensibly 
his democratic credentials were suspect, the perception was that all possible alternatives to 
him were either too weak or fundamentalist in ideology. At a time when anger had been 
mounting in the Islamic world, a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan would have caused 
irreparable harm to U.S. counter-terrorism policy.  
The second factor was the campaign in Afghanistan. Washington required 
Pakistan’s assistance in operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Indo-Pak 
standoff would divert Pakistani troops away from their anti-terrorism role on the border 
with Afghanistan. In fact, within weeks of the Parliament attack, in January 2002, as India 
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mobilized its military, Islamabad withdrew half its troops from the Afghan border.183 
During the second major period of tension after the May 2002 Kaluchak attack, Musharraf 
publicly announced that he was considering withdrawing troops from the Afghan border 
again, saying at a news conference that, “We are very seriously contemplating moving 
some elements...on to the east if at all the tensions remain as high as they are now.”184
But while, the U.S. had to limit the pressure on Pakistan, it had to persuade it to 
concede to some degree to defuse immediate tensions. Washington’s major concern was 
the prospect of nuclear war. A classified Pentagon study predicted that in a nuclear 
confrontation between India and Pakistan, there would be up to 12 million immediate 
casualties.185 The chaos emanating from such a scenario would completely overwhelm 
U.S. resources in an area where vast numbers of U.S. troops were stationed. Thus for the 
U.S., a key contextual variable – image of war – forced it to intervene. Even before the 
December crisis, U.S. policymakers were concerned that components of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapon arsenal might fall into the hands of Al Qaeda-related groups or might be handed 
down to a successor regime linked to fundamentalist groups.186  
The first instance of U.S. pressure on Islamabad was immediately after the 
Parliament attack. Following the attack, President Bush called upon Gen. Musharraf “to 
take additional strong and decisive measures to eliminate the extremists who seek to harm 
India, undermine Pakistan, provoke a war between India and Pakistan, and destabilize the 
international coalition against terrorism.”187  At the same time, he urged the Indian 
government to take into account Islamabad’s recent efforts at clamping down on militant 
groups after the attack.  
The second major period of tension in the crisis was after the Kaluchak massacre 
on May 27, 2002. U.S. pressure on Pakistan increased immediately after this attack. 
Disregarding Gen. Musharraf’s protests that there was no infiltration across the Line of 
Control, President Bush said that, “He (Musharraf) must stop the incursions across the 
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Line of Control… He must do so. He said he would do so. We and the others are making it 
clear to him that he must live up to his word.”188 Bush also responded to Pakistan’s threat 
to move its troops from their counter-terror role in Afghanistan, by saying that this move 
would not affect the offensive against Al Qaeda.189 Secretary of State Colin Powell also 
weighed in, saying that infiltration was continuing, and that, “There is an urgency to it 
(decreasing infiltration)… The situation has not improved in the last month or so. We were 
receiving assurances from President Musharraf that infiltration across the LoC (Line of 
Control) would be ended. But unfortunately we can still see evidence that it is 
continuing.”190  
Subsequent to each of the two periods of tension (January and in May-June after 
the Kaluchak massacre), General Musharraf’s two speeches (on Jan. 12th and May 27th) 
helped defuse immediate tensions. Each speech came about through direct pressure from 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and according to one source quoted by an influential 
Indian analyst, the drafts of the speeches and changes were approved by Powell.191 The 
key turning point was Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s meeting with General 
Musharraf in early June 2002. In this meeting, Armitage received assurances from 
Musharraf that there would be a ‘permanent end’ to terrorist activity from Pakistan 
directed at India.192 This assurance, which was also a surprise to the Indian government, 
became the point of reference for defusing tensions in the subsequent months. 
Further, Washington also tried to ensure that the message in the speeches remained 
constant and was not subject to interpretations by Musharraf to satisfy his domestic 
audience. After Musharraf’s concessionary speech in May 2002, he backed away from a 
permanent commitment. To ensure that this did not wreck the fledgling peace process, U.S. 
State Department officials, including Secretary Powell intervened, with the result that the 
State Department spokesman later reiterated that Musharraf’s promise to end infiltration 
was a “a commitment that’s been made very clear.”193 Musharraf’s concessions were 
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accepted by India, with Prime Minister Vajpayee stating a few weeks later that, “If 
Pakistan had not agreed to end infiltration, and American had not conveyed that guarantee 
to India, then war would not have been averted.194
But it was difficult for Washington to go beyond these pressures on Pakistan. The 
administration tried to ensure that Musharraf’s concessionary statements and temporary 
decrease of infiltration helped defuse tensions. Apart from that, the spate of attacks on 
Western targets in Pakistan in the summer of 2002 by Al Qaeda-linked groups suggested 
that further pressure by the U.S. would destabilize the Musharraf regime and in fact 
threaten his life itself.195
The other focus of U.S. pressure was India but not to the level of the pressure on 
Pakistan. Washington sought to modify New Delhi’s objectives, by focusing on decreasing 
infiltration and the September 2002 election in Kashmir. By reducing and reformulating 
objectives, there could at least be a temporary reduction of tensions. As the next section on 
the Kashmir election shows, such modifications of India’s objectives removed the focus 
from initial demands such as the list of wanted terrorists, and the complete cessation of 
violence.  
This has to be seen in context of the situation in Afghanistan in the same period. By 
May 2002, Al Qaeda fighters were concentrated in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, 
which borders Afghanistan. Washington wanted the Pakistani military to combat these 
groups in its territory, which was different from providing logistical assistance to U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan, which Pakistan had been doing since the 9/11 attacks. However, the 
top Pakistani military leadership decided that the U.S. government should be informed that 
if the situation with India did not calm down, it would not be possible for the Pakistani 
army to combat Al Qaeda fighters on its border with Afghanistan.196 Furthermore, the 
internal opposition by Islamic parties against combating Taliban-related groups in 
Pakistani territory itself would have been too severe. This was a crucial bargaining chip 
that Pakistan employed to limit U.S. pressure. 
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To prevent the two countries from going to war after the Kaluchak massacre, 
Washington tried other public methods to in order to dissuade them. One crucial step was 
to announce that departure of non-essential personnel from its embassy in India, and to 
recommend that American nationals defer travel to the region.197 Other countries, such as 
Australia, UK, Germany, and France also advised their non-essential diplomatic staff to 
leave the country. According to the Australian embassy, this had more to do with the 
uncertainty of the situation rather than fear of conflict.198 Even if this was the aim of just 
one country, it indicates a desire to positively influence the uncertainty and defuse 
tensions. Further, a step of this magnitude adversely impacts on foreign investment and 
plans of multinational companies in India. For a country with a growing liberalizing 
economy this was a major source of pressure. 
As it happens, thousands of U.S. soldiers were already stationed at various air bases 
in Pakistan, such as Jacobabad and Pasni. If we consider Pakistan’s limited geographical 
depth and its threats to widen any conventional attack by India, it was very likely that these 
bases would be used by the Pakistan Air Force, and would also have become a target for 
Indian bombing. Thus the possibility of U.S. forces and its nationals being directly in the 
line of fire in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan was high (Even though the 
U.S. was drawing up contingency plans for evacuation it is not clear if all its personnel 
would have been moved out).   
As the deployment stretched out, other sources also pressurized India to stand down 
its troops. At the third European Union-India summit in early October 2002 in 
Copenhagen, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that India needed to 
deescalate and open talks with Pakistan. The summit was controversial also because the 
EU and India were unable to agree on a common statement on Kashmir.199  By October 
2002, the concern, according to some Indian analysts, was that if New Delhi retained its 
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confrontationist posture, it might fritter away some of the gains of Operation Parakram.200 
These gains were the international support it had achieved for its position and Musharraf’s 
unprecedented promises in January and June 2002 to prevent terrorist activity originating 
from Pakistan. The longer New Delhi refused to negotiate, the greater the chance that 
world opinion would eventually shift toward Pakistan, as Pakistan could then state that it 
was amenable to talks while India was not. 
Thus, while there was international support for India’s concerns (the problem of 
terrorism), this support did not necessarily extend to New Delhi’s strategy for alleviating 
these concerns (i.e., military threats). International support, a variable favoring success in 
coercive diplomacy, was therefore not overwhelmingly in India’s favor, mainly on account 
of the image that a sub-continental war presented, as well as the its negative impact on the 
anti-terror operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S. followed a dual approach. First, 
it exerted pressure on Pakistan to satisfy India’s demands, however temporarily, while 
ensuring that Pakistan did not publicly backtrack on its promises. Second, Washington set 
about helping to modify India’s objectives, which would enable it (India) to move toward 
ending the standoff. This objectives modification strategy was centered around the 
scheduled elections in Kashmir in September 2002, and is elaborated in the next section.    
An analysis of the international strategic environment highlights an important point 
pertaining to coercive diplomacy. Since a crucial Indian objective was to get U.S. support, 
New Delhi also had to convince the U.S. that it was serious in its threats. This India was 
able to do, judging from Washington’s concern for nuclear war as well as its concern for 
the impact on operations in Afghanistan. This showed that apart from the direct coercion 
that New Delhi was applying on Pakistan, it was also applying indirect coercion through 
the U.S.  
Therefore, by convincing Washington that India was ready to attack (at least till 
May 2002) India got the U.S. to pressurize Pakistan. Here the concept of assurances is 
important (mentioned in chapter 1). An important part of indirect coercion was that India 
had to provide an implicit assurance to the U.S. that if it persuaded Pakistan to make 
concessions, the military standoff would be eased. From the perspective of CD this 
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highlights the increased importance third parties can play in a coercive equation. While on 
the one hand some entities can disrupt coercion through their role as spoilers, in this case 
the U.S. played the role of a ‘facilitator’ by extracting concessions from Pakistan for India 
while legitimizing the modification of India’s objectives (as the next section on Kashmir 
elections shows). 
Implications:  
How did the confrontation impact on the interests of third parties and eventually 
coercive diplomacy? Did the point of dispute affect other security issues in the 
region? 
If major powers have a stake in a coercive equation between two states, it increases the 
possibility of third party interference. In Operation Parakram, Washington’s concern was 
two-fold. First, that the standoff could degenerate into a nuclear clash. Second, that it 
would adversely affect Washington’s counter-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan as 
Pakistan would have to divert its troops to the border with India. These factors forced the 
U.S. to intervene. 
Washington followed a two-pronged strategy. First, senior Bush administration 
officials put pressure on Gen. Musharraf to offer some concessions by clamping down on 
Pakistan-based jihadi groups that were involved in violence in Kashmir. Second, the U.S. 
emphasized on New Delhi to show restraint. Washington’s policymakers were driven by a 
conviction that if New Delhi’s coercive policy continued it would spiral into a 
conventional conflict with a low nuclear threshold. On the one hand, New Delhi was able 
to convince the U.S. that it was determined to take military action, while on the other hand, 
Islamabad convinced the U.S. that it would respond with nuclear weapons in the event of 
expected conventional successes by India.  
However, despite the mutual belligerence by Islamabad and New Delhi, 
Washington’s policymakers were of the opinion that the two sides were looking for a 
solution. According to the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, “They 
were proud leaders who had got themselves out on a limb and needed to find a way 
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back.”201 This reiterates the importance of third parties in a coercive equation, especially 
when the image of war is so catastrophic. Thus, one way to deal with an impasse brought 
on by the image of war is to seek third party intervention, whether in public, or through 
secret negotiations. Third parties, especially influential actors such as the U.S., can help by 
facilitating or imposing some clarity of settlement which can assuage the suspicions of 
either side.  
Thus the issue of reassurances is crucial here also, except that these reassurances 
are being provided not by one or the other of the protagonists but by the third party, or 
‘facilitator.’202 Reassurances by third parties can circumvent problems of high asymmetry 
of interests and deep suspicion on both sides of the coercive equation. One example from 
this case is the reported secret clause dealing with peace talks that India accepted as a 
concession to Pakistan’s pledge to clamp down on militants (see section on Indian 
objectives). It is doubtful if such a secret commitment could have been made in bilateral 
negotiations between the two sides; indeed, New Delhi refused to negotiate directly with 
Islamabad after the Parliament attack. Therefore, reassurance through third parties can 
provide the plausible deniability that can be adopted in the event of loss of face or 
domestic opposition to talks with the adversary.   
The international community, led by the U.S., also played an important role in the 
modification of objectives by India. As this section and the next section on internal factors 
demonstrate, successful state assembly elections in Kashmir in September 2002 were used 
by New Delhi as a major accomplishment of its Kashmir policy as well as its anti-
militancy campaign. In this manner the Indian government was able to reframe its 
objectives from the rigid original demands presented to Pakistan.  
The international community assisted in this modification of objectives by 
endorsing the process of democracy in Kashmir and approving the September 2002 
elections there, which led to a Congress Party-led coalition in Srinagar (the capital of 
Kashmir). The subsequent condemnation by the EU of the military-dominated elections in 
Pakistan implicitly bolstered India’s case and allowed it to modify its goals. This 
modification then enabled New Delhi to justify ending the standoff in October 2002.  
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INTERNAL FACTORS 
Apart from credibility issues and international factors, domestic political and bureaucratic 
issues contributed to the conduct of Operation Parakram. These factors included the 
Gujarat riots in February-March 2002, and state election in Kashmir in September 2002. 
While the prevailing domestic environment after 9/11 helped heighten the aggressive tone 
of the ruling party, the scheduled elections in Kashmir for fall 2002, helped to modify 
India’s objectives, which then allowed the government to end Parakram.  
 
Domestic politics 
Domestic political disputes and the February-March 2002 Gujarat riots helped to shape the 
attitudes of the ruling coalition in the initial stages of the deployment. While the opposition 
Congress Party and the Communist parties condemned the Parliament attack, they also 
came down strongly on the security and intelligence failure by the government. This put 
pressure on the government which had always portrayed itself as strong on defense and 
counter-terrorism. Even before the December attack, the BJP-led coalition had decided to 
use counter-terrorism as a political tool in view of the February 2002 state assembly 
election in the northern province of Uttar Pradesh (UP), which is politically the most 
important state in the country. This was the party’s major theme and was highlighted at the 
party’s national meeting in November 2001, by among others, UP Chief Minister Rajnath 
Singh (now BJP Party President).203 This reflected a realization that as a coalition 
government, continuing to use the Ayodhya mosque/temple issue as the main election 
plank was now counterproductive, and that the campaign against terrorism could now be 
exploited to gain popular electoral support.      
Further, in 2001, the government also introduced a new law titled the Prevention of 
Terrorism Ordinance (POTO; also known as Prevention of Terrorism Act, after it was 
passed by Parliament), which was part of the larger political emphasis on counter-
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terrorism. This law, due to its controversial provisions on civil liberties, became an 
important point of contention between the ruling party and the opposition; for the BJP the 
publicly stated attitude was that any party that opposed POTO helped terrorism.204 The 
larger campaign against terrorism and the December 13 attack was thus a way to use an 
international crisis for domestic political gains.205 Thus the period after the September 11 
attacks was one in which the ruling coalition was gearing up to utilize terrorism as an 
election tool which meant that the December 13 attack provoked an aggressive response.  
The second domestic factor that impacted on Parakram was the outbreak of riots in 
the western state of Gujarat in February-March 2002. The riots, orchestrated by right-wing 
Hindu groups, followed the burning of train compartment in Godhra (Gujarat), which was 
carrying Hindu pilgrims from Ayodhya (the site of the mosque destruction in December 
2002). Hundreds of Muslims were killed in these riots by right-wing Hindu gangs, 
allegedly linked to the ruling state government (also a BJP regime). While official 
estimates casualties are below 800, unofficial estimates are at least 2,000, which include 
killings in rural areas.206 In the midst of this internal crisis, almost a division-worth207 of 
troops had to be recalled from the border to help quell the violence, and these troops were 
able to return to the border only in May 2002.208   
Elements within the BJP (the leader of the coalition of 12 parties constituting the 
National Democratic Alliance) also saw the Gujarat riots as a major failure. According to 
Jaswant Singh, the Indian foreign minister from December 1998 to July 2002, the riots 
were a ‘blot on Gujarat’s face.’209 He also stated that, “a mishandling of events, as a 
consequence of Godhra and whatever happened as a reaction, gave substance to the worst 
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imaginings about the BJP, so were forced to observe even those who remain very 
sympathetic towards it.”210
Furthermore, the Gujarat riots were also used by Gen. Musharraf to counter India’s 
assertions of Pakistan’s support to terrorism. At the UN General Assembly’s annual 
session in September 2002, he stated that those responsible for the killings should be 
brought to justice. Musharraf equated the riots with international terrorism saying, “the 
international community must act to oppose extremism with the same determination it 
displayed in combating terrorism, religious bigotry, ethnic cleansing and fascist tendencies 
elsewhere in the world.”211 At the same time, prior to Deputy Secretary of State 
Armitage’s visit to India in September 2002, the Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, an official U.S. government agency, recommended that he should express to the 
Indian government, Washington’s ‘profound concern’ regarding the anti-Muslim riots in 
Gujarat.212 Thus, at a time when international and domestic support was crucial to New 
Delhi’s case against Pakistan, the Godhra riots proved to be an unwelcome distraction.  
 
Elections in Kashmir  
Coinciding with the long deployment on the border was the state assembly election in 
Jammu & Kashmir in September 2002.  Over the decades, one of the main complaints of 
the Kashmiri populace was the rigging of successive elections in the state which rendered 
the democratic process meaningless. In 2002, the Indian Election Commission (which 
operates autonomously from the government) was committed to free and fair elections in 
Jammu and Kashmir as a major step toward restoring normalcy in the state. The European 
Union welcomed the conduct of the elections, stating that “the EU welcomes the strenuous 
efforts of the Indian Election Commission in promoting free and fair elections. We 
encourage the Indian government to follow through on its commitment to fully investigate 
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reports of irregularities… (The) Elections will be a starting point for a forward-looking and 
inclusive dialogue with Kashmiri stakeholders.”213
Before the elections, Prime Minister Vajpayee had already emphasized the 
importance of the Kashmir election. In his Independence Day address from the historic 
Red Fort, he said that, “I wish to assure the people of Jammu and Kashmir that if any 
mistakes have occurred, we shall make amends.”214 His reference here to the perceived 
discrimination and electoral malpractices in the past has to be seen in context of the need to 
place the upcoming election as a test case of India-Pakistan relations. Indeed in the same 
address he disparaged Gen. Musharraf’s description of the election as a ‘farce,’ stating that 
“Those who call the forthcoming elections in the state farcical should not give us lectures 
on democracy. Let them take a look at their own track record.”215  
The ‘track record’ here is a reference to the military nature of the regime in 
Pakistan. Indeed, the October 2002 parliamentary elections held in Pakistan under military 
rule were roundly criticized by the EU observers’ mission there. Condemning the military 
regime’s bias toward friendly political parties, the EU stated that, “regrettably, in choosing 
the course of interference, the Pakistan authorities engaged in actions which resulted in 
serious flaws in the electoral process.”216 Furthermore, in Pakistan’s provincial elections, 
fundamentalist parties came to power in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, 
hardly a positive development from the perspective of the ‘campaign against terror.’ 
The important aspect here is not whether elections in Indian Kashmir and in 
Pakistan were free and fair or not, but that for New Delhi successful conduct of Kashmir 
elections provided an indirect route to announcing a withdrawal of troops, which occurred 
within days of the EU’s statement. The BJP was soundly defeated in the assembly election 
which was won by an alliance of the Congress Party and the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP). The BJP leadership explained its defeat saying that the elections were not about 
party politics but a contest between Pakistan-basked terrorism and Indian democracy, and 
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the latter had won.217 Such a statement would be intended to put on a brave face for the 
domestic audience. But it also contributed to an environment in which New Delhi could 
justify ending Operation Parakram, citing positive political developments in Kashmir, the 
main source of dispute between India and Pakistan.  
The democratic change of government in Kashmir from the previous National 
Conference (NC) to the Congress-PDP alliance reflected a desire for change in the state, 
according to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and in fact official sources also opined 
that the assembly elections strengthened India’s position against Pakistan.218  In another 
statement, Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani hailed the conduct of elections and said 
that, “there is a definite shift in the past one year and Pakistan has changed its language 
now. It has started condemning the terrorist acts in India now, which includes the killing of 
innocent women and children whereas earlier it used to call it as ‘azadi ki ladai’ (fight for 
freedom).’219
Therefore, the Kashmir assembly election was an important factor in modifying 
India’s coercive objectives by providing a cover for these changes. The international 
community also helped to reframe the issue by highlighting the importance of these 
elections and placing it in context of broader Indo-Pak relations. Just prior to the 
September 2002 elections, international figures who visited New Delhi included then U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, who linked the Kashmir election with positive 
developments between India and Pakistan.220  
Therefore, by August 2002, with the upcoming elections in both Kashmir and 
Pakistan, the strategy of the Vajpayee government was slowly moving from the 10-month 
long military coercion to emphasizing the democratic credentials of India and using this 
contrast with Pakistan to make a point to the international community.   
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Implications: 
How did these internal factors impact on the respective positions of the parties in the 
coercive diplomacy equation? 
The New Delhi government used internal political issues for contradictory purposes in its 
conduct of Operation Parakram. First, domestic political reasons persuaded the BJP-led 
government to exploit Operation Parakram as well as the Parliament attack for electoral 
gains, especially in the February 2002 assembly election in the largest province of Uttar 
Pradesh. A decision to use the anti-terrorism plank for domestic political purposes had 
already been taken by the top leadership of the BJP, even before the Parliament attack. 
The BJP which had traditionally advocated a tough line on security issues, 
therefore hardened its stance even further after the Parliament attack. This meant that a 
tougher message was sent to Pakistan, which ensured a high magnitude of demands. This 
raised Pakistan’s stakes in the crisis and lessened the chances of successful coercive 
diplomacy by India. Additionally, these demands were very specific and very public, and 
therefore it was difficult for India to backtrack from them.  
From the Pakistani perspective, the February 2002 anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat 
provided Gen. Musharraf with a way to put India at a disadvantage internationally, but it 
did not impact on the stance of the international community. By equating the riots with the 
Parliament attack, Musharraf tried to manipulate the type of provocation issue. If sufficient 
ambiguity could have been infused into the broader state of Indo-Pakistan relations as well 
as the Muslim community in India, the sympathy of the international community might 
have moved away from India’s position on the specific issue of the Parliament attack. 
However, this did not take place, as at least then, the BJP-led state government’s 
complicity in the attack was sufficiently shrouded in ambiguity. 
As stated, the elections in the state of Uttar Pradesh in February 2002 encouraged 
the BJP-led government in New Delhi increase the magnitude of its demands and 
objectives. Subsequently, the September 2002 elections in the state of Jammu & Kashmir 
allowed it to modify and lessen these very demands. By modifying its objectives and 
choosing a lesser one – that of successful elections in Kashmir, India was able to end the 
standoff in a more dignified manner.  
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What this suggests is that multiple objectives is not necessarily a negative issue in 
terms of ending coercive diplomacy. It does not mean that the main objectives were 
fulfilled but that flexibility of objectives is an integral requirement to coercive diplomacy. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, it is a characteristic displayed in the Laos crisis in which 
President Kennedy modified U.S. objectives to bringing peace and stability in Laos, which 
was a major reduction from President Eisenhower’s objectives of stopping the spread of 
communism. Therefore, this section underscores the importance of limited objectives, 
flexibility of objectives, and a recognition that in the middle of a crisis, the coercer’s 
objectives might have to be modified. 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY BY INDIA: DID IT SUCCEED?  
After ten months of a warlike deployment on the border with Pakistan, the Indian armed 
forces finally stood down in October 2002. According to Defence Minister George 
Fernandes, Operation Parakram had achieved its objective which was “to act on the orders 
that would be given and secure the frontiers which were being threatened.”221 The Cabinet 
Committee on Security (CCS) took the decision after a cost-benefit analysis by the 
National Security Advisory Board conveyed to the National Security Council that the gains 
from deployment of troops were outweighed by the disadvantages.222  
Nuclear deterrence played a major role in preventing a conventional engagement, 
especially one begun by India. It demonstrated to the international community, especially 
the U.S., the unacceptable image of a nuclear war, and forced it to mediate in the crisis. 
But while there was international support for India’s broader objectives (ending militancy), 
this support did not necessarily extend to India’s methods for achieving these objectives.  
From the Indian perspective, the initial demands made to Pakistan were too rigid 
and specific to allow an ambiguous concession from Pakistan, one which would have 
allowed it to save face in front of a hostile domestic opposition. These objectives did not 
take into account the realities of the Musharraf regime. At a time when Pakistan was siding 
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with the U.S. in Afghanistan, concessions on Kashmir would have been unacceptable to 
fundamentalist groups within the country as well as to hard-line elements within the 
military and the ISI. Further, in the wake of U.S. action in Afghanistan, large numbers of 
militants were fleeing to relative safe havens within Pakistan, which created further 
domestic pressure from radical groups. These factors threatened the existence of the 
Musharraf regime itself. Therefore, from the perspective of coercive diplomacy, the 
motivation was higher for Pakistan, i.e., its stakes in the crisis were higher than that of 
India, and therefore the asymmetry of interests shifted in favor of Islamabad. 
Other factors, dealing with conventional balance and extended deployment further 
reduced the efficacy of India’s threats. As the stalemate continued, the impending elections 
in Kashmir allowed India to modify its objectives, with the support of the U.S. The 
successful conduct of assembly elections in Kashmir and its approval by the international 
community223amounted to a face-saving accomplishment for New Delhi and paved the 
way for ending the mobilization. For the first time in decades, Kashmiris got a genuinely 
popular government after successive elections were marred by rigging, boycotts and low 
turnouts. The elections gave much needed credibility to the Indian position on Kashmir. 
For India, there were limited gains from this exercise. The most important of these 
was support from the international community. The U.S. and U.K. came round to the 
position that violence in Kashmir is the work of terrorist elements and not freedom 
fighters. During Parakram, for the first time General Musharraf stated publicly, on two 
occasions, that Pakistani-territory or Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir would not be allowed to 
be used for purposes of terrorism in Kashmir. Considering that in the past Pakistani leaders 
had always linked this to Kashmiri separatism this was a major break. Furthermore, such 
concessions would be an important reference point for future peace talks. Thus one could 
argue that this declaration as well as Pakistan’s ban on two prominent terrorist groups 
(Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed) and the temporary arrest of their leaders was a 
major gain. But these moves were merely cosmetic. Within a few months the militant 
leaders had been released,224 and the outfits had regrouped under new names.225   
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India’s main objective – ending infiltration of Pakistan-backed militants to Kashmir 
– was only partially fulfilled. The Indian Army chief during this period, Gen. S. 
Padmanabhan, stated that infiltration had declined, but this did not end violence in 
Kashmir, which continued throughout Parakram (There were several serious incidents, the 
prominent ones being the Kaluchak massacre in May 2002, and the assault on Akshardham 
temple in September 2002). Even the state election in September 2002, overall a successful 
exercise, was accompanied by large-scale political violence (946 killed in the state from 
July to October 2002), while infiltration of militants was put at 284 for the month of 
September, about the same as the 2001 figure for the same month.226 Even if these are 
inflated official figures, it underscores the failure of India’s coercive diplomacy on this 
important objective. 
Further, the 2003-03 annual report of the Indian Ministry of Defence stated that 
even though the mountainous passes in Kashmir were snow-clogged in January 2003 
(three months after Parakram ended), infiltration in this month was higher as compared to 
January 2002 (when Musharraf made his first speech pledging to clamp down on terrorism 
originating from Pakistan).227 And in the period July-September 2003 (the traditional 
months of militant infiltration when the snow melts), infiltration was higher when 
compared to the same period in 2002 (immediately after the May 2002 Kaluchak massacre, 
when Musharraf made his second speech promising to prevent militants from operating 
from Pakistan).228 Indian Home Ministry figures also refuted the political leadership’s 
claims.  Between September 11, 2001 and December 12, 2002 (two months after Parakram 
ended), there were 3,940 terrorism-related deaths which was similar to the figure for the 
calendar year 2001 – 3,970.229  
Longer-term assessments thus suggest that initial concessions by General 
Musharraf to turn off militant flow have been reversed. Even after Parakram ended, 
Pakistani military officials stated that a complete u-turn on support to Kashmiri militants 
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was not possible unless India offered major concessions.230 Meanwhile, militant violence 
has persisted since Operation Parakram, and in fact has spread to other parts of India. This 
reflects a desire by Pakistan-based militant groups to widen the scope of violence 
geographically. It also involves recruiting Indian groups such as the Students Islamic 
Movement of India (SIMI) which has been implicated in the Mumbai train bombings (July 
2006) and the Varanasi attack (March 2006). Independent reports have also confirmed that 
militant groups which had resumed their activities through other front organizations have 
been at the forefront of relief work after the October 2006 Kashmir earthquake. The 
organizations include the Al Rasheed Trust, which evolved from the banned Jaish-e-
Mohammed, and the Jamaat ud-Dawa, the parent organization of Lashkar-e-Toiba.231 The 
fact that these groups operated in earthquake-affected areas where international agencies 
were also present indicates that they were not under any stringent government control.  
From the U.S. perspective, the Bush administration successfully helped India 
change the objectives in order to bring about de-escalation. The increased focus was on 
decreasing infiltration into Kashmir and the state election. These objectives could be 
potentially achieved, at least temporarily, as opposed to the list of demands that India had 
put forth, especially those involving surrender of wanted terrorists.  Thus the rigidity of 
New Delhi’s initial objectives had been lessened.      
 Within six months of the troop pull back, India announced a series of measures to 
improve the situation and pave the way for meaningful talks. Regardless of the outcome of 
the series of talks, one can imagine the conciliatory moves by New Delhi as a continuum to 
the aggressive moves that preceded them, and as a carrot-and-stick policy as a whole. 
CONCLUSIONS: CONSEQUENCES OF OPERATION PARAKRAM 
This case highlights several salient features of coercive diplomacy. First, it demonstrates 
how the two sides saw Operation Parakram as representing two different variants of 
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coercive diplomacy. New Delhi was aiming for behavior change in Islamabad (Type B 
CD) by demanding that the Musharraf regime permanently end Pakistan’s support for the 
Kashmir militancy. But for Islamabad, India’s demands would have ultimately resulted in 
regime change (Type C CD), because by conceding to these demands, the Musharraf 
regime would have been under serious threat or being overthrown by fundamentalist forces 
and/or hard-line Islamist sections of the military. Thus, the coercer has to reconcile its 
demands in accordance with possible consequences in the target state.  
Second, this case highlights the importance of moderation and modification of 
demands in coercive diplomacy. This helps tilt the balance of interests away from the 
target and increases the chances of successful coercion. Third, support from the 
international community for modified objectives (the Kashmir state election) provided a 
cover and a face-saving device for India to opt for reduced objectives. In coercive 
diplomacy, third party international actors can either play the role of ‘spoiler’ or 
‘facilitator.’ The U.S. government, while sympathetic to India’s cause adopted both roles 
at various points. It was a facilitator when it pressurized Pakistan to offer concessions, but 
it was a spoiler when it encouraged India to back down from the crisis. Its most crucial role 
as facilitator was its endorsement of the Kashmir election, which gave India the latitude to 
end the crisis. It must also be noted that one of India’s original objectives behind Operation 
Parakram was to correct the perceived post-9/11 tilt toward Pakistan by the U.S. Thus, 
from the CD perspective, it could be speculated that one reason for India’s coercive threats 
was to avoid a future situation in which the U.S. play a spoiler (such as the 1971 war).  
India’s coercive diplomacy through Operation Parakram also led to a reappraisal of 
political and military assumptions in the subcontinent. One major consequence is the 
realization in the Indian political establishment that coercive diplomacy involving large 
scale military deployment will not be effective in response to such militant attacks. Since 
Parakram ended, there have been several terror attacks but none of them provoked a 
similar response. These attacks occurred in various areas of symbolic importance, similar 
to the Parliament in New Delhi. The site of the disputed temple/mosque in Ayodhya was 
unsuccessfully attacked by a group of militants in July 2005. In October 2005 a crowded 
market in New Delhi was bombed. Following this, a temple in the pilgrimage town of 
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Varanasi was attacked by militants in March 2006. Finally, the Indian financial capital 
Mumbai suffered a series of train bombings in July 2006, killing almost 200 people.   
After each of these incidents, New Delhi did place the blame on groups operating 
from across the border, especially Lashkar e-Toiba. However, no military responses were 
contemplated. Further, most CBMs introduced since 2002 have been unaffected by 
terrorist incidents. The most important of these is a ceasefire that has been in effect since 
November 2003, after almost 15 years of artillery exchanges across the Line of Control, 
and extending to Siachen glacier.  
Another significant change is that New Delhi is attempting to make a better case to 
the international community against militant violence (whether state-sponsored or not). An 
indication of this is the willingness of India to share evidence on the July 2006 Mumbai 
blasts with Pakistan.232 This would help to surmount the problem of the type of 
provocation, by demonstrating unambiguously the source of militant activity. 
The lessons have not been restricted to political links between the two sides. 
Operation Parakram also acted as a catalyst for changes in Indian military strategy. The 
military deployment in Parakram as a part of coercive diplomacy involved movement of 
about 400,000 troops to forward areas, a process that took several weeks. Therefore, the 
element of surprise, if a military attack had to be carried out, was lost. To remedy this, in 
April 2004, the Indian military formulated a new offensive strategy, ‘Cold Start,’ which 
aims to build up the capacity to attack quickly across the Line of Control through mobile 
and compact integrated battle groups.233 This is clearly a lesson learnt from Parakram in 
which the strike formations took too long to reach forward areas.  
What this implies is that in a  future crisis, New Delhi might side-step Parakram-
style coercive diplomacy and launch penetrating strikes on terror camps in POK, or even 
deeper into Pakistani territory, provided the capability is developed. The objective here 
would be to strike and withdraw before the Pakistani military has a chance to react.  
Thus Parakram is a relevant milestone, because the elements that brought about this 
crisis are still in place – militant violence, terror groups operating from Pakistan (whether 
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government-sponsored or not), and nuclear deterrence, even though the two countries have 
embarked on a peace process.  This case also demonstrated the involvement of the U.S. in 
political and military matters in South Asia, which has only been strengthened by the 
recent nuclear deal with India. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in a similar crisis 
in future, all sides would be looking to learn from the lessons of Parakram, and act 
accordingly.  
 
Table 4: South Asia - Summary of arguments  
Factors affecting coercive diplomacy Consequence 
Perceptions 
- Indian self-perception of a soft/weak state  
 
 
- Pakistani perception that India had not 
reconciled to partition and wanted to destroy it. 
 
India’s counter-terrorist strategy had to be
more assertive, leading to coercive measures. 
 
Led to resistance to Indian coercion. 
Objectives (Indian) 
- Magnitude of objectives very  high 
-  Too many specific objectives 
Asymmetry of motivation balanced in 
Pakistan’s favor 
Unintended consequence – The multiplicity of 
objectives allowed India to modify and pick-and-
choose some lesser objectives at a later stage to 
facilitate an honorable end to the stand-off. 
Credibility of India’s threats 
- Low credibility due to nuclear deterrence and 
Pakistani statements that they would use them 
- Problems with India’s conventional threat 
capability. 
 
 
Indian military remained mobilized for ten 
months, which removed any element of surprise, 
which is crucial to CD. 
 
Led to a high magnitude of objectives Internal factors 
Riots gave Musharraf an argument against India. - Domestic politics in India 
 -  Gujarat riots 
Elections in Kashmir enabled India to modify its 
objectives in  Parakram. 
- Elections in Kashmir 
 
 
International Strategic Environment U.S. forced Musharraf to make to public speeches 
condemning terrorism in Kashmir. - -  U.S. concerns that South Asia is a nuclear 
flashpoint.  
U.S. got India to make secret deal on Kashmir 
negotiations at a later stage.  
 
- - U.S. concerned that the standoff would 
adversely effect operations in Afghanistan  
 
 
U.S. also endorsed Kashmir election to enable 
India to get some positive recognition enabling the 
change in objectives. 
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3.0  OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN – 
FAILURE OF U.S. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY?  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Soon after the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government concluded that it had been 
masterminded by Al Qaeda head Osama bin Laden. Hours after the attacks, President Bush 
annunciated what was subsequently known as a key component of the Bush doctrine, 
saying, “We will make no distinction between those who planned these attacks and those 
who harbor them.”1 The U.S. then set out to apprehend bin Laden from his base in 
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. He had moved there in 1996 after being expelled from Sudan. 
In his second tenure in the region, bin Laden built up a sophisticated network of terrorist 
training camps and fundraising operations. Sheltered by the isolated Taliban, he was able 
to plan the 1998 embassy bombings, the USS Cole attack and the 9/11 plot. 
After 9/11, Washington exerted pressure on the Taliban to surrender bin Laden. 
This coercive process was carried out for almost a month as U.S. forces started arriving in 
the region to carry out Washington’s military threats. The Taliban refused to give him up 
and on Oct. 7th the U.S. launched air strikes which were combined with a ground campaign 
led by the Northern Alliance. Eventually the Taliban was overthrown, and an interim 
government, dominated by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, was installed in Kabul. 
                                                 
1 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster), pg. 30. 
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This chapter contends that the episode was a failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy 
because the demands put forth to the Taliban (surrender of bin Laden and end to terror 
camps) were not conceded. Throughout the period of coercion, military forces kept 
gathering in the region, prepared to attack the Taliban. This does not necessarily mean that 
U.S. forces would have attacked even if the Taliban had fulfilled all U.S. demands. It is 
also plausible that the movement of U.S. troops in the region was to ensure that the 
Taliban’s possible compliance was full and without any loopholes, especially the task of 
shutting down terror camps. 
As the following pages demonstrate, the ambiguity over Washington’s agenda of 
regime change in Afghanistan precludes any conclusion that the U.S. intended to go to war 
whether the Taliban conceded or not. Only after its threats failed, did the U.S. act to carry 
out its threats and try to fulfill its objectives. 
 
Archetype  
This case is a prominent example of coercion on a state sponsor of terrorism, which also 
happens to be a radical fundamentalist group. It shows the limitations of coercing a target 
with vastly differing belief systems. It is also an interesting case in which the entity 
responsible for the provocation (bin Laden) is different from the target of coercion 
(Taliban). But more importantly, this is a crucial case because of the rise of terrorism as a 
security threat. Though state-sponsorship is not as prevalent as it was some years ago, it 
still continues; Iran being a notable example. Fundamentalist groups are also gaining 
strength in several regions such as Somalia while in Afghanistan the Taliban is 
experiencing a resurgence. This is also a crucial case because it highlights the issue of 
perception gaps when it comes to cultural belief systems, something that was not really 
covered by traditional research on CD, though the issue of rationality has been discussed in 
several cases.  
This case study is a relevant example of two important issues of international 
politics – (a) how to deal with weak, fragmented states? and (b) how to deal effectively 
with cultural, ethnic, and religious priorities of adversaries? The broader question then 
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becomes – if the adversary displays the above mentioned characteristics, under what 
circumstances does coercive diplomacy work?  
In this chapter, I ask why U.S. coercive diplomacy was unsuccessful; why the 
Taliban resisted U.S. demands? Recent research has focused on inaccurate cultural 
perceptions of the Taliban in the minds of U.S. policymakers. Briefly, this view holds that 
Washington had an inaccurate image of the Taliban, which placed great importance on 
Pashtunwali, the Pashtun tribal code according to which, the Taliban could not surrender 
its guest, i.e., bin Laden. Thus U.S. decision-making did not take into account how 
important a set of customs could be to the Taliban leadership.      
However, further investigations suggest that while Pashtunwali was the main 
reason why the Taliban resisted, other factors also contributed to this stance. In particular, 
the Taliban’s close financial and military ties to Al Qaeda and Mullah Omar’s personal 
relationship to bin Laden helped strengthen the Taliban leadership’s resolve to resist. 
Furthermore, even though Washington’s explicit objectives were the capture of bin Laden 
and the destruction of the Al Qaeda terror network, for the Taliban this was taken to imply 
a regime change agenda.  
Following a brief background to U.S. attempts in the nineties to capture bin Laden, 
I examine Operation Enduring Freedom as a failed case of coercive diplomacy through 
five main variables – Perceptions, Objectives, Credibility of threats, Internal factors, and 
the International strategic environment. These factors take into account the various 
elements of coercive diplomacy, such as asymmetry of motivation, magnitude of demands, 
image of war, domestic and international support, among others.  
Chronology of events 
Osama bin Laden had been based in Afghanistan intermittently throughout the eighties 
during the mujahideen struggle against Soviet occupation. After Soviet forces left 
Afghanistan he went back to his home country, Saudi Arabia, and in 1991 he went to 
Sudan, from where he was expelled in 1996. Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996, 
just as the Taliban was starting to take control of the country. The Taliban had arisen two 
years earlier in southern Afghanistan and attracted Pashtun recruits from seminaries in 
  119
Pakistan and from amongst Afghan refugees in the country. It was discreetly supported by 
the Pakistani government which was disillusioned by the failure of its long-time protégé, 
Pashtun leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the Hezb-i-Islami.2  
In October 1996, bin Laden declared jihad, or holy war, against the U.S., and in 
February 1998, he issued a fatwa stating it was the religious duty of Muslims to kill 
Americans everywhere. In August 1998, U.S. embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-
Salaam (Tanzania) were hit by massive bomb blasts which killed over 300 people. 
Following this, Washington retaliated by attacking suspected bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. However, these attacks failed to hit bin Laden or the 
Al Qaeda leadership. In the years preceding 9/11, the U.S. made several attempts to have 
bin Laden extradited to face trial for his involvement in the 1998 embassy bombings. The 
United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions under resolutions 1333 and 1267, 
demanding that the Taliban hand over bin Laden and shut down terror camps.3 But this 
was consistently refused by Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader. In an interview in July 2000, 
he stated that, “extraditing Osama bin Laden, who fought jihad against the communists 
during their occupation of Afghanistan, is tantamount to leaving a pillar of our religion.”4  
The Taliban suggested that bin Laden’s fate could be decided by Islamic scholars 
from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and one more country at a conference. These options 
were rejected by the U.S. According to Washington, such a conference of the ulema5 could 
only be accepted if it provided the Taliban with the cover to accept and implement UN 
Security Council resolutions by surrendering bin Laden.6 The U.S. government refused to 
accept the possible decisions by the ulema in place of the Taliban’s compliance with the 
resolutions and U.S. demands.  
                                                 
2 For rise of the Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 25-30 & 
Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan, (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 2002, pp. 279-285.  
3 Resolution 1267 (October 1999) imposed a limited air and financial assets embargo on the Taliban, and 
Resolution 1333 (December 2000) imposed an air and arms embargo and froze fund of the bin Laden 
network. See http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ResEng.htm  
4 ‘Afghanistan: Taliban leader Mulla Omar,’ The Pakistan Newswire, July 28, 2000 (Lexis-Nexis). 
5 Ulema refers to learned interpreters of Islamic law (Sharia). Mullahs are clerics who lead prayers at 
mosques and also perform religious ceremonies. In general ulemas are higher than mullahs in the religious 
hierarchy. 
6 Declassified State Department document, February 2000, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc%2015.pdf   
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The Taliban leadership also asserted that the U.S. produce evidence linking bin 
Laden unequivocally to the embassy bombings and even then he would be tried by the 
Supreme Court of Afghanistan.7 In the late nineties, several Taliban officials stated that 
they had seriously considered Saudi and U.S. demands to expel bin Laden, but (according 
to the Taliban), they had to discount this option because bin Laden commanded popular 
support among the Afghan people for his role in the anti-Soviet struggle.8 But while the 
U.S. worked to apprehend bin Laden from Afghanistan during the nineties, it continued to 
tacitly tolerate the Taliban’s control of most of the country. In fact it provided the Taliban 
with $43 million to combat drug production in the country in early 2001.9 Thus 
stabilization of the country (despite widespread human rights abuses by the Taliban) and 
Washington’s anti-drug trafficking agenda brought in a less than forceful anti-Taliban 
policy in the pre-9/11 period. This of course changed after 9/11. 
OBJECTIVES 
The theory of coercive diplomacy stresses the importance of magnitude of demands to the 
success of the strategy. Briefly, it states that if the magnitude of demands encroaches on 
the target’s basic national interests, the chances of successful coercion decreases. This 
section therefore asks – Did U.S. demands encroach on fundamental interests of the 
Taliban? Here fundamental interests would naturally include regime survival (from the 
Taliban perspective). It must be noted that even if explicit U.S. demands did not involve 
regime change in Kabul, what was crucial was the perception among the Taliban of the 
nature of U.S. demands and the consequences of U.S. military strategy. 
The Taliban’s primary objective after it came to power in 1996 was to ensure 
survival of the regime and extend its rule to those parts still under control of the Northern 
Alliance. Even after the Taliban’s rise to power in 1996, the regime and the opposition 
forces were locked in a constant struggle. By 1998, the Taliban controlled about 80% of 
                                                 
7 ‘Taliban ready to solve Afghanistan issue,’ The Pakistan Newswire, November 30, 2000 (Lexis-Nexis). 
8 Declassified State Department document, October 1998,  
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc%209.pdf  
9 Robert Scheer, ‘Bush’s Faustian deal with the Taliban,’ The Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2001. 
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the country after it captured the important northern cities of Mazar-e-Sharif and Bamyan, 
which had been controlled by Uzbek and Hazara forces respectively. Subsequently, anti-
Taliban forces under leaders such as the Tajik Ahmed Shah Masood and the Uzbek 
warlord General Rashid Dostum came together in December 1998 to form the United Front 
for the Liberation of Afghanistan (commonly known as the Northern Alliance) to dislodge 
the Taliban.10 In fact, just before 9/11, in June 2001, the Taliban launched a massive 
offensive with 35,000 troops against the Northern Alliance/United Front forces outside 
Kabul and in northeastern Afghanistan.11  
U.S. objectives in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 revolved around the extradition of 
Osama bin Laden. Thus the objectives, while, in accordance with U.S. national interests, 
were not necessarily contradictory to the basic national interests of the Taliban. By the late 
nineties, the Taliban was isolated internationally and was widely criticized for the 
fundamentalist nature of the regime. Nevertheless, during Washington’s attempts to 
extricate bin Laden from Afghanistan prior to 9/11, the focus was nowhere on bringing 
about regime change in Kabul, though the U.S. was highly critical of the Taliban’s 
repressive policies.  
After 9/11, the Washington intensified the hunt for bin Laden and in the process put 
renewed pressure on the Taliban. Addressing a joint session of Congress on September 20, 
2001, President Bush condemned the Taliban for its repressive policies and association 
with Al Qaeda, but he stopped short of overtly threatening regime change. The closest he 
came to suggesting overthrow was when he stated that, “they (Taliban) will hand over the 
terrorists or they will share their fate.”12 Two days later, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
also had an ambiguous response, stating that, “With respect to the nature of the regime in 
Afghanistan, that is not uppermost in our minds right now. It wasn't 15 days ago, and it 
isn't right now, except to the extent that the Taliban regime continues to support Osama bin 
Laden.”13 White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer also stated that the administration’s 
                                                 
10 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002),  
pp. 166-170. 
11 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, pg. xiv. 
12 Transcript of President Bush’s address to joint session of Congress, September 20, 2001, CNN.com, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/. 
13 ‘Text: ABC's 'This Week',’ The Washington Post, September 23, 2001, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/abctext092301.html  
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objective was ending terrorism and not deposing anyone from power.14 Therefore, the U.S. 
position was that it would consider regime change in Kabul (i.e., type ‘c’ coercive 
diplomacy) only if the Taliban refused to give in. 
Throughout the standoff, the Taliban leadership insisted that the U.S. provide proof 
of bin Laden’s complicity in the 9/11 attacks. But even if convincing evidence was 
presented, their position was that he would be tried only in Afghanistan. This was 
unacceptable to the U.S. which wanted to capture bin Laden and destroy his terror camps. 
But the Taliban insisted that there were no such camps were being run and therefore 
Washington’s demands to shut them down were meaningless.15 This suggests that (a) the 
Taliban did not regard these camps as ‘terrorist,’ and (b) because of this reason, any action 
the Taliban did take would not necessarily be trusted by the U.S.  
The Bush administration wanted complete access to these terror camps to make 
sure that they could not be used in future. Thus the objective was not just to punish bin 
Laden and the Al Qaeda network for 9/11 but also to permanently neutralize Afghanistan 
as a future base for global terrorism. On the other hand, whatever concessions the Taliban 
offered were mainly concerned with punishing bin Laden, provided the U.S. offered 
incontrovertible evidence of his guilt. Even if this evidence was provided, the Taliban 
stated that bin Laden would be tried in Afghanistan in an Islamic manner.16 A key 
contextual variable – type of provocation – suggests that coercive diplomacy is more 
difficult if it involves the target’s support for terrorist activity because of the difficulty for 
the coercer in establishing international legitimacy and pinpointing the source of the attack. 
In this case, while the U.S. stance on the Taliban acquired international legitimacy the 
Taliban tried to manipulate ambiguity by asking for proof. And in fact for a short period 
after 9/11, the U.S. State Department also raised the evidence issue. 
Nevertheless, in the weeks after 9/11, the U.S. did not overtly espouse regime 
change as its priority. The Bush administration’s foreign policy agenda prior to 9/11 had 
pointedly eschewed nation-building and criticized the Clinton administration’s 
involvement in such exercises. As part of this coercive exercise, U.S. policy against the 
                                                 
14 ‘US: No negotiations with the Taliban,’ The Pakistan Newswire, September 22, 2001. 
15 ‘Taliban again reject US demand of disbanding Al-Qaida, handing over of Bin Laden,’ The Pakistan 
Newswire, October 7, 2001. 
16 ‘Osama to be given Islamic trial: Taliban,’ The Pakistan Newswire, October 5, 2001. 
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Taliban was restricted to capturing bin Laden and destroying Afghan terror camps. A week 
before the attack began, White House Chief of Staff, Andrew Card said that the 
administration did not favor any specific group to rule Afghanistan and stated, “we are not 
about nation-building… We want to make sure the Taliban is not a government that will 
aid and abet terrorists.”17
However, such statements from the highest levels of the U.S. government were not 
necessarily taken at face value by the Taliban leadership, especially Mullah Omar. After 
9/11, Omar stated that the U.S. was using bin Laden “as a pretext for attacking 
Afghanistan,” and also that since bin Laden’s communication facilities had been 
withdrawn and he was cut off from the outside world, he could not have planned the 
attacks.18 Omar stated that, “our Islamic state is the true Islamic system in the world, and 
for this reason the enemies of our country look at us as a thorn in their eye and seek 
different excuses to finish us off. Osama is one of these.”19  
Therefore, there are indications that Taliban leaders assumed U.S. objectives 
behind this coercion to include regime change in Kabul. As early as the end of September 
2001, there was increasing discussion on the return of the exiled Afghan King Zahir Shah 
to some unspecified role in his country, which clearly suggested that regime change was 
being considered by some in the international community. Mullah Amir Khan Muttaki, 
Taliban Minister of Education, stated that after the long fight against Soviet forces they 
would not permit Zahir Shah to return, and that bin Laden would not be surrendered.20 
There was thus an implied link between denying the deposed king entry into Afghanistan 
and the fate of bin Laden. Mullah Omar also stated in a rare interview that Zahir Shah 
would be an ‘imposed puppet’ and the country did not need him.21  
                                                 
17 ‘Text: Andrew Card on ‘Fox News Sunday,’’ Washingtonpost.com, September 30, 2001, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/foxtext_093001.html  
18 ‘Taliban chief seeks talks with the U.S. to ward off attack,’ The Pakistan Newswire, September 19, 2001, 
(Lexis-Nexis). 
19 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa’ida and the Holy War, (London, UK: Pluto 
Press, 2003), pg. 271. 
20 ‘The noose tightens,’ The Observer, October 7, 2001, 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/waronterrorism/story/0,,564785,00.html
21 ‘No room for ex-king, says Taliban,’ The Tribune, September 30, 2001, 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010930/world.htm#2  
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To a large extent this fear in the Taliban leadership was not unfounded. While 
public statements by the Bush administration centered around the objectives of 
apprehending bin Laden and destroying Al Qaeda terror camps in Afghanistan, military 
plans included paving the way for the Taliban’s downfall. Even if the U.S. did not publicly 
announce the removal of the Taliban as a major objective, U.S. military strategy was 
shaped in such a way that such an eventuality was entirely possible. According to U.S. 
intelligence officials, the best fighters on the Taliban side were Al Qaeda militants, who 
would be natural targets of U.S. attacks.22 Even if the Taliban conceded, a key U.S. 
demand was the destruction of Afghanistan’s terror camps, implying neutralization of Al 
Qaeda fighters in the country. This would have again impacted negatively on Al Qaeda 
firepower and would have severely degraded the Taliban’s war fighting capability against 
the Northern Alliance, which was already gearing up to play a major role in the ground 
war. This was therefore a clear example of non-articulated objectives that are assumed by 
the adversary. 
In fact, plans considered and decided by the U.S. military involved intense air 
attacks on Taliban positions, combined with a ground offensive led by the Northern 
Alliance.23 However, while the Alliance was to be an important component, it was part of 
an overall strategy where ‘applying pressure’ was the key objective.24 The U.S. wanted to 
avoid a scenario where the Alliance rapidly took over the country exploiting the air 
campaign. This scenario would have risked starting a civil war with the predominantly 
Pashtun population of southern Afghanistan.25  
Once the air campaign started on October 7th, in its initial stages, the bombardment 
by U.S. and British aircraft was restricted to Taliban airfields and artillery units in northern 
and eastern Afghanistan, while the Northern Alliance agreed to postpone the inevitable 
assault on the capital, Kabul.26 Such an attempt would come after an interim government 
to replace the Taliban was formed, to avoid large scale bloodshed in the capital. The U.S. 
                                                 
22 ‘The noose tightens,’ The Observer, October 7, 2001,  
23 ‘The rout of the Taliban,’ The Observer, November 18, 2001, 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,596923,00.html  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Peter Baker, Molly Moore, & Kamran Khan, ‘Rebels delay move against Kabul,’ The Washington Post, 
October 11, 2001. 
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agreed to this under pressure from Pakistan which did not want the Northern Alliance to 
replace the Taliban. Even as the initial air campaign began, there was restraint in terms of 
the military objectives. According to one military account, the air campaign intended to 
provide “air support for friendly forces working with the Northern Alliance and other 
opposition forces in order to set the conditions for regime removal and long-term regional 
stability.”27 Even in this official statement, the objective was to create conditions that 
could possibly lead to regime change if required, but not necessarily aim for regime change 
as the main objective. Further, according to other official sources, one of the main 
objectives in the initial stages of the campaign was to force bin Laden and the Al Qaeda 
leadership to reveal their whereabouts, so that U.S. operatives already in Afghanistan could 
then target them.28 This would have also demonstrated to the Islamic world that 
Washington’s objectives were limited and did not involve subduing the whole country.29
But while stated U.S. objectives were not clear whether regime change was on the 
agenda, once the military threats were carried out, they would have created conditions that 
could have led to the downfall of the Taliban. The Northern Alliance might have applied 
some restraint in the initial stages, but it was clearly preparing for a major offensive sooner 
or later. By the second week of October, it had already captured several northern districts 
and was making a move to cut off important Taliban supply routes so that northern 
Afghanistan could then fall to Alliance forces.30 Therefore, it was clear that whatever 
restraint was being displayed, it was temporary. From the Taliban perspective, as the 
campaign progressed, the image of war was preferable, because in effect, regime change 
was de facto now on the agenda.  
As the attacks began, conflicting signals were sent out by the Taliban leadership. 
The day after the attacks began, its ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Abbas Salaam Zaeef 
said that the Taliban was willing to detain and prosecute bin Laden in accordance with 
Islamic law if the U.S. formally requested this.31 This was a softening of the earlier offer in 
                                                 
27 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), pg. 83. 
28 Michael Duffy, ‘War on all fronts,’ Time, October 15, 2001. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, ‘Rebels capture northern areas, cut off Taliban supply route,’ The 
Washington Post, October 10, 2001. 
31 ‘Taliban agree on Osama trial, if requested by US,’ The Pakistan Newswire, October 7, 2001. 
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that Taliban did not ask for prior evidence from the U.S. But within a few days, Taliban 
spokesman Abdul Hai Mutmaen stated that since the U.S. had launched air attacks all 
restrictions on bin Laden were lifted and he could now fight a holy war against the U.S.32 
Soon after, a repeat offer by Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Haji Abdul Kabir to discuss 
surrendering bin Laden to a third country if evidence was provided was rejected by 
President Bush who stated that the U.S. would not negotiate with the Taliban. While the 
Taliban was willing to discuss the issue, it was obvious that its only concessions were 
variants of the original offer to try bin Laden in either Afghanistan or in a third country, 
preferably in accordance with Islamic laws. The U.S. maintained its stance that this was 
unacceptable. 
Other elements that favored successful coercive diplomacy were also in place. U.S. 
actions conveyed a clear sense of urgency to the Taliban. Addressing a joint session of 
Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush stated that the Taliban had to surrender 
bin Laden and close down terror camps immediately, adding that, “the Taliban must act, 
and immediately.”33 This urgency was also conveyed through other important actors, such 
as Pakistan, which attempted to impress upon the Taliban regime the importance of U.S. 
demands as well as the seriousness of Washington’s threats. While there was a sense of 
urgency to U.S. demands, the administration was willing to wait a certain amount of time 
to allow coercive diplomacy to take effect. But this time period was not indefinite. 
According to one senior U.S. intelligence official, Washington was willing to wait for the 
Taliban to concede; however, for political reasons military action could wait only till 
Thanksgiving. He stated that, “what is clear is that we need some blood on the sand by 
November 22.”34 As it happens, the actual period of time the U.S. was willing to give the 
Taliban was much less, as the air campaign began on October 7th.    
One tactic employed by Mullah Omar within a week after 9/11 was to try to change 
the target of U.S. demands by stating that bin Laden’s fate would be decided by the 
                                                 
32 Unspecified headline, The Pakistan Newswire, October 10, 2001. 
33 Transcript of President Bush’s address to joint session of Congress, September 20, 2001, CNN.com, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/  
34 ‘The noose tightens,’ The Observer, October 7, 2001. 
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Shoora, the council of Islamic clerics which would issue a fatwa.35 The Shoora decided to 
ask bin Laden to leave Afghanistan voluntarily and save the Afghan people from U.S. 
attacks, while rejecting the U.S. demand to hand him over.36 Voluntary departure from 
Afghanistan was not the same as surrendering bin Laden. Afghanistan is situated in a 
region replete with rugged and remote mountainous areas where the Al Qaeda leader could 
hide out. Furthermore, at that point, bin Laden had about 3,000 well-armed Al Qaeda 
militants and also commanded the support of many Taliban soldiers.37    Thus from the 
U.S. perspective, the Shoora’s decision did not fulfill its demands, and Washington 
rejected it.38  
To influence eventual U.S. objectives, Pakistani agencies also tried to push forward 
moderate Taliban leaders who might be given a role in the future regime, so that Islamabad 
could retain its influence. Thus, by now (October second week), the Taliban regime, as 
exemplified by the Mullah Omar clique was rejected by Pakistan and according to one 
Pakistani intelligence official, “an overthrow of the present Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
is now an ISI objective. There is no doubt that the ISI now wants Mullah Mohammad 
Omar and his cronies to go.”39
However, along with the demands that the U.S. presented to the Taliban, no 
substantive concessions (carrots) were offered. Washington did not offer financial aid (as it 
had to Pakistan after 9/11), nor did it offer any form of diplomatic recognition to the 
regime if it gave up bin Laden. After the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, it had sought 
diplomatic recognition for its regime from countries around the world, including the U.S, 
and also tried to get economic sanctions lifted.40 In fact, when the Shoora met in late 
September to consider bin Laden’s fate, it also demanded diplomatic recognition for the 
Taliban, removal of economic sanctions, and an end to assistance for the Northern 
                                                 
35 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘Afghan people are urged to prepare for a holy war,’ The Washington Post, 
September 18, 2001, pg. A01.  
36 ‘US rejects Shoora’s decree on Osama bin Laden,’ The Pakistan Newswire, September 20, 2001. 
37 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘Afghan people are urged to prepare for a holy war.’ 
38 ‘US rejects Shoora’s decree on Osama bin Laden,’ The Pakistan Newswire, September 20, 2001. 
39 Peter Baker, Molly Moore, and Kamran Khan, ‘Rebels delay move against Kabul,’ The Washington Post, 
October 11, 2001. 
40 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, pp. 172-174. 
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Alliance.41  However, Washington’s coercive diplomacy did not include any concessions 
on these issues.  
The only ‘carrots’ the U.S. did offer were air drops of food and medicine as the air 
campaign began. Just days before the campaign started, President Bush ordered a further 
$320 million in food and medicine to be shipped to Afghanistan, stating that, “this is our 
way of saying that while we firmly and strongly oppose the Taliban regime, we are friends 
of the Afghan people.”42 Further, in the run up to the air campaign, Central Intelligence 
Agency operatives were secreted into Afghanistan with large sums of money to distribute 
to tribal leaders who could provide assistance and also help pinpoint bin Laden’s location. 
However, such concessions are not necessarily the kind that favor successful coercive 
diplomacy as they are not even aimed at the main target. Food and medicine were meant 
for the Afghan people, not the Taliban leadership, who would actually make the decision 
whether or not to surrender bin Laden. Concessions as part of coercive diplomacy are 
meant to create an environment where the target can consider the demands more favorably. 
In this case the carrots were meant to neutralize the ill effects of the air bombardment and 
to salvage some goodwill among the Afghan people. 
 
The role of reassurances 
Reassurances played a key role in determining the Taliban’s attitudes toward U.S. 
demands. As stated in chapter 1, reassurances are an important component of compellent 
as well as deterrent threats. While the U.S. never approved of the Taliban regime it gave 
mixed signals regarding its acceptability. According to one opinion, prior to 9/11, 
Washington was more concerned about stopping Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program than 
getting Islamabad to stop support for the Taliban and facilitate its removal from power.43 
Furthermore, during the late nineties, there were numerous diplomatic contacts between 
                                                 
41 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa’ida and the Holy War, pg. 271. 
42 Michael Duffy, ‘War on all fronts,’ Time, October 15, 2001. 
43 Feroz Hassan Khan & Christopher Clary, ‘Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case of Pakistan,’ 
Strategic Insights, Vol. III, Issue 10, October 2004. 
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the U.S. and the Taliban, mainly on the issue of terrorism and bin Laden. These documents 
show that the U.S. was in favor of continuing dialogue with the Taliban and warned the 
group that associating with bin Laden would be detrimental to the Taliban’s interests.44  
Further, even though bin Laden was still entrenched in his camps in Afghanistan, 
the U.S. provided the Taliban with $43 million to combat drug production in the country in 
early 2001.45 While this is a very significant ‘carrot,’ in the absence of any reciprocal 
gestures by the Taliban on handing over bin Laden or even neutralizing his activities, this 
seems to have been a less than hard-line position by the U.S. It also shows the 
communication of mixed signals by the U.S. After 9/11: while the U.S. demanded that the 
Taliban surrender bin Laden and destroy bin Laden, there was no unambiguous declaration 
of an assurance that regime change was not on the U.S. agenda.  
As mentioned earlier, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card did say during the 
period of coercion that the U.S. was not interested in nation-building and wanted an end to 
Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists. While this does not mention regime change, 
there is no unambiguous disavowal of this agenda. Therefore, there was no clear 
reassurance  conveyed to the Taliban that its regime was secure, leading to the group’s 
insecurity about U.S. intentions. In the absence of such credible reassurances, the Taliban 
leaders had to rely on their perceptions and calculations of what U.S. moves would 
eventually amount to.  
Implications: 
How did the characteristics of U.S. objectives impact on the success or failure of 
coercive diplomacy? 
The analysis in this section shows that the asymmetry of motivation was not 
overwhelmingly in favor of the U.S. In any episode of coercive diplomacy, the more 
important the stakes of one side, the higher its inclination to resist or coerce. Further, the 
coercer can induce a favorable asymmetry of motivation in two ways – (a) first, as 
mentioned earlier, by restricting its demands only to objectives that deal with its own vital 
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interests and do not contradict the fundamental interests of the adversary, and (b) through 
carrots that lessen the target’s motivation.46 Another key factor favoring successful 
coercive diplomacy is clarity of settlement conditions. If the target is reassured over 
specific terms for ending the crisis, coercive diplomacy is strengthened.47 However, in this 
particular case, regime change was hardly an acceptable settlement condition for the 
Taliban, which made the process more difficult. 
The demands that the U.S. put forward were in line with the ultimatum variant of 
coercive diplomacy. This variant has three steps – (1) a demand, (2) a time limit or a clear 
sense of urgency, and (3) a credible threat of punishment if the demands are not met.48 
While the U.S. did not announce a clear deadline, there was an obvious sense of urgency 
which convinced the Taliban that if any concessions were to be offered, this had to be done 
right then. However, this variant also has considerable risks of failure and the Taliban’s 
resistance was in line with three out of the four main risks enunciated by George and 
Simons.49  
The first risk is that a target might decide that conceding to the demands is 
dishonorable.50 As the section on perceptions and assumption of rationality demonstrates, 
for the Taliban leadership, adherence to the Pashtunwali code was of paramount 
importance, given that the code itself is based on the overall concept of honor. The second 
risk of the ultimatum is that even if the target takes the threat seriously, it might still prefer 
to go to war. In this case the Taliban took seriously Washington’s capacity and willingness 
to use force but preferred to resist and opt for war. Finally, the target might try to lessen 
the coercive threats by ambiguous acceptance of the demands. The Taliban attempted this 
also through its decision to ask the Shoora to make the decision on bin Laden’s fate and 
also through its counter proposals to try bin Laden within Afghanistan. But this was not 
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enough for Washington because it might have left the terrorist infrastructure in place, even 
if Bin laden was somehow neutralized.  
This demonstrates that the U.S. had significant multiple objectives against the 
Taliban after 9/11, even if the regime change option was discounted. Merely securing the 
capture of Bin Laden was not enough; it was integrally linked to the destruction of 
Afghanistan as a terror base. Washington also did not modify any of its objectives, as 
suggested by the Taliban, through its proposals for an Islamic trial for Bin Laden. 
Furthermore, as already stated, Washington offered no reassurances to the Taliban that 
their regime would be maintained.  
 
Table 5: Taliban case - objectives  
U.S. Objectives Coercive diplomacy result 
- Ambiguous/mixed signals by U.S. Taliban convinced that ultimate U.S. objective was 
regime change (Type C CD) -  No reassurances 
- U.S. military strategy would have led to 
gains for Northern Alliance 
Asymmetry of motivation tilted in Taliban’s favor. 
 
 
CREDIBILITY OF U.S. THREATS 
Credibility of threats depends on the capacity and resolve of the coercer to carry out its 
threats. It also depends on how seriously the target state takes these threats. Key questions 
here involve – was the coercer in a position to carry out its threats? Was there adequate 
domestic leadership and resolve? What capacity did the target have to defend itself 
effectively against the coercer’s attacks? This section argues that even though the threats 
were credible enough and were backed with adequate international support, and were also 
taken seriously, nevertheless coercive diplomacy failed. This refers to the second risk of 
the ultimatum variant that is specified above, where the target considers the threats credible 
but prefers war anyway.  
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Soon after 9/11, the Bush administration prepared itself and the country for an 
aggressive response. President Bush told the American people that countering the terrorist 
network would require sacrifices by the military. After meeting military officials a few 
days after 9/11, he said, “I will not settle for a token act. Our response must be sweeping, 
sustained and effective. You will be asked for your patience, for the conflict will not be 
short. You will be asked for resolve, for the conflict will not be easy. You will be asked for 
your strength because the course to victory will be long.”51 In another nationwide address, 
Bush stated, “we’re gonna get ‘em running, find ‘em and hunt ‘em down,” and was 
supported by a 91 percent approval rating.52  
The determination to strike back was thus strong. After this attack on the American 
homeland, a spirit of bipartisanship and popular support emerged to back the 
administration in whatever counter-terrorist responses were undertaken. Within a week of 
the attack, the U.S. Congress passed a near unanimous joint resolution authorizing the 
president to use all required force to bring to justice the perpetrators of the September 11 
attacks. The fact that this move came less than a year after a contentious presidential 
election showed strong collective domestic leadership.  
Furthermore, soon after the attacks, the UN Security Council passed several 
resolutions condemning terrorism. The first one (resolution 1368) was passed on 
September 12, 2001, and it called for those responsible for the 9/11 attacks to be brought ti 
justice and that all such terrorist attacks are a threat to international security. Subsequently, 
resolution 1373, passed on September 28th, obliged member states to combat all terror 
activities and networks and aimed to bolster the collective ability of states to fight 
terrorism. Therefore, there was also considerable measure of international legal legitimacy 
for the U.S. position.  
The fact that some senior members of the administration favored a comprehensive 
attack on ‘rogue’ regimes and suspected terror bases around the world (such as Iraq), 
suggested that the administration was willing to seriously consider the strongest response 
possible, not just an air attack on Afghanistan. Therefore, key variables underlying 
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successful coercive diplomacy – resolve, strong domestic leadership and popular support – 
were demonstrated.  
The U.S. military geared up for possible military action and to back up coercive 
threats after 9/11. By October first week, American fighter aircraft were stationed in 
Tajikistan and airbases in Pakistan, and warships patrolled the Arabian Sea to act in 
support. There were initial hurdles to stationing U.S. military forces in the region. 
Countries that offered military logistical assistance wanted something in return. President 
Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan wanted the U.S. to effectively condone his regime’s 
imprisonment of thousands of political prisoners. The government of Oman, an important 
transit point for U.S. forces, wanted a major arms deal, while the Musharraf regime in 
Islamabad wanted the U.S. to remove economic sanctions and resume aid. But despite 
these conditionalities Washington was able to get these crucial partners on board. This 
showed the importance it attached to this objective as well as the strong resolve.  
The Taliban leaders and the population they controlled took U.S. military threats 
seriously. Their erstwhile allies in Islamabad informed them that if they did not surrender 
bin Laden, the U.S. would certainly attack.53 Meanwhile, the Taliban leadership started 
preparing the Afghan people to face the U.S. attack. Deputy Taliban leader Mohammed 
Hasan Akhund stated on the official Voice of Shariat radio that, “if America attacks our 
homes it is necessary for all Muslims, especially Afghans, to wage a holy war.”54 Further, 
thousands of Afghans started fleeing Kandahar and other Taliban-controlled cities towards 
the Pakistan border, in anticipation of the U.S. attack. Taliban units also deployed artillery 
and anti-aircraft guns on the borders with Tajikistan and Pakistan.  
However, U.S. intelligence reports concluded that the quality of Taliban forces was 
much lower than previously assumed. The conventional wisdom had been that the Taliban 
consisted of battle-hardened veteran guerrilla fighters who had successfully defended 
themselves against all invaders. This revised intelligence assessment, especially an 
influential study prepared by a former Afghan army colonel,55 only added to the credibility 
of U.S. threats (in U.S. perceptions).  
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But this assessment did not necessarily imply that because of the high credibility of 
U.S. threats, the Taliban would hand over bin Laden.  Nor did it mean that Washington had 
given up on coercing the Taliban. One indicator is that after the Musharraf regime 
reluctantly agreed to assist in operations in the region, at least two delegations of senior 
military and religious officials from Pakistan were sent to Afghanistan in order to convince 
the Taliban leadership to give up bin Laden.  
 
Implications: 
How did credibility of threats impact on the process of coercive diplomacy? 
As this section demonstrates, U.S. threats had high credibility. However, because the 
Taliban leadership was convinced that any military action that the U.S. did take would lead 
to regime change, it resisted Washington’s  demands. In coercive diplomacy if the image 
of war is too catastrophic for one side, its motivation to resist (if it is the target), or to apply 
further pressure (if it is the coercer) goes down. This leads to an advantageous position for 
the adversary. However, for the Taliban leadership, especially Mullah Omar, the image of 
war was not catastrophic and therefore a fight to death was preferred.  This contributed to 
the failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy because of the refusal of the Taliban leadership to 
take U.S. military threats seriously.  
Furthermore, despite the credibility of U.S. threats, the Taliban did not display any 
fear of unacceptable escalation and was willing to fight back. Considering that Afghanistan 
had gone through decades of civil war that had destroyed the country, there was not much 
left for the U.S. to threaten with destruction.56 Thus, there was nothing for the U.S. to 
escalate to which the Taliban had not already experienced and overcome. If the target state 
fears escalation of violence to a much higher level by the coercer, it becomes more willing 
to concede. But about ten days after the bombing started, Omar was still exhorting his 
followers to fight on, and called upon Muslims around the world to continue a holy war 
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against the U.S.57 The Taliban leader was (publicly at least) willing to sacrifice his life for 
Islam58 which showed that however potent U.S. threats were, they were incompatible with 
the Taliban leader’s stated objectives. 
From Omar’s perspective, the shared experience of the senior Taliban leadership as 
part of the Mujahideen’s fight against Soviet forces in the 1980s was another prominent 
reason for his seeming defiance in the face of overwhelming odds. Mullah Omar had 
himself been a senior Mujahideen commander, operating out of a strategically important 
base near Pakistan.59 His wounds in the conflict, including the loss of an eye, substantially 
enhanced his credibility.60 In an interview after the U.S. attack commenced, Omar vowed 
that the Taliban would inflict upon the U.S. “a much more bitter lesson” than that given to 
the Soviet Union in the 1980s.61 In another interview days after the bombing started, Omar 
stated that, “as for those who strike against us now, they have to know that the struggling 
nature of the Afghans and the geography of Afghanistan make our country a grave for the 
invaders.”62 He also dismissed the growing strength of the opposition Northern Alliance 
stating that it would meet “the same fate as those who allied” with Soviet forces during the 
civil war.63 It is perhaps with this legacy of anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in mind that in 
late September 2001, Omar appointed a trusted aide, Jalaluddin Haqqani as commander of 
all Taliban forces. Haqqani had fought against Soviet forces and was also a member of a 
tribe that maintained large numbers of militia fighters in its ranks64 (giving him substantial 
control over Taliban fighters). 
This leads to the conclusion, at least in Mullah Omar’s calculations, that the U.S. 
forces could be beaten back on account of the treacherous strategic geography of 
Afghanistan, denting the potency of U.S. coercive threats. And as the next section shows, 
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the Taliban leadership’s differing priorities were not taken into account by Washington’s 
policymakers. 
Table 6: Taliban case - Credibility of threats 
Credibility of threats Coercive diplomacy result 
- U.S. threat credibility high Taliban’s motivation to resist high 
- But Taliban convinced that regime change 
actual agenda. 
Asymmetry of motivation tilted in Taliban’s favor 
 
- Taliban leaders fought Soviet forces Confident of defeating U.S. forces, therefore 
determination to resist U.S. coercion high 
 
PERCEPTIONS 
Perceptions of the adversary, the situation, and one’s own side provide the basis for 
specific coercive strategies. In this case, one U.S. intelligence assessment of the situation 
in the weeks after 9/11 concluded that because of the lack of integration between the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda the two groups would eventually go to war with each other, though 
this assessment did not specify whether this implied that bin Laden would be handed 
over.65 Thus even within some U.S. intelligence agencies there was a faulty image and 
opinion of the cohesiveness of the Al Qaeda and Taliban alliance. As a later section states, 
while there were differences, the influence of Mullah Omar was overwhelming enough to 
counter any divisive tendencies. 
A key conceptual issue highlighted in the theory of coercive diplomacy is the 
assumption of rationality on the part of the target. The implication is that a rational target 
will make decisions based on a cost benefit analysis that takes into account a preference 
order assumed by the coercer. When the coercer assumes that the target is a ‘rational’ 
decision-maker, it (the coercer) might not necessarily consider the nature of the target’s 
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preferences.66 What might be rational for the target in its own social and cultural milieu 
might not be considered rational by the coercer. The target’s decision-making in that 
environment might be based on a set of preferences which it considers rational, but the 
coercer may not. And therefore, the coercer may apply a set of policies without taking this 
crucial difference into consideration.  
Thus, the strategy of coercive diplomacy stresses that instead of assuming pure 
rationality on the part of the opponent, the coercer has to take into account cultural, 
psychological, and political factors.67 But this was not necessarily the case in coercing the 
Taliban. The Taliban attached great importance in its policymaking to conservative Sunni 
Islamic law (Sharia) and Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the Pashtun people and tribes 
based in Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. But while the U.S. issued its demands to the 
Taliban, there was no acknowledgement of the fact that the Taliban might view the issue 
differently, or might suggest other methods of bringing bin Laden to justice (such as trying 
him in a third country). Thus, there was no space for compromise, which might have 
accommodated the tribal sensibilities of the Taliban.  
It is necessary to highlight the Taliban regime’s stance on these two levels – on the 
basis of Islamic jurisprudence/Shariat and on the basis of Pashtunwali. Initially, Taliban 
leaders refused to hand over bin Laden on Islamic principles. In his response to President 
Bush’s Congressional address on September 20, 2001, Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, 
Abdul Salam Zaeef said that handing over bin Laden or forcing him to move out of 
Pakistan would be an insult to Islam and the Shariat.68  
Thus the focus initially was to invoke Islamic principles for not surrendering bin 
Laden to the U.S. Prior to Zaeef’s statement, the Afghan Shoora officially asked bin Laden 
to leave the country voluntarily. As an earlier section had noted, with increasing American 
pressure after 9/11, Mullah Omar gave the Shoora (Council of the Ulema) responsibility 
for deciding bin Laden’s fate. This did not meet the Bush administration’s demands. 
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Neither did the other Taliban suggestion that bin Laden be tried according to Islamic 
principles, as long as evidence of his complicity was provided.   
Thus the Taliban, in its policymaking, cited Islamic religious principles, i.e., Sharia 
law, but was also influenced by Pashtunwali. The evolution of the Taliban stance shows 
how the intermingling of conservative Islamic principles and Pashtunwali lead to 
increasingly hard-line positions, culminating in the protection of bin Laden. The Taliban 
are adherents to the Deobandi stream of Sunni Islam that arose in British India in the 
nineteenth century as a reformist movement. After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, 
Deobandi madrasas proliferated in the country and also led to the creation of a political-
religious movement, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI).69 JUI became one of the largest political 
parties in Pakistan and eventually a powerful supporter of the Taliban and was quite vocal 
in its backing after 9/11.  
In the 1980s, JUI established thousands of madrasas in the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan for impoverished Pakistanis and Afghan refugees. 
However, mullahs at these madrasas had an agenda that was far from the reformist 
beginnings of the Deobandi creed.70 Their teaching of the Sharia was heavily influenced 
by the Pashtunwali tribal code as well as by Saudi-sponsored Wahabi tenets. The Taliban 
arose from these institutions and combined radical teachings from the Wahabi doctrine 
with the strict Pashtunwali code and an extremist variant of the Deobandi stream.  Through 
the JUI, the Taliban was also closely connected to extremist anti-Shia sectarian militant 
outfits such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) which had been involved in numerous acts 
of terror in Pakistan.71 Furthermore, links between the Taliban and extremist Deobandi 
groups in Pakistan were also strengthened by the fact that several leaders of these groups 
belonged to the same Durrani Pashtun tribe present on both sides of the border.72
Pashtunwali consists of a social code under which tribal councils, or jirga, decide 
on cases and disputes based on traditional laws and customs.73 The jurisdictional boundary 
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between Sharia and Pashtunwali has never been clearly defined, though the Taliban’s 
judgments and punishments were based largely on the latter.74 At the root of all 
components of Pashtunwali lies the concept of honor. The main component relevant to this 
study is ‘melmastia,’ or hospitality. Melmastia has several aspects such as providing food 
and shelter to outsiders who seek it, but it also involves defending the guest, a 
responsibility termed ‘nanawati.’75 This clause was the basis for the invocation of 
Pashtunwali to shelter bin Laden.  
But these two traditions (Sharia and Pashtunwali) do not necessarily coincide; in 
some matters they diverge strongly. Islamic law and Pashtunwali also differ on broader 
goals, with the Ulema (learned interpreters of the Sharia) favoring a movement away from 
tribal and ethnic loyalties toward a higher religious identity, while Pashtunwali highlights 
the importance of a certain value system (centered on hospitality, bravery, honor and 
chivalry).76 In this case, while Taliban leaders appropriated Islamic principles, their 
resistance was rooted more in the Pashtunwali creed. However, it was not just an 
adherence to the Pashtunwali code that the Taliban used as a justification. The Taliban 
leadership had claimed in 1998 that if it went against this code and expelled bin Laden, the 
regime would be overthrown.77 Thus the goal of regime survival was intertwined with the 
need to adhere to traditional tribal laws as well as religious principles. 
While the Taliban leaders based their decision on Pashtunwali, it was not as if the 
U.S. was unaware of this preference ordering. As stated above, in the late nineties, when 
Washington tried to apprehend bin Laden, the Taliban had made the same argument. 
According to recently released State Department documents detailing contacts with the 
Taliban, in 1998, the U.S. government communicated to the Taliban that bin Laden had in 
fact abused the Pashtunwali code because of his behavior unworthy of a guest.78 One U.S. 
diplomat who spoke to Mullah Omar in 1998 told him that, “bin Laden was like a guest 
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who was shooting at neighbors out of the host’s window.”79 Thus the U.S. had earlier tried 
to frame the issue differently. After 9/11, the priority allotted to Pashtunwali by the 
Taliban was disregarded by Washington. Even if it was considered by U.S. policymakers, 
this was not reflected in U.S. coercive diplomacy.  
According to one account, U.S. action both before and after 9/11 was based on the 
perception that since Al Qaeda was a non-state actor the Taliban (a state actor) would 
accord more importance to cooperation with the U.S. (another state actor) than to support 
bin Laden.80 If this view is accepted then it shows that U.S. policy was still largely rooted 
in Cold War era structures and had not taken seriously the changes in the international 
political system.  
However, while the importance of Pashtunwali for the Taliban cannot be 
understated, it is important to consider that during this crisis there were dissenting opinions 
from lesser known Pashtun leaders which suggested that this code was not as rigid as 
commonly assumed. Abdul Rahim Kham Mandokhel, a Pakistani Pashtun leader and 
former senator, stated during the crisis that according to the same Pashtun customs, the 
Taliban was obliged to give up bin Laden because actions of the guest are the 
responsibility of the host.81 According to this interpretation, the Taliban had two options – 
to either absolve bin Laden or hand him over to the U.S. for prosecution. Another Pashtun  
leader and politician based in Pakistan, Lateef Afridi, also stated that melmastia and its 
obligations on the host have its limits. According to Afridi, “As far as a foreigner is 
concerned, if he takes refuge in my house and has enemies, then it (melmastia) doesn’t 
apply.”82 This suggests that while the image that the U.S. had of the Taliban was not 
accurate, at the same time, the rigid Pashtunwali code was open to interpretation, at least in 
some quarters. Before 9/11, on at least one occasion, U.S. diplomats had tried to frame 
Pashtunwali in their own favor by stating that bin Laden had in fact violated the code. 
However, post 9/11 this line of reasoning was not explored further.  
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The Taliban leadership’s reliance on Pashtunwali and Islamic solidarity to protect 
bin Laden further eroded the asymmetry of motivation between the two sides. This attitude 
of adherence to traditional customs had a high priority (despite the dissenting opinions 
stated above) and was part of the Taliban’s fundamental interests. Therefore, since U.S. 
demands were seen as breaching the Taliban’s interests, coercion became more difficult. It 
must be noted here that U.S. motivation was not insignificant either – capturing bin Laden 
and neutralizing terror camps was a pressing national need.  
Implications: 
How did perceptions impact on coercive diplomacy? 
This section shows that while the U.S. was aware of the impact of cultural and religious 
factors in the Taliban’s decision-making, Washington did not give adequate importance to 
this factor. It is therefore likely that the assumption was that the massive international 
outcry would be enough to reduce the cultural/religious arguments in the Taliban’s 
policymaking that led to resistance. Indeed, Mullah Omar himself condemned the attacks 
immediately after 9/11.83
While there were other motivations, especially for Mullah Omar (see next section 
on internal factors), the point here is that the Taliban was able to adopt cultural and 
religious doctrines as a credible basis for resistance. The issue here is not that it may or 
may not have been the complete reason for the Taliban’s resistance; the issue is that in fact, 
the U.S. did not frame its arguments and demands that took into account the Taliban’s 
cultural mores. Thus, the deficiency of Washington’s coercive policy was not just in terms 
of understanding the target’s psychological decision-making, but also in a failure to 
communicate and signal in a manner that was compatible with Omar’s cultural and 
psychological mindset (since he was the primary decision-maker of the Taliban).  
It is therefore no surprise that after the Taliban’s fall, one of its senior leaders, 
Ramatullah Hashimi, stated that, “He (Omar) was a simple man who did not really 
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understand international relations.”84 Thus, while the U.S. articulated its demands on a 
security/strategic plane, Omar’s responses were based mainly on religious dimensions 
(such as his suggestion of Islamic courts to try Bin Laden) or cultural motivations (the 
adoption of Pashtunwali to justify protecting Bin Laden). 
This analysis shows that Washington’s coercive demands had the effect of 
increasing the Taliban’s motivation to resist, because the U.S. did not give adequate 
importance to the Taliban’s cultural priorities. Thus, while the U.S. motivation in this crisis 
was high, this was also increasingly the case with the Taliban. The initial condemnation of 
the attack and offers of an Islamic trial for Bin Laden soon gave way to a belligerent 
attitude by Mullah Omar based on an increasing resolve to resist U.S. forces. While other 
factors bound Omar to the Bin Laden cause, in the absence of any credible reassurance by 
the U.S. that his regime was not in danger, it was simpler for the Taliban to retreat into a 
cultural and religious decision-making shell.  
 
Table 7: Taliban case – Perceptions  
Perceptions Coercive diplomacy result 
- Increasing U.S. coercive demands after 9/11 Taliban was able to co-opt Pashtunwali code to 
protect bin Laden        did not adequately consider Taliban’s 
       cultural/tribal priorities  
  
 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Pashtunwali was invoked by the senior Taliban leadership to justify the protection granted 
to bin Laden. However, this alone does not explain the Taliban’s resistance and how this 
strong connection between bin Laden and the Taliban (especially Mullah Omar) 
developed. Other internal factors including financial and operational connections as well as 
Omar’s personal relationship with bin Laden strengthened the reliance on Pashtunwali.  
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Taliban’s drug profits and financial dependence on Al Qaeda 
A further hypothesis is that if the Taliban was somehow gaining financially or through 
some other vital sector from Al Qaeda, it would have been reluctant to hand over bin 
Laden to the U.S. Therefore, the crucial questions to be asked in this section are: What was 
the financial relationship between the Taliban and the Bin Laden – Al Qaeda network? Did 
Bin Laden have access to sufficient finances to transfer portions of them to the Taliban? To 
what extent were bin Laden and Al Qaeda involved in the drug trade from Afghanistan? 
Would the Taliban’s drug business have been affected if bin Laden was surrendered to the 
U.S.? 
U.S. officials had claimed after 9/11 that the link between the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda developed because of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade in Afghanistan.85 
While there is ample evidence of ties between various drug trafficking networks and terror 
organizations, it is unclear how bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network assisted the Taliban 
in furthering its drug revenue. In fact, the 9/11 Commission Report stated that though the 
Taliban received drug profits, there was no clear evidence that bin Laden was also part of 
the drug trafficking network or received any money from them.86 However, it is possible 
that through his intricate financial networks, bin Laden might have facilitated the Taliban’s 
drug activities, and according to some reports, bin Laden encouraged the Taliban to use the 
drug trade in its campaign against the West.87 Further, according to a September 2001 
British report, up to 3,000 tons of opium was stockpiled in Afghanistan, and a major 
proportion of this was held by bin Laden and his fighters.88 Therefore, there were some 
indications of bin Laden’s involvement in the drug trade, but these were never fully 
confirmed. On the other hand, the Taliban, while never directly involved in drug 
trafficking, profited by taxing the drug trafficking network.   
In the war against terror, one of the chief aims of the U.S. government was to 
destroy terrorist financial and logistical networks. The Taliban was using drug profits (to 
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varying degrees) to sustain itself and its activities. While the connection between Al Qaeda 
and Afghan drug trafficking is not very obvious, the Taliban was deeply involved in 
profiting from drug production.  When the group first emerged in 1994, clamping down on 
drug production was high on its agenda. It started out by closing hashish outlets and 
destroying large stocks of opium. But it became obvious that poppy cultivation was all that 
large sections of the ravaged population had in order to earn their livelihood. Therefore, 
cultivation was allowed but not for personal consumption, and Taliban religious scholars 
imposed a taxation system under which 5-10 percent of the output went to the Taliban, 
which kept two-thirds of that while distributing the rest among the needy.89 Taliban’s 
opposition to the drug trade was restricted to preventing its own populace from drug 
consumption. In an interview, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar said, ‘One thing, 
at least, is clear: we will permit neither opium nor heroin to be sold in Afghanistan itself. It 
is not up to us to protect non-Muslims who wish to buy drugs and get intoxicated… Our 
goal for ourselves is to gradually eliminate all drug production in the country so as to 
safeguard our youth.’90 Omar also admitted in another interview that the Taliban received 
taxes from the opium trade.91  
Other eyewitness accounts went further than this. They claimed that the Taliban 
aggressively encouraged the production of opium and in fact distributed fertilizers for this 
purpose.92 By 2001, the Taliban controlled 90% of Afghanistan and officially its 
leadership claimed to have acted stringently to eradicate the opium poppy and cannabis 
production. While the Taliban did ban the cultivation of poppy in 2000, it continued to tax 
the product. Through its monopoly position and the control of the level of production, it 
was able to facilitate a dramatic increase in prices, which resulted in higher profits.93
The argument being made here is that if bin Laden was given up, the drug trade 
would also have been under threat as it was a crucial fund raising tool for terror groups. 
And since Washington sought to degrade terrorist financial networks, ending drug 
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trafficking from Afghanistan would be a crucial step towards a long term solution. 
Therefore, this was a major threat to the Taliban’s income. As it happens, the group was 
already under major international sanctions by 2001.94 Thus, the decision to resist U.S. 
pressure was closely related to the Taliban’s regime survival agenda, even if Washington 
did not necessarily focus on regime change in the early stages of the campaign in 
Afghanistan.  
More obvious financial links between bin Laden and the Taliban were through 
direct assistance by the former,95 despite the fact that Bin Laden’s personal fortune had 
been reduced drastically during the 1990s. This reduction in his personal fortune came 
when bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in May 1996, causing him a loss of $300 million 
in investments in the country.96 This followed his financial losses in Saudi Arabia in the 
early 1990s when the government there clamped down on his activities. After his departure 
from Sudan, bin Laden rebuilt his financial network and, according to the 9/11 
Commission Report, by early 1998 he had become the ‘rich man of the jihad movement.’97
Bin Laden also received millions from wealthy Arabs who donated money either 
because they believed in his version of Islamic jihad or to buy protection in the event that 
fundamentalist Islamic groups owing allegiance to Al Qaeda overthrow the Persian Gulf 
monarchies.98 According to one report, Arab financial backers provided $16 million 
annually to bin Laden.99 An important network was the so-called ‘Golden Chain,’100 
comprising prominent individuals in the Gulf, which was formed in the 1980s to aid anti-
Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan. The money was used to build the terrorist 
infrastructural network for the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The 9/11 
Commission Report concluded that bin Laden ‘enjoyed a strong financial position in 
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Afghanistan’ through various sources such as the Saudi financiers and that the Taliban 
benefited from this largesse, financially and in other ways.101
Financial networks supporting Al Qaeda also included several charities operating in 
the Middle East. One of the most prominent of these was the Al Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, which was designated by the Treasury Department in June 2004 as a non-
governmental organization providing support to Al Qaeda.102 In Pakistan, through Jaish-e-
Mohammed chief Maulana Masood Azhar, bin Laden secured access to funds from the Al 
Rashid Trust, the second largest charity in Pakistan by 2002.103 Further, according to some 
reports, after 1997, the ISI arranged for bin Laden’s terror camps in places like Khost to 
train militants to fight in Kashmir.104 This system brought in more funds to bin Laden’s 
network, and considering he was operating in Taliban territory, it would be fair to assume 
that some portion of these profits might have gone to Mullah Omar. 
One indication of bin Laden’s relatively strong financial base was the increase in 
the annual budget of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad organization in 1998 from 
$300,000 to $500,000 after IJ decided to formally target the U.S. (By now IJ was formally 
affiliated to Al Qaeda).105 Even earlier, bin Laden had laid the foundation for his 
relationship with the Taliban in 1996 when he gave the group $3 million as it prepared to 
capture Kabul.106 Further, according to Russian intelligence sources, the unsuccessful 
attack on Bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan in August 1998 had left him with unexploded 
Tomahawk missiles, which he then sold to China for at least $10 million.107  
By 2001, Bin Laden already had more than one source of income to succeed his 
own personal fortune. News reports also stated that from early 2000 to mid-2001 bin 
Laden was spending up to $800,000 per month on acquiring ammunition, small arms, and 
rocket launchers from Soviet-era stockpiles.108 Even if this is an exaggeration, a smaller 
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expense account would still be quite substantial, suggesting a relatively deep Al Qaeda 
financial chest from which to support the Taliban. The argument that the Al Qaeda 
network funded the Taliban was corroborated by Taliban leader Mohammed Khaskar, 
former Taliban intelligence chief and deputy defense minister. He stated in November 
2001 that bin Laden controlled specific Taliban leaders by giving them money. He said 
that, “Al Qaeda was very important for the Taliban because they had so much money. 
They gave a lot of money. And the Taliban trusted them.”109  
While there is no clear trail of a Taliban-Al Qaeda drug trafficking nexus, it is 
reasonable to argue that with the U.S. war on terror networks, an important source of 
funding for the Taliban would have been disrupted. Further, Bin Laden’s financial 
assistance had helped shore up the isolated Taliban regime, which contributed to the close 
ties between them, adding to the impact of the Pashtunwali code. 
From the coercive diplomacy perspective, this shows the vulnerability of weak 
fragmented states, and the increased difficulty in successfully coercing such entities as the 
Taliban. One option would have been to break the financial relationship. This again 
highlights the importance of credible positive assurances or carrots, such as the promise of 
lifting economic sanctions.  Nevertheless, given that there were other crucial links between 
the Taliban and bin Laden, it is unclear if economic rewards would have led to the Taliban 
changing its stance.  
Furthermore, as we have seen there were significant differences within the Taliban 
itself regarding the treatment of bin Laden. This suggests that in weak states with 
competing power centers as well as external non-state benefactors (such as bin Laden), it 
becomes difficult for the coercer to decide on which group to apply coercion against. In 
such a scenario, the chances of spoilers emerging are also high.  
Operational links between Taliban and Al Qaeda 
A further explanation for the Taliban’s support to bin Laden lies in the principle of 
reciprocity. In the period before 9/11, bin Laden provided the Taliban with various levels 
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of military and operational support, apart from financial assistance. In fact unconfirmed 
reports also stated that for a period, bin Laden was defense minister under the Taliban 
regime.110  
This strong relationship between the Taliban and bin Laden was reinforced just a 
few days prior to 9/11. On September 9, 2001, two Tunisian Al Qaeda members, posing as 
journalists carried out a suicide bombing in Khwaja Bahauddin in Afghanistan which 
killed Northern Alliance chief Ahmed Shah Masood.111 According to U.S. officials, 
Masood had been key to neutralizing bin Laden after the Taliban leadership had firmly 
allied itself with Al Qaeda.112 Considering that Masood was the Taliban’s arch-enemy, this 
was a big favor from bin Laden and foreshadowed the events two days later. Recent 
revelations by a former Taliban foreign ministry official stated that the assassination of 
Masood was part of a plan by Al Qaeda to destroy the Northern Alliance and take the 
pressure off the Taliban.113 In fact, one U.S. FBI official was quoted as saying after the 
attack on Masood, “Bin Laden is appeasing the Taliban. Now the big one is coming.”114 
After 9/11, as the U.S. demanded bin Laden’s surrender, the Al Qaeda chief reiterated that 
Omar was his leader. In a statement on September 16, he said, “I am residing in 
Afghanistan. I have taken an oath of allegiance to Omar, which does not allow me to do 
such things from Afghanistan.”115
The Taliban also needed Al Qaeda’s assistance in maintaining security in areas 
under their control. There were indications of unreliability of some Taliban soldiers and 
officials as U.S. coercion began. When the bombings commenced, night-time security in 
Kabul and other prominent cities was taken over by foreign militants, generally Arabs, 
because local Taliban fighters were not considered good enough.116  As stated earlier, bin 
Laden’s network was on an arms buying spree in the year prior to 9/11. Reports indicated 
that the weaponry equipped the 055 brigade, a unit consisting of 500-2000 Arabs based at 
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Rishkor outside Kabul, and which was deployed with the Taliban on the Kabul 
frontlines.117 This brigade had two functions. The first was its role as an integral part of the 
Taliban army, acting as its shock troops, while the second was as Al Qaeda’s guerrilla 
organization.118  
This highly motivated and experienced group, composed mainly of non-Afghans 
was thus a very useful component of the Taliban’s forces, and had fought the Northern 
Alliance from 1997 to 2001. According to one U.S. defense official, “it is that part of Al 
Qaeda that appears to be exclusively dedicated to the support of the Taliban,” and is better 
motivated than Taliban soldiers.119  Documents recovered after Enduring Freedom also 
show that the 055 brigade was an important operational link between the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. Mullah Omar had appointed Jon Juma Namangani (leader of the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan – IMU) as head of this brigade before he was killed in an air attack on 
Kunduz in November 2001.120
Although the strategic links between Taliban and Al Qaeda became increasingly 
obvious after the U.S. intervention, they were not restricted to bin Laden’s assistance in 
militarily defending the Taliban. Evidence recovered from the regime’s facilities in Kabul 
after the Taliban’s defeat in November 2001, showed that the Taliban was at the very least, 
aware of Al Qaeda’s terrorist plans. These materials, found in a house belonging to the 
Taliban Ministry of Defense, included a flight-stimulator computer program, a list of 
flying schools, and chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare-related documents.121 This 
was yet another component of the multi-pronged connection between the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda, and demonstrated the symbiotic nature of the two groups.  
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Religious and Personal Connection between Bin Laden and Mullah Omar 
Apart from financial and operational links between bin Laden and the Taliban, personal 
and religious ties between them were also important factors that shored up the Taliban’s 
resistance to U.S. demands. This was particularly so when disagreements within the 
Taliban on how to treat bin Laden, emerged after 9/11.122 These differences were a 
reflection of broader differences between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. According to a then 
classified DIA document, “eventually the Taliban and Al Qaeda will war with each other. 
The weakness of both is in the minds of the individuals that belong to the groups and in the 
power that is given to them by their names. Al Qaeda have not integrated with Afghans or 
the Taliban, leaving them susceptible to exploitation.”123 Nevertheless, Omar quickly 
dismissed any perceived weaknesses in the public comments by Taliban officials and its 
envoys in Islamabad.124 However, Omar was able to throw the institutional backing of the 
Taliban behind bin Laden. To a large degree Omar was able to control his group’s attitude 
toward bin Laden because the Taliban’s practice of Islam rested on unrelenting loyalty and 
submission to the authority of a charismatic leader.125
The relationship began after Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan from Sudan in May 
1996 and it soon became clear that there were differences between bin Laden and Mullah 
Omar. In fact, for a time in the late nineties, the Taliban leadership, including Omar, was 
greatly concerned about bin Laden’s frequent provocative media interviews. On several 
occasions Omar ordered bin Laden to desist from these public pronouncements, and in fact 
got him to move his base from Jalalabad to Kandahar so that his activities could be 
regulated. Matters became more serious after the embassy bombings and the subsequent 
retaliatory missile attacks by the U.S., as bin Laden’s campaign threatened to split the 
Taliban and this infuriated Omar.126 The turning point came shortly afterwards when bin 
Laden swore loyalty to Omar and accepted him as Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the 
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Faithful).127 After this, Omar’s relationship with bin Laden was firmly established. In the 
nineties, as the U.S. sought to apprehend bin Laden, he sought Omar’s protection. In a 
letter found after the overthrow of the Taliban (letter’s date unspecified), bin Laden 
requested Omar not to surrender him to the U.S., and Omar wrote back agreeing to the 
request.128  
While the Taliban leadership espoused the Pashtunwali doctrine to justify 
protecting bin Laden, the push for this stance came from Mullah Omar. A significant 
proportion of Taliban officials dissented from this policy on bin Laden, as far back as 
1998. In a recently declassified State Department from September 1998, Abdul Hakim 
Mujahid, who was Taliban ambassador to Pakistan till 1998 before transferring to the 
Taliban’s UN mission, told U.S. officials that Omar was the main supporter of sheltering 
bin Laden and that 80 percent of Taliban officials including deputy Taliban leader, Mullah 
Rabbani, were against this policy.129 Thus the collective backing of the Taliban for bin 
Laden stemmed from Mullah Omar’s insistence on this position. The close personal 
relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar therefore helps explain why the Al 
Qaeda leader was not surrendered by the Taliban after the 1998 embassy bombings. 
Further, hardliners around Omar such as Justice Minister Nooruddin Turabi and 
intelligence chief Qari Hamidullah, encouraged Omar in his intractable approach.130 And 
by 2001, hardliners largely controlled the Taliban.131
Evidence of increasingly radical positions came in the form of three controversial 
actions by the Taliban. In early 2001, the ancient Bamiyan Buddha statues (dating 5th-7th 
century) in Afghanistan were destroyed by the Taliban. Then, Hindus in the country were 
ordered to wear identifying labels, and finally in August 2001, several western aid workers 
were arrested on charges of proselytizing. Therefore, by September 2001, the Taliban was 
becoming even more radical in its agenda and combined with bin Laden’s influence over 
Omar, this made its (Taliban’s) resistance even stronger.  
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Former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki bin Faisal, also backed the opinion 
that Mullah Omar had become increasingly influenced by bin Laden’s radical ideas by 
2001. In June 2001, Mullah Omar reportedly agreed to hand over bin Laden to Saudi 
Arabia. However, in September 2001, when Prince Turki went to Afghanistan to persuade 
Omar to give up bin Laden, he was rebuffed. Furthermore, Omar also reverted to bin 
Laden’s virulent criticism of the Saudi kingdom by condemning the presence of American 
troops in Saudi Arabia, and calling for a jihad there.132 Considering that Saudi Arabia was 
one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban (the others being Pakistan and the 
United Arab Emirates), and that Saudi Arabia also followed a variant of the strict Sunni 
Islam that Omar adhered to, this development was a major indicator of bin Laden’s 
influence.    
Bin Laden’s influence on the Taliban also stemmed from his wider international 
exposure to radical Islamic groups and movements. According to one author, as the 
Taliban regime became more isolated internationally, bin Laden’s influence on the group 
increased and he was able to introduce the ultra-conservative Wahabi doctrine of his 
homeland Saudi Arabia to the Taliban.133 One indication of this was the increase in public 
executions under the Taliban from 1997 onwards, in line with Saudi tradition.134 A major 
turning point in the Taliban’s march across Afghanistan was its defeat in 1997 in the 
northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif at the hands of Shiite Mujahideen troops. The 
accompanying massacre of hundreds of Taliban soldiers outraged its leadership, and when 
the United Nations’ reaction was not deemed satisfactory, it pushed the regime into an 
enhanced attitude of paranoia, deepening the resentment toward the West, which was then 
exploited by bin Laden.135
One line of opinion has also stated that bin Laden desired this kind of counter-
attack by the U.S. after 9/11 because this might then provoke the global Islamic 
community into waging war against the U.S.136 In a signed letter to Mullah Omar, dated 
Sept. 13, 2001, bin Laden stated that whatever the U.S. response to 9/11, it would lead to 
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its decline and destruction. If the U.S. did not retaliate, its reign as a superpower would be 
over, and if it did respond, its power would decline because it would be defeated in 
Afghanistan just like the Soviet Union in the eighties.137 With these calculations in mind, 
bin Laden was thus able to manipulate Mullah Omar’s backing (and by extension, the 
Taliban’s backing) for his broader goals.  
Honor Code Vs Political/Financial Connections 
The discussion on perceptions and internal factors might suggest a basic incompatibility 
between the Taliban’s adherence to the honor code and more worldly connections between 
bin Laden and the Taliban. One way to explain this seeming contradiction is that the 
financial, political, and personal relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar 
reinforced the need to adopt the tribal honor code to protect bin Laden. This does suggest 
that there might be some element of choice in whether to take recourse to a rigid tribal 
system, religious belief system.  
As stated in the second half of the perceptions section, there were some dissenting 
voices among Pashtun leaders who felt that this code was misrepresented. From the 
perspective of coercive diplomacy, if recourse to a cultural belief is a matter of choice that 
is left to a leader of a collective leadership, it means that there has to be a more thorough 
examination of the decision-making structure of the target. 
Implications: 
How did the various internal factors impact on coercive diplomacy? i.e., how did 
these factors bolster the Taliban’s decision to resist U.S. demands? 
The numerous internal factors show that interactions between the Taliban leadership and 
Bin Laden over the years had been substantial enough. Thus, for Mullah Omar, the implicit 
reassurances provided by the connection to Bin Laden outweighed the threat of U.S. attack. 
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These financial and military links between the Taliban and Bin Laden’s network were 
proven and did not necessarily rest on some future benefits from the Al Qaeda leader to the 
Taliban. Therefore, these internal links were a contributing factor to Omar’s decision to  
protect Bin Laden. 
From the coercive perspective, these shared links raised the strength of motivation 
on the part of the senior Taliban leadership, which then raised their stakes or level of 
national interest (defined in religious and cultural terms) in the dispute. The Bin Laden 
issue therefore incorporated several dimensions of firm links which provided a foundation 
for the decision to side with the Al Qaeda leader. As stated earlier, the tribal code of 
hospitality was already a major issue for Mullah Omar. When combined with other internal 
reasons for supporting Bin Laden, it contributed to the Taliban’s resistance to U.S. 
coercion. As the next section on international strategic environment shows, elements 
within Pakistan, acting as spoilers, further bolstered the Taliban’s resistance.  
 
Table 8: Taliban case: Internal factors 
Internal factors Coercive diplomacy result 
- Personal connections between bin Laden 
and Mullah Omar 
These links provided reassurances to Mullah Omar.  
Reinforced the adoption of Pashtunwali code to 
protect bin Laden. - Military links between Al Qaeda and 
Taliban  
- Financial support from Taliban to Al Qaeda  
 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
International support is a key variable favoring success in coercive diplomacy. For a 
regime that is already isolated internationally, withdrawal of support by a key ally would 
logically push it toward conceding to the coercer’s demands, especially if the demands do 
not necessarily focus on regime change. In this case, Pakistan, an erstwhile ally, did not 
just withdraw support, it also offered (albeit under some duress) military logistical support 
to the U.S. For the U.S., international support enhanced the credibility of its threats, once 
troops, aircraft, and warships moved in to the area around Afghanistan. These regional 
powers, such as Russia and Uzbekistan, had their own domestic political reasons for 
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supporting U.S. action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  However, while Washington co-
opted regional powers into its coercive policy, powerful elements within Pakistan 
subverted the intensity of this pressure. This compromised the extent of international 
support for the U.S. and also sent conflicting signals to the Taliban leadership. 
One of the first major steps taken by the U.S. government after 9/11 was to ensure 
that Pakistan gave military and diplomatic assistance in combating Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. Washington asked the Musharraf regime to provide all information 
it had on Al Qaeda and allow the U.S. military to use Pakistan’s air space if air-strikes 
were to take place. Soon after, on September 19, 2001, Musharraf delivered a televised 
address in which he explained to the Pakistani people why his government had decided to 
side with the U.S. against the Taliban. Islamabad’s official renunciation of its support to 
the Taliban was a major step in the campaign against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine. 
Pakistan’s political-religious and military establishment had been the Taliban’s staunchest 
ally since its evolution in the early 1990s in the madrasas of western Pakistan. Islamabad 
supported the Taliban in its fight against the Masood-led Northern Alliance, which, 
incidentally, was actively backed by India.138 Pakistan was also one of only three countries 
to diplomatically recognize the Taliban (the others were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates). Therefore, for the Taliban’s key sponsor to back out in this manner at the time 
of greatest need would appear to have been a major setback.  
International backing for U.S. action in Afghanistan also came from other regional 
actors, who had long-standing differences with the Taliban. Russia, which had experienced 
Islamist and separatist violence in Chechnya since the early nineties, did not pose any 
hurdles to U.S plans for using former Soviet republics such as Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan as military logistical bases. Ruling regimes in these states had serious 
differences with Islamic opposition movements, and all of them, barring Turkmenistan, 
had supported regime change in Afghanistan since at least 1999.139 Further, Iran which had 
serious differences with the Taliban, based on the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide, also assisted 
the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11. Russia and Iran also shipped significant quantities of 
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weapons to the opposition Northern Alliance. By the first week of October, even though 
the U.S. still had not declared the ouster of the Taliban as a major objective, the Northern 
Alliance prepared to take the lead in fighting the ground war. The Northern Alliance 
foreign minister Dr. Abdullah stated just before the attacks that the Alliance had a force of 
10,000 men to fight the Taliban.140 It is also crucial to note that initial calls by the U.S. 
State Department for obtaining evidence of bin Laden’s connection to 9/11141 did not pose 
any significant problems to gathering regional support.  
But while there was a diplomatic boycott of the Taliban after 9/11, this isolation did 
not extend to significant groups and political parties within Pakistan that supported the 
Taliban. Powerful politico-religious groups such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Afghan 
and Pakistan Defense Council defended the Taliban and stated that they would fight back 
if the U.S. attacked.142 Meanwhile, tribal groups in Pakistan’s Baluchistan and North West 
Frontier Province (bordering Afghanistan) mobilized to act in support of the Taliban, and 
according to some reports as many as 10,000 volunteers crossed over from Pakistan to 
fight for the Taliban.143
This hard-line attitude was also reflected among senior members of Gen. 
Musharraf’s military regime. When Musharraf took power in October 1999, one of his 
objectives was to lessen the role of fundamentalist extremist groups in the country’s 
political system, which was increasingly leading to sectarian violence. However, his 
military regime contained several senior military officers who had been radicalized over 
the years through General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamist agenda in the 1980s. After 9/11, as 
Washington tried to get Islamabad to put pressure on its Taliban allies, several of these 
officers disagreed with Musharraf’s tilt towards the U.S.144 Some of these officers, such as 
Lt. General Mohammed Aziz, Corps Commander Lahore,145 reportedly continued to 
provide information and logistical support to bin Laden and his coterie even as U.S. 
                                                 
140 ‘Russia’s arms to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan,’ The Pakistan Newswire, October 3, 2001. 
141 ‘The march to the brink of battle,’ The Observer, September 23, 2001. 
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coercion and the eventual air campaign began after 9/11.146 Further, Maulana Fazlur 
Rehman, leader of Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), which has always had close connections 
with the Taliban, stated that, “If Afghanistan is attacked, we will resist till the last drop of 
our blood… Government (Musharraf regime) agreement with the U.S. to extend the 
cooperation to it against Taliban is not acceptable to the nation.”147 Thus, sympathetic 
elements across the Pakistani military and religious establishment worked to build up the 
Taliban’s resistance. 
A more obvious indication of this came when Gen. Musharraf dispatched a 
delegation to the Taliban on September 16, 2001 to persuade it to comply with U.S. 
demands. The team included Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, head of a major Deobandi 
madrasa in Binori,148 and Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, who was at that time head of the 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). However, instead of conveying this forceful message, 
Shamzai encouraged Mullah Omar to begin a jihad against the U.S. if Afghanistan was 
attacked.149 Shamzai was a vital cog in the Taliban-Al Qaeda network, and also a patron-
in-chief of the Al Rashid Trust, which was banned by the U.S. for financing Al Qaeda.150 
Furthermore, while Gen. Mahmood was not known to be a fundamentalist Islamist he was 
one of the officers who had strongly supported the rise of the Taliban and who favored a 
Pashtun-dominated administration in Kabul if the Taliban was dislodged.151
Ahmed also reportedly sanctioned another visit to Kandahar by a delegation of 
retired ISI officers to advise the Taliban on defense against possible U.S. air attacks.152 He 
also persuaded Gen. Musharraf to cancel a direct meeting with Mullah Omar, ostensibly 
for security considerations.153 Such a meeting might have helped soften Omar’s position 
by emphasizing the serious nature of the threat, and would have conveyed differing advice 
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than the favorable, encouraging opinions offered by Pakistani religious and military 
delegations.  
As stated in the objectives section, by the second week of October, Islamabad 
realized that the Mullah Omar regime had to be replaced and its choice was a regime 
dominated by moderate Pashtun Taliban leaders. The September 16 visit thus has to be 
seen in this context. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when the visit took place, the 
Musharraf regime had not necessarily reached this conclusion (about the replacement of 
Omar). Therefore, when Musharraf sent a religious leader and an ISI chief, both with 
impeccable pro-Taliban credentials, it detracted from Pakistan’s pressure on the Taliban 
and possibly strengthened Mullah’s resolve to resist. This could have been avoided if the 
delegation had pressured Omar to concede, but as stated above, that did not happen, with 
Shamzai advising Omar to do the opposite.  In fact, after the visit, Shamzai implicitly 
endorsed Omar’s resistance by saying that, “we (Pakistani religious leaders team) are 
convinced that whatever Mullah Omar says is right and in accordance with Islamic laws 
and traditions.”154  
Apart from political support provided by these elements the Taliban reportedly also 
received direct military assistance from some groups within Pakistan. In November 2001, 
several news reports stated that as Northern Alliance and American forces advanced to the 
Northern Afghanistan city of Kunduz, hundreds of Pakistani army officers and intelligence 
officials were airlifted back to Pakistan in flights approved by the U.S. government.155 
According to Indian intelligence officials, about four thousand Pakistanis were evacuated 
in this airlift, including two Pakistani army generals.156 It is not certain when these 
personnel arrived in Afghanistan, but it is fair to assume that they were present there two 
months earlier, before the bombing campaign began on October 7th.  
If they had entered after that period, the possibility of being detected by American 
forces would have been high. Therefore, if we assume that these personnel were present 
with the Taliban in the period immediately after September 11, it is entirely possible that 
they would have contributed to the Taliban being more resolute in its resistance. This is 
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plausible for two reasons – first, the Pakistani personnel would have added to the 
manpower available to fight. Second, given the presence of Pakistanis there, Gen. 
Musharraf would have been less inclined to support the U.S. in carrying out its threat to 
attack.  Consequently, the clearest possibility is of spoilers disrupting the coercive process. 
Through political and military support they were probably able to bolster the defense and 
morale of the Taliban.  
Implications: 
How did the international strategic environment impact on the effect of U.S. 
coercion? 
Initially the international community, especially regional states such as Russia, Iran and 
Pakistan, was quite supportive of U.S. demands as well as its threats to the Taliban. 
However, non-state elements within Pakistan acted as ‘spoilers’ to the success of U.S. 
coercion. Even though these actors eventually were unable to successfully defend the 
Taliban against the U.S. military threat, they were able to help convince the Taliban 
leadership that U.S. coercion could be countered successfully. In this manner, they were 
able to manipulate the Taliban’s perceptions of its overall capability as well as its 
(Taliban’s) perceptions of the intentions of these ‘spoilers.’ 
These non-state elements, acting as spoilers, therefore provided reassurances to the 
Taliban, which the U.S. had not conveyed effectively. Once again the issue comes down to 
the differing consequences that each side concluded successful CD would lead to. The 
Taliban assumed that any military action by the U.S. or concessions by the Taliban would 
lead to overthrow of the regime. The U.S. did not unambiguously deny such an agenda, 
even though its primary goal was behavior change in the Taliban (Type B CD). In order to 
ameliorate the resulting insecurity, the Taliban was willing to accept whatever reassurances 
it could get, and the spoilers, in the form of Pakistani religious and military leaders, 
provided this through their encouragement and support.  
It is important to note that in this episode the U.S. had to engage with spoilers at an 
earlier stage also. Soon after 9/11, when the U.S. began to pressurize the Taliban, the 
Musharraf regime was a reluctant ally, hesitant to damage ties with the Taliban and 
inflame hard-line domestic opinions within Pakistan. At this early stage, senior U.S. 
  160
officials, including Secretary of State Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage 
weighed in on Gen. Musharraf demanding that Pakistan cooperate with the U.S. in battling 
terror networks based in Afghanistan.157 This was a clear example of anticipating potential 
spoilers before the coercive process begins.  
However, other spoilers were able to damage U.S. coercive diplomacy. This section 
demonstrates that even though the U.S. was able to gather regional support for its actions, 
in the case of Pakistan this did not work effectively. Political-religious groups and 
individual actors had their own agendas and acted as spoilers to undermine the Musharraf 
regime’s official commitment.  
 
Table 9: Taliban case – International Strategic Environment 
International Strategic 
Environment 
Coercive diplomacy result 
- Influential Pakistani religious and military 
leaders were sympathetic to the Taliban  
These entities acted as spoilers to U.S. coercion. 
- Reports of some unofficial military 
assistance to Taliban  
Bolstered Taliban resolve to resist U.S.  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that even though cultural and religious mores derived 
from tribal Pashtun culture provided the main justification for the Taliban’s support for bin 
Laden and resistance to U.S. demands, other factors helped reinforce the Taliban’s 
resistance. These included U.S. objectives, which were taken to amount to eventual regime 
change, and the military and personal influence that bin Laden had developed over the 
Taliban leadership, especially Mullah Omar. Furthermore, spoilers in the coercive process 
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  161
included elements within Pakistan. Thus, a combination of these factors enabled the 
Taliban to resist U.S. coercion.  
The lack of reassurances by the U.S. government also played a major role in 
shaping the Taliban’s decision-making. In the absence of such reassurances, the Taliban 
had to opt for entities it was familiar with – Bin Laden and sympathizers within Pakistan. 
On a basic level, therefore, it was the Taliban’s search for regime security that lead it to 
defy Washington’s demands. Thus, the Taliban’s stakes in the matter were already 
extremely high and therefore, asymmetry of motivation helped lead to failure of coercion. 
This case has broader implications for contemporary developments in the region. 
Since 9/11, the role of bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network has transformed into a loose 
umbrella group that provides ideological inspiration, contacts, and direction to cells around 
the world. Meanwhile, bin Laden and his second-in-command Zawahiri have managed to 
survive and have periodically sent video and audio messages through the media. By now it 
is generally assumed that they are hiding out in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan.158 
Even if the direct threat from this network has been reduced, the resurgent Taliban-related 
groups in the region (both Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan) are emerging as potent 
forces. Pashtuns living on the Pakistan side of the border have become increasingly 
radicalized in the last few years and extremists now dominate the Waziristan region.159  
Further, hard-line Islamist parties linked to the Taliban have now taken control of 
the government in Baluchistan province (which also borders Afghanistan), by democratic 
means. This symbolizes the fragmented nature of politics, society and economy in the 
broader region including Afghanistan and its neighbors. Ethnic and religious politics in the 
region has to be considered along side the devastated economy which is once again 
increasingly dependent on the production and transfer of illicit drugs.160 This means that 
conflicting parties have ample resources to carry on the fight, and it also makes them more 
resistant to ending these illegal economic activities. They develop a stake in perpetuation 
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of the status quo. The international community has to consider these intricacies of the 
region before adopting any future policies, whether coercive or conciliatory. 
 In recent developments, in September 2006 the Musharraf regime signed a deal 
with pro-Taliban tribes in the Waziristan region bordering Afghanistan. As part of this 
deal, the Pakistani army, which is supposed to combat Taliban and Al Qaeda elements, will 
withdraw, and militants in the region will be allowed to remain as long as they do not 
engage in violence. Considering the porous nature of the border with Afghanistan it is not 
far-fetched to assume that Taliban and its related groups will now mount bolder attacks 
within Afghanistan in an attempt to overthrow the Karzai regime. 
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 Factors affecting coercive diplomacy Consequence 
Perceptions ? Therefore Taliban refused to 
     give up Bin Laden.  - Faulty perception of Taliban’s preference 
ordering  
- Taliban’s concern was for adhering to 
Pashtunwali, under which a guest had to be 
protected. 
? U.S. did not try to frame  argument in this 
     manner, i.e., that a guest should not bring  harm to
      the host. 
 
U.S. Objectives  - Assumption by Taliban that U.S. wanted to 
  overthrow it. - Capture of Bin Laden and destruction of 
terrorist network in Afghanistan  - Destruction of terror camps would have negatively 
  impacted on Taliban’s firepower. - Ambiguity regarding regime change 
    Objective - Taliban refused to  surrender bin Laden 
- No reassurances were given to Taliban 
 
Credibility of U.S. threats However, for the Taliban image of war was not 
daunting, especially since it believed the U.S. 
eventually wanted regime change 
- High credibility of U.S. threats 
- Various UN resolutions supportive of U.S. 
actions Mullah Omar believed that the Soviet defeat would 
be replicated – contributed to Taliban’s resistance.   
Internal factors  
Taliban benefited financially from Al Qaeda 
and bin Laden 
Strengthened relationship  between Bin Laden and  
Mullah Omar, and gave the latter a disincentive to 
surrender bin Laden. • Money given by bin Laden 
 • Possible partnership in drug trade 
Operational links between Taliban and Al 
Qaeda  
International Strategic Environment  
- Presence of spoilers in the coercive 
environment 
Bolstered Taliban resolve to  resist  
Lessened isolation of Taliban. 
• Senior Pakistani religious and military 
leaders advised Mullah Omar to resist 
 
 
Table 10: Taliban case – Summary of arguments  
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4.0  OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM – FAILURE OF U.S. 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY? 
INTRODUCTION 
The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the subsequent occupation and insurgency became 
one of the defining actions of the George W. Bush administration. This chapter posits that 
the invasion of Iraq as well the resulting occupation was a failure of coercive diplomacy 
and asks why, in the face of the massive U.S. military build up and determination to go to 
war, Saddam Hussein did not concede. These coercive measures were part of ‘Type C’ 
coercive diplomacy, under which one state tries to force a change in the regime of the 
target state. Furthermore, in this particular case, an additional failure of CD stemmed from 
the resulting occupation of Iraq as well as the civil war-like situation in the country which 
has led to the loss of thousands of American lives and hundreds of thousands of Iraq lives. 
This was a failure of the coercive process and the decision-making structure to foresee 
such a situation.  
Soon after George W. Bush took office in January 2001, the administration 
espoused a much more aggressive line on various security issues facing the U.S. The 
administration’s attitudes on foreign policy were marked by a preference for unilateralism 
in the event that multilateral support for its actions was not forthcoming. The fact that the 
U.S. was now the sole super power (albeit with important rivals, most notably China) in a 
unipolar world added to this confidence. After coming to power, the Bush administration 
had shown its unilateralist tendencies by opposing the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the 
fledgling International Criminal Court. An aggressive attitude toward the Saddam Hussein 
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regime was a continuation of a broader trend toward aggressively remaking the world 
order, especially after the events of 9/11.  
As succeeding sections demonstrate, the Bush administration had decided to go to 
war long before the invasion in March 2003. Soon after 9/11, the administration sought to 
find connections between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein in order to justify military action 
against Iraq. It was clear to the international community that the Bush administration was 
aiming to take aggressive military action and was making the case for this by playing up 
Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and its alleged link to bin Laden. In such a 
scenario it would be reasonable to suggest that implicit coercion was in progress. In a 
situation where one side is determined to take military action against another state, there 
are naturally certain goals that it wants to achieve. Therefore, if the target can satisfy some 
of these objectives to avoid military action, it would imply that coercive diplomacy has 
succeeded. In any crisis (though generally not in cases of surprise attack), there is a period 
of time before military action by the coercer commences, and this is when coercive 
diplomacy can be successful if the target submits to the demands and fulfills the coercer’s 
objectives. In this case, the time period was considerable, even if we consider 9/11 as the 
beginning of more aggressive U.S. intentions toward Saddam’s Iraq.  
The concept of coercive diplomacy includes objectives under which the coercer 
seeks changes in the regime of the target state, and is termed as Type C coercive 
diplomacy. Therefore, the question that this chapter seeks to answer is – why did Saddam 
Hussein resist this Type C regime change coercive diplomacy?  The answer to this 
question lies in an examination of the period prior to the invasion in March 2003 through 
the concept of coercive diplomacy and focusing on the five major variables in this 
dissertation – objectives, perceptions, credibility of threats, international strategic 
environment and internal factors.  
Archetype 
This case study is an example of the use of Type C coercive diplomacy with the primary 
objective of stopping acquisition of WMD by a ‘rogue’ state. Counter-proliferation is a key 
element of U.S. foreign policy, and the U.S. government has considered several options for 
dealing with this problem. One such option is to facilitate regime change in a country 
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suspected of pursuing WMD programs. Given that states such as Iran and North Korea 
have begun (as of 2006) plans for possible nuclear weapon acquisition, it is important to 
examine what role coercion plays on states considering such strategies. 
Chronology 
The Iraq project concentrated the minds of several Bush administration luminaries after the 
first Gulf War. Many of these figures held prominent positions in the administration of 
President George H.W. Bush and during the nineties they voiced concern that Saddam 
Hussein represented a grave threat to the United States. This included an influential 1998 
statement by the Project for the New American Century (signed by several future Bush II 
administration officials such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Armitage) 
that advocated regime change in Baghdad. The first Gulf War had left Saddam Hussein 
still entrenched as ruler of Iraq. No-fly zones had been established to protect Shia and 
Kurdish populations, but that did not stop Saddam from brutally clamping down when the 
Shias rebelled after the war. The decision to leave him in power was regretted by 
prominent members of the first Bush administration, some of whom were now back in the 
second Bush White House. The unfinished nature of the objectives of the 1990 war was 
compounded by the fact that UN weapons inspectors after the war found that Baghdad’s 
WMD program (including its pursuit of nuclear weapons) had been much more advanced 
than previously assumed. 
In the years preceding 9/11, steps had been taken by the U.S. and its allies to apply 
increasing pressure on Saddam’s Iraq. These moves were based on the framework of a 
series of UN resolutions. One of the most prominent of these was UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 687 which led to the formation of the UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) charged with destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international 
supervision” of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons program and those of its ballistic 
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.1 The bargain here was that if Baghdad 
cooperated in dismantling its WMD programs, economic sanctions against it would be 
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lifted.2 But despite this seemingly straightforward bargain, Washington’s intention was 
regime change. According to President George H.W. Bush, speaking in April 1991, UN 
sanctions were meant not just for disarmament in Iraq but for the ultimate objective of 
removing Saddam Hussein from power.3 This was based on the opinion that while UN 
inspectors tried to ensure Saddam’s weapons programs were rolled back, there was always 
the suspicion that Saddam still aimed to acquire nuclear weapons and this pursuit would be 
resumed as early as possible. 
After 9/11, the clamor for action against Iraq grew among influential members of 
the policymaking establishment. This was touted as part of the campaign against terror, as 
well as an initial and necessary step towards bringing about paradigmatic change in the 
Middle East. The ‘domino effect’ which concentrated U.S. strategic minds during the 
Vietnam War, played a role in this instance also. Regime change in Iraq would lead to a 
democratic domino effect through which repressive, unfriendly regimes in the region 
would be replaced by democratic ones. Regime change through force or the threat of force 
thus became an integral part of post 9/11 U.S. foreign policy. This paper attempts to 
explain a major case study of U.S. foreign and military policy. Its importance stems from 
the fact that there are still several other states against which regime change is one of the 
objectives being considered.  
OBJECTIVES 
This section deals with a key element of coercive diplomacy – the kind of objectives that 
the coercer has in putting forth its demands. One of the key elements of a coercive 
diplomacy strategy is that the higher the magnitude of the demand, the more difficult it is 
for the target state to concede. Conversely, a more reasonable demand, which provides 
more room to maneuver for the target has a higher chance of succeeding. This section 
makes two main points. First, that the U.S. pursued regime change as the main, non-
negotiable demand, which broadened objectives, detracting from effective coercion. 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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Second, intelligence presented by the Bush administration was too distorted for a reliable 
case to be made for effective coercive diplomacy.  
A guiding principle of coercive diplomacy is that one way for the coercer to turn 
the asymmetry of motivation in its favor is ensuring that the demands do not go against the 
basic fundamental interests of the target, and should be restricted to the interests of the 
coercer only. In this case however, regime change was the main agenda, which by its very 
nature goes against the interests of the target regime. Therefore, this ensures that the target 
has a fundamental stake in resisting the coercer’s demands. Toning down the objectives 
can still increase the possibility of some settlement. Merely a few changes in the target 
regime (such as the removal of some personnel) can still leave the asymmetry of interests 
in favor of the coercer. But in this case a comprehensive regime change agenda left the 
Saddam Hussein regime with much more at stake in the confrontation. Thus the 
asymmetry of motivation tilted in favor of Baghdad.4 Throughout the pre-Operation Iraqi 
Freedom phase, the Bush administration argued its case from a type B approach – i.e., roll 
back of Iraq’s WMD programs, while simultaneously arguing that this variant of coercive 
diplomacy was not possible without the success of type C (forcing changes in the target’s 
government).  
When the Bush administration came into office in January 2001, its foreign policy 
posture was more aggressive than that of the outgoing administration, and this posture was 
reflected across several issues. Officials were reluctant to offer too many concessions to 
North Korea under the then ongoing Agreed Framework deal.5 Senior members of the 
administration had been advocating tougher measures against ‘rogue’ regimes during the 
nineties. For example, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been involved in an 
influential report on the growing missile threat from such ‘rogue’ nations. Thus, even 
before the events of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration was gearing up to take 
action against hostile regimes, such as North Korea and Iraq.  
                                                 
4 An interesting contrast here would be to compare this case with that of coercive diplomacy in Laos, 1961-
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With 9/11, the quest for regime change in Baghdad received fresh impetus. The day 
after the attacks, at a National Security Council meeting, Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld suggested that along with Afghanistan, Iraq should be a primary target; his 
deputy, Paul Wolfowitz strongly concurred.6 Wolfowitz advocated military action against 
Iraq even though the blame pointed mainly toward the Osama bin Laden-led Al Qaeda and 
its support structure in Afghanistan in the form of the Taliban. Thus some influential 
members of the administration sought to frame the issue of regime change in Iraq as part of 
the broader anti-terrorism campaign. In October 2001, the campaign in Afghanistan began. 
As Taliban and Al Qaeda elements were being rounded up, slowly but steadily the clamor 
for action against Iraq gained ground in the administration. By November 2001, President 
Bush asked Secretary Rumsfeld to consider plans for war against Iraq.7 In early 2005, 
British government memos, dating back to July 2002, revealed that the Bush 
administration had decided on regime change in Baghdad through military action as early 
as July 2002, if not earlier.8
In January 2002, in his State of the Union address, President Bush labeled Iraq as a 
member of the ‘axis of evil.’ He further stated that ‘axis of evil’ states like Iraq posed a 
threat to the world not just because of their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction but also 
because they would be inclined to transfer these weapons to terrorist groups.9 Thus by 
linking Iraq to two of the most severe threats facing the U.S. (WMD proliferation and 
terrorism), the administration sought domestic and international support for its actions.  
Clearly, the primary objective for a group of influential U.S. policymakers was 
regime change in Baghdad. However, the rationale for this objective (regime change) was 
extremely broad and included the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the 
Saddam regime. By the end of 2001, the goals for the Iraq campaign were regime change, 
eliminating any ties to WMD proliferation and terrorist networks and removing the danger 
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from Iraq to any of the neighbors, especially Israel.10 By any standards this was a tall 
order. The rationale moved from WMD pursuit, to connections to Al Qaeda to democracy 
promotion. This betrayed a lack of clarity of objective, which is a key factor favoring 
successful coercive diplomacy. In contrast, Operation Desert Storm in 1991 had limited 
objectives and enabled international consensus for action to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait.   
Simultaneously some relatively moderate members of the administration such as 
Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage at the State Department, endorsed a plan 
centered on persuading Saddam to admit further UN inspections.11 President Bush also 
publicly stated in November 2002 that Saddam should allow weapons inspectors back in, 
saying that “he’ll find out” the consequences if he did not.12 This has to be examined in 
context of attempts by the United Nations to send inspectors back into Iraq as a way of 
avoiding war. Between March and May 2002, United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan tried to persuade the Baghdad regime to allow in inspectors, but in vain.  
One analysis has suggested that for the U.S., the minimum objective was not 
regime change but in fact removing the threat of WMD proliferation, and in this context, 
President Bush stated in a September 2002 speech at the UN that, “If the Iraqi regime 
wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally foreswear, disclose, remove, or 
destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles and all related material.”13 
Then in December that year, weapons inspectors did go back to Iraq. The Iraqi dictator’s 
opinion was that by allowing weapons inspectors back and allowing them complete access, 
Washington would lose its rationale for invasion.14 Thus for a short period, the signal was 
that an objective short of regime change might be considered; but soon the objective 
reverted to regime change as the only way to ensure that Iraq’s future WMD capabilities 
and intentions were destroyed. The inspectors remained there till March 2003, and certified 
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pg. 29. 
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that Iraq was not running a nuclear weapons program.15 In October 2003, this was 
subsequently endorsed by the Iraq Survey Group team led by David Kay. The Duelfer 
report also reached the same conclusion.  
It is interesting to juxtapose the unilateral and multilateral tendencies of U.S. 
coercive diplomacy, whereby the administration tried to convince the international 
community, and specifically the UN Security Council, that its threat of unilateral action 
against Iraq was real, which would then spur the UN to act more strongly.16 This led to UN 
Security Council resolution 1441 (Nov. 2002) which warned Iraq a final time to comply 
with its commitment to disarm. However, the serious difficulty here was that even if Iraq 
partially complied with the UN resolutions, this would not have been enough and the U.S. 
would then interpret it as a material breach and opt for military action. This is eventually 
what happened – Iraq did allow weapons inspector back in, but it was not adequate for the 
Bush administration. Regime change, by its very nature, raises the stakes for the target 
state because that is the most fundamental interest.  
Information manipulation and clarity of objectives 
Prior to the war there were three main reasons given for military action against Iraq.17 First 
was the accusation that the Saddam Hussein regime was linked to the 9/11 attacks. 
Evidence for this was a reported meeting between an Iraqi intelligence operative and 9/11 
terrorist Mohammed Atta in Prague in April 2001. But this claim was refuted on several 
occasions, by agencies such as the FBI and CIA.18 Nevertheless, this claim was repeated 
by administration figures, notably Vice President Cheney. There were also allegations of 
connections between Al Qaeda and the leader of the Al Tawhid terror group, Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, even though Zarqawi’s group had been operating from the Kurdish region in 
northern Iraq, which was not under the control of Baghdad.  
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As recent official U.S. government reports have indicated it was difficult to prove 
that Saddam had links to terror groups, whether Al Qaeda or Zarqawi, simply because 
Saddam himself was opposed to these outfits. According to a declassified report by the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hussein in fact repeatedly turned down overtures 
from Al Qaeda and had in fact tried to apprehend Zarqawi, and according to former Deputy 
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi dictator “only expressed negative sentiments about bin 
Laden.”19
But it is not as if the administration had been unaware of the Saddam’s lack of 
connections to terror groups. In January 2003, a CIA report concluded that, “Hussein 
viewed Islamic extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat.”20 Nevertheless, the very next 
day, Vice President Cheney stated that the Saddam regime “aids and protects terrorists, 
including members of Al Qaeda.”21 The administration played down a crucial difference. 
Saddam, while an authoritarian dictator, was a secular Arab, as was the case with the 
Ba’ath Party right from its inception. He did adopt Islamic nationalism periodically to 
further his appeal; however, the basis for his rule was secularism. In contrast, Al Qaeda 
and its various adherents such as Zarqawi always adopted a radical, extreme and sectarian 
version of Islam, which condemned the officially secular regimes in the Arab world, such 
as Iraq and Egypt.  
The second reason given was that Iraq was moving towards acquiring nuclear 
weapons capability and already possessed considerable stocks of chemical and biological 
weapons. In August 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney warned the American people that 
Saddam was “armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror,” and that he could 
“directly threaten America's friends throughout the region and subject the United States or 
any other nation to nuclear blackmail.”22 Administration officials stated that Baghdad’s 
nuclear weapons program had continued after the 1991 Gulf War. According to President 
Bush in September 2002, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
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calculated that Iraq could develop a nuclear weapon within six months.23 Such decade-old 
calculations were used by the administration to refute counter-arguments that Iraq was 
actually years away from developing nuclear weapons.24 They also contended that IAEA 
inspectors had failed to completely dismantle Iraq’s nuclear program after the first Gulf 
War. Therefore, Iraq would have had a standing nuclear program after 1991 through which 
to continue its weapons development.  
Officials claimed that since Iraq already possessed a nuclear weapon design, if it 
acquired fissile material it would be in a position to manufacture a weapon.25 For some 
time, the Bush administration also claimed that Iraq was trying to procure uranium from 
Niger, a claim that was refuted by the CIA26 and other administration officials. 
Furthermore, the Senate Select committee report (mentioned above) also concluded that 
the anti-Saddam Iraqi National Congress (INC) which was favored by the Department of 
Defense had in fact given false information to the U.S. government about Iraq’s WMD 
programs.27   
Such distortion of the intelligence analysis process then influenced the National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s weapons program in October 2002. The report while, 
extremely detailed, and containing dissenting opinions on Iraq’s WMD pursuit, only 
resulted in a one page summary being presented. This summary itself had contentious 
conclusions, especially dealing with Iraq’s alleged hunt for aluminum tubes, findings that 
were disputed by the State and Energy Departments’ intelligence branches.28 Throughout 
2002, while the U.S. and the United Kingdom repeatedly insisted on the availability of 
reliable intelligence on Iraq’s WMD pursuit, it was never disclosed to the UN Security 
Council, and even then policymakers cautioned that no one should expect a smoking 
gun.29
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Third, the administration stated that regime change in Iraq was required to promote 
democracy in the Middle East, because once Iraq was transformed into a democracy it 
would lead to a domino effect and introduce democracy to other authoritarian countries in 
the region. President Bush’s opinion in framing this argument was that by fostering 
democracy and human rights in the Islamic world, their societies would be reformed 
thereby reducing the threat from terrorism.30  However, from the standpoint of coercive 
objectives, several questions remained unanswered, such as – How would such an 
expansive democracy objective impact on U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that 
were less than democratic? What if the imposition of democracy led to radical Islamist 
parties with links to terror groups gained parliamentary power (such as the case of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon)? Such issues only added to the lack of clarity of objectives and 
broadened the magnitude of demands to unmanageable levels. 
The purpose of this summary is not to point out the shortcomings of the Bush 
administration’s arguments for the invasion of Iraq, but to show that a defective line of 
reasoning (by the administration) was used to bolster the case for regime change and 
impacted on components of coercive diplomacy. Key elements of coercive diplomacy did 
not operate in favor of the U.S., especially the clarity of objectives. This multiplicity of 
objectives which resulted in a high magnitude of demands reflected a lack of fundamental 
knowledge of Iraqi society and Iraqi attitudes. According to the Defense Science Board, a 
Pentagon advisory body, “it is clear that Americans who waged the war and who have 
attempted to mold the aftermath have had no clear idea of the framework that has molded 
the personalities and attitudes of Iraqis.”31
Such an approach to intelligence analysis and information processing makes it 
more difficult to build a case to the international community and distorts the coercer’s 
decision-making. Ideally, if there was unrelenting pressure from the international 
community, especially important states such as Russia and France, there would have been 
a better chance of successful coercion. However, with contentious and contradictory 
arguments put forth by various sections of the government and intelligence agencies, and 
no conclusive proof of Saddam’s connections to terrorism or any recent pursuit of WMD, 
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it was difficult to convince the international community. As a later section mentions, the 
U.S. had effectively downgraded the importance of the international endorsement; 
however, this was not necessarily true of Saddam.   
Furthermore, as the theory of coercive diplomacy specifies, one way of reducing 
the target’s motivation to resist is by bringing down the magnitude of demands. The 
preceding analysis showed that the opposite happened. A second method is to offer 
carrots/concessions. However, this element was conspicuous by its absence. With an 
objective as extreme as regime change it is inherently difficult to offer any concessions, 
especially when the target is a regime like Iraq’s in which the paramount objective is 
regime survival.   
Preventive war and justification of hostility 
The Bush administration also argued the case for overthrowing Saddam Hussein from the 
conceptual standpoint of preventive war, in the belief that war with Iraq was inevitable.32 
The contention was that preventive war was necessary because deterrence and containment 
of Saddam was not possible in the future. The administration argued that if the U.S. did not 
act immediately and strike at future threats, the consequences might be disastrous for 
America, even if they were not immediate.33  
However, while the characteristics of the case were in favor of the preventive war 
option (meaning that while there was no imminent threat, the adversary might develop the 
capacity to strike in future), it is actually a pre-emptive situation that favors more effective 
coercive diplomacy. In a pre-emptive scenario, the threat from the target is imminent and if 
the coercer does not strike, the target would definitely attack. Therefore, making the case 
for coercive diplomacy is easier in a pre-emptive scenario, and important components such 
as establishing a sense of urgency in the target can be fulfilled. It also then makes it easier 
to convince the international community, leading to isolation of the adversary.  
But even with manipulation of intelligence, Washington could not effectively make 
the case that Saddam’s Iraq was an imminent threat, and therefore the case had to be 
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effectively argued from the preventive war perspective. But preventive war is fraught with 
obstacles that are relevant to the conduct of coercive diplomacy. First, information on 
future threats is never completely certain or unambiguous, and second, information on 
capabilities and intentions can be open to various interpretations.34 This was a particular 
problem in the Iraq case with disputes in the government over Saddam’s connections to 
terror groups and the regime’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.   
At this point it would be useful to discuss an alternate theoretical concept – 
Justification of Hostility Crises. According to Richard Ned Lebow, “Justification of 
hostility crises are unique in that leaders in the initiating nation make a decision for war 
before the crisis commences,” not to force a compromise but in fact, to provide a 
justification for the war before the crisis begins.35 This concept helps frame the type of 
provocation into an advantageous contextual variable of successful coercive diplomacy. 
Briefly, the ‘type of provocation’ impacts on the ability of the coercer to define the 
culpability of the target state. Covert sponsorship of terrorism is more difficult to pinpoint, 
while an unambiguous violation of an established boundary is easier to prove, providing 
international legitimacy for the coercer.36
Recent reports show that this route was attempted by the Bush administration, even 
before it raised the issues of WMD proliferation and terrorism links to indict the Saddam 
Hussein regime. In 2002, in an operation codenamed Anabasis, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) planned to use exiled Iraqi soldiers to capture an air base inside Iraq and 
then when Saddam retaliated and violated the no-fly zone, use that as a justification of war 
and eventual regime change.37 The plan was cancelled by Central Command chief Gen. 
Tommy Franks, but these fighters who were trained by the CIA were used for disruptive 
activities in Iraq prior to the invasion. This was therefore an attempt to manipulate the type 
of provocation element of coercive diplomacy. A clear violation of the no-fly zone by 
Saddam was a more direct provocation than suspected (but as yet unproven) WMD and 
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terrorism links. However, as it happened, in the post 9/11 period, Washington preferred to 
go with ‘weightier’ issues with which to justify type ‘C’ coercive diplomacy.  
We can therefore argue that the Bush administration forced a crisis in order to 
justify a military attack. But it can also be argued that the more realistic and serious the 
threat of military attack, the better the chance of success of coercive diplomacy. Thus 
creating such a hostile situation can force the adversary to realize the seriousness of the 
coercer’s threats. However, while the type of provocation can be used to acquire 
international legitimacy for coercive actions, this legitimacy also has to be present in the 
minds of policymakers in the target regime. As the section on perceptions shows, this was 
lacking in the mind of the main decision-maker in Iraq – Saddam Hussein.  
Implications: 
How did the magnitude of objectives impact on coercive diplomacy? Did the U.S. try 
to modify/moderate its demands and objectives? 
In its campaign against Iraq, the U.S. proclaimed several objectives. These included 
prevention of WMD proliferation/acquisition by Saddam Hussein, ending his regime’s 
alleged links to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and finally, democracy promotion in 
the Middle East. As is clear, coercive diplomacy is most effective when limited objectives 
are being pursued. However, in this case, the Bush administration retained these objectives 
and in fact, posited that only regime change would effectively complete the mission.  
Despite these multiple goals, the administration did not modify or moderate its 
objectives. On the contrary, in order to justify the regime change agenda, newer objectives 
were added to make the case to the American people and the international community. 
Thus, Saddam’s links to WMD production and acquisition as well as alleged Al Qaeda 
connections were used as initial justifications. Subsequently, when WMD links were 
finally refuted, democracy promotion was forcefully adopted38 to retroactively justify 
regime change. Thus, in pursuit of Type C coercive diplomacy, Washington kept adding 
Type B goals (behavior change objectives) that were either refuted (WMD, Al Qaeda 
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links) or which were too broad and contradicted limited objectives (democracy promotion 
in the Middle East).  
 
Table 11: Iraq – Objectives  
Objectives Clarity of 
Objectives 
Magnitude of 
demands 
Type of provocation 
Type ‘C’ coercive 
diplomacy 
 
Regime change 
Arguments ? 
 
 
 
 
- WMD proliferation 
- Connections to Terrorism 
- Promotion of democracy 
 
Reduced clarity of 
objectives. 
 Type of provocation 
not a clear violation of 
territory or 
international law, but 
speculation on WMD 
connections and terror 
links, therefore, 
difficult to prove case.  
Very high 
magnitude, broad 
objectives 
 
CREDIBILITY OF THREATS 
While U.S. military capability was considerable and up to the task of dismantling the 
regime, Saddam Hussein did not take this capacity seriously and implicitly refused to 
accept the credibility of these threats. Saddam assumed that the U.S. would never invade 
Iraq because it did not have the capacity to tolerate mass casualties in battle and also felt 
that the U.S. was a ‘paper tiger’ incapable of a strong forceful response.39 This reason for 
this confidence was that U.S. military strategy and action in the decade preceding the 2003 
invasion did not measure up to Saddam’s definition of a threat.  
During the first Gulf War, the U.S. spent considerable time in its air campaign 
before sending in ground troops, and even then it permitted most of the Republican Guard 
to survive, actions which did not pose any threat to the regime itself. Furthermore, after the 
war, the U.S. did not come to the aid of the Shia rebels who were then brutally defeated by 
Saddam’s forces. U.S. actions in other areas of the world also did not provoke any 
apprehension in Saddam. U.S. evacuation of its troops from Somalia in 1993 was, for 
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Saddam, a confirmation of his preconceived notions. Even when the U.S. launched its air 
attack on Serbia it did not change these opinions, because by then his regime had 
demonstrated that it could survive a no-fly zone and U.S. air attacks.40 In the most recent 
episode before the 2003 invasion, that of Afghanistan in 2001, Saddam felt that the U.S 
had overthrown a weak enemy with yet another air campaign and Special Forces soldiers, 
while the bulk of the ground war was conducted by the Northern Alliance.  Furthermore, 
when the U.S. had its chance to capture bin Laden in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, 
it flinched and let him escape.41
Therefore, this suggests that Saddam took selective lessons from the pattern of U.S. 
military actions in Iraq and elsewhere and applied it to the most recent crisis. Saddam 
therefore concluded that the kind of military action that the U.S. was used to performing 
would not be a threat to his regime’s survival. In particular, the use of a massive ground 
force was a key issue. Since, in past operations, the U.S. had not committed the kind of 
ground force that would be required to overthrow his regime, Saddam was confident that it 
would not do so this time either.   
According to former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, “A few weeks before 
the attacks, Saddam still thought the U.S. would not use ground forces. He thought they 
would not fight a ground war because it would be too costly for the Americans.”42 Saddam 
also changed his defensive strategy to suit this mindset. In December 2002, Saddam 
changed his plan for the defense of the capital. The long-standing plan had been to deploy 
Iraqi forces along any invasion route in order to degrade any incoming army. The new plan 
called for the troops to be stationed in defensive rings around Baghdad.43 Therefore, 
Saddam’s attitude reflected a priority to defend the capital, if the invading arm was able to 
reach there, while the loss of the rest of the country was acceptable.    
Before the invasion began, one opinion stated that in order to depose Saddam 
Hussein, the U.S. would have to achieve control of Baghdad and that if Washington was 
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not able to lure significant sections of the Iraqi military to defect, a major invasion force 
would be required.44 Apart from the military aspects, the U.S. would also have to form a 
full-fledged administration for the whole country. Even on the question of Saddam’s 
pursuit of WMD capabilities, U.S. analysts were not certain prior to the 2003 invasion, 
how effective earlier U.S. strategies against Saddam’s regime, such as Operation Desert 
Fox had been.45  
The existing war plan (in 2001) against Iraq, Op Plan 1003, was seen as a 
cumbersome strategy involving 500,000 troops, and was a replication of the first Gulf 
War.46 This was not acceptable to the top defense leadership, especially Secretary 
Rumsfeld who wanted a leaner invasion force and a plan that could be implemented very 
quickly, even by spring 2002.47 Later, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, 
testified in the weeks before the invasion that the occupation of postwar Iraq would require 
several hundred thousand troops, a figure that was dismissed by Deputy Defense Secretary 
Wolfowitz.48
Two points need to be noted here. First, that the original war plan for invading Iraq 
and overthrowing Saddam Hussein required about half a million troops and this 
requirement was also recognized by outside analysts. Second, Saddam did not believe the 
U.S. could invade with a force that was sufficient to bring about regime change. And this 
seemingly insufficient force was exactly what was deployed. Thus taking into account 
Saddam’s preconceived notions on U.S. capacity and intentions, the eventual invasion 
force was less than adequate, detracting from the credibility of U.S. threats, at least in the 
Iraqi ruler’s decision-making framework. 
Evidence that Saddam did not expect U.S. forces to reach the capital also comes 
from the fact that he had no real plans to escape Baghdad - and his eventual departure from 
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there was conducted in haste.49 Furthermore, two months before the invasion Saddam 
ordered the Iraqi air force to stay away from the conflict. His reasoning was that the air 
force planes were extremely inferior to the opponent’s and therefore they needed to be 
shielded for use in future campaigns.50 Given his existing sense of security threats, these 
campaigns were probably meant to be against internal rebellions or Iran. Nevertheless, 
some recent evidence (through captured documents) also indicates that there was some 
planning in Baghdad for an insurgency campaign in the pre-war period. One opinion has it 
that Saddam Hussein’s regime did not concede to the U.S. also because it decided to rely 
on an anti-occupation insurgency which would make it too costly for the U.S.-lead 
coalition to remain in Iraq.51  
This insurgency was based initially on Saddam’s fanatical Fedayeen fighters, who 
had originally been formed to deal with internal threats, especially from the Shias. The  
ferocious fight by the Fedayeen, who were dispersed around the country, was not expected 
by the U.S. military leadership in the run up to the invasion.52 Thus, Saddam’s effective 
military strategy involved a strong defensive ring around the capital (dominated by the 
Republican Guard) and Fedayeen throughout the country to bog down the invading forces. 
Even after the invasion began, Saddam continued to believe that his forces were blocking 
the advance of Coalition forces, on the basis of optimistic reports from regime officials.53
Thus, Saddam’s confidence was based on two factors. First, that the U.S. did not 
have the stomach for a costly ground war and therefore, U.S. threats were simply not 
credible enough. Second, even if Washington did attempt an invasion, Saddam’s 
deployment of Republican Guard troops around the capital and the Fedayeen elsewhere 
would make the regime change objective too costly for the U.S., leading to its defeat. The 
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regime’s attitude was that at worst U.S. troops would occupy southern Iraq and let Saddam 
remain in power.54  
Therefore, important contextual variables and variables favoring success in 
coercive diplomacy were operating against the U.S. due to the lack of credible threats as 
seen by the Iraqi dictator. The image of war was not an issue for Saddam as long as the 
regime survived, and in any case the pattern of U.S. military action suggested to him that a 
ground invasion was unlikely. For the same reason, the opponent’s (Saddam) fear of 
unacceptable escalation was not an issue either. The conclusion, for Saddam was that the 
U.S. just would not escalate to a level that could pose a threat to his hold on power.  
Implications:  
How did the credibility of U.S. threats impact on the success/failure of coercive 
diplomacy? 
As this section showed, Saddam did not take seriously the ability or the willingness of the 
U.S. military to attack Baghdad successfully in order to overthrow him. Therefore, there 
was no sense of urgency in his calculations; nor was there a fear of escalation on the part of 
the adversary. In his view, the worst case scenario was that the U.S. would occupy 
southern Iraq while a fortified Baghdad would remain under his control.  
Therefore, two points are crucial. First, Saddam cast doubts on the Type C coercive 
agenda of the U.S. In his calculations, the U.S. would be satisfied with a less than-Type C 
objective, such as the occupation of a limited portion of the country, which though not a 
Type B objective (behavior change) was not a Type C goal either. Thus, Washington 
simply was not able to impress on Saddam the extent of its coercive objectives.  
The second point, which follows from the first, is that in such a scenario, Saddam 
was not looking for reassurances from the U.S. that his regime was secure. As the section 
on international strategic environment shows, external actors such as Germany and France 
were able to provide some level of implicit reassurance that his regime would be 
maintained. The following table summarizes the arguments in this section: 
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Table 12: Iraq – Credibility of U.S. threats 
Credibility of threats Image of war 
(against U.S.) 
Threat of 
unacceptable 
escalation? 
Credibility of U.S. 
threat 
U.S. not believed to have 
resolve for a ground war 
No apprehension as 
past U.S. actions 
suggested to 
Saddam that there 
would be no ground 
war, the only viable 
military threat from 
U.S. to his regime. 
 
No threat of 
unacceptable 
escalation as 
Saddam did not 
believe U.S. would 
escalate to a ground 
invasion, which 
would have been 
unacceptable. 
 
 
Therefore, according to 
Saddam’s calculations, 
credibility of threat not 
high.  
Fedayeen and Republican 
Guard would defeat U.S. forces.  
 Even if the 
U.S. did escalate, 
Fedayeen and 
Republican Guard 
troops would defeat 
them. 
Therefore, Saddam 
believed credibility of 
U.S. threat low.  
 
PERCEPTIONS 
Perceptions of the adversary, its objectives, and one’s own objectives and interests play a 
major role in formulating the attitudes of either party in a coercive equation. An important 
approach to studying international relations involves examining an actor’s beliefs and its 
images of the opponent as a way of explaining its actions.55 The concept of coercive 
diplomacy states that assumptions of rationality must be balanced with adequate 
knowledge of the cultural, social, and religious milieu in which the adversary conducts its 
decision-making. The coercer also has to take into account the opponent’s threat 
perceptions and preference order in which it places its objectives. Thus it is entirely 
possible that perceptions of the coercer and the adversary might differ and this impacts on 
several factors which favor successful coercive diplomacy such as the image of war, and 
the opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation.   
                                                 
55 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), pg. 29-30. 
  185
As some analysts have stated, a key point during the run up to the war that Saddam 
would not opt for deception if there was nothing to hide, missed the problem of mirror-
imaging.56 This implies a belief that the adversary would act in ways and according to 
standards and belief systems similar to the coercer. In this case, prior to the war, the U.S. 
did not take into account Saddam’s threat perceptions and opinions of U.S. military power. 
Saddam’s perception of regional threats 
One important question is why Saddam did not declare more forcefully that he did not 
possess weapons of mass destruction. This has a direct bearing on the effect of implicit 
coercive diplomacy. If Saddam Hussein had been able to prove unequivocally to the 
international community that there were no WMD, then the most important element of 
Washington’s case against regime change would have been demolished. According to the 
Iraqi Perspectives Project, which studied captured documents and interviewed senior 
regime officials, Saddam was apprehensive that if it were unequivocally confirmed that 
Iraq did not have any WMD, it would encourage his adversaries to attack.57 An ambiguous 
stance on WMD constituted what the Republican Guard commander General Hamdani 
termed as ‘deterrence by doubt.’58 But this purposeful ambiguity also constituted 
resistance to the implicit coercion by U.S. military action. 
Saddam’s adversaries included the U.S. but he had discounted the possibility of a 
U.S. ground offensive. Saddam was also convinced that so long as he could maintain the 
façade of possible WMD possession, his adversaries would be deterred. Even his top 
generals assumed that their regime had some weapons of mass destruction (such as poison 
gas and germ weapons), and in fact, when they were told the truth just prior to the 
invasion, they assumed that Saddam was lying.59 His refusal to concede was directly 
related to his need to protect his arsenal from destruction by the U.S., especially in view of 
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the perceived threat from Iran.60 If Saddam had backed away and given up power, it is fair 
to assume that most major Iraqi weapon systems that were present would have been 
destroyed, leaving the country vulnerable to the threat from Iran.  
According to the Iraqi Perspectives Project, Saddam perceived Iran as the main 
threat to this rule (Israel and Turkey were the other regional threats), though in his 
calculation the threat had less to do with Iran’s military capability and more on account of 
its capacity to stir up Iran’s Shia population into a rebellion.61  
The threat from Iran had lingered on long after the 1980-88 war between the two 
countries. Iran and Iraq have been traditional rivals in the region, even more so after the 
1979 revolution. The resulting eight year war was sparked by grievances and objectives 
that remained for years afterward – desire for regional dominance, rivalry and suspicion 
over the religious divide between the secular Sunni nationalist dictatorship and the 
theocratic Shia regime. Ill-will and bitterness between the two countries remained after 
Iraq emerged victorious in the war. During the nineties, Baghdad and Tehran regarded 
each other as the main security threats, rather than the U.S., which had actually sought to 
contain the two countries.62 After the U.S. increased pressure on Iraq 2001 onwards, 
Tehran also stepped up its contacts with Iraqi opposition leaders such as the INC’s Ahmed 
Chalabi and Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, besides facilitating contacts between Chalabi 
and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was based in 
Iran.63 Thus the Tehran regime was starting to lay the ground for eventual changes in 
Baghdad, even though it maintained contacts with elements in the Saddam regime.  
Therefore, to a certain extent, Tehran’s theocratic regime was a threat to Saddam’s 
rule, but not an immediate one. A second perceived threat for Saddam was Israel. During 
the first Gulf War, Saddam had attacked Israeli cities with rockets in an attempt to provoke 
it into the war which would then have threatened the U.S.-led coalition. At that time, 
Saddam enjoyed considerable support from Palestinian groups, especially the PLO which 
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came out in his support. Saddam, who saw himself as a modern day Saladin, had therefore 
always played up his support for the Palestinian people in an attempt to gain a major 
leadership role in the Arab world. Therefore with this track record, Saddam expected an 
attack from Israel at some point. Hence, even after he told members of his Revolutionary 
Command Council that Iraq did not possess WMD, Saddam refused to allow public 
confirmation of this reality on the grounds that it would persuade Israel to launch an 
attack.64
Saddam’s decision-making  
Saddam’s view of the U.S. threat to invade was further impaired by his ignorance of the 
Iraqi military’s weaknesses. By 2002, his direct contact with military units had ended and 
his view of his own military was now derived from highly unreliable sources, including 
senior Republican Guard commanders who misled him about the state of their forces.65 
Lack of adequate and reliable information was a major problem in the entire decision-
making and intelligence apparatus of the regime. One line of inquiry in decision-making 
also talks about the concept of ‘defensive avoidance.’ This states that a decision-maker can 
avoid making decisions because that allows “an escape from having to recognize the 
decisional dilemma.”66 Such a mental framework fits in the case of Saddam Hussein and 
his threat perceptions. His decision to focus on other possible threats could have been a 
way of avoiding a decision on the main threat.  
Furthermore, apart from lack of adequate information, the decision-making process 
itself was faulty. According to officials from the former regime, Saddam’s decision-
making was frequently, and especially with important issues, conducted alone and 
according to former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, it was tinged with an ‘unrealistic 
outlook.’67 Top generals and other senior regime officials were kept out of the loop on the 
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most important issues, such as WMD. This attitude arose from a sense of distrust and 
paranoia over possible coup attempts. In fact Saddam so feared an internal coup that even 
in the run up to the invasion he refused to allow his senior military officials to plan 
seriously for fighting back (except for the defense of Baghdad).68 Such an analysis was in 
tune with an influential personality profile of Saddam which stated that, “while he was 
psychologically in touch with reality, he was often politically out of touch with reality.”69 
Here, the assumption of rationality problem in coercive diplomacy is again relevant, 
because information was not being processed by the decision-maker in a manner that 
would have led to a more effective appreciation of the threat.  
According to one senior Ba’ath Party official, “Saddam had an idea about Iraq’s 
conventional and potential unconventional capabilities, but never an accurate one because 
of the extensive lying occurring in that area.”70 Two conclusions can be reached here. 
First, that Saddam was unaware of the real strength of his conventional forces, which is 
why he assumed they could resist U.S. coercion. Second, with respect to the non-existent 
WMD program, since he was in control of it, and had been disseminating untruth about it 
to his generals, he could maintain the flow of information in this sector. Either way, both 
his senior officers and Saddam himself had illusions about the real level and quality of 
forces. For Saddam, the illusion was over the state of conventional forces, while for the 
senior staff, the illusion was over the existence of weapons of mass destruction.  
Implications: 
How did the issue of perceptions impact on the process of coercive diplomacy? 
This section showed that in order to deter possible coercion from perceived threats (Iran, 
Iraq’s Shia minority, Israel, Turkey) Saddam had to maintain his bluff of WMD 
possession. A second objective of his bluff was also to maintain a strong leadership in the 
face of external threats. But the paradox here is that in his quest to deter coercion from 
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perceived threats, he helped confirm the suspicions of the actual threat (U.S.). In order to 
perpetuate the ambiguity from the bluff, the chances of Saddam actually coming clean on 
his supposed WMD arsenal diminished further, and with it, the chances of successful 
coercive diplomacy. This case (as well as the next chapter on the North Korean nuclear 
crisis) shows that in a coercive equation in which WMD possession is suspected of one 
side (but not confirmed) some degree of bluffing by the coercer or the target is to be 
expected.  
While Saddam was able to manipulate the WMD perceptions of his adversaries, his 
view of Iraq’s actual conventional strength was far from accurate, on account of a 
dysfunctional decision-making system. His misplaced confidence in the Republican Guard 
and the Fedayeen encouraged him to believe that U.S. forces could be prevented from 
capturing Baghdad. This further damaged the credibility of U.S. threats for him, and 
therefore, there was even less of a reason for him to concede to Washington’s belligerence.  
Furthermore, his apprehensions of an external threat came mainly from Iran, and not from 
the U.S. Therefore, by not prioritizing the U.S. threat, Saddam’s own hierarchy of 
objectives was subverted, and there was no reason for conceding to the U.S.  
The following table summarizes the arguments from this section: 
 
Table 13: Iraq - Perceptions 
Perceptions Consequence Coercive diplomacy 
Perceived threat from Iran Saddam 
apprehensive of 
war, but from Iran 
and internal 
elements, and not 
from the U.S. 
 
 
- Refused to elevate threat of U.S. ground invasion 
to its rightful place on the list of perceived threats. 
 
 
 
Defective decision-making: 
Saddam’s illusions over 
state of conventional 
forces, especially 
Republican Guard and 
Fedayeen 
 
Allowed Saddam to
believe that U.S. 
could be prevented 
from taking 
Baghdad 
- Façade of WMD prevented a confirmation that 
Iraq possessed WMD, and prevented any 
concession to coercion. 
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INTERNAL FACTORS 
Domestic factors affected decision-making in both, the Saddam regime as well as 
the Bush administration in the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. For Saddam, the main 
internal factor relevant to this discussion was the threat that he perceived from elements 
within Iraq. According to one analysis, one potential development that would have 
seriously damaged his support base was if it was demonstrated that he was not in a position 
to sustain the country’s WMD program.71   This suggests that while the U.S. was gearing 
up to foster regime change in Baghdad, Saddam’s priorities were elsewhere. Therefore, 
this defective priority order of threats meant that Saddam was unable to process the danger 
of the U.S. threat adequately, leading to failure of coercion. When we consider Saddam’s 
threat perception from Iran and Israel as well as internal elements, it becomes clear that 
while the U.S. was implicitly coercing his regime, Saddam was employing the threat of 
WMD possession in a bid to deter other threats.  
Threat of coup/rebellion against Saddam 
Saddam Hussein had led Iraq as President with full dictatorial control since 1979 and 
served as a powerful vice-president for ten years before that. From his early days in the 
Ba’ath Party regime Saddam had developed a reputation for suppressing any political 
rivals, including his predecessor, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. This threat perception was also 
extended to rivals in the Arab world, especially Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who 
passed away in 2000. Within Iraq his regime had brutally clamped down on all potential 
internal threats, especially from the Shia and Kurdish populations.  
After the first Gulf War, Saddam’s support within Iraq eroded, and even within the 
military and his tribal base, there was dissatisfaction. This occurred for several reasons. 
Discontent within the Iraqi people grew in the 1990s as they saw Saddam and his coterie 
make huge profits from oil smuggling, while the general population faced increasing 
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deprivation on account of UN sanctions.72 Profits from the Oil for Food program that were 
supposed to assist the Iraqi people were instead siphoned off by the ruling regime. The 
growing sense of threat to his regime was also heightened by several coup attempts during 
the nineties. These included suspected plots from within the elite Republican Guard, which 
was responsible for protecting the regime.73 The U.S. also facilitated the formation of the 
Iraqi National Congress (INC) an umbrella organization of overseas Iraqi opposition 
groups.  
These developments led to a siege mentality in the Iraqi dictator and very elaborate 
security arrangements were put in place, led by the Organization of Special Security, 
which was commanded by Saddam’s son, Qusay.74 Dissension within Saddam’s innermost 
circle came to the fore in 1994 when his two sons-in-law who were from the same tribe 
(Tikriti), defected and provided western agencies with considerable information on Iraq’s 
WMD program. Increasingly in the 1990s, even tribes that had been closely connected to 
his own and were influential were looked upon with suspicion. Meanwhile, the Kurdish 
and Shia populations in the north and the south rebelled and were brutally put down. Also 
put down was the most elaborate coup attempt, organized by the London-based Iraqi 
National Accord (INA) and backed by the CIA, which involved numerous officials 
stationed at various levels of the regime. 
This siege mentality and obsession with internal threats affected his priorities in the 
period before the U.S. invasion. As American forces invaded, despite the advice of his top 
generals, Hussein refused to order counter-measures to stop their advance to Baghdad. One 
senior officer, Lt. Gen. Raad Majid al-Hamdani repeatedly requested orders to blow up a 
bridge on the Euphrates River that would have slowed or stopped the advance of U.S. 
forces.75 However, Saddam’s concern was that the bridges would be required to transfer 
troops to the south in case the Shia population there rebelled. Indeed, another reason why 
Saddam needed to maintain the façade of possessing WMD was to deal with internal 
threats from Shia and Kurdish populations. He already had a track record of using 
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chemical weapons against them during uprisings in the 1980s, killing thousands. Even if, 
by 2003, he did not possess adequate stocks of chemical weapons, he had to maintain the 
façade in order to wield an effective threat. 
Furthermore, paramilitary forces created by Saddam in the 1990s, especially the 
Fedayeen and the Al Quds Army, were tasked with putting down rebellions by Shia and 
Kurdish populations. This impacted negatively on the state of the regular army because 
valuable manpower that could have gone to it was diverted to the Fedayeen for internal 
security duties. It was only as the invasion began that Saddam decided these forces would 
also be tasked with blocking American forces in the countryside (as stated in the section on 
threat credibility). 
The Shia rebellion after the first Gulf War was an important consideration in 
Saddam’s decision-making. The Shia, which constitutes a majority in Iraq, had long been 
dominated by the mainly Sunni Baathist tribal regime. Shia populations in the Gulf region 
began to reassert their sectarian identity after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. 
Following this, the Saddam regime began large scale purges and repression and killing of 
Shia; according to one account, in 1991 alone, 30,000 Iraqi Shias were killed.76 Later, after 
the Gulf war there was another Shia uprising which the regime brutally clamped down 
upon. Thus from the Shia perspective, there was considerable animosity to Saddam’s rule. 
Indeed this has been reflected in the post-Saddam era when Shia parties and groups have 
increasingly asserted their power and have demonstrated considerable rivalry with the 
Sunni parties.  
Therefore, with this kind of record toward the Shia, for Saddam, internal upheaval 
and regime threats were a constant worry. According to one analysis, based on his 
personality profile, Saddam was in the habit of exploiting international crises to quell 
domestic unrest.77 The theory was that if he emerged victorious in the confrontation, this 
would elevate his standing in his country, and in fact the rest of the Arab world too. 
Saddam’s confrontation with Iran, Syria (1977), and finally Kuwait all came when he tried 
to deal with internal dissension among Shias and other sections of the population by 
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provoking external crises. Therefore, one reason why Saddam did not take U.S. threats too 
seriously is because his intention could have been to manipulate it and turn it into an 
advantage and thereby strengthen his position. As stated earlier, he did not take American 
threats too seriously, and had already concluded that even if the invasion took place, his 
forces, especially the Republican Guard and the Fedayeen, would defeat them.  
Apart from fear of rebellion by disaffected populations, Saddam was also 
concerned about the possibility of a coup from among his senior leadership. The result was 
that the senior military leadership was replete with officers who were chosen for their 
loyalty rather than competence. It also meant that as the invasion began, Hussein insisted 
on making the smallest military decisions himself, not trusting the military leadership. 
Apprehensive about a possible coup, Saddam also ordered regular army troops to be 
stationed near Kurdistan and near the Iranian border so they could be away from the 
capital. Only the Special Republican Guard, responsible for security of Baghdad, was 
allowed into the city, and even then an incompetent officer was placed in command.78 
Further, units deployed as the invasion began were prevented from communicating with 
each other to avoid the possibility of a successful coup. 
Prioritization of internal threats from disaffected populations as well as the military 
distracted attention from the threat of a ground invasion by the U.S.-led coalition. Saddam, 
therefore, failed to appreciate the extent of the military threat facing him.  Moreover, this 
breakdown in the decision-making framework diminished the chances for successful 
coercive diplomacy.  
Decision-making structure in U.S. and the failure of coercive diplomacy 
As stated earlier, influential elements within and outside the Bush administration (mostly 
known collectively as neoconservatives) refused to accept that the invasion of Iraq would 
require hundreds of thousands of troops. The most prominent example of this attitude was 
the refusal of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to accept Army Chief Gen. Eric 
Shinseki’s estimate that the invasion would require much more than the 130,000 troops 
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allocated. Such an attitude was part of a closed decision-making structure termed a ‘cabal’ 
between Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld by a high-ranking State 
Department official.79 Because this decision-making framework refused to accept that the 
invasion and the post-invasion period would require a lot more investment in terms of 
troops, money and expertise, it led to faulty war-planning and eventually, failure of 
coercive diplomacy. This failure took place because the U.S. was unable to carry out its 
threats effectively and was in fact bogged down in the post-invasion occupation of Iraq. 
This was extremely costly on several counts – casualties (both American and Iraqi), 
financial investment, civil war-like situation, Iraq as a base for terrorists.  
Soon after Baghdad fell, it became clear that the main adversaries fighting U.S. 
forces were the Shia and Sunni insurgents, many of whom increasingly developed 
logistical networks from neighboring states. With the relatively limited number of troops 
sent to Iraq, the Bush administration had failed to prepare for the violence and instability 
of the post-Saddam period. But it is not as if the administration was unaware of such an 
eventuality. Documents released in November 2006 revealed that the 1999 ‘Desert 
Crossing’ war games conducted by the U.S. government concluded that 400,000 troops 
would be needed for an invasion of Iraq.80 Even with these numbers, chaos and a failed 
state were likely consequences.81  
Intelligence prior to the war also warned that insurgent groups in Iraq were getting 
ready to fight American forces and that more Iraqis would join them as the occupation 
continued.82  However, Secretary Rumsfeld’s war plan, made in consultation with Central 
Command chief, General Tommy Franks, refused to pay any heed to these warnings, and 
instead assumed that Iraqi soldiers would surrender and the civilian population would 
welcome the coalition forces.83  
This dysfunction in the decision-making process was a reflection of broader 
doctrinal differences on the shape of U.S. defense policy. In particular, the clash between 
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the Powell Doctrine and Secretary Rumsfeld’s plans for the future of U.S. military 
operations contributed to the complete lack of reassurances to Saddam’s Iraq by the U.S. 
as well as the post-invasion quagmire that the U.S. forces found themselves in.  
The Powell Doctrine84 essentially states that any U.S. military force should be 
applied only in pursuit of limited, clearly defined objectives that are grounded in the 
national interest, with overwhelming force to guarantee a quick victory, and a clear exit 
strategy.85 This doctrine also concluded that stabilizing or ending a conflict always 
requires troops on the ground, and that most advanced technologically superior weaponry 
and equipment are no substitute for this.86 On the other hand Secretary Rumsfeld came 
into office in January 2001 pledging a transformation of the military, a goal that acquired 
additional impetus after 9/11. According to Rumsfeld, the U.S. military needed to be 
“flexible, light and agile” to combat threats from actors such as terrorist groups.87 Under 
Rumsfeld’s plan, technologically superior U.S. forces would be able to defeat adversaries 
in any theater without the need for massive numbers of troops.88 Thus, Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s transformational goals for the military were in clear opposition to Gen. 
Powell’s cautious approach, built on the experience of the Vietnam war.  
After 9/11, as the Bush administration commenced preparing for the Iraq campaign, 
for Rumsfeld, this war was to be the arena for applying, testing and modifying the new 
transformational strategies for the military.89 By late 2002, the Pentagon had combined a 
‘refreshed’ Iraq war strategy with the goal of military transformation.90 However, by 
incorporating the Iraq campaign within such broad objectives of military modernization, 
the administration, and specifically the Pentagon, reduced the opportunity for diplomacy or 
concessions from the Saddam regime.  
Apart from combat operational planning, post-invasion efforts were handicapped 
on other levels too. First, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), responsible for 
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administering and rebuilding Iraq, was not allotted the required number of personnel to 
establish offices in the 18 provinces in Iraq.91 Second, even among the personnel who were 
dispatched, a substantial number had no requisite experience, and were sent solely because 
of their conservative beliefs and Republican Party connections.92 According to journalists 
and reconstruction officials, with their misplaced priorities (such as trying to institute a flat 
tax and trying to set up a modern, computerized stock market), these inexperienced 
officials alienated the Iraqi people.93 Finally CPA officials disregarded the considered 
advice of military officials who were dealing with the Iraqi people on a day to day basis. 
These are merely some of the missteps of the post-invasion planning, a process that was 
accorded low priority. The purpose of this brief analysis is to show that by failing in the 
post-Saddam period (both, in terms of anticipating the insurgency and in terms of 
reconstruction efforts), the U.S. failed to carry out the threat element of its coercive 
diplomacy effectively.  
A secondary internal shortcoming lay on the opposite side of the political fence. 
Essentially, this argument is that the push toward invasion of Iraq by neoconservative 
elements was not met with adequate skepticism or roadblocks from domestic institutions 
such as the Congress as well as the press. If the press or political groups had enquired into 
the Bush administration’s strategy for Iraq more thoroughly, it might have a forced a more 
effective appraisal of the requirements of a successful invasion and post-war stabilization. 
Thus the absence of a more questioning media contributed to ineffective checks on policy-
making. One example here is the lack of interest displayed by newspapers in the U.S. in 
covering surveillance operations in 2002-03 by U.S. intelligence agencies on UN 
delegations of countries crucial to favorable Iraq resolutions.94 While newspapers outside 
the U.S. gave considerable coverage to these activities, even liberal papers such as the New 
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York Times did not give them much importance.95 The inaction by domestic institutions 
which are meant to act as crucial checks to public policymaking was an important internal 
factor in the failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy. If these institutions had carried out their 
traditional roles, the inefficiencies in Washington’s Iraq policies would have been detected 
at the appropriate time and might have been corrected.  
Implications: 
How did internal factors in the U.S. as well as in Saddam’s Iraq impact on the 
process of coercive diplomacy? 
Internal factors in both, the coercer and the target state, degraded decision-making 
structures, which then led to failure of the implicit coercion on Saddam’s Iraq. Within the 
Bush administration, the faulty decision-making process helped decrease the chances for 
successful coercion. The significance of the use of Iraq as a test case for the Rumsfeld 
military transformation strategy was that it inflated Washington’s already high objectives 
in its Iraq campaign. U.S. objectives in Iraq became part of the Pentagon’s broader goal of 
military transformation. However, coercive diplomacy’s chances of success rest mainly on 
limited, clear objectives, a characteristic that is more compatible with the Powell Doctrine.   
Furthermore, in testing the new, agile military, the Pentagon sent in inadequate 
numbers of troops for the invasion and paid very little attention to the post-invasion 
scenario. In coercive diplomacy, when the threat finally has to be carried out, it has to 
demonstrate to the target (as well as any other potential adversaries) the punishment for not 
acceding to the coercer’s demands. However, in this case, while the invasion and 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein was relatively quick,96 the resulting post-war occupation of 
the country embroiled the U.S. military into an environment beset with sectarian violence 
and radical Islamic terrorism, which, by the middle of December 2006, had cost almost 
                                                 
95 Norman Solomon, ‘NSA Spied on Diplomats in Push for Iraq War,’ December 28, 2005, 
http://www.antiwar.com/solomon/?articleid=8313  
96 The invasion began on March 20, 2003, and Baghdad officially fell to coalition forces on April 9, 2003.  
  198
3,000 U.S. military deaths.97 This ensured that the implementation of the U.S. threat was 
largely a failure (apart from the overthrow of Saddam). 
This ineffective decision-making process also contributed to the failure of yet 
another U.S. goal – promoting democracy in the Middle East through Iraq. The violence 
and civil war-like conditions in the three years after the March 2003 invasion showed that 
Iraq had actually become a base of instability in the Middle East, rather than a democratic 
model for other states to follow. While it is true that sectarian violence, interference by 
neighboring states (such as Syria and Iran) and the influx of terrorist elements, have played 
major roles in fomenting Iraq’s instability, it is reasonable to state that such a scenario 
should have been anticipated by the Bush administration. In fact, as this section earlier 
noted, war games in 1999 and prewar intelligence did predict such a scenario in which 
hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops would have been required. But this was disregarded 
by the critical decision-makers. Consequently, the high magnitude of objectives that the 
U.S. selected also led to a high magnitude of consequences that were rooted in inefficient 
and politicized decision-making.      
But apart from domestic U.S. issues, the analysis of the Saddam regime’s internal 
workings shows a dysfunctional policy-making structure in which there was an incorrect 
assessment of the priority of threats. What this suggests is that it is not just the coercer’s 
objectives that are crucial to coercive diplomacy; it is also important to understand the 
target’s set of objectives, which then guides the formulation of its interests, and 
subsequently determine the symmetry or asymmetry of motivation. In other words, 
hierarchy of objectives (or threats) is a crucial issue on both sides of the coercive equation. 
Thus, while Saddam feared threats to his regime, internal elements were a bigger worry 
than the U.S.  
As stated in the section on threat credibility, while Saddam did recognize the 
military threat from the U.S., his calculation was that the U.S. was not interested in Type C 
coercion. Therefore, from Saddam’s perspective, the image of war also was not a source of 
concern, because the bigger concern was the threat from other sources. Therefore, because 
Saddam did not adequately prioritize the threat from the U.S., the possibility of his 
                                                 
97 Figures from ‘Iraq Coalition Casualties,’ http://www.icasualties.org/oif/ The U.S. military death toll till 
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conceding to U.S. demands also receded further. The following table summarizes the 
arguments in this section:  
 
Table 14: Iraq – Internal factors 
Internal factors Coercive diplomacy 
Iraq 
Saddam feared higher threat from internal elements 
Diverted attention from actual magnitude of U.S threat. 
Downgraded U.S. threat. 
Therefore, possibility of conceding to U.S. demands 
diminished, contributing to failure of U.S. coercion. 
U.S. 
Inefficient invasion and post-war planning  
Conflation of Iraq campaign with military 
transformation agenda 
Failure of U.S. threat implementation 
Failure of U.S. goal of spreading democracy in the  
Middle East through Iraq. 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
For any coercive diplomatic activity to work, international endorsement can be crucial. 
Apart from political and moral legitimacy, multilateral support also adds to the coercive 
potential.98 International support can also come in the form of financial and military 
support which can help make the coercer’s threats more credible. Therefore, the case for 
coercion on the target state has to be made out by the coercer(s) in terms which signify an 
impending threat to the rest of the world or at the very least a regional threat. This helps 
assuage suspicions that the coercer is acting in its own narrow self-interests. So then the 
question arises – how to go about presenting an effective case to the international 
community?  The crux of the argument would be irrefutable evidence that the target state 
has been involved in activity that is a threat to regional and international security. But as 
the objectives section shows, the U.S. was largely unable to convince the international 
community that military action against Iraq was essential for international security.  
In this context, it is important to note the broader direction of American foreign 
policy which had increasingly become unilateral and after 9/11 was willing to push ahead 
with its agenda even if the international community did not fully support it. Therefore, a 
                                                 
98 Bruce W.  Jentleson, ‘The Reagan Administration Versus Nicaragua: The Limits of Type ‘C’ Coercive 
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key variable favoring successful coercive diplomacy – international support – had been 
effectively downgraded by the U.S. Even if the international community did not 
overwhelmingly endorse U.S. policy toward Iraq, it would go ahead anyway.  
The international community showed mixed support for U.S. policies against Iraq 
in the run-up to the war. The main ally in this endeavor was Britain, and to a lesser extent, 
assorted countries like Australia and Poland, and Spain. But other prominent NATO allies, 
especially France & Germany, came out strongly against the campaign. A key military 
ally, Turkey, declined to permit U.S. troops to enter Iraq through its territory. This forced 
some changes in the deployment schedule of the U.S. military forces headed to Iraq. This 
divide was also a reflection of the desire for the European Union to play a more assertive 
foreign and defense role, separate from the traditional alliance with the U.S.  
However, while there was strong disagreement between the U.S. and Germany on 
the Iraq issue, documents released after the war stated that in February 2003 German 
intelligence had passed on to their American counterparts Saddam’s military plan for 
defending the capital.99 Other states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia also provided secret 
military logistical assistance to U.S. forces.  The fact that this collaboration (especially the 
German assistance) was not publicized before the war indicates that the Iraqi dictator’s 
confidence in the international community continued to be maintained, and added to the 
dictator’s resolve to resist. 
On the other hand, from Saddam’s perspective, support of the international 
community was a crucial element for decreasing the regime’s sense of isolation. Saddam 
Hussein was convinced that the French and Russian governments would prevent the U.S. 
from launching an invasion of Iraq.100 The reason for this confidence was that these two 
countries had considerable economic interests in Iraq and these profits were linked to their 
maintaining a pro-Baghdad position.  Saddam had been able to distribute his largesse 
among them, because his regime could order humanitarian goods from any country it 
chose even though international commercial contracts were monitored by the UN Security 
                                                 
99 Michael R. Gordon, ‘German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says.’  
100 Iraqi Perspectives Project, pg. 28. 
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Council resolution 668 committee.101 Iraq’s commercial dealings with these countries, as 
well others such as China, included commitments for lucrative deals in the oil field 
development sector, and this ensured that they (especially Russia) came out against 
stringent constraints on Iraq, such as no-fly zones. For example, this economic cooperation 
with Russia culminated in an August 2002 agreement between the two countries that 
amounted to about $40 billion.102 Baghdad also successfully threatened negative economic 
consequences against countries such as Poland after they had committed to siding with 
coalition forces before the invasion.103
This strategic economic relationship built up by Saddam’s Iraq also extended to the 
sale of oil apart from UN approved shipments, which were ostensibly for humanitarian 
reasons. It built up a huge smuggling racket, which, by 2001 provided about $1.5 billion to 
Saddam.104 Furthermore, as the 2005 Volcker Committee report on corruption in the Oil 
for Food program revealed, in order to facilitate such illegal transactions, hundreds of 
influential politicians and government officials around the world were paid off. Thus, 
through its ability to distribute economic profits to countries and individuals, Baghdad was 
effectively able to buy their support.   
Opposition from the general population in these countries (especially France and 
Germany) also impacted on their government’s resistance to U.S. efforts against Iraq. Even 
after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in November 2002 (which the 
U.S. and U.K. used as justification for military action against Iraq) France and Germany 
tried to diplomatically block implementation of these threats.105 The French government in 
fact wanted all sanctions lifted in order to protect commercial ties with Baghdad. 
Interestingly, several former Iron Curtain countries (such as the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
and Poland) came out in support of the U.S. However, the fact remains that the biggest 
diplomatic blow to U.S. efforts came from influential states that had previously been allied 
with the U.S. – France and Germany.106 It is important to consider that from the coercive 
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diplomacy perspective, the very public opposition from European states bolstered Saddam 
Hussein, even though, as is noted elsewhere in this section, there was some covert German 
intelligence assistance to the U.S. in the weeks before the invasion.  
But Baghdad did not just benefit from political support. The Iraqi Perspectives 
Project revealed that as U.S. troops moved to capture Baghdad, Saddam’s regime received 
detailed intelligence on U.S. troop movements from Russian diplomats in Iraq. Among 
other reports, Russian officials correctly informed the regime that U.S. forces were 
bypassing Iraqi cities to launch an offensive on Baghdad.107 According to other sources 
this was part of a pattern of Russian assistance through retired military personnel and 
serving diplomats and intelligence agents in Iraq, including the Russian ambassador in 
Iraq, Vladimir Titorenko, as well as the former head of the Soviet airborne forces, Gen. 
Vladislav Achalov, who visited Baghdad just prior to the invasion.108  
Before and after the invasion, Russian military intelligence (GRU) officials as well 
as other retired military officials such as the former deputy commander of Soviet air 
defense, Col. Gen. Igor Maltsev, admitted that they advised Baghdad on improving their 
air defenses.109 Titirenko is suspected of having provided information on U.S. war plans 
and could have been involved in this activity for financial reasons, given that the Volcker 
commission’s investigation into corruption in the UN oil for food program indicted the 
ambassador and his son, among many other senior Russian government figures and 
politicians.110 Nevertheless, it is considered unlikely that this collaboration in the run up to 
the war was approved at the highest levels of the Putin government.  
Several pieces of intelligence that were passed were extremely flawed, and 
considering that the U.S. Central Command was aware of the Russian-Iraqi collaboration, 
it is likely that at least some element of this was part of a disinformation campaign by the 
U.S. military. However, this issue has to be seen from the Saddam regime’s perspective. In 
the face of increasing U.S. pressure and the inevitability of an invasion, such foreign 
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support in the form of valuable military intelligence would have lessened the sense of siege 
in the regime.  
Post-invasion period 
The implementation of U.S. threats eventually involved post-invasion stabilization, a task 
for which the U.S. military as well as the Coalition Provisional authority were ill-equipped. 
The resulting instability flared up in the form of sectarian violence (Shia Vs. Sunni) that 
was also directed at U.S.-led coalition forces. Here, external actors, such as Iran and Syria 
were prominently involved, through their support for various militia.  
Elements of the clerical regime in Iran supported Shia militia operating in Iraq 
while Syria is alleged to have provided sanctuary to Sunni Arab militants as well as former 
members of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party.111 Additionally the Lebanese Hezbollah was also 
involved in training the Mahdi Army of Moktada Al-Sadr.112 Both Iran and Syria have 
strategic reason for backing such groups, stemming from a need to expand their area of 
influence in the Middle East and to counter any U.S. political/military strategies against 
them. Thus, Iran and Syria are among the external actors that have played the role of 
‘spoilers’ in the post-invasion U.S. plans in Iraq.  
Implications:  
How did various actors in the international strategic environment impact on CD? 
In this case, various external actors played spoilers or were expected to do so (by the 
Saddam regime). Consequently, they provided implicit reassurances to Saddam that his 
regime would be protected from U.S. invasion. These major powers, in their role as 
spoilers helped increase the Saddam regime’s strength of motivation. Combined with his 
view that the U.S. would not send in an invasion army to take Baghdad, Saddam therefore 
downgraded the threat to his regime from the U.S. He was confident that the international 
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community, especially France and Russia, would come to Iraq’s assistance by preventing 
U.S. action. Therefore, the effect of coercion on Saddam by U.S. military moves did not 
occur.  
On the other hand, after the invasion, countries such as Iran and Syria, in an 
attempt to counter U.S. presence, as well as to prevent Iraq from becoming a hostile power 
once again, increased their influence in the country through proxies. The high number of 
spoilers present in this case is a reflection of the extremely broad and numerous objectives 
formulated by the U.S. It is therefore natural that the greater the coercer’s objectives, the 
greater the number of actors that could potentially be affected (positively or negatively) by 
the consequences of coercion. In this case, even though countries such as France and 
Germany were not directly affected by U.S. action against Iraq, they feared the broader 
regional and geopolitical shifts that would result from the expansion of  the U.S. presence 
in the Middle East. Therefore, for the coercer, it is not just the strength of motivation of the 
target state that is important. In cases where third party involvement is likely, the interests 
and strength of motivation of these potential spoilers is also a crucial calculation for the 
coercer.  
Various other components of coercive diplomacy acted against the coercer (the 
U.S.). An important contextual variable – isolation of the adversary – did not take place 
since France, Russia and some other important states, especially Germany, did not side 
with the U.S. and in fact worked to thwart its plans.  
For the same reason, there was no international support (whether through military 
or financial assistance) which would have helped make U.S. threats more credible. Another 
contextual variable is unilateral/coalitional coercion, which essentially states that a 
unilateral exercise can be more effective because it is easier to maintain unity and a clear 
sense of purpose.113 In this case, apart from Britain, Washington did not have any major 
allies, but the large ground force that would have made the threat more credible, was 
missing. This ground force could have conceivably come from states such as France and 
Russia, but instead they opposed U.S. plans. Therefore, while unilateral coercive 
diplomacy by the U.S. gave the exercise a sense of purpose, because of Saddam’s 
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assumption that other major powers would counter this determination it adversely affected 
coercive diplomacy.  
The following table briefly summarizes the arguments in this section: 
 
Table 15: Iraq – International Strategic Environment 
International Strategic Environment Isolation of 
adversary (Iraq) 
International 
support (to U.S.) 
Unilateral/Coalitional 
coercion 
French and German trade 
ties a motive for them to 
prevent U.S. from 
attacking. 
  
Not possible 
  
No (though the UK 
was part of the 
coalition, it was largely 
driven by the U.S.) 
 Not enough 
support.  
Arguments 
Lessened 
Saddam’s sense 
of isolation 
 
 
 Covert Russian intelligence 
and military assistance 
 
CONCLUSION 
This case has showed the limitations of Type ‘C’ coercive diplomacy, especially the 
extreme variant where nothing short of the overthrow of the target regime is sought. The 
U.S. objective of regime change drastically increased the magnitude of demands which 
also made it difficult to make a plausible case for support to the international community.  
But a bigger issue was that Saddam Hussein refused to take seriously the threat of a 
ground invasion (which would have resulted in a regime change) for three main reasons. 
First, that the U.S. did not have the ‘stomach’ for an invasion. Second, Saddam was 
diverted by other perceived threats and third, he assumed that influential states, especially 
France and Russia, would prevent Washington from going ahead with the invasion. 
Therefore, in this particular case, the role of spoilers was extremely relevant, but in 
a slightly different manner than usual. Here, the target expected certain third parties to act 
as spoilers in the coercive process; however, they were ineffective. In fact, one expected 
spoiler (Germany) was also surreptitiously assisting the coercer (U.S.) while maintaining 
public opposition to the coercive process. Here it is important to mention the importance of 
reputations. Part of the reason why the spoiler assisted the coercer might have been due to 
the reputation of the coercer. However, the spoiler’s own need to maintain its own 
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reputation of independence then helps explain why Germany maintained public support for 
Iraq.  
A secondary element is the possible use of spoilers by the coercer to feed 
disinformation in the target state. This is suspected to have been deployed by the U.S. 
through its use of connections between some Russian military officials and Saddam 
regime. What this suggests is that such entities (spoilers) need not always be a negative 
element for the coercer.  It all depends on how the coercer views the particular spoiler.  
The U.S. had hoped that its campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq would provide an 
appropriate measure of its power to other potential adversaries, such as Iran, North Korea, 
and Syria. But this demonstration effect114 backfired as it got bogged down in Iraq in the 
midst of a raging insurgency. Therefore, its threats to other states carry less potency, given 
that its military might is compromised in other places. This case study therefore highlights 
the effect of adequate demonstration effects when pursuing coercive diplomacy, especially 
when it comes to convincing a potential adversary of the credibility of its military threats. 
Saddam did not perceive past U.S. actions as a threat because he felt that the pattern of 
U.S. actions elsewhere did not suggest it could use more forceful measures against Iraq. 
Therefore, for policymakers the question then becomes – how to demonstrate to a potential 
adversary the efficacy of its threats through present actions elsewhere? 
A further question is – can Type ‘C’ coercive diplomacy be applied in these cases? 
At the outset, the very notion that regime change is the objective tilts the asymmetry of 
motivation in favor of the target state because it has a lot more at stake, which then makes 
it more determined to resist and resort to brinkmanship. It also depends on how credible 
threats are. At a time when U.S. forces are stretched across the globe this would not be 
very easy. The fact that the target states might possess varying stocks of chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons would be an added consideration. The global strategic 
environment is another crucial factor to be considered here. Major powers such as Russia 
and China would be influential in any future type ‘C’ activity, especially given their close 
ties to Iran and North Korea. But these very links also provide them with motivation to 
resist U.S. pressures on their allies, whether due to commercial or strategic reasons.  
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An additional problem this case raises is that the misuse of intelligence in order to 
carry out a military attack has far reaching implications on strategies elsewhere. It lessens 
the sense of trust in crucial intelligence analyses dealing with compelling issues such as the 
Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs and other crises that might emerge in the 
future. Coercive policies require strong domestic leadership as well as clarity of objectives, 
especially when threats have to be backed up with military action which involves loss of 
lives. In the U.S., with its strong division of powers and constitutional oversight, past 
records of intelligence manipulation makes it more difficult for the executive effectively to 
make the case for future action elsewhere. This naturally detracts from the credibility of 
threats and lessens the sense of isolation in the adversary.   
But on the other hand, such a cautionary example (i.e., the Iraq case) also 
encourages policymakers and intelligence analysts to examine the actual capabilities 
(rather than just the intentions) of other targets more carefully. Therefore, in the Iranian 
case, while official reports still cannot say for sure what its actual capability is, estimates 
of the likely period of time it would take to construct a nuclear device have been revised 
and suggest a longer breathing space. 
Such cases also give rise to debates within policymaking circles on whether 
alternative strategies (other than coercion and military attacks), such as deterrence and 
containment can be considered, especially if their cost, in terms of human lives and 
financial resources, is much lower. It is thus clear that coercive process across the board 
have to be seen as a continuum of foreign policymaking across regions, much as was the 
case during the Cold War. 
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 Factors affecting coercive 
diplomacy 
Consequence 
Objectives  
Prevented clarity of objectives, high magnitude of 
demands. 
Broad multiple objectives 
Regime change because: 
Detracted from international support. - WMD 
- Terrorism 
- Democracy 
Perceptions  
Image of war from U.S. did not deter Saddam - Saddam had a defective priority order of 
  threats  
- Israel given priority in threat perceptions 
Credibility of U.S. threats  
Threat of unacceptable escalation not an issue for 
Saddam. Did not believe the U.S. would escalate to 
unacceptable levels. Unacceptable escalation = ground 
war, leading to regime change. 
- Saddam did not take threat of ground 
  invasion seriously 
 
- Confident U.S. would be content with  
  occupying territory short of 
   regime change 
 
- Confident Republican Guard and 
   Fedayeen would stop U.S. 
   forces from regime change objective 
Internal factors 
 
- More concerned with  coup/rebellion 
 
- Defective decision-making in US 
 
  
 
Image of war (for Saddam) defective. Image of war was 
threatening from the wrong source. 
 
Led to failure of post-war occupation 
International Strategic 
Environment 
-    Support from France and Russia, based 
     on their commercial interests. 
  
-   Russian military collaboration 
 
International support not in favor of U.S. 
Saddam assumed U.S. would be prevented from 
launching ground invasion.  
 
 
Table 16: Iraq – Summary of Arguments 
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5.0  COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE NORTH KOREAN 
NUCLEAR CRISIS 2002-06 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1950-53 Korean War, North Korea-U.S. relations have gone through several 
crisis situations. The latest one began in October 2002 after Pyongyang’s secret uranium-
enrichment program was revealed.  The U.S. firmly maintained throughout that North 
Korea (Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea – DPRK) should not be allowed to possess 
nuclear weapons, something that was rejected by the Kim Jong Il regime. This animosity 
has to be understood in the context of the Korean War which essentially ended in a 
stalemate without a peace treaty.  
This crisis featured four years of coercive threats by Pyongyang in pursuit of 
certain demands. This is an interesting case in which Washington also countered with 
coercion which helped cement North Korea’s perception that the U.S. was intent on 
bringing about regime change in Pyongyang. Pyongyang’s demands essentially centered 
on getting adequate reassurances from Washington that the Kim Jong Il regime would not 
be destabilized. However in the absence of any such reassurances from the U.S., North 
Korea maintained its coercive stance through threats that included missiles tests and the 
eventual nuclear test in October 2006. 
During the crisis, the U.S. also put pressure through several mechanisms, such as 
the Six Party Talks (U.S., North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia). However, 
Pyongyang rebuffed these attempts at coercion and in return ratcheted up its own coercive 
diplomacy. This chapter argues that North Korea’s coercive diplomacy was partially 
successful because it succeeded in extracting several concessions from Six Party allies 
other than the U.S. It also managed to demonstrate its nuclear capability, which was not 
just a way of demonstrating threat credibility but also an end in itself. On the other hand, 
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U.S. coercive activity was completely unsuccessful, because it failed to prevent 
nuclearization of North Korea and also did not succeed in the implicit regime change goal.  
This outcome can be explained through the use the five factors that provide the framework 
for   this dissertation: objectives, perceptions, credibility of threats, internal factors, and 
international strategic environment.   
Archetype 
This case study is an example of coercion directed at the U.S. from a ‘rogue’ regime. It is 
also a case of the U.S. attempting multilateral coercion against a nuclear armed adversary. 
The U.S. has attempted to stem the spread of WMD acquisition world wide in recent years, 
against countries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Counter-proliferation through 
coercive means is one of the approaches used by the U.S. over the years. Interestingly, the 
most recent case of nuclear rollback, that of Libya, involved mainly discussions with the 
Gaddafi regime and began after Tripoli indicated that it wanted to remove its pariah status. 
However, Washington did not apply lessons from the Libya case and refused any 
concessions or bilateral talks with Pyongyang. 
More crucially, this is a relevant case of coercive diplomacy by a suspected nuclear 
state directed toward the U.S., which in fact, has played the role of  ‘coercer’ in several 
instances of coercion over the decades. With WMD acquisition increasingly becoming an 
attractive approach for countries such as Iran, coercion against the U.S. is quite possible in 
future conflict situations. An crucial point to note here is that since this is a case where 
both North Korea and the U.S. tried to coerce each other, both entities are periodically 
referred to as ‘target’ and ‘coercer’ according to the argument being presented.  
Chronology 
In late 2002, Pyongyang accepted that it had a uranium-enrichment program, which was in 
violation of both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its 1994 Agreed Framework 
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deal with the United States.1 Its actions could be seen as scaling the ladder of escalation. 
After its admission of the uranium enrichment plant, North Korea announced that it would 
restart plutonium production, and expel inspectors from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Then in January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. The general 
agreement among experts has been that Pyongyang is capable of producing nuclear 
weapons,2 and the October 2006 test confirmed this suspicion. Delivery vehicles, in this 
case, missiles, are also either in place or in various stages of production.3 These missiles 
have the capability to strike North Korea’s regional opponents – South Korea and Japan.  
Also crucial is North Korea’s role as a proliferator. The danger of it selling nuclear and 
missile technology in exchange for hard cash is ever present.  
The 1994 Agreed Framework with the Clinton administration had cooled tensions 
after war almost broke out on the peninsula. In return for fuel, food, and a light water 
reactor, North Korea agreed to desist from taking steps to acquire a nuclear arsenal.4 The 
agreement was unable to prevent North Korea from reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods at 
its plutonium generator at Yongbyon. This is adequate for building up to six nuclear 
weapons.5 At present, it would be safe to say that Pyongyang has completed the nuclear 
fuel cycle and has developed nuclear weapons capability.6  
PERCEPTIONS 
The basis for North Korea’s coercive demands and high objectives was a deep perception 
of threat from the U.S. The Kim Jong Il regime assumed that if North Korea did not take 
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measures to bolster its deterrent capability, the U.S. would successfully coerce regime 
change. Therefore, for North Korea the fear was impending regime change Type C 
coercive diplomacy by the U.S. and this reinforced Pyongyang’s own coercive threats to 
achieve demands that would have blunted Washington’s supposed regime change 
objective.  
Thus, North Korea consistently suspected that Washington’s actual intentions 
revolved around regime change in the country. To a large extent, influential sections of the 
American foreign policy establishment backed such an objective. Though officially regime 
change was not on the Bush administration ’s agenda, sections of the administration were 
involved in planning for this eventuality.7 The problem was that regime survival was the 
main objective of Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il’s regime learnt a lesson from the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003, and saw its own confrontation in the same context. A September 
2006 statement by the Rodong Sinmun, the Communist Party’s official newspaper said, 
“In order for any country to defend itself it is important to have a correct view on war, 
among other things. This can be proved by what happened in Iraq,” adding that a state “can 
reliably defend itself only when it manufactures necessary weapons by itself.”8
Pyongyang’s perceptions of U.S. regime change agenda were not quelled by 
President Bush’s personal animosity toward the North Korean dictator. In an interview he 
stated that, “I loathe Kim Jong Il. I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is 
starving his people. And I have seen intelligence of these prison camps – they’re huge – 
that he uses to break up families, and to torture people.”9 For North Korea such opinions 
were unacceptable. In 2004, DPRK’s vice foreign minister Kim Gye Gwan asked a visiting 
American scholar, “How can we deal with you when your leader doesn’t show us even a 
minimum of respect?”10
With such an overall attitude, it is unclear if the Bush administration would have 
been satisfied even if North Korea had agreed to a complete rollback. North Korea had 
already been placed on the ‘axis of evil’ list even before the October 2002 revelations. 
                                                 
7 David Rennie, ‘Rumsfeld Calls for Regime Change in North Korea,’ The Telegraph, April 23, 2003. 
8 ‘North Korea Cites Iraq, Lebanon to Justify Strong Military,’ DefenseNews.com, September 6, 2006. 
9 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pg. 340. 
10 Michael Hirsh, Melinda Liu & George Wehrfritz, ‘How N. Korea Changed the Nuclear Club’s Rules,’ 
Newsweek, October 23, 2006. 
  213
After the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the administration reinforced the argument for 
spread of democracy and human rights to other countries with authoritarian regimes. 
Therefore, with this kind of perceived regime change agenda, Kim Jong Il’s motivation to 
resist such pressures through counter-threats increased.  
Due to this regime insecurity, Pyongyang consistently demanded bilateral 
negotiations with Washington involving security guarantees and full diplomatic relations. 
Kim Jong Il’s view was that only such a direct deal with the U.S. could provide real 
security to the regime.11 This was because the main conceivable military threat to North 
Korea comes from the U.S. However, as stated in the previous section, the U.S. was not 
willing to offer any such guarantees or even bilateral talks, because this was an integral 
part of applying a strong coercive policy. 
Further, while the Bush administration demanded complete and verifiable 
denuclearization of North Korea, there was no clarity of settlement conditions. If the target 
is assured by the coercer that after it (the target) concedes it would be treated in acceptable 
ways, and an appropriate agreement would be adhered to, the chances of successful 
coercive diplomacy greatly increase. However, in this case, the Bush administration, 
chastened by North Korea’s surreptitious nuclear program after the 1994 deal, refused to 
discuss any issues related to concessions to Pyongyang till it completely and verifiably 
dismantled its nuclear weapons program. Such issues would have revolved around a formal 
peace treaty between North Korea and the U.S. as well as security guarantees which might 
have included a no-war pact. However, there was no room for any discussion on the post-
denuclearization period, and this left little clarity regarding the future of the regime.  
Perception issues also arose due to differing understandings on each side on the 
meaning of denuclearization. For North Korea, denuclearization had a broader connotation 
and involved making the entire Korean peninsula nuclear-weapon free; however, the U.S. 
denied deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea.12 North Korea also perceived U.S. 
assistance to refugees from the country as signifying a regime change objective. This was 
Pyongyang’s likely conclusion after President Bush signed the North Korean Human 
                                                 
11 Chung-in Moon and Jong-Yun Bae, ‘The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,’ Asian 
Perspective, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2003, pg. 15. 
12 Jim Yardley, ‘North Korea Seeks U.S. Aid Before It Halts Its Nuclear Program,’ The New York Times,  
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Rights Act which granted an annual sum of $20 million to assist refugees from North 
Korea.13 Therefore, North Korea’s motivation to resist arose because of its perception that 
Washington’s objectives were not restricted to a roll back of the nuclear arsenal, but in fact 
included an overthrow of the regime and possible reunification with the South. If 
Pyongyang had agreed to rollback its nuclear arsenal in the absence of adequate security 
reassurances, it would then have been easier for the U.S. to go ahead with forcible regime 
change.   
The regime change agenda went beyond the fundamental interests of the U.S., and 
so it was difficult to attain, making the resolve of Pyongyang stronger, and the credibility 
of American threats weaker. Asymmetry of interests is a very important concept here. If 
the U.S. had restricted its demands in both cases to the nuclear issue, then coercion would 
have had a better chance of succeeding. But the way the discourse has been played out, 
there was now an inseparable linkage between nuclear weapons and regime change. This is 
why Pyongyang insisted on security guarantees and written pledges that it would not be 
attacked – because it was convinced that any negative action against it had the larger 
motive of regime change. This naturally gave rise to suspicions in Washington that any 
talks that North Korea engaged in or any supposed concessions that it offered would solely 
be for the purpose of extracting aid and securing the regime and would not involve any 
actual dismantling of its nuclear program.  
Coercive measures to deal with counter-proliferation in this case depended on 
whether the overall strategy is one of regime change or behavior change.14 In a regime 
change strategy, conditionalities of any deal would be extreme enough to force the target 
into a belligerent posture, which could then be used to justify more direct regime change 
measures. But a strategy that concentrates on behavior change rather than regime change 
could be more reasonable without being unnecessarily concessionary.  However, this 
difference was never specified by the Bush administration. Therefore, the uncertainty 
regarding the regime change agenda remained and allowed to North Korean regime to take 
a pessimistic view of the situation.  
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Nevertheless, the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the most crucial international 
security problems, and regime change was a prominent option considered in case of North 
Korea. If a firm decision on regime change is taken in any situation, a key question to be 
asked is – who is conducting this change.15 A multilateralist approach would bring in 
much needed international acceptance, and provide credibility to threats. But this was 
hardly the case here.  
Implications: 
How did perceptions impact on coercive diplomacy? 
The recurring theme of this dissertation is the importance of perceptions on the opposing 
sides and how it framed their respective positions and demands. In North Korea’s 
perceptions, the U.S. was aiming at eventual regime change in Pyongyang through 
multilateral isolation and refusal to negotiate bilaterally. Washington did not try to change 
these threat perceptions by denying such an agenda or through a reassurance strategy. 
Indeed, for some influential policymakers in Washington, regime change was the answer to 
dealing with the threat from North Korea, and therefore, Pyongyang’s threat perceptions 
were not entirely inaccurate. As the section on internal factors demonstrates, the Bush 
administration’s first term was dominated by neo-conservative officials who had 
recommended strong action against ‘rogue’ states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq 
throughout the Clinton years.  
Armed with a high degree of threat perception centered around regime change, 
Pyongyang therefore made high coercive demands that impacted on national security 
interests defined by the Bush administration. The national interests were enshrined in 
documents such as the 2002 National Security Strategy and were linked to sweeping 
references such as the ‘Axis of Evil,’ and North Korea’s membership of this group. The 
administration had firmly committed itself to a policy under which bilateral talks about 
security guarantees would only follow complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament 
(CVID). Thus high threat perception led Pyongyang to put forth a high magnitude of 
demands that balanced the asymmetry of interests, essentially leading to a stalemate.   
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Thus, perceptions of mutual distrust ensured that the interests remained  high and 
symmetrical on both sides, reducing the chances of success of coercive diplomacy. This 
was not necessarily because fundamental interests of both sides were at stake. It was more 
to do with the fact that perceptions of suspicion had ensured that any agreement would 
have required a high degree or reassurance that each side would have had to offer to the 
other. Thus, the U.S. wanted complete CVID as a reassurance against any deal breaking by 
Pyongyang, while North Korea wanted credible security guarantees against possible Type 
C coercive diplomacy by Washington.  Therefore, as the next section shows, both sides 
framed objectives that were wide-ranging and in the U.S. case at least, immune to any 
modification.  
 
Table 17: North Korean case: Perceptions 
Perceptions Coercive Diplomacy consequence  
  
North Korean perceptions that 
real U.S. objective is regime 
change. 
Therefore, its demand for direct bilateral talks with U.S. over security guarantees, 
as it perceived the U.S. to be the main threat. 
 
  
U.S. perceptions of mistrust based 
on North Korea’s cheating in the 
past. 
Refusal to give any security assurances, increased the fear of Type C CD in 
Pyongyang’s perception, leading to high demands and symmetry of motivation, 
resulting in a stalemate.  
 
OBJECTIVES 
The magnitude of objectives and demands of the coercer as well as the target help 
determine the eventual course of coercive diplomacy. If the coercer issues demands that go 
against the vital interests of the adversary, then the asymmetry of interests favors the 
adversary, making it more likely to resist.16 In this case, both U.S. and North Korea had 
certain irreducible objectives, because of which they stuck to their stated positions.  
                                                 
16 Alexander L. George, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,’ in Alexander L. George and 
William E. Simons, (ed) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994), pg. 15.  
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North Korean coercive objectives and demands 
Pyongyang’s coercive moves came about in its pursuit of certain goals that would have 
helped secure its regime, especially in context of the threat perception from the U.S. North 
Korea’s coercive responses to U.S pressure involved ‘brinkmanship diplomacy’ where it 
raises the stakes to procure increased economic aid, which would then help in shoring up 
the regime.17  
For Pyongyang, its nuclear weapons program was both a method of extracting more 
demands as well as an end in itself (for deterrent purposes). The objectives underlying 
North Korea’s nuclear program can be summarized as follows. First, nuclear weapons are 
supposed to help deter a military attack by the U.S. and/or Republic of Korea (South 
Korea), whether it is a general invasion or a limited attack on North Korean nuclear and 
missile facilities. Second, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons would help North Korea 
in the eventual reunification of the peninsula on its terms.18 Third, nuclear weapons have 
become a tool for Pyongyang to extract aid, in terms of food, fuel, and cash.19 Its demands 
also include a non-aggression pact with the United States to officially end the 1950-53 
Korean War. A further danger is that besides its missile deliveries to countries like 
Pakistan, it could soon start exporting weapons grade plutonium,20 or even transfer nuclear 
materials to terrorist groups.  
While the U.S. preferred multilateral coercion, North Korea demanded direct 
bilateral talks with the U.S., which the latter felt would be too much of a concession to 
Pyongyang. In the first two rounds of the recent six-party talks, Pyongyang proposed a 
three step agenda as its immediate objectives. These were (1) North Korea be excluded 
from Washington’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, (2) end of all sanctions, and (3) the 
supply of heavy fuel oil.21 These immediate and general objectives (security guarantee for 
the Korean peninsula and a non-aggression pact with the U.S.) are indicators that for 
                                                 
17 J.H. Lee and C.I. Moon, ‘The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated 
Settlement,’ Security Dialogue, June 2003, Vol. 34, No. 2. 
18 J.S. Bermudez, Jr., ‘The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons,’ pg. 183. 
19 ‘Analysis: North Korean Nuclear Blackmail?’ United Press International, June 11, 2003 
20 Michael A. Levi, ‘Uncontainable: North Korea’s Loose Nukes,’ The New Republic, May 26, 2003. 
21 B.B. Koh, ‘Kim Jong Il’s April 2004 Visit to China,’ Policy Forum Online, The Nautilus Institute,  
May 7, 2004. 
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Pyongyang the main objective has been the survival of the regime and any demands that 
threaten this would be turned down.   
North Korea’s approach included an insistence that it could not dismantle nuclear 
weapons as well as a threat to demonstrate or even transfer these devices.22 This implied a 
threat to destabilize the region with a nuclear test. But it also represented an attempt to 
exploit U.S. insecurity regarding terrorism in the post 9/11 period. The threat to transfer 
nuclear material clearly referred to terror groups, especially Al Qaeda, which had 
expressed an interest in non-conventional weapons. Given these worries in the U.S., such a 
threat was bound to be taken seriously.23  
North Korea also stated that if the U.S. and the UN decided to impose economic 
sanctions, this would be regarded as an act of war and that Pyongyang would retaliate by 
leaving the U.S. in a ‘sea of fire.’24 While the U.S. attempted multilateral pressure, it is 
also clear that the characteristics of nuclear weapons (especially the deterrence capability) 
also enable coercion in the other direction, i.e., by the target state on to the coercer.25 
Given the internal conditions in the country, Pyongyang had much less to lose than 
members of the U.S. alliance in the region (South Korea and Japan). Furthermore, large 
numbers of American troops stationed in South Korea and Japan would have been an 
obvious target of North Korean coercion. Therefore, this brings about fundamental changes 
in the way coercion can be applied in a context of nuclear weapons.  
Another way for North Korea to issue counter-threats was through periodic missile 
tests. North Korea has a history of testing missiles in an attempt to gain the international 
community’s attention. Periodically, since the crisis began in 2002, intelligence reports 
suggested that the regime was on the verge of testing missiles in the Sea of Japan.26 
Despite a September 2002 agreement between Japan and North Korea under which the 
                                                 
22 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Prepared Statement, U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2004, pg. 4, 
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/multilateralTalks/CanKor_VTK_2004_07_15_six_party_talks_
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23 See for example, Graham Allison, ‘The ongoing failure of imagination,’ The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
September/October 2006, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 36-41. 
24 Michael Klare, ‘For Oil and Empire? Rethinking War with Iraq,’ Current History, March 2003. 
25 William M. Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?” in Robert J. Art & 
Patrick M. Cronin (ed.) The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2003) 
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North agreed not to test missiles, it tested shorter-range anti ship missiles in 2003. There 
were also reports in 2004 that North Korea was planning to test its Nodong missiles that 
can cover most of Japan, which had thousands of American troops stationed there.27  
Apart from U.S. and South Korean forces, North Korea’s threats also targeted other 
countries in the region. The U.S. nuclear umbrella has ensured that Japan and South Korea 
did not pursue a nuclear weapons program and instead concentrated on economic progress. 
All that would have changed if Pyongyang had fired another missile over the Sea of Japan. 
As it is, there has been growing domestic support in Japan for a nuclear deterrent.28 Japan 
is a key player in the long-term perspective that takes into account the possible 
reunification of the Korean peninsula and the implications for East Asian security. 
North Korea offered some concessions along with its threats as was the case during 
the October 2002 talks, but neither of them met the minimum U.S. demands. In 
negotiations it considered proposals to eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program, 
but the initial steps would only involve freezing it,29 which was unacceptable because it 
still left it the option of restarting the program at any future date, or even using it as a 
threat to the international community. But what does seem clear is that part of its agenda 
for negotiations was to extract as many concessions as possible for the slightest positive 
moves. Even for a partial freeze for its nuclear program, Pyongyang sought compensation, 
while Washington wanted to end the program completely.30 When its enriched uranium 
project was revealed, Pyongyang immediately offered to halt it in return for a non-
aggression pact with the United States.31 Therefore, with this kind of track record, it was 
difficult for the U.S. to consider the limited concessions offered by Pyongyang.    
                                                 
27 As of 2006, 47,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed in Japan, about half of them in Okinawa, see 
‘Cost split stalls talks on US troops in Japan,’ ChinaDaily.com, March 25, 2006, 
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28 Ivo H. Daalder and James Lindsay, ‘Nuclear Wal-Mart?’ The American Prospect, September 1, 2003. 
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30 ‘North Korea nuclear talks begin,’ BBC News, May 4, 2004,  
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Washington’s refusal to concede to North Korean demands 
From the Bush administration’s perspective, the magnitude of North Korean demands was 
simply too high because it could have recreated the danger of Pyongyang cheating once 
again. The U.S. refused to give in to any of Pyongyang’s demands because doing so would 
have compromised its objectives on the Korean peninsula. The most urgent of these was 
halting and possibly reversing Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program. Avoiding war on 
the peninsula between the two Koreas (which would most certainly draw in the U.S.) has 
been another goal. Washington has also sought to curtail North Korea’s role as a 
distributor of missile and potentially, nuclear material and know-how. Also important was 
a major reduction in the conventional military capability of North Korea. At the heart of 
any U.S. approach to North Korea was the fundamental principle that Pyongyang had to 
give up nuclear weaponization first and only subsequent to that could any talks be held on 
security agreements and other long term deals.  
While the Bush administration had a clear unilateral approach to foreign policy, 
(judging by the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns), on the North Korean issue it preferred a 
multilateral approach, albeit one still involving coercion. Washington’s multilateral 
approach aimed to pressurize Pyongyang by getting other regional powers, especially 
China, Japan, and South Korea to persuade the regime.32 Through this multilateral 
approach, Washington avoided making any direct concessions to North Korea, given that 
one of Pyongyang’s key demands has been direct bilateral talks with the U.S.  
Washington’s threats included suspension of the 1994 Agreed Framework and an 
end to economic assistance. The U.S. forced the Korean Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) to halt shipment of heavy oil to Pyongyang. Hard-line proponents of 
American strategy recommended strong measures such as demanding that Pyongyang 
surrender its entire nuclear capability, shut down its missile bases, and submit to a full and 
complete inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).33
In February 2003, as tensions increased, President Bush stated that ‘all options are 
on the table,’ indicating that military options had not been discounted. At the same time, 
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Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declared North Korea a ‘terrorist state,’ and ordered twenty-
four long-range bombers to be put on alert for a possible strike role.34 In the event of North 
Korea’s refusal to accede to these demands, direct action could include an air and naval 
blockade of the country. Simultaneously, U.S. troops in South Korea would be redeployed 
to take them beyond range of North Korean attacks. The most direct response of course 
would be striking Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities, even though U.S. intelligence has not 
been aware of all its facilities.35 Specifically, military action included striking the 
Yongbyon reactor, the most prominent nuclear facility, a complex that contains a reactor 
and plutonium reprocessing plant.36   
The U.S. also demonstrated its hard-line response through regular military 
exercises with allies in the region, especially South Korea. One view held that military 
exercises could help deter the north from making any aggressive moves in the peninsula.37 
The problem with this view was that instead of pressurizing the North, it risked provoking 
it into aggression, because of Pyongyang’s obsession with regime survival.  
U.S. counter-moves also involved taking proactive measures to defend itself by 
beginning the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems in the region. The initial stages 
of this project began in the second half of 2004 with the arrival of state of the art destroyers 
of the 7th Fleet off the waters of North Korea.38 Even though the project was not expected 
to be complete for some years, it represented an attempt to degrade the North’s missile 
capability, to make American threats more credible. North Korea’s attempted missile tests 
in July 2006 immediately led to interceptor missile systems in Alaska being put on high 
alert.39  
One of Washington's primary concerns was the threat of nuclear proliferation from 
North Korea. In this connection Washington introduced the Proliferation Security Initiative 
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(PSI) in 2003 to prevent North Korea from peddling its WMD and missile proliferation 
wares. While it was broadly aimed at countering all proliferation, it was recognized  by 
U.S. policymakers as being especially aimed at North Korea and Iran. However, this 
framework, which is outside the nonproliferation regime, was hampered because other 
states in the Six Party talks, China, Japan, and South Korea were uneasy about the legality 
of the system, which seeks to interdict ships on the high seas suspected of carrying WMD-
related materials.40 This framework did have some low profile successes in 2002-03, 
including preventing Pyongyang from acquiring missile propellant related equipment as 
well as prevailing on China to halt the supply of chemicals related to the nuclear weapons 
program.41  
Prior to the PSI, in December 2002 U.S. special forces boarded and searched a 
North Korean ship in the Arabian Sea, which was found to be carrying Scud missiles to 
Yemen, in what was a legitimate sale. While the U.S. allowed the ship to proceed with its 
cargo, Pyongyang bitterly protested Washington’s move, and its spokesman stated that the 
U.S. had committed “unpardonable piracy that wantonly encroached upon the sovereignty 
of the DPRK.”42 But as far as helping pressurizing North Korea to denuclearize, this 
system did not have much success. The program’s strength lay in denying Pyongyang new 
materials rather than actually degrading its existing capability, which was the non-
negotiable U.S. objective. 
The U.S. recognized that a key element of successful coercion is a carrot and stick 
policy which helps reduce the target’s motivation to resist. However, a key problem has 
been the sequencing of such a deal. The U.S. has insisted that the first step had to be 
complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament (CVID)43 but North Korea insisted that the 
U.S. offer concessions first, in the form of fuel, financial and possibly security 
guarantees.44 Washington rejected proposals such as the one by Russia in January 2003, 
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under which security guarantees would be offered to North Korea in exchange for a 
nuclear freeze. Therefore, with this hard-line approach, Washington was able to display 
strong resolve and determination, but from the perspective of lessening the adversary’s 
motivation to resist, it offered no concessions. The experience of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework ruled out any similar agreement, as Pyongyang had carried its surreptitious 
uranium-enrichment program in violation of the 1994 deal. When it came to power in 
January 2001, the Bush administration had criticized its predecessor on its North Korea 
policy for not being aggressive enough and for having adopted an appeasement attitude. 
Even before October 2002, the administration was gearing up for sterner measures. 
Consequently, the idea of offering concessions simultaneous to CVID was seen as 
submitting to nuclear blackmail.   
But it is not as if possible concessionary strategies were unavailable. One suggested 
policy was a ‘grand bargain’ that would have involved energy, economic, military and 
diplomatic initiatives, such as transfer of conventional sources of energy in return for 
dismantling the nuclear weapons program, and drastic reductions in troop strengths on both 
sides.45 The problem with the 1994 agreement was that it was tactical and crisis-driven, 
and left in place the nuclear program. Other strategies included a variant of the Nunn-
Lugar cooperative threat reduction program under which economic help could have been 
provided by North Korea’s neighbors in return for dismantling its nuclear program.46 
Security assurances on the lines of those provided to Ukraine in 1994 under the Nunn-
Lugar program were also proposed for Pyongyang.47 But such carrot and stick policies 
were not seriously considered by the U.S., which meant that the asymmetry of interests 
remained tilted against Washington. To reduce the target’s motivation to resist, offering 
concessions plays an important role.   
American objectives of counter proliferation in North Korea also reflected higher 
ambitions of preventing the emergence of a threat to U.S. dominance. In the post-Cold War 
period, policymakers in Washington considered a more aggressive approach, under which 
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the U.S. would do whatever possible to prevent the emergence of a countervailing power.48 
Thus the high magnitude of North Korean demands was countered by higher ambitions on 
the part of the U.S., which again encouraged high magnitude demand which are relatively 
incompatible with the practice of coercive diplomacy. Another important factor is the type 
of provocation, which helps establish the target’s culpability. If the target’s provocative 
action is unequivocally against all international norms and laws such as the occupation of 
foreign territory, it becomes easier to pin the blame and gain international support for 
coercive action. In this case, while there was support from the international community on 
the need for denuclearizing North Korea, the dispute was over the means to achieve this 
objective.  
Coercion is also strengthened by the element of urgency.49 But in this case it 
worked against the U.S. The passage of time without any deal only brought North Korea 
closer to nuclear capability,50 and it then demonstrated this capability in October 2006. 
Washington  was not able to establish a sense of urgency in the North Korean regime, by 
assuming that isolating it would be effective enough. Some hard-line policymakers in the 
U.S. in fact favored a ‘malign neglect’ strategy because of which North Korea would 
acquire nuclear weapons and that would provide enough justification for aggressive 
military action.51 Thus, here the view was to reinforce the type of provocation to make 
coercive action more favorable.  But in that scenario, the credibility of U.S. military threats 
would decrease further, as Pyongyang would then have a full-fledged nuclear arsenal.  This 
was consistent with a growing opinion that Pyongyang might just be trying to force the rest 
of the world to accept it as a de facto nuclear weapons state, and all its talk of freezing and 
eventual dismantling could be to buy some more time.52  
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CVID  and the lack of clarity of settlement conditions  
For both sides a significant hurdle in terms of objectives and the willingness to make 
concessions was a deep mistrust of the adversary based on past behavior. This past 
behavior centered around commitments that neither side made as part of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework. From the U.S. perspective, Pyongyang violated the agreement with its secret 
nuclear program, while from the North Korea angle, the U.S. did not supply promised 
items, such as a light-water reactor.53 Because of this mistrust, there was a significant lack 
of clarity over eventual settlements.  
North Korea alleged that part of the reason for the 2002 crisis was that Washington 
did not fulfill its end of the bargain under the 1994 Agreed Framework. This included 
delay in oil shipments, lack of trade liberalization, and a refusal to introduce full 
diplomatic relations that North Korea perceived was part of the arrangement.54 Therefore, 
this was an attempt to frame the case in a manner unfavorable to the U.S. by exploiting the 
type of provocation factor. The U.S. position was that by going ahead with a surreptitious 
uranium enrichment project, the North Korean regime had broken its commitment to freeze 
its nuclear program under the 1994 agreement.  
Thus, both sides argued that the type of provocation issue was the fault of the other 
because of broken commitments. The result was that Washington insisted on complete, 
verifiable, irreversible, disarmament (CVID) as the primary condition for any negotiation 
on concessions or bilateral security guarantees. However, as some scholars have pointed 
out there was no clear road map for the most part about what CVID would entail. 
Moreover, comprehensive CVID would take years to implement.55 In the interim, 
Washington might have continued its policy of isolating DPRK and waiting for eventual 
fall of the regime. Thus, for North Korea this was hardly reassuring.  
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Mixed messages 
A prominent factor in this episode was the lack of clarity of what the objectives were on 
both sides, as well as the threats that were conveyed to coerce the adversary.  The Bush 
administration, when it came to office, decided that it would pursue a more hard-line 
agenda against Pyongyang. However, there was no unanimity about what this meant. It 
resulted in a plethora of demands, which detracted from the clarity of objective which is 
necessary for conveying threats and intentions to the adversary.  
These mixed messages however, have come from both sides. After the October 
2006 nuclear test,  Pyongyang sent contradictory signals after discussions with a senior 
Chinese government figure, Tang Jiaxuan. In one account, the Chinese diplomat reported 
to the global media that the North Korean leader had expressed remorse for the nuclear test 
and had stated that there would be no more such tests. However, in another account, U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that when the Chinese official briefed her about 
the meeting he did not mention any such statements from Kim Jong Il,56 even though, if 
true, they would have been an important climb-down by North Korea.  
It is entirely possible that this particular episode was an attempt by Pyongyang to 
moderate its coercive diplomacy objectives through statements that can be retracted or can 
be attributed to misinterpretation at a later stage. It is crucial to state, that at least in the 
initial days after this statement, the Chinese government made no attempt to clarify it, 
suggesting some interest in maintaining ambiguity over intentions in the interests of a 
peaceful settlement.      
Regardless of the eventual result, it demonstrates that mixed messages in coercive 
diplomacy do not always make the situation more tense. In cases where one side would 
like to take a more moderate stance, mixed messages can mask any political or diplomatic 
loss of face. Thus the importance of mixed messages is that it helps the actor(s) claim 
plausible deniability in the event the situation worsens. Therefore, mixed messages and the 
accompanying plausible deniability can persuade an actor (or actors) in a coercive equation 
to take risks toward lessening tensions.   
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 Implications: 
What was the magnitude of objectives and how did this impact on the asymmetry of 
motivation/interests in coercive diplomacy? 
North Korea’s objectives in the crisis revolved around regime survival which is the highest 
national interest for any ruler. As the analysis has shown, this objective was based on a 
perception that Washington’s eventual goal was to bring about regime change in 
Pyongyang. If North Korea had consented to CVID as a precondition to any discussions on 
concessions and a non-aggression pact with the U.S., it would have left the Stalinist regime 
vulnerable to U.S. military threats. Therefore, according to experts who interviewed DPRK 
officials, Pyongyang’s suspicions of U.S. intentions would decrease if simultaneous 
denuclearization and (in exchange) the supply of aid and energy took place.57  
Thus, since DPRK’s eventual objective was regime survival, its magnitude of 
demands reflected this high objective. However, from the U.S. perspective, because of 
North Koreas’ past record of deception and violation of the 1994 agreement, a 
simultaneous process of denuclearization as well as flow of economic aid was untenable. 
Through its October 2006 nuclear test and attempted missile tests in July 2006, 
Pyongyang also sought to capture the attention of the U.S. and demonstrate the seriousness 
of its demands as well as threat capability. After the test, the North Korean ambassador to 
the U.S stated that North Korea was forced to “prove its possession of nukes to protect its 
sovereignty and right to existence from the daily increasing danger of war from the United 
States.”58 However, from the U.S. perspective, this further entrenched the Bush 
administration’s existing position. This was because any concessions by the U.S. after the 
test would have been seen as a reward for unacceptable behavior by North Korea. Thus, for 
both sides, the stakes became extremely high, further balancing the asymmetry of interests. 
As the crisis dragged on, the opposing sides’ positions became more and more 
entrenched. In the case of North Korea, according to some experts who visited the country, 
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it became more difficult for North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons after it declared 
publicly on February 10th, 2005 that it had assembled nuclear weapons; this was 
exacerbated by the October 2006 nuclear test.59 From the coercive diplomacy perspective, 
by publicly aiming for such a high objective, Pyongyang found it difficult to back away.  
As the section on objectives showed, for the U.S., talking directly with North Korea 
was too high a demand and contrary to Washington's non-negotiable position that only 
after CVID would any talk of concessions by the U.S. take place. On a broader level, 
Washington had backed itself into a corner from where it was difficult to make 
concessions, even if there was a desire to do so among Washington’s policymakers. Even 
before the crisis, President Bush named DPRK as a member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ in the 
January 2002 State of the Union address,60 one of the most important policy statements by 
the U.S. government. Further, the National Security Strategy, released a month before the 
crisis began in October 2002 also resolved to take firm measures against proliferators such 
as North Korea.61 The importance of this point is that by publicly and repeatedly assuming 
such a high, non-negotiable objective, and by linking it inextricably to U.S. security, 
Washington diminished any chances of negotiation.       
 
Did any modification of objectives take place? 
Modification of objectives by the coercer can frequently lead to a situation conducive to a 
settlement if the modified demands are less stringent and severe than the original ones. 
Pyongyang had several objectives in issuing its coercive threats. Apart from security 
guarantees and economic aid, increasingly, the regime also demanded that the U.S. remove 
the economic measures taken against North Korean criminal activities.62  
Pyongyang’s displeasure over the freezing of its financial assets was also 
heightened by the fact that instead of its financial interests in Macao (which had been a 
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major center for DPRK criminal activities), U.S. companies were expanding their presence 
especially through the lucrative casino industry.63 But while the U.S. claimed that such 
economic actions were unconnected to the impasse over DPRK’s nuclear program, 
Pyongyang’s diplomats insisted that the nuclear issue would be off the agenda till 
Washington removed these economic measures.64 Thus both sides tried to manipulate 
secondary points of dispute as a lever in the main issue – the nuclear program.  
As this section showed, Washington had multiple objectives in North Korea. The 
South Asia chapter (ch. 2) showed how multiple objectives can have both negative and 
positive consequences for the state making the demands. It can make an adversary more 
rigid (negative effect) due to the numerous demands against it, but it can also make the 
adversary more flexible (positive effect) if only some objectives need to be fulfilled 
(modification of demands).  
However, in this case, while the U.S. had multiple objectives there was no 
demonstrated hierarchy of these objectives. A hierarchy of objectives would have meant 
prioritization and therefore some possibility of compromise and modification of goals. A 
downward modification of objectives would have tilted the asymmetry of interests away 
from North Korea. 
Thus, Washington’s objectives ranged from denuclearization and suspected regime 
change to rolling back Pyongyang’s criminal networks and promoting human rights by 
assisting North Korean refugees. But Washington did not create a hierarchy among these 
objectives, something which could have facilitated a conciliatory move through scaling 
down of demands. Washington refused to link financial sanctions (in response to North 
Korean criminal activities) with the nuclear issue. In February 2006, State Department 
spokesman Adam Ereli stated that, “If they are making linkages, that’s their business. 
We’re not making linkages. We and the other parties, I should stress, think that talks on 
denuclearizing in the Peninsula should resume on their own merits.”65   
Nevertheless, after the October 2006 nuclear test by North Korea, in an attempt to 
resume some multilateral discussions, Washington did dangle some incentives to the Kim 
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Jong Il regime, in return for certain commitments by Pyongyang. These commitments were 
said to include immediate dismantlement of some nuclear equipment such as a 5MW 
reactor that can process fuel into weapons grade material and a plutonium reprocessing 
facility.66 Such steps are potentially a far cry from the non-negotiable CVID which, in any 
case, would have required years to implement. Thus, in the weeks after the October nuclear 
test, the U.S. began to show signs that it might be amenable to modification of objectives. 
Furthermore, Washington’s refusal to link demands (mentioned earlier in this 
subsection) also underwent a change. U.S. diplomats stated that they would be willing to 
discuss the financial sanctions issue (regarding the sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, the 
Macao bank) in the hope that it would lead to progress on the nuclear issue.67
These potentially radical changes in U.S. attitudes suggest that when the 
asymmetry of interest is balanced at a very high level, i.e., if both sides place enormous 
stakes on a dispute, a stalemate ensues, and it allows a rethinking of the magnitude, 
hierarchy, and linkage of objectives. 
 
How did clarity of settlement conditions impact on coercive diplomacy? 
Clarity of settlement conditions reassures the parties to the dispute that any promises of 
concessions or ‘carrots’ would be adhered to and would not be unilaterally abrogated. 
Therefore, the higher the clarity of settlement conditions, the greater is the chance of a 
peaceful resolution and/or concession to the demands by the target state. But, in this case, 
clarity of settlement conditions was lacking and played a crucial role in hardening the 
opposing positions.  
As stated previously, the main point of dispute was over CVID (complete, 
verifiable, irreversible disarmament). However, for the most part, Washington did not offer 
clear positions on the process of CVID, and dismissed recommendations of other Six-Party 
members that an Agreed Framework-type series of negotiations with Pyongyang would 
make the route clear.68 Furthermore, while the agreement reached at the Six Party Talks in 
September 2005 talked about denuclearization coupled with U.S. security guarantees and 
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economic aid, it did not specify any roadmap to the process of CVID.69  Thus, for the Kim 
Jong Il regime there were no adequate reassurances that its interests would be protected.  
Interestingly, developments in November 2006 hinted that the U.S. might be 
willing to modify demands (see previous subsection). Such a move would be conducive to 
more clarity of settlement conditions.  
 
Did the objectives show any difference in the way the two sides viewed the demands 
as representing different variants of coercive diplomacy (Types A, B, or C)? In other 
words, did the coercive policy reflect different coercive diplomacy consequences for 
the two protagonists? 
It is clear that U.S. coercive threats were interpreted by Pyongyang as representing 
eventual Type C coercive diplomacy. And this persuaded North Korea to ratchet up its 
threats. A difference of opinion on which variant of coercive diplomacy is being pursued 
can also impact on reassurance strategies. Washington could have claimed that its demands 
reflected goals of behavior change in Pyongyang (Type B) and offered concessions 
accordingly. But since the Kim regime was convinced that Type C CD was the goal, such 
concessions of future security guarantees were not enough.  Therefore, it is clear that 
reassurances have to be  conditioned to clearly suit a particular variant of CD.   
An intriguing line of analysis is that North Korea was also pursuing Type C 
coercive diplomacy. Some analysts also stated that part of the reason why North Korea was 
so adamant was because it was waiting out the Bush administration in the hope that the 
2008 U.S. Presidential election would bring in a more pliable administration.70 It is 
possible that by ensuring a stalemate through high demands, North Korea wanted to 
contribute to failures of the Bush administration which would pay off in the 2008 election. 
It would therefore be useful to speculate that if this was so, it shows a different approach to 
Type C CD – one in which the coercer passively seeks regime change in the target, as 
opposed to direct intervention. It also demonstrates that objectives modification which 
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generally moderate the coercer’s goals, can also work the other way, i.e., the coercer’s 
objectives can increase to type C (regime change) from type b (behavior change). 
 
The following table summarizes the arguments in this section:  
 
Table 18: North Korean case: Objectives 
Objectives Carrots?  Coercive Diplomacy consequence  
U.S. objectives 
- denuclearization 
- no concessions 
 
North Korean objectives 
- Direct talks with U.S. 
- End sanctions 
- supply fuel 
 
 
No modification of objectives 
 
   No  
 
Sequencing of deal problematic, U.S. wants complete 
verifiable disarmament first.  
 
Also, suspicion that North Korea intends to keep nuclear 
weapons anyway, so no deal.  
 
From the U.S. perspective, Pyongyang’s demands too 
high.  
 
Stalemate continued. 
 
CREDIBILITY OF THREATS 
Credibility of threats is an essential component of coercive diplomacy which, if adequately 
present, convinces the target that the coercer has both resolve and capability to carry out its 
threats. In the absence of credibility, the target’s willingness to resist increases. In this 
particular case both coercer (North Korea) as well as targets (U.S., South Korea and Japan) 
had more than adequate fire power to make the image of war catastrophic.  
U.S. threats from the beginning itself were beset with credibility problems.  On the 
military level, two factors decreased the credibility of U.S. threats. First, the extension of 
U.S. forces across the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, the North Korean 
military capability was (and still is) strong enough to deny the U.S. a quick victory and in 
fact was able to issue substantial military threats of its own. 
North Korean military threats were taken quite seriously by its neighbors, 
especially Japan. Tokyo was concerned about the roughly one hundred Nodong missiles 
that Pyongyang had aimed at Japan and which could carry chemical and nuclear 
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warheads.71 However, the mainstay of the North Korean military is the army. The North 
Korean People’s Army (NKPA), 1.2 million strong, is the fourth largest army in the world 
and more than a match for the South Korean army, which is about half a million strong and 
the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there. Crucially, the NKPA’s 125,000-member Special 
Operations Force (equivalent to Iraq’s Republican Guard) is said to be one of the largest 
such forces in the world.72 Such a massive highly trained section of the army can pose a 
potent threat behind enemy lines. North Korea’s missile strength (especially the 1,200-mile 
Taepo Dong-I missiles and the medium range Nodong missiles) is also a major threat, if 
not to continental United States, then at least to U.S. interests as well as those of its allies 
in the region.  
Soon after the Bush administration took office in 2001, it became obvious that the 
Pentagon’s plan for war against North Korea was not adequate. The contingency plan for 
war, Op Plan 5027 was shown to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2001 and it was 
clear that the plan was unwieldy because it was concerned mainly with transporting 
massive troop levels to the area.73 While this plan was subsequently updated, the North 
Korean army still posed a substantial threat to U.S. and South Korean forces.  
A key element of any U.S. military attack would be controlling escalation in the 
peninsula, i.e., neutralizing North Korean aircraft and artillery. While this can be achieved, 
problematic elements are North Korea’s missile strength and its chemical weapons. 
Pyongyang runs a minimum of 12 chemical weapons factories manufacturing 4,500 tons of 
mustard gas, phosgene, sarin, as well as V-type chemical agents and also possesses 
adequate delivery systems for these weapons.74 U.S. military sources have testified that 
chemical weapons could be a ‘showstopper’ and that these weapons have been integrated 
with North Korean artillery aimed at Seoul.75  For the U.S. military, to prevent escalation it 
would have to quickly neutralize Pyongyang’s missile, nuclear, and chemical weapons 
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installations, and would require up to 4,000 sorties per day (as opposed to the 800 per day 
carried out in Iraq).76  
Credibility of U.S. resistance to North Korean threats as well as counter-threats was 
also damaged because of disputes with South Korea in 2005. The Seoul government 
rejected Op. Plan 5029, a contingency strategy for dealing with consequences of the fall of 
the current North Korean regime. South Korea’s grievance was that in such a scenario, the 
U.S. would take the lead in controlling the North, an unacceptable plan for the South as it 
regards the entire Korean peninsula as its own territory.77  
To counter possible U.S. military strikes, the North Korean military studied recent 
U.S. military operations such as the 1999 Kosovo conflict, concentrating especially on the 
perceived U.S. reluctance to deploy large scale ground troops. The North Korean People’s 
Army (NKPA) concluded that the U.S. would rely on high-tech weaponry, including cruise 
missiles and precision-bombing., and on this basis the NKPA decided to focus on 
defensive frameworks to survive an air campaign and electronic warfare.78  The NKPA 
also assumed, after studying the 1991 Gulf War, that the U.S. would take too long to 
deploy adequate numbers of ground forces for a campaign.79 This would provide adequate 
time for the international community to step in and pressurize the two sides to desist from 
conflict. 
U.S. military options have concentrated on destroying North Korea’s nuclear 
facilities. A 1994 plan centered on destroying the Yongbyon facility involved little risk of 
U.S. casualties but factored in a North Korean counterattack on the south, which would 
leave hundreds of thousands people killed.80 Furthermore, even at that time, decision 
makers in the U.S. had concluded that Pyongyang might have been able to manufacture 
one or two nuclear devices, though this wouldn’t change the eventual nature of the 
conflict.81  
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In 1994, war nearly broke out between the United States and North Korea; the 
general impression among American policymakers was that any war would lead to about a 
million casualties. This calculation remains unchanged.82 In terms of targets too there is no 
certainty. For example, plutonium adequate for about six devices was stored at Yongbyon 
for eight years after the 1994 agreement. But unknown amounts were moved away to 
locations that were not confirmed, at least publicly.83 This made the task of any attacking 
force even more difficult. Another relevant factor, both in 1994 and in the most recent 
crisis, was the possibility of a preemptive attack by North Korea in response to perceptions 
in Pyongyang that the U.S. and its allies were preparing for a military attack. 
Analysis of credibility also has to be considered in the context of U.S. military 
deployments in recent years. After 9/11, thousands of U.S. troops were deployed in 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and many still remain there. By early 2003, more than a 
hundred thousand troops arrived in the Middle East to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
March. As the Iraqi insurgency gained strength, it soon became clear that the campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan had already stretched the U.S. military,84 and therefore, deployment 
of troops for a major military campaign in another sector would be very difficult. 
Deployment problems were also revealed in a 2004-05 South Korean government report 
which stated that in the event of a conflict, Washington would deploy up to 690,000 troops 
as well as 2,000 fighter planes.85 Considering that after the March 2003 Iraq invasion, the 
U.S. military has been bogged down without adequate personnel, it is unclear how the U.S. 
government would have been able to deploy such a massive force to yet another front. 
Further, by the end of February 2005, when North Korea announced that it had 
nuclear weapons, the U.S. military had already suffered almost 1,500 casualties in Iraq.86 It 
would have been difficult to rally around public opinion in the U.S., which was already 
increasingly dissatisfied with U.S. policies in Iraq, even if the threat from Pyongyang was 
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more justified. This was factored in by Kim Jong Il, who has believed that once the 
casualty level rose above 20,000, public opinion in the U.S. would make it very difficult 
for the U.S. to fight a long war.87 The perceived manipulation of intelligence by the Bush 
administration had already set a higher benchmark for the intelligence agencies on the 
basis of which to prove the culpability of yet another ‘rogue’ regime.  
The significance of this analysis is that it shows that components of coercive 
diplomacy were not in favor of the U.S. The image of war was catastrophic not just for 
Washington but also for its regional allies in the region. Chances of successful coercive 
diplomacy are enhanced if, in the target’s mindset, the threat of escalation of conflict is 
unacceptable. There was no indication that for North Korea this was a pressing concern.  
Threats and Bluffs 
This previous section examined the capabilities on each side as well as the accompanying 
image of war for policymakers. For policymakers an important element of issuing credible 
threats is the ability to convince the adversary of the seriousness of its threats. Throughout 
the crisis, the fundamental premise of all U.S. counter-threats was that North Korea would 
not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. Speaking in 2003, President Bush declared, 
“We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea. We will not give into blackmail. 
We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.”88
But with two events in 2006, Pyongyang called Washington’s bluff. The first was 
in July with a series of missile tests that represented a challenge to North Korea’s 
adversaries, even though the tests were only partially successful. The second was the 
October 2006 nuclear test. Thus the proverbial ball was in Washington’s court, because the 
Bush administration now had to make good its resolve to not allow Pyongyang to reach 
nuclear status. 
Not surprisingly, after initial condemnations, in November 2006 it was declared 
that the Six Party Talks would be resurrected in December. Washington was even willing 
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to talk about incentives that might be offered in exchange for North dismantling some 
nuclear equipment. This move away from the rigid CVID demand was a signal that further 
bluffing may not work, due to low U.S. threat credibility. According to one prominent 
scholar of coercive diplomacy, “the United States should not start down the road of 
coercive diplomacy, unless it is willing to resort to war or unless it has devised a political 
strategy that will enable it to back down without too much loss of face should coercive 
diplomacy fail.”89 From Washington’s perspective, further threats or hard-line positions 
might just have worsened the situation and lowered its credibility further. 
North Korea was therefore well-positioned to call Washington's bluff. 
Paradoxically, the Iraq campaign which might have demonstrated U.S. resolve to take 
military action against North Korea, ended up hampering Washington’s force projection 
capability. Not just that, it only proved to North Korea that unless it possessed weapons of  
mass destruction, the U.S. could not be deterred. Moreover, while the Bush administration 
was resolute in the objective – nuclear rollback – senior officials did not necessarily 
demonstrate a willingness to launch military strikes. For example, Vice President Dick 
Cheney, who was known to have a hard-line approach toward ‘rogue’ regimes, stated in 
March 2003 that, “The situation in North Korea is very serious… Each set of 
circumstances we’re faced with around the world is different. It doesn’t automatically 
mean an approach that makes sense in Iraq is necessarily an approach that would make 
sense in North Korea. North Korea, we think the key is a multilateral approach. Everybody 
always wants us to be multilateral and we think it’s appropriate here.”90 Therefore, the fact 
that different standards were being applied to North Korea and Iraq, suggested that the 
U.S. was not as ready to use force as it was in Iraq. 
Thus, while bluffing can be used to convey certain demands and accompanying 
threats, if the adversary calls the bluff, the coercer has no option but to carry out its threat 
to save face or to kick-start a conciliatory process.  
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Implications: 
How did credibility of threats impact on coercive diplomacy? 
While both U.S. and South Korean military had enough firepower (even conventional) to 
impose huge damage on North Korea, the overall destruction that such a conflict would 
cause was too horrifying. Thus the image of war was too catastrophic for North Korea’s 
adversaries. In any coercive equation, the worse the image of war, the greater is the 
proclivity of at some concerned parties to look for a stabilizing settlement. Pentagon 
estimates in October 2006 stated that if the U.S. attacked North Korea there would be 
52,000 U.S. military casualties, besides at least a million casualties, just in the first three 
months.91  
From the U.S. perspective, the pressure tactics that it did apply were also not 
enough to counter North Korea. One of the main instruments was the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), which was mentioned earlier. PSI aimed at interdicting the shipment of 
WMD-related material to and from North Korea (among other suspected proliferators). 
Expectedly, Pyongyang vehemently criticized PSI, calling it “U.S.-led military operations 
whose purpose is to blockade the country.”92 Moreover, South Korea refused to join PSI, 
which obviously further detracted from its credibility. From the coercion point of view, it 
was not clear how PSI could act as an instrument of U.S. counter threats, because it could 
not effectively degrade or roll back Pyongyang’s existing nuclear capability. As the 
October 2006 nuclear test by North Korea showed, the regime does have the wherewithal 
to construct nuclear weapons, however rudimentary they might be at this stage. PSI had no 
effect on this capability and therefore did not assist in the key U.S. objective of 
denuclearization of North Korea.  
By operating in international waters, PSI enabled Washington to apply a financial 
squeeze of the country in a bid to foment instability – but little more. Thus, the proactive 
measures that Washington took were hardly credible in terms of demonstrating an ability 
to inflict immediate punishment. U.S. counter-threats therefore suffered from a lack of 
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urgency, without which it is difficult to get the target to understand the gravity of the 
situation.   
In the 1990s, U.S. military planners tried to formulate plans that would involve 
striking only nuclear facilities, in an attempt to reassure Pyongyang that regime change 
was not on the agenda.93 However, Pyongyang’s reaction was assumed to be too 
unpredictable.  Moreover,   North Korea  might attack the South even if it were clear that 
the U.S. military objectives were limited. From the coercive diplomacy perspective, it can 
also imply that one state might completely refuse to accept reassurances from the other 
side in an attempt to maintain  an unpredictable posture and because of a perception that 
even the slightest concession from it might open a window of opportunity for Type C 
coercion.  
On the other hand, North Korea, even though it faced substantial U.S. and South 
Korean military capability, managed to retain some threat credibility even with a failed 
missile test in July 2006. At the very least it reiterated to North Korea’s adversaries 
Pyongyang’s ability and willingness to periodically indulge in brinkmanship. Even U.S. 
President George Bush had to concede its seriousness when he stated, “One thing that we 
have learnt is that the rocket did not stay up very long. It tumbled into the sea, which 
doesn’t frankly, diminish my desire to solve this problem.”94
Thus, while both sides have sufficient firepower to cause immense destruction, this 
was not enough to successfully coerce the other side. Nevertheless, brinkmanship by North 
Korea was taken very seriously by its neighbors and has frequently served its purpose for 
the North. As one scholar put it, “Pyongyang’s goal is not to go over the brink, but to be 
pulled back from the brink.”95 And pulling North Korea from the brink required some 
amount of carrots/concessions. As the section on international strategic environment 
demonstrates, the various regional parties, in fact, periodically satisfied Pyongyang’s 
demands through economic concessions and energy aid. In this manner, North Korea’s 
threats were relatively successful, because they did achieve some of its coercive demands, 
though not from the Washington.  
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A second benefit was that it demonstrated to other regional actors that siding with 
the U.S. in a coercive activity against Pyongyang would be detrimental to their interests. A 
third benefit for Pyongyang was that through such blatant demonstrations of threats, it 
persuaded these regional parties to encourage Washington to provide some concessions to 
North Korea, especially through security guarantees.96 In the immediate period after the 
North Korean nuclear test, when the concerned states talked about re-launching the Six 
Party Talks, one distinguishing feature was that Washington was more readily talking 
about various concessions, including possible lifting of sanctions on financial institutions 
connected to North Korean criminal activities.97 Thus it is safe to assume that North 
Korean threat credibility has been more effective against the non-U.S. members of the Six 
Party Talks, and has led to partially successful coercive diplomacy by Pyongyang.    
 
 
Table 19: North Korean case: Credibility of Threats 
Credibility of Threats Coercive Diplomacy consequence  
U.S. Credibility  
    - Extension of U.S. forces around    
the world  
            Therefore, U.S. military credibility not very high. - Unclear if North Korean nuclear,   
missile, and chemical weapon   
sites can all be destroyed before 
escalation. 
 
 
 
 - Unclear if U.S. was willing to    
apply force            Success of some North Korean demands, especially food and economic aid. 
 
North Korean Credibility 
- North Korean brinkmanship 
  did convince regional actors to 
  negotiate, and offer some 
  concessions. 
 
Demonstrated to regional allies the perils of siding with U.S. coercion.  
Regional actors encouraged U.S. to provide some concessions.  
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INTERNAL FACTORS 
A key question here is – why North Korea managed to resist multilateral coercion in the 
face of economic catastrophe and isolation, and in fact launched coercive threats of its 
own? Part of the answer is that Pyongyang’s illegal economic activities that allowed it to 
retain some economic resources to shore up the military and the regime elites. In recent 
years, there have been persistent rumors of power struggles within the regime, especially 
over the role of the  military. North Korea’s economic isolation has adversely impacted on 
the status of the regime’s elites, leading to some dissatisfaction. In such a scenario, a major 
priority for Kim Jong Il was to maintain the standards of living of the elites, and also to 
maintain his hold over the military.  
From the coercive diplomacy standpoint, Kim’s threats and demands were related 
to a need to consolidate his rule, as is the regime’s involvement in illegal economic 
activities. For years it has been a key proliferator of missiles, and has received in exchange, 
nuclear technology from Pakistan as well as money from other states. In recent years, it 
earned up to $500 million annually from the sale of missiles to countries such as Pakistan, 
Iran, Syria, and Yemen.98 But apart from this, the regime’s substantial role in 
counterfeiting and drug trafficking has also been noted.  
All this points to a need to consolidate the internal rule, a factor recognized by 
Washington. In 2004-05, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on several North Korean 
firms and froze their accounts in foreign banks in an attempt to tighten the cash flow into 
the regime. However, as some experts noted in 2006, such a policy had the paradoxical 
effect of forcing Kim to ratchet up domestic support further.99
 
Internal power struggles in North Korea 
North Korea’s coercive demands had to be examined in the context of internal power 
struggles within the regime. During that period, Kim Jong Il sought to consolidate his rule, 
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and according to some sources he tried to pave the way for eventual succession by one of 
his sons, possibly Kim Jong-Chol. In this context, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law Jang Song 
Thaek was removed as the second-highest ranking leader in April 2004. European experts 
saw this as a salvo in the ongoing power struggle in the leadership.100 Jang was considered 
more acceptable than Kim and was mentioned in South Korea as a possible replacement 
who commanded respect from both, the communist part and the military, a rare 
achievement.101 His ouster was seen as Kim’s attempt to consolidate control over the 
military.  
This also has to be seen in connection with a massive explosion at a railway station 
in North Korea in May 2004, hours after Kim Jong Il had traveled through. This incident 
was regarded as an assassination attempt and if so, it signaled some dissatisfaction in the 
immensely controlled totalitarian regime. Regarding the succession ladder, there was 
considerable speculation over which of Kim’s sons would be chosen. These events 
coincided with rumors in late 2004 of major challenges to Kim’s hold on power.102  
Experts also stated that part of the reason for the power struggle was that 
increasingly, the military was convinced that the next ruler should come from outside the 
ruling family (this probably referred to the immediate family and not the ousted Jang). It 
was widely believed that if a member of the Kim family became the next leader, the same 
policies would be continued and there would be no positive moves on the nuclear and 
economic issues.103 This approach implied that paradigmatic changes in the North 
depended on an outsider taking power.  
From the coercive diplomacy perspective, it suggests that one possible reason for 
Kim’s coercive demands was to safeguard his rule by (a) presenting a nationalistic image 
to the domestic elites which would rally them around, and (b) using brinkmanship 
diplomacy to extort more aid from the international community which would pacify the 
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military. Furthermore, from March 2003, the official status of the military was raised with 
the proclamation of the ‘songun’ principle, which stood for ‘military first.’104 It coincided 
with a period of increased military threats by the U.S. and was therefore a way of 
consolidating Kim’s domestic leadership by offering sops to the military. The attempted 
missile tests in July 2006 were also seen as a mechanism for consolidating the internal 
base, through their nationalistic overtones as well as the acceptance of the wishes of 
elements in military who favored the acquisition of long-range missiles.105
Increased profile of the military as well as coercive moves on the outside world 
thus reinforced each other. Indeed, the view in Pyongyang was that the strengthened 
position of the military was integral to resisting U.S. pressures, and shortly after the 
invasion of Iraq, further statements in the official North Korean media declared that the 
nuclear option was now an essential component of the military.106 It can therefore be 
concluded that with this move, Kim sought to co-opt the military further into the tough 
nuclear stance, and also make resistance to the U.S. as well as counter-coercive threats  
more potent.  
In order to consolidate his rule, Kim’s regime also introduced some limited 
economic reforms and used illegal activities to gain more profits. This partly helps to 
explain why Kim was able to survive internally in the face of U.S. attempts at isolating 
him totally.  
 
Economic activities – legal and illegal 
The North Korean regime had been involved in counterfeiting for decades and in recent 
years, the U.S. government took stern measures, such as clamping down on banks in the 
Chinese territory of Macau that were accused of laundering money on behalf of North 
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Korea.107 Investigations by U.S. government agencies revealed that such activities were 
carried out by the regime itself rather than criminal networks.  
Even though the danger from North Korea’s counterfeiting operations was 
relatively low, the Bush administration saw it as an economic threat and a hostile act 
because of the mistrust it generated in the U.S. currency.108 But from Pyongyang’s 
perspective, engaging in counterfeiting has not just been a way of responding to U.S. 
threats. For years it has also been a reflection of the regime’s guiding principle – ‘juche,’ 
which roughly meant self-reliance or sovereignty. Juche also refers to compromising the 
sovereignty of other states, and therefore, it is also a method of consolidating the 
legitimacy of the regime. 
As stated earlier, the North Korean perception was that the U.S. would attempt 
Type C coercion against Pyongyang and therefore it countered with coercive diplomacy 
with a high magnitude of objectives and strict conditions regarding clarity of  settlement 
prerequisites.  From the perspective of countering possible Type ‘C’ regime change 
coercive diplomacy, juche and the accompanying subversive economic activity was a way 
of responding to perceived threats to the rule of Kim Jong Il. Counterfeiting also helped 
assuage financial discontent among the elite sections of the regime, which expected luxury 
goods and services for themselves.109  
North Korea’s involvement in drug trafficking was another aspect of its illegal 
economic activities and included cultivation of opium poppies. According to U.S. 
government figures, 1995 estimates suggested that about 7,000 hectares of land was under 
poppy cultivation alongside a capability to process 100 tons of raw opium annually.110 
Apart from this Pyongyang also profited from the production and sale of 
methamphetamine and was said to produce about 10-15 tons per year. Indeed, since bad 
harvests negatively impacted on opium production, Pyongyang  started concentrating more 
on methamphetamine production. All these illegal activities were carried out by ‘Bureau 
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39’ of the North Korean Communist Party and the profits went toward supporting elites 
and buying their allegiance, funding national security-related projects as well as purchasing 
WMD components.111 Bureau 39’s illegal transactions had accumulated as much as $5 
billion for the Kim Jong Il regime, according to reports in 2003.112
North Korea’s capacity to resist through consolidation of the leadership was also 
helped by the introduction of some economic reforms. The Pyongyang regime sought to 
maintain internal stability through some limited economic progress to prevent a total 
collapse and to ensure protection against international sanctions.113 Slowly, but steadily, 
moves were being made toward some sort of ‘local make-shift economies’ in the North, 
which would provide an income for the military.114 Since the nineties, at least 2 million 
people died of starvation in the country, but the million-strong army has been taken care of 
through diversion of multilateral food aid.115
Thus, through these measures, Pyongyang tried to maintain domestic leadership 
which is a crucial element favoring success in coercive diplomacy. It was also a response 
to U.S. attempts to subvert its regime through financial sanctions. Thus, illegal economic 
activities and shoring up internal support were integrally related to coercive diplomacy. 
Hard-line demands as part of coercive diplomacy as well as firm positions on the nuclear 
issue were Kim’s methods of consolidating domestic support amidst suspicions of internal 
discontent. But then, success in coercion also required a strong internal base otherwise, 
U.S. pressures would have subverted the regime and weakened Kim’s position. 
 
Internal pressures in other states 
North Korean intransigence was also a reflection of hard-line positions adopted by 
influential members of the Bush administration. Internal political factors within 
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Washington’s foreign policy and defense circles were an important factor in framing the 
administration’s position on North Korea. The Bush administration took over in January 
2001 following a bitter election battle with the Democratic presidential nominee, former 
Clinton Vice President Al Gore. Members of the Bush team were intensely critical of the 
Clinton era foreign policy, especially in dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, 
which was termed as ‘appeasement.’116
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had, in fact, chaired a prominent commission 
on the ballistic missile threat, which concluded in 1998 that North Korea (as well as Iran 
and Iraq) could manufacture intercontinental ballistic missiles with WMD warheads within 
five years.117 Rumsfeld, who became even more influential after the 9/11 attacks, had 
therefore already come into office with this kind of negative position. Further, Paul 
Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary in the Bush administration’s first term was also a 
member of this commission. Thus important luminaries of the Bush team had negative 
views of North Korea’s intentions and capabilities even during the Clinton period. 
Conservative commentators at that time saw in the above mentioned Rumsfeld report an 
implicit criticism of the Clinton administration’s policy on the missile threat as well as of 
the perceived delay in introducing missile defense systems.118  
Additionally, even within the administration there were disputes right from the 
beginning, between moderates led by Secretary of State Colin Powell and hardliners, 
including Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney. By March 2001, 
Secretary Powell’s approach of continuing the Clinton administration’s engagement 
strategy had been rejected as President Bush rebuffed the visiting South Korean President, 
Kim Dae Jung’s recommendation to continue discussions with DPRK.119
As late as a few months before the North Korean nuclear test, Bush administration 
officials repeated their criticism of Clinton’s engagement strategy toward Pyongyang, and 
especially the 1994 Agreed Framework. In July 2005, White House Press Secretary Tony 
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Snow termed the Clinton team’s approach to the Kim regime as offering ‘flowers and 
chocolates’ apart from light water nuclear reactors.120
Apart from the U.S., internal political pressures in other concerned countries also 
conditioned their stance on the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, it must be noted that 
the general consensus among all Six-Party states (except North Korea) was that North 
Korea’s nuclearization was an extremely dangerous possibility and needed to be avoided. 
While for Washington, the single, non-negotiable priority was nuclear rollback, the other 
actors had various domestic issues that qualified their positions on Pyongyang’s nuclear 
program.  
For Japan, the early period of the crisis (2002-03) also coincided with the emotive 
abduction issue. This concerned the fate of numerous Japanese citizens who were 
kidnapped by North Korea in the 1970s. Japanese public opinion was firmly of the view 
that the Tokyo government pursue investigations into the fate of the abductees.121 At such 
a time, a compromise with North Korea would have been a disaster for any political group 
in Japan.122 Tokyo’s stated position on the North Korean nuclear issue was that a 
diplomatic framework was the desired policy. It must also be noted that while Tokyo 
maintained a hard-line stance against North Korea, it was almost wholly due to the 
abductee matter, rather than the nuclear dispute.123 But Japanese domestic opinion was so 
strongly against Pyongyang that it was not possible for Tokyo to put forward any 
diplomatic initiatives to deal with the nuclear crisis.124  
However, Japanese politicians who garnered domestic support by taking strong 
positions on the abductees issue (such as Shinzo Abe, who became prime minister after 
Junichiro Koizumi in October 2006) provoked nationalist sentiments that risked Japan’s 
fragile ties with China and South Korea.125 These nationalist sentiments were aroused in 
particular, by controversial visits by Japanese politicians, especially Prime Minister 
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Junichiro Koizumi, to the Yasukuni shrine, which commemorates the country’s war dead 
and is frowned upon by Japan’s neighbors, who see it as a reminder of Japan’s role in the 
Second World War. Thus, long-standing disputes and mutual suspicion in Japan, South 
Korea and China served to provoke periodic distrust among these governments and, to a 
certain extent, undermined any united action that they could take against North Korean 
coercion.   
But perhaps more importantly, the shrine visits aroused Pyongyang’s anger also. 
After a January 2005 visit to the shrine by the then Japanese Premier Koizumi, North 
Korea slammed Japan’s political establishment, and stated that, “it shows how frantically 
the ruling class is rushing toward a revival of militarism.”126 Earlier, a 2004 claim by 
Koizumi to the Dokdo/Takeshima islets had provoked Pyongyang, which alleged that this 
demonstrated Tokyo’s growing militarism as well as its plans “for the re-invasion of Korea 
and the rest of Asia.”127
Japanese domestic positions also highlighted other disputes with South Korea. In 
early 2005, the Japanese prefecture128 of Shimane approved a bill designating an annual  
‘Takeshima Day’ commemorating the disputed East Sea islands of Dokdo/Takeshima 
(Japanese and Korean names), which are claimed by both Japan and South Korea.129 This 
led to a  major outcry in South Korea and disrupted bilateral ties. South Korean analysts 
concluded that this was Tokyo’s way of building up nationalistic feelings within Japan.130 
Soon after this episode, further controversy ensued when Beijing and Seoul complained 
vigorously about certain Japanese textbooks, which they said distorted Japan’s historical 
role in the region.131
In South Korea, criticism by domestic audiences was not just reserved for Japan; 
the U.S. government was a frequent target. In 2002-03, the immediate provocation for anti-
American protests within South Korea was the accidental deaths of two Korean girls by a 
U.S. military vehicle. The massive demonstrations that followed also called for the U.S. to 
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leave the country.132 In large part, such calls reflected a growing sentiment among average 
South Koreans that Pyongyang was no longer a dangerous threat.133
The North Korean nuclear crisis also coincided in 2005 with the 100th anniversary 
of Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula as well as the 60th anniversary of the end 
of Japanese occupation.134 The government of President Roh Moo-Hyun raked up 
nationalist issues by questioning the role of post South Korean leaders alleged to be 
collaborators.135 Though such debates were seen as an attempt to gain domestic popularity, 
they inevitably negatively affected ties with Japan.136  
While China was a key interlocutor with North Korea, it had its own internal 
priorities that colored its overall position. The prospect of millions of refugees streaming 
into China in the event of a crisis was a sobering thought for Chinese policymakers. Apart 
from this, increasingly, the northeastern provinces of China bordering North Korea 
benefited greatly from cross border trade after years of economic decline in that area.137 
Experts stated that this economic activity was crucial for the economic regeneration of 
northeastern China and therefore it would influence Beijing’s reactions to Pyongyang’s 
nuclear plans.138 It must also be noted that for the Chinese government, maintaining 
internal stability in the face of disparate economic growth in a growing population has 
been of utmost importance. Therefore, issues such North Korean refugees and economic 
growth in border areas of China potentially impact on millions of citizens, and therefore 
have been of crucial importance to Beijing.  
The significance here is that domestic controversies and debates were an important 
factor that prevented Japan, China and South Korea from presenting a united stance to 
deter Pyongyang’s threats. It does not mean that these were the main factors, but 
undoubtedly contributed to the general tone of the reactions of these three countries toward 
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Pyongyang. It meant that the united front that Washington desired for pressurizing and 
isolating North Korea was also absent. Domestic forces, especially in Japan, that persuaded 
politicians to periodically adopt controversial positions (such as territorial claims and 
shrine visits) provided North Korea an additional lever with which to build its case, and 
divide its supposedly united adversaries.  
Implications: 
How did these internal factors impact on the respective positions of the parties in the 
coercive diplomacy equation? 
The Bush administration’s first term was marked by the dominance of conservative hawks 
in foreign policymaking. Further, since the 2000 presidential election, Bush’s views on 
foreign policy were guided by an ‘Anything but Clinton’ mantra, with claims that his 
predecessor’s policy was ‘action without vision, activity without priority and missions 
without end – an approach that squanders American well and drains American energy.’139 
According to one anonymous expert involved in North Korean policymaking during the 
Bush administration, “Their A.B.C. approach – ‘Anything but Clinton’ - led to these 
problems.”140  
A good example of the politicization of North Korea policy came in January 2003, 
when New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, who had negotiated with Pyongyang for the 
Clinton administration, held discussions with North Korean diplomats. However, the Bush 
administration refused to utilize his services. In the words, of Charles Pritchard, who was 
the State Department’s special envoy on North Korea in the Bush administration’s first 
term, “the North Koreans were grasping for straws, looking for any friendly face. But they 
forgot to do the math. Richardson was a Democrat, a Clinton guy. No way would Bush 
have anything to do with him.”141
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Therefore, there was an instinctive disgust in the Bush administration toward any 
Clintonesque conciliatory moves that might have offered some concession to Pyongyang in 
exchange for simultaneous denuclearization. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
the rigidity of the ‘CVID first, negotiations later’ mantra of the Bush administration came 
about partly due to the disdain for the Clinton administration’s ‘appeasement’ and 
supposed failure to pursue a more assertive approach  against Pyongyang in the 1990s. 
Thus, the dispute over CVID, which constituted a significant lack of clarity of settlement, 
was, to a certain extent, brought on by rigid domestic positions taken by the Bush 
administration. It only reinforced the suspicion in North Korea that regime change was the 
ultimate objective of the Bush administration.   
Regarding the other domestic issues mentioned in the above section, internal 
political complications, especially in Japan and South Korea served to undermine 
resistance to North Korean demands. Indeed, this was even recognized by policymakers 
there. In January 2004, for example, the South Korean ambassador to Japan regretted 
Japanese Premier Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine and stated that it could harm 
bilateral collaboration on the North Korean nuclear issue.142  
The important analytical point here is that domestic political compulsions caused 
mutual suspicions among the Six-Party allies, which detracted from a united resistance to 
Pyongyang. International support is an important variable favoring success in coercive 
diplomacy. However, while Pyongyang did not have any significant international support 
for its demands, there was no united international opposition against it either. And as the 
next section demonstrates, Pyongyang was then able to extract significant concessions 
from them.   These domestic constraints on CD are summarized in the following table. 
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Internal factors Coercive Diplomacy consequence  
 
- North Korea’s need to shore up  
the regime 
 
 
 
- Led to high demands 
- Led to integration of nuclear option with military, leading to increased 
coercive threats to other regional actors 
- Involvement in illegal economic activities to provide financing for 
military and elites ?  allowed resistance to American pressure.  
  
- Domestic compulsions in Japan   
and South Korea 
- Lack of united resistance to North Korean threats and demands. 
 
  
- Bush administration followed an 
  ‘Anything But Clinton’ policy 
       -      Led to rigid stand on CVID – hampered clarity of settlement 
 
Table 20: North Korean case: Internal factors 
 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
While Washington attempted multilateral isolation of North Korea it was clear that this 
pressure was not overwhelming enough for Pyongyang to consider reducing its demands. 
Apart from the U.S. and North Korea, the four other states in the Six-Party Talks had their 
own agendas and attitudes on how the crisis could be resolved.143 This shows that 
multilateral dynamics in coercive diplomacy can complicate the situation further, 
especially when the interests and priorities of allies and other concerned parties do not 
coincide. Lack of support from allies and other regional players hampered Washington’s 
position because it eased the pressure on Pyongyang as well its isolation. For one thing, the 
image of a possible war turning into a nuclear flashpoint was too catastrophic to 
contemplate, not just for the U.S., but also for regional actors. Thus, while the U.S. resisted 
all of North Korea’s demands throughout the crisis, Pyongyang was able to achieve several 
of its objectives through other regional actors. This was a crucial factor that hampered 
Washington’s resistance.  
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For the regional actors, economics played a major role, especially the increase in 
economic ties between Pyongyang and its neighbors through restricted economic zones. 
Commercial projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Park which had been set up in North 
Korea just short of its border with the South, employed up to 2,000 workers from the 
North.144 This partnership which produced consumer items was part of multi-million dollar 
investments by the South Korean government. It was symbolic of the deeper economic ties 
that three members of the Six-Party Talks – South Korea, China, and Russia – developed 
with North Korea. According to official South Korean figures, during the first two years of 
the nuclear crisis (2002-04), Pyongyang’s foreign trade jumped 20 percent, going from 
$2.5 billion in 2002 to $3.5 billion in 2004.145 With both Russia and China, North Korea’s 
trade levels doubled during the same period. These investments in some specified areas in 
North Korea were part of an attempt to draw the Stalinist regime into a stabilizing regional 
economic relationship. Instead of increasing pressure by applying economic sanctions, 
regional actors rejected this approach.  
Furthermore, in South Korea, a policy favoring conciliation with the North 
combined with an anti-American feeling domestically, ruled out endorsing the use of force 
or its threat.146 Since 1998, under the newly elected President Kim Dae Jung, Seoul 
pursued a ‘sunshine policy,’ to promote better ties between the North and South. That 
policy had been committed to ensuring the survival of the Pyongyang regime. It entailed 
economic and political concessions to the North in the belief that it would lead to 
reciprocal moves from the latter.147 The eventual concessions that Seoul hoped for 
involved dismantling of Pyongyang’s WMD arsenal. But in the more immediate term, 
South Korea’s sunshine policy was also been driven by the need to avoid an invasion by a 
desperate North.148
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These burgeoning economic and political ties reduced the efficacy of multilateral 
coercion championed by the U.S. International support is a key element of coercive 
diplomacy because it bestows political legitimacy on the coercer’s actions and also assists 
logistically in pressurizing the target state. It also highlights the problem of coalitional 
coercive diplomacy, which is generally fragile because of the relative difficulty of 
maintaining a united sense of purpose. 
Economic activities also highlighted the growing involvement of South Korean 
economic conglomerates in impacting on North Korea’s interaction with regional actors. 
Hyundai Asan, the South Korea firm operated a highly profitable tourist venture at Mount 
Kumgang, that earned Pyongyang almost $500 million between 1998 and 2005.149 These 
ventures brought in much needed legal revenue for North Korea, and helped bolster the 
regime by decreasing its isolation.  
A crucial role was played by the Chinese government in the crisis. For Beijing, 
stability in the region is of paramount importance and therefore it concluded that this goal 
would not be furthered by North Korea’s nuclear program as well as objectives of regime 
change. China’s top priority has been to maintain its high economic growth and therefore, 
it had to pressurize Pyongyang to make some concessions. China attempted to capitalize 
on its close ties with Pyongyang in order to jump start negotiations at several points since 
2002. However, Beijing’s pressure was limited to getting North Korea to the negotiating 
table. It tacitly opposed the broader unilateralist trend in U.S. foreign policy that raised the 
perception that regime change might be the ultimate objective against Pyongyang. Beijing 
preferred to base negotiations on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which were 
introduced by China, India and Myanmar (then Burma) in 1954 and which stress  non-
interference in the internal affairs of another country.150  
While China did not entirely oppose U.S. demands, it sought to moderate them by 
lessening the perception of regime change agendas. Beijing rejected most coercive 
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measures that included economic sanctions as well as regime change objectives, and 
sought arrangements that would deal with North Korea’s security needs.151  
One of the most prominent U.S. demands it rejected was in May 2005, under which 
Beijing would have halted the supply of oil to North Korea until it returned to the 
negotiating table.152 In 2003, China had reportedly shut down the oil pipeline to the North 
(Pyongyang imports all its oil) for three days, but U.S. officials doubted that this was 
related to the nuclear crisis, especially because China was able to get North Korea to join 
the peace talks through financial incentives.153 This highlights another major problem of 
multilateral coercion – North Korea’s strategy of playing of one party against the other. 
But getting from China what the U.S. refused to provide, Pyongyang was able to poke 
holes in the multilateral isolation framework. 
A major source of worry for both China and South Korea was the effect of 
instability in North Korea. Both South Korea and China wanted to avoid a destabilizing 
collapse of North Korea that would send millions of refugees streaming into their borders, 
creating a humanitarian disaster that would overwhelm their governments and create 
massive law and order problems. In recent years Beijing had been plagued by huge inflows 
of refugees from North Korea,154 which had been a political and diplomatic problem. A 
longer term issue for Beijing was the pattern of U.S. activity in the region. Taiwan is one 
of the biggest irritants in Sino-American relations, and any attempts by the U.S. to force a 
solution on the Korean peninsula would be perceived as setting a precedent for similar 
action vis-à-vis Taiwan.155  
China also saw the North Korean nuclear issue in terms of eventual reunification of 
the two Koreas, and it was extremely doubtful if it would be comfortable with a nuclear-
armed Korea. North Korea has played an important buffer role between the Chinese 
mainland and South Korea for more than half a century. China’s concern is the long-
standing deployment of U.S. troops in the South. If the North Korean regime collapsed and 
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led to reunification (whether peaceful or otherwise) it would in all probability lead to the 
deployment of U.S. troops there. Even if U.S. forces were not deployed in the North, a 
unified Korea would mean the extension of U.S. influence up to the Yalu River.156 
Beijing’s attitudes toward this crisis are therefore related to China’s broader strategic goal 
of reducing U.S. influence in the region. Beyond a point, Beijing wanted to place hurdles 
in Washington’s goal of increasing coercion on North Korea. According to one expert who 
has visited Pyongyang several times, Selig Harrison, “the most important (priority) in 
Chinese calculations is to forestall a war by keeping the United States engaged in six-party 
negotiations with North Korea of indefinite duration.”157
However, Beijing also understood the serious regional implications of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapon program. North Korea’s nuclear breakout would have the result of 
boosting the nuclear weapon programs of all major states in the region – Japan, South 
Korea, and even Taiwan. Such a development would be contrary to China’s desire for 
regional stability and therefore, while it opposed U.S. coercive military activity, Beijing 
also wanted a nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsula. 
Thus, the priority order for China and South Korea was different from that of 
Washington. In fact, in February 2003, a senior foreign policy aide to South Korean 
President-elect Roh Moo Hyun stated that the new government would rather see 
Pyongyang with nuclear weapons than see the regime’s collapse.158 Furthermore, the new 
South Korean President’s view was that North Korea was merely using nuclear weapons as 
a bargaining chip and if economic assistance and regime security were promised to 
Pyongyang, it would give up its nuclear weapons. This was a clear fundamental difference 
from the U.S. position that Pyongyang needed to commit to a verifiable nuclear rollback 
plan, before negotiations on an overall deal could take place.   
Washington’s closest ally in the Six-Party Talks framework had been Japan, but 
while Tokyo’s objective was also nuclear rollback of North Korea, its strategy for 
achieving this objective differs from the U.S. approach.159 It has offered Pyongyang 
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substantial economic benefits including $10 billion in aid as well as membership of the 
Asian Development Bank, in return for verifiable disarmament. Despite lack of progress 
on this front, Tokyo has enjoyed period of upswing in its relations with North Korea. This 
was reflected in Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s first visit to the country in 
2002. After a second visit in 2004, North Korea released several Japanese citizens who had 
been kidnapped by Pyongyang’s agents decades ago.   
However, these developments do not imply that Japan has not considered 
aggressive measures. Tokyo has steadily increased its participation in the missile defense 
system, and has sought to develop its missile capability as well as aircraft capability to 
strike nuclear installations in North Korea.160 The point here is that while U.S. allies were 
willing to adopt a carrot and stick approach, the U.S. was unwavering in its multilateral 
coercion policy which did not involve any concessions till Pyongyang conceded on 
denuclearization. 
Russian involvement in the crisis also demonstrates the problem of multilateral 
isolation. Moscow also visualized the regional instability (mentioned earlier) and domino 
effect of nuclear weaponization that would come about as a result of North Korea 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, in January 2003, Russia independently offered its 
own proposal to resolve the crisis, which centered around: (1) a nuclear free Korean 
peninsula, (2) implementing international agreements, (3) security guarantees for North 
Korea, and (4) resumption of humanitarian and economic cooperation.161 However, these 
plans were rejected by both North Korea and the U.S., with the latter ruling out any 
security guarantees in exchange for nuclear rollback. 
While Moscow agreed with the U.S. objective of denuclearization, it also provided 
food aid to North Korea in 2004 in the form of 35,000 tons of wheat.162 But Russia also 
had a less strategic agenda under which it would have supplied hydroelectric plants to 
replace the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)-supplied nuclear reactors. 
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Russia’s interest also lay in establishing transport and energy links to South Korea through 
the North which would open up new markets.163
These examples therefore demonstrate that even though all parties involved in 
negotiations with Pyongyang agreed on the goal – denuclearization – they differed with the 
U.S. on providing concessions. The problem of multilateral coercion brings forth a key 
issue – prioritizing objectives in a coalition. Even in unilateral coercive diplomacy, such a 
goal is difficult to achieve. After 9/11, the U.S. faced several security objectives – 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and North Korea, though not necessarily in that order – which was the 
key dilemma. If pressure is applied on a state multilaterally, the problem is exacerbated. 
Each side in the Six-Party Framework had its own agenda. For example, China and South 
Korea, being neighbors of North Korea have been concerned about possible refugee flows, 
an issue that Washington has appreciated, but to which it (the U.S.) did not give as much 
importance. Such a diversion of objectives in the coalition then filters down to the means 
being adopted and this affects joint coercive activity. 
Implications: 
How did the international strategic environment impact on coercive diplomacy? 
North Korea was able to achieve several of its demands through regional actors in 
Northeast Asia. While the U.S. was steadfast in its refusal to negotiate, other Six Party 
members were of the view that an engagement strategy was the best option. Therefore, 
these actors offered Pyongyang economic incentives to desist from brinkmanship. In this 
manner, North Korea’s coercive diplomacy partly succeeded, but not against the U.S. 
This engagement strategy by North Korea’s neighbors shows an interesting 
dimension to the coercive process. North Korea’s brinkmanship was aimed at more than 
one target, which then increased the possibility of at least some concessions from one or 
more actors.  It demonstrated the benefits of maintaining some ambiguity in terms of 
demands for the coercer. If North Korea had very specific demands (apart from economic 
and food aid) directed at one particular state, the others would not have had any incentive 
to offer any concessions. Therefore, in this case the relative lack of clarity of objectives 
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worked to a certain extent for the coercer (North Korea). The following table summarizes 
the arguments in this section: 
 
International Strategic 
Environment 
Coercive diplomacy 
  
- Reduced isolation of North Korea 
- Provided economic support to Pyongyang  
Argument 
 
U.S. goal of multilateral 
coercion was not adhered to 
by other parties 
 
- Brought some success for North Korean coercive 
diplomacy. But CD did not succeed against U.S.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As this chapter demonstrates, clarity of settlement conditions is an important element in 
the conduct of coercive diplomacy. In general, clarity of settlement is a condition that has 
to be satisfied for the target state. Because this case also involved counter-threats from the 
U.S., reassurances in terms of settlement conditions was a crucial point for the main 
coercer, Pyongyang. 
The importance of reassurances in this case was two-fold. First, reassurances, at 
least from the U.S. would have contributed to an increased clarity of settlement conditions 
by lessening mistrust, and allowing either simultaneous CVID/economic aid and U.S. 
security guarantees, or might have allowed one side to fulfill its side of the bargain first. 
Second, and relatedly, because of Pyongyang’s high threat perceptions of possible Type C 
regime change coercive diplomacy by Washington, a reassurance by the Bush 
administration would have been a major confidence building mechanism. It would have 
reassured Pyongyang (to some extent anyway) that any U.S. demands were limited to 
behavior change (Type B CD) rather than regime change (Type C CD). 
This chapter spells out two main problems of coercive diplomacy. First, is the 
perception in the target state that Type C coercive diplomacy is the ultimate objective, 
rather than just rollback of the nuclear weapons program. This raises the stakes for the 
target state and makes it more determined to resist. In the process it also makes it more 
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difficult for the coercer to carry out the lesser Type B coercion – rollback of an action the 
target state has embarked upon or behavior change. Second, this chapter demonstrates a 
key problem of multilateral coercive diplomacy – differing agendas of the coalition which 
makes it difficult to maintain unity of purpose as well as a consensus on the methods to 
achieving the desired objective.  
Crucially, it also shows that in circumstances when the coercer is pressurizing 
several targets at the same time (as North Korea did), it becomes correspondingly easier to 
get some concessions out of at least one of them, especially if they do not present a united 
front. In this particular case, domestic issues within the East Asian states cause friction 
among them and that made it even more difficult to present a united resistance to 
Pyongyang’s coercion and brinkmanship. 
The post nuclear test developments in Northeast Asia also highlight the importance 
of modification and hierarchy of objectives. While, prior to the nuclear test, the U.S. was 
firm in its refusal to link separate issues such as denuclearization and North Korea’s 
criminal networks, after the test, in an attempt to facilitate talks, Washington reportedly 
hinted at a hierarchy of objectives. Through this approach, it was reportedly ready to 
negotiate over the anti-money laundering and counterfeiting actions taken by the U.S. 
against North Korean entities.  But in return, Pyongyang would have to take some 
immediate measures to dismantle nuclear equipment. This was clearly a shift from the 
rigid ‘CVID first’ principle, and showed the potential benefits of carrots in coercion.   
In the last two years, especially since 2005, U.S. government agencies increasingly 
clamped down on illegal economic activities originating from the North Korean regime. 
These measures have included sanctioning banks (such as Banco Delta Asia in Macau) for 
aiding North Korea’s money laundering and counterfeiting activities. Such aggressive 
activities by the U.S. also led to sanctioning European companies accused of assisting in 
Pyongyang’s WMD proliferation efforts. While the U.S. was focused on North Korea’s 
criminal activities for about three years now, after 2005 it became an integral part of the 
overall policy of applying pressure against Pyongyang. We can therefore speculate that 
because of the failure of U.S. pressure tactics and isolation policy from 2002 onwards, 
Washington concentrated on another avenue to apply pressure on Kim Jong Il. According 
to some reliable sources the objective here was  to clamp down on key revenue sources of 
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the Pyongyang elites which would then act as a catalyst for the regime to collapse 
internally.164 It is clear that it had to be seen as part of a continuum of evolving U.S. 
policies toward North Korea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 Christian Caryl, ‘Pocketbook Policing,’ Newsweek, April 10-17, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12114822/site/newsweek/  
  262
Factors affecting coercive diplomacy Consequence 
U.S. Objectives  
        -     Denuclearization Prevented clarity of objectives, high 
magnitude of demands from both sides. - But no carrots/concessions 
 North Korean Objectives 
Detracted from international support for U.S. - Humanitarian aid 
- Removal from terrorism and sanctions 
list 
- Direct talks 
 
Perceptions Therefore, insistence on direct talks that 
would involve security guarantees. - Kim’s perception that regime change
                 was the main agenda But there were no security reassurances from 
the U.S.  
Credibility of U.S. threats  
Image of war against the U.S., as well as 
regional allies.  
- Extension of U.S. forces  
- Unclear if nuclear, chemical and
                  missile sites can be destroyed 
   before escalation 
 
Internal factors  
 - Kim’s need to consolidate control over 
military Kim’s integration of nuclear option more 
firmly with military. - View that a member from outside the 
family would be acceptable. Also led to more nationalistic, coercive threats 
by DPRK - Military’s view that some one from its 
fold should rule. Failure by Six Party allies to put up a united 
front. - Domestic upheavals in Six Party allies 
in Northeast Asia. 
 
International Strategic Environment  
-   International support not in favor of U.S. - Other parties (China, Russia, South Korea, 
  Japan) agreed on objective of denuclearization
  but disputed over means. 
-   No complete isolation of North Korea.  
-  Shows problem of multilateral/coalitional
     coercion - Other states offered economic cooperation to 
  Pyongyang  - Resulted in some success in DPRK
     coercive diplomacy  
 
Table 21: North Korean case: Summary of arguments 
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6.0  CONCLUSION – COERCIVE DIPLOMACY SINCE 9/11 
Introduction 
This dissertation has tried to further the field of coercive diplomacy by analyzing recent 
cases of its application. In general, the model explains the course taken by the actors in 
each case effectively, demonstrating the continuing relevance of this concept. In the 
following pages I address some of the substantive conclusions derived from these studies. 
Prior to that, a brief summary of the case conclusions would help put the issues in 
perspective.  
As is obvious, all cases focus on the continuing influence of the United States in 
contemporary politics. Three of the cases focused on this issue directly, while in the fourth 
the U.S. was an important mediator which encouraged the disputing parties to back down. 
The peculiarities of each case are by no means unique. Characteristics such as the presence 
of nuclear weapons in the coercer and/or target state, state sponsorship of terrorist groups, 
defective state control over non-state actors, are present in many other cases where 
coercive diplomacy can be potentially applied.  
Case Summaries 
The four cases studied in this dissertation have brought up diverse consequences on the 
conduct of coercive diplomacy. While these effects are elaborated later in this chapter, it is 
useful to consider these cases again.  
The South Asia case demonstrated the impact on coercion of a high magnitude of 
objectives which struck at the target’s national interests. The chances of coercion were 
further limited by the presence of nuclear weapons in the target state. Fearing an adverse 
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impact on other strategic imperatives (war on terror) the U.S. stepped in to facilitate a 
compromise and to secure some reassurances for India from Islamabad. The subsequent 
modification of objectives, which was endorsed by members of the international 
community (in their role as ‘facilitators’ rather than ‘spoilers’) then enabled New Delhi to 
end its coercive policy.  
The Taliban case demonstrated the pitfalls of perceptions that lead to (a) an 
assumption in the target state that Type C CD was in progress, and (b) an incorrect 
assessment of the target’s preference ordering by the coercer. It also demonstrated the 
pernicious effects (from the coercer’s perspective) of spoilers acting in their own capacity, 
and subverting their own government’s support to the coercer.  
On the other hand, high expectations of assistance from spoilers allowed Saddam 
Hussein to be reassured, when the coercer had not actually offered any such reassurances. 
Defective threat perceptions on the part of Saddam, coupled with Washington’s inability to 
properly make the case for war as well as its inefficient and politicized policy-planning 
ensured the failure of this coercive episode, which was also characterized by a high 
magnitude of objectives.  
The North Korean case showed how, through brinkmanship coercive diplomacy, 
Pyongyang was able to extract some concessions while retaining its nuclear arsenal which 
can conceivably continue to be used for future coercion. It is also an example of how a 
regime essentially used coercion to achieve some security in the absence of unambiguous 
reassurances from the primary adversary, the U.S. This is also a case which showed that 
coercing more than one target can sometimes yield rewards from some of them.  
Coercive diplomacy and WMD 
As the South Asia and North Korea cases demonstrated, the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction in the target state, (whether of the chemical, nuclear, or biological variety) can 
decrease the credibility of the coercer’s threats, reducing the chances of successful 
coercive diplomacy. This might lead one to conclude that such a realization would help 
cool down tensions as the adversaries realize the futility of coercion. On the one hand this 
  265
view is plausible, given that in the four years after Operation Parakram, New Delhi did not 
attempt further coercive moves against Pakistan, despite several serious terrorist incidents.  
But on the other hand, the Indian military is now introducing newer war-fighting 
strategies, such as the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, which seeks to execute quick, decisive 
operations, whether through an armored thrust or by destroying terrorist camps across the 
border, before Pakistan has a chance to react. India sees this as a way of getting around the 
reality of nuclear deterrence and the failure of coercive diplomacy by relying increasingly 
on a conventional strategy. However, given Pakistan’s conventional military weakness it is 
not certain that Islamabad would allow the conflict to be restricted to a conventional level 
if it faces an outright defeat. Therefore, in the South Asian context at least, the failure of 
coercive diplomacy has not only had positive developments favoring negotiations but also 
has led to the introduction of more war fighting strategies, which are ostensibly ‘flexible,’ 
but in reality might make full-scale war in the subcontinent more likely.   
Similarly, in the North Korean case, after the failure of coercion in the first two 
years of the crisis, the U.S. concentrated on other avenues of coercing Pyongyang by going 
after its sources of criminal profits, which would increase dissatisfaction among the 
regime’s elites because those profits are an important source of income for them.  
A key lesson of the North Korea study is also that in cases where an adversary 
pursues WMD capability, coercive diplomacy is naturally easier early on rather than later 
on in the target’s progression toward WMD capability. Indeed, one of the drawbacks of 
coercive diplomacy is that the Iraq war as well as the Indian-Pakistan crisis of 2002-03, 
provided examples of the potency of WMD threats against coercion. States such as Iran 
and North Korea have learned this lesson well. In fact, the North Korea episode shows that 
it is possible to use nuclear weapons (as well as other WMD) in order to coerce adversaries 
into delivering concessions, especially economic and energy related items. In this 
particular case, the threat did not involve an actual attack but merely the threat to develop 
the capability which could one day effectively threaten the target (U.S.). But in the process 
no credible assurances are offered by North Korea that its nuclear program is being 
reversed, because, with the rewards it can extract, there is a no real incentive to 
denuclearize.     
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Multiple Objectives 
Each of the case studies highlighted the importance of framing objectives in coercive 
diplomacy. More specifically, the cases reiterate that the higher the magnitude of 
objectives the more difficult successful CD becomes. In the South Asia case study, the 
Indian government put forth a formal list of demands that ranged from the complete 
cessation of state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan to the surrender of militants wanted 
by New Delhi. Apart from this a major implicit objective was to gain U.S. support. 
Similarly, in the Iraq case, Washington had several objectives (stopping WMD acquisition, 
terrorism, democracy) which required Type C coercive diplomacy. While the objectives 
mattered less in the Iraq case than Saddam’s faulty perceptions and international factors, it 
would not be unreasonable to suggest that if Saddam Hussein had perceived U.S. 
objectives and threats correctly the high magnitude of U.S. demands and Type C coercive 
diplomacy would have led to resistance to coercion anyway.  
These conclusions mainly show the negative impact of multiple objectives on 
coercive diplomacy. But the South Asia case study also showed how modifying objectives 
by playing up the significance of the Kashmir election allowed New Delhi to end coercion. 
It does not mean that coercive diplomacy (as defined by the original demands) was 
necessarily successful, but in fact, suggests that by choosing a lesser objective, the coercer 
can help deflect international and domestic attention from the inability to get the target to 
concede to the primary demands. Thus, even with multiple objectives, the manner in which 
the objectives are presented and framed can help the coercer, especially if it is attempting 
to end the stand-off with, at the very least, ambiguous results. 
Therefore, in this sense, multiple objectives can be advantageous for the coercer. If 
there is one unambiguous objective of the coercer, failure invites a loss of reputation 
because the lack of success is stark. On the other hand, with more than one objective, it is 
possible for the coercer to pick one and maintain some ambiguity over the final result of 
the standoff. A recent example was the reported statement by a North Korean official after 
the October 2006 nuclear test that Pyongyang would be willing to return to the Six Party 
Talks if Washington agreed to help resolve the confrontation over Pyongyang’s criminal 
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activities, such as counterfeiting and money laundering.1 This was obviously a major climb 
down from other demands such as extraction of economic benefits and direct talks and 
peace treaty with the U.S. It is an example of how, by choosing a lesser objective, a state 
can attempt to seek a way out of the standoff.  
The problem of Type C coercive diplomacy 
The cases in the dissertation have involved explicit, implicit, or perceived (by target) 
objectives of regime change in the adversary. Such an objective is regarded as the most 
difficult variant of coercive diplomacy because it increases the stakes of the target and 
either balances the asymmetry of interests or leaves it unfavorable for the coercer.  
In this dissertation, a crucial issue is how perceptions can condition the way one 
state views the other’s objectives. It can also lead to a disconnect in the way the coercer 
and the target view the coercer’s objectives. Thus, in the South Asia and the Taliban cases, 
while the coercer (India, U.S., respectively) did not overtly aim for regime change CD, the 
perception in the targets (Pakistan, Taliban, respectively) was that eventually successful 
coercion would threaten the ruling regimes. In the case of the Musharraf regime, if major 
concessions were made to New Delhi, it would have further angered fundamentalist 
elements in the military as well as the religious parties. In the Taliban case, U.S. assistance 
to the Northern Alliance would eventually have overthrown the Taliban. More crucially, 
ambiguous statements by the Bush administration did not dispel the Taliban’s conviction 
that regime change was the actual objective. Thus, in these cases the coercer’s calculations 
of the consequences of its threats and objectives did not match what the target concluded 
the objectives would lead to.  
In terms of modification of objectives, a crucial issue is whether the coercer is 
willing to accept a lesser objective of behavior change (Type B) instead of regime change 
(Type C). A key analytical question here is whether the coercer believes that only through 
regime change in the target can it (the coercer) achieve behavior change. Therefore, if 
behavior change is crucial to the coercer it can renounce regime change in order to increase 
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the chances of the target changing its behavior. It means that the coercer would have to 
move back from Type C coercive diplomacy to Type B (target has to undo an action) or 
Type A (target has to stop short of a goal).  
A further point that the South Asia case raised is that in some instances the coercer 
might not want regime change in the target state. During Operation Parakram, New Delhi 
did not aim to dislodge Gen. Musharraf as the ruler of Pakistan, i.e., regime change was 
not India’s objective. An influential view in India has been that only a military ruler in 
Islamabad can deliver any concessions, whether under threat of military attack or through 
negotiations. Conversely, a replacement government, either a weak democracy or a 
fundamentalist regime would be a bigger threat to New Delhi. Therefore, in such cases, 
while the coercer desires a change in the policies of the target, it (the coercer) might not 
want regime change as such an objective would be counter-productive. Therefore, while 
making threats and in formulating demands, the coercer has to ensure that the pressure is 
not overwhelming enough for regime change to take place in the target due to domestic 
dissatisfaction there. To prevent such a scenario, the role of assurances and carrots is 
crucial.  
Spoilers in coercive diplomacy 
An important element in all four case studies is the role that third parties (e.g., actors apart 
from the coercer and the target) played in the coercive process, mainly by weakening and 
undermining coercion. In the South Asia case, the U.S. stepped in to prevent escalation of 
coercive diplomacy by India into all-out war. But in the process, Washington also enabled 
New Delhi to limit and modify its objectives by reframing the issue and playing up the 
importance of elections in Kashmir, while simultaneously pressuring Islamabad to make 
public concessions. Therefore, while Washington was initially a spoiler in India’s coercive 
policy, eventually it helped New Delhi seek a way out of the stalemate and took on the role 
of a ‘facilitator.’2  
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this analysis, a ‘facilitator’ can be defined as any third party that enables or assists in 
the coercer’s objectives, or acts as a catalyst for a peaceful settlement that allows the coercer to retain its 
reputation. 
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In the Taliban case study, while some parties (the Musharraf regime, Russia, some 
Central Asian states) played an important logistical and political role in building up the 
American military threat against the Taliban, other parties (religious and military leaders 
within Pakistan) helped bolster the Taliban’s resistance by disrupting effective 
communication and signaling of threats and by assisting the Taliban militarily. This second 
category of third parties therefore played the role of spoilers in the coercive process. In the 
Iraq case, Saddam’s perceptions of the intentions of third parties (Russia, France, and 
Germany) helped lessen the credibility of U.S. coercive policy in the period before the 
invasion. As it turned out, these perceptions were faulty, as Russia and France did not 
intervene adequately to stop the U.S. attack. The third potential spoiler in this case, 
Germany, in fact, offered surreptitious support to the U.S. The reasoning behind such a 
‘betrayal’ was probably to maintain some ties with the U.S., while outwardly maintaining 
their reputations for independence by opposing the Iraq war, politically and diplomatically. 
This underscores the point that intentions and capabilities of potential spoilers are a crucial 
element in the extent to their interference in the coercive process.  
In the final case, North Korea, the U.S. objective of multilateral coercion was not 
fully accepted by regional powers – China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. They played 
spoilers to Washington’s counter-coercion by providing economic assistance as well as 
some political and diplomatic support to Pyongyang. 
An important task for the coercer, apart from pressurizing the target, is to neutralize 
the negative effects of spoilers. In this dissertation, coercers have attempted to deal with 
spoiler issues through different strategies. In the Taliban case, Washington anticipated 
Islamabad’s potential spoiler role and through a ‘with us or against us’ message, got 
Musharraf’s support – although not that of other entities in Pakistan.  On the other hand, in 
the Iraq case, Washington dealt with spoilers through a disinformation campaign using 
Russian military officials in contact with the Saddam regime.  
This dissertation shows the increasing importance of third parties in coercive 
diplomacy, whether as facilitators or as spoilers. It implies that in formulating their 
strategies in a coercive equation, the target and the coercer have to account for potential 
spoilers at some stage of the process. As this dissertation shows, such spoilers can appear 
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in any form – as a state (e.g., China in the North Korean case), as well as individual actors 
(Pakistani religious and military leaders in the Taliban case).  
Mixed messages 
This dissertation also highlights the impact of mixed messages and how the target 
perceives threats. Contradictory statements from the coercer’s leadership as well as 
ambiguous messages increase the target’s reliance on its own perceptions of what the 
coercer’s objectives, intentions and threats are. This was displayed in the Taliban case 
study in which mixed messages by the Bush administration on the extent of U.S. 
intentions, removed any credible assurances for the Taliban, which then assumed the worst 
case scenario (regime change). Similarly, in the North Korean case, while the Bush 
administration thoroughly disapproved of the Kim Jong Il regime, there was no clear 
indication as to whether its main objective was counter-proliferation or regime change. 
Therefore, in the absence of any direct talks the possibility of mixed messages increased.  
International strategic environment: Prioritizing coercive objectives 
A target state can base its reaction to coercion on the basis of information it has on the 
capacity of the coercer to carry out its threat. If the coercer’s military is stretched on 
multiple missions, its ability to threaten effectively in yet another coercive crisis is 
naturally affected. Therefore, from the coercer’s perspective, a clear analysis of its 
commitments in the global and regional strategic environment, a key contextual variable, is 
necessary. Following that, prioritization of broader objectives is an important component 
of coercive diplomacy.  
This factor also has a crucial bearing on the selection of objectives of coercive 
diplomacy. As Robert Jervis pointed out, once it became clear after the Iraq invasion that 
weapons of mass destruction as the rationale for war did not hold much ground, the Bush 
administration increasingly relied on other rationales, especially democracy promotion to 
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justify the invasion.3 This set a much higher standard that the administration then has to 
adhere to when considering strategies against other security threats. Democracy promotion 
was never on the Bush administration’s initial agenda considering its disdain for the 
nation-building of the Clinton years.  
The question then is – in a future coercive diplomacy case, would the U.S. attempt 
consistency by adding democracy to the list of objectives if the target is not sufficiently 
democratic? It is not clear whether the capability for such an exercise is present, given the 
current circumstances. Therefore, this is a stark manifestation of the problem of broad 
objectives. All four case studies in this dissertation exhibit problems related to high 
magnitude of demands that go beyond their vital national interests, and in fact deal with 
higher ambitions. It is therefore obvious that there is a perception gap between what the 
coercer believes the target’s response would be and the target’s actual response.  
While in the Westphalian system, states controlled the use of force internally, 
increasingly, Washington has adopted the idea that another state’s domestic systems are up 
for debate and modification.4 Two issues then arise, how compatible is such a broad 
objective with the strategy of coercive diplomacy? This is a pertinent issue because while 
the U.S. cannot deploy its military in every conceivable situation, it requires the need to 
threaten the use of force. And for adequate credibility to its threats, the asymmetry of 
motivation has to be tilted in Washington’s favor. Therefore, the question then is whether 
the U.S. is willing to limit its objectives, select demands that only affect its own national 
interests and not those of the target. For example, while democracy has been touted as a 
panacea for the threat of global terror, there is no evidence to support this thesis. Therefore, 
national interests cannot be confused for a system of government in another state that is a 
mirror reflection of the coercer’s. 
The second issue is that objectives can also be constrained by the need for political 
and military support from allies in the international community. Shortly after 9/11, 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that “the mission determines the coalition. And 
                                                 
3 Robert Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 29, No. 1, February 2006, pg. 8. 
4 On this point see G. John Ikenberry, ‘Power and liberal order: America’s postwar world order in transition,’ 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5 (2005), pg. 141. 
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the coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission.”5 However, it is not obvious 
whether this motto and unlimited objectives can co-exist in future crises.  International 
support is needed to coerce the target effectively, as this backing provides a measure of 
legitimacy, and is also crucial if threats have to be carried out. While the model of coercive 
diplomacy states that unilateral coercion can be stronger since it is easier to maintain a 
sense of purpose, increasingly it is obvious that to wield effective, credible threats, and to 
carry them out if necessary, multilateral support can be crucial. The Iraq and Afghanistan 
cases show that apart from these stages, international assistance is also crucial in imposing 
stability on the target state after the conflict.6
When we consider the Iraq and North Korea cases, a key question emerges – If 
Iraq’s WMD pursuit made it a fit case for aggressive action, why not North Korea which 
had a much more advanced nuclear weapons program and had similar hostility levels 
toward the U.S.? This highlights a lack of consistency in objectives that makes it harder to 
convince both a domestic audience and the international community to support future 
coercive policies. Thus, prioritization of coercive objectives across areas has to take into 
account the fact that such measures might be necessary in future,7 and that action in the 
present circumstances has a bearing on the reactions of targets, allies, and populations in 
the future.   
Implementation of threats 
It is also important to consider that carrying out military threats if the target does not 
concede is important for its demonstration effect and is an integral part of coercive 
diplomacy. The Afghanistan case showed the negative effects of not accomplishing fully 
the objectives of coercive diplomacy. The U.S. objective in coercing the Taliban centered 
on apprehending or neutralizing bin Laden and destroying the capability of Afghanistan to 
function as a terrorist base. When the Taliban did not concede, the U.S. launched a military 
                                                 
5 News transcript, Washington, DC, September 23, 2001, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09242001_t0923so.html  
6 Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment,’ Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C., 2006, pg. 6. 
7 Ivo H. Daalder & James B. Steinberg, ‘Preventive War, A Useful Tool,’ The Los Angeles Times,  
December 4, 2005.  
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attack. While Al Qaeda terror camps were destroyed and the Taliban overthrown, bin 
Laden and some of his lieutenants escaped. In November 2001, U.S. forces had cornered 
bin Laden and his fighters at his hideout in the Tora Bora mountains bordering Pakistan.8 
Nevertheless, the U.S. did not send in adequate forces (despite CIA requests) to cut off the 
group’s escape route into Pakistan, and the key objective of capturing bin Laden remained 
unfulfilled. 
Bin Laden and his inner circle, especially Ayman Zawahiri survived, most probably 
in the Pashtun tribal belt straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. From there the 
network has provided varying degrees of inspiration to autonomous terror cells around the 
world. Further, Taliban violence in Afghanistan has escalated rapidly in 2006. Thus in the 
long run, the objective of U.S. coercive diplomacy on the Taliban was unsuccessful not 
just because the Taliban did not concede, but also because American implementation of its 
threats against the Taliban were not carried through to their logical conclusion.  
It is clear that credible coercive diplomacy also requires that military strategies to 
carry out the threats (if coercion fails) be tailored to the needs of the military environment. 
9  In the period after the invasion of Iraq, as the insurgent violence increased, a U.S. 
Special Forces lieutenant colonel was quoted as saying, “What you are seeing here is an 
unconventional war being fought conventionally.”10  Therefore, it is not enough to have 
the military might and the resolve to carry out threats if the threats are going to be carried 
out without taking into consideration ground realities and the nature of the adversary. 
The image of war 
The image of war is an important contextual variable in coercive diplomacy. If the coercer 
or the target is wary of the consequences of an actual war, the resolve of one side can 
falter. During the Cold War, several cases of coercive diplomacy involved the threat of 
nuclear confrontation between the super powers. Therefore, the idea that nuclear weapons 
could be used, deliberately or inadvertently, was an important calculation. As mentioned 
                                                 
8 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 73-75. 
9 Noah Feldman, ‘Ballots and bullets,’ The New York Times, July 21, 2006. 
10 Thomas E. Ricks, ‘In Iraq, Military Forgot Lessons of Vietnam,’ The Washington Post, July 23, 2006, pg. 
A01. 
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earlier, the nuclear element continues to be part of the coercive process in many cases and 
regions, especially Northeast Asia and South Asia.  
However, increasingly, the international community, including the U.S., has to 
consider what to do after the threat is carried out. It is not enough to wield credible military 
threats, especially on countries with weak political and social foundations. The realization 
now is that carrying out the threat can frequently involve stabilization tasks in the target 
state after the military threat has been carried out. This naturally requires thousands of 
extra troops and civilian advisers as well as massive financial infusion. Such an objective 
comes about in two circumstances: (a) When Type ‘C’ coercive diplomacy (regime 
change) has been carried out. In this case, coercion is successful, and because the coercer’s 
main objective was regime change, there might be an alternate leadership to take the place, 
i.e., the coercer introduced clarity of eventual settlement. Nevertheless, the coercer and the 
international community would have to provide various degrees of assistance to stabilize 
the fledgling regime. (b) When regime change is not the main agenda, but in the process of 
carrying out the threat, the existing regime collapses anyway. In this case, the coercer 
might or might not have anticipated the resulting requirements.  
Regardless of the circumstances, regime collapse of the target then involves a 
major broadening of the coercer’s objectives – from changing the target’s behavior or the 
regime itself to rebuilding the target’s society and polity. It also means realizing that with 
such a broad objective, delicate power structures within the target regimes can be 
irreparably disturbed leading to chaos and instability. Coercive diplomacy that might 
eventually involve nation-building suffers from the basic problem of this strategy – 
magnitude of demands. According to one expert, nation-building plans suffer due to a 
chasm between the objective and the commitment level of the coercer.11 This scenario was 
displayed in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
U.S. military agencies have since undertaken comprehensive evaluations of their 
roles in Iraq and Afghanistan and these reports have quoted Pentagon officials as stating 
that serious flaws were detected in the overall plans.12 The issue then is whether the U.S. 
                                                 
11 James Dobbins, ‘Preparing for Nation-Building,’ Survival, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pg. 32. 
12 Tom Regan, ‘Pentagon studies examine ‘mistakes’ in Iraq, Afghanistan,’ Christian Science Monitor, 
August 16, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0816/dailyUpdate.html  
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would be automatically self-restrained in carrying out its coercive military strategy or 
whether it would have the capacity to overcome these obstacles and again resort to 
coercive measures elsewhere, while taking into account the fact that it might be involved in 
post-coercion/war stabilization program in the target state.  
If it did anticipate the post-regime change scenario and its own responsibilities, the 
coercer might be restrained in its coercion. Even if it does try coercive diplomacy, it might 
then be restrained in the process, and try a less intense version, with lesser objectives – the 
wait and see approach or the turning of the screw, rather than the ultimatum variant. 
Further, because the adversary is now aware of the situation, the coercer’s threats carry less 
credibility. Thus, the image of war now involves not just scenarios of massive destruction 
but also the responsibility for post-regime change political stabilization in the target. These 
goals require cooperation from the international community, international organizations 
and so coercive diplomacy has to expand its horizons and consider global-governance 
related issues.  
A further issue is learning the wrong lessons from other coercive confrontations. 
After the overthrow of the Taliban, the U.S. quickly turned its attention to Saddam 
Hussein, without considering the massive ground force that would be required to stabilize 
a post-Saddam Iraq. Analysts before the Iraq invasion had pointed out that Afghanistan 
and Iraq were very different entities and if regime change were effected, dissimilar 
strategies had to be applied.13
Coercive diplomacy, Non-state actors, and Governance incapacity  
Governance incapacity arises when ruling regimes (whether democratic or dictatorial) 
cannot control non-state groups operating in their territory. In the context of coercive 
diplomacy this can mean the difference between the target regime resisting demands and 
conceding to them. Even if the regime somehow comes round to the idea that conceding 
(to some degree) to the coercer’s demands would be a better policy choice, it may not be in 
                                                 
13 For example, Faleh A. Jabar, ‘The Iraqi Army and the Anti-Army: Some Reflections on the Role of the 
Military,’ in Toby Dodge & Steven Simon (ed.) Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of 
Regime Change, Adelphi Paper 354, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, January 2003. 
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a position to implement these decisions. Such possibilities include vacation of territory by 
a non-state group. A relevant example could be the Hezbollah’s dominance of parts of 
southern Lebanon. While it is debatable whether the government in Beirut is completely 
behind Hezbollah’s aims which are sectarian in character (as opposed to the multi-religious 
nature of the country), it is not necessarily in a position to do anything about it, because of 
the immense power that the largely Shia group commands.  
The governance incapability factor is also an increasing problem in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Tribal areas in Pakistan, especially Waziristan) bordering Afghanistan are 
now home to thousands of militants owing allegiance to the broad Taliban network, which 
extends across the border in to Afghanistan. Extremism in these areas has been exacerbated 
by radical clerics as well as the presence of 80,000 Pakistani army troops stationed there to 
combat Taliban and Al Qaeda linked groups.14 This network of ethnic Pashtun tribes with 
Taliban links saddles the vast, geographically inhospitable border area between the two 
countries. Islamabad has traditionally enjoyed very little control over these areas and tribes 
while the fledgling government in Kabul is too weak to control its side of the border.  
Therefore, coercing these regimes is meaningless if the actual targets of demands and 
threats are non-state groups which are effectively autonomous. Further, the coercer also 
has to consider that if the governments in these countries try to impose these externally 
mandated demands on hostile tribal groups that might provoke a backlash inflaming the 
situation further.  
Nevertheless, states such as India and the U.S. have tried to surmount the 
‘statelessness’ of terror groups by instead threatening states and entities that are associated 
with them. The introductory chapter highlighted the difficulty of coercing highly motivated 
terror groups which, theoretically, cannot be punished because they have no permanent 
base. Therefore, by threatening the Taliban and Pakistan, Washington and New Delhi 
attempted to impose some costs on support structures and associated entities of the main 
targets.  
Increasingly, governance incapacity also becomes a factor when non-state groups 
start providing services that have traditionally been the domain of the state. In Lebanon, 
                                                 
14 Ron Moreau & Zahid Hussain, ‘Border Backlash,’ Newsweek International, July 31, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13990130/site/newsweek/  
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Hezbollah has built up enormous popular support not just through its armed resistance to 
Israel, but also through the massive social services network in the area it controls, 
including hospitals and schools. Another contemporary example is the role of militant-
linked charities, especially Jamaat ud Dawa (a sister organization of Lashkar-e-Toiba) in 
relief work following the Kashmir earthquake in 2005. JUD garnered a huge chunk of 
relief funds, some of which might have come from foreign sources, increasing its resource 
base, while also gaining immense popular support, at a time when the Pakistani army was 
slow to begin relief operations. These examples show how activities of non-state groups 
can cut into the authority and legitimacy that the government might want to impose in 
these areas. In times of crises, when a coercer targets these entities, they have to contend 
with two issues. First, that these groups become more powerful logistically through the 
networks they established. Second, it becomes more difficult to whip up popular support 
against them, enabling these groups to resist coercion, whether from an external actor, or 
from their own governments.   
But on the other hand, when such groups build up social and logistical networks, it 
also provides them with a ‘return address,’ which can then be threatened by a coercer. 
Israel’s summer 2006 bombing campaign against targets in Lebanon has to be seen in this 
context. 
A different variant of the governance incapacity issue arises when the coercer 
exploits possible divisions within the target’s regime to help achieve its objectives. Such a 
strategy has reportedly been applied by the U.S. against North Korea. By increasingly 
cracking down on criminal activities of the Pyongyang regime, Washington sought to 
squeeze an important source of revenue through which Kim Jong Il has bought the 
allegiance of the regime’s elites. This would then provoke dissatisfaction against Kim.  
Thus, governance incapacity is relevant in two ways from the coercive diplomacy 
perspective. On the one hand, it shows how coercion can fail because a target government 
may not have the capacity to rein in the perpetrators of the actual provocation. On the other 
hand, the coercer can increase chances of successful coercion by indirectly targeting 
potentially disgruntled elements of the regime and inducing governance incapacity.  
The contemporary international political system thus shows important changes in 
the equation between state and non-state actors, which has a crucial bearing on the conduct 
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of coercive diplomacy. ‘Traditional’ state-sponsorship involved a state that was the major 
player while the terror/insurgent group was the subsidiary. Therefore, more often than not 
the flow of power, influence, money, and logistics has been one way from the state sponsor 
to the terror/insurgent group. But increasingly this equation is being challenged in the ways 
described above. Non-state elements are becoming more powerful vis-à-vis their state 
sponsors. Several questions arise here in the context of coercive diplomacy.  
For one thing, it is not clear who the target of coercion would be. For example, 
even if the U.S. and Israel seek to punish Hezbollah to send a message to Iran, such a 
message may not be valid because the military tactics employed against the Hezbollah 
might not work against Iran. Indeed the debate on Israel’s bombardment of Hezbollah in 
summer 2006 generated an important question – If Israel’s air force could not destroy the 
Hezbollah, how could the U.S. expect to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, even the nuclear 
ones, without causing massive civilian casualties. An important conceptual point here is 
that through proxies, the main actors in a coercive equation can gather valuable 
information about the adversary’s intentions, capabilities, and tactics.  
A slightly different equation arises when non-state actors act as proxies for other 
states. Hezbollah can be used as an example here also. It is widely believed that Iran and 
Syria provide logistical, financial, military and political support to the mainly Shia militia 
operating in Lebanon.15 According to some analysts, the Hezbollah-Israel conflict is 
increasingly a proxy war between the U.S. and Iran,16 as Washington seeks to formulate 
policies (including coercive ones) to neutralize Tehran’s nuclear program. The process of 
coercive diplomacy becomes more complicated, whether it involves aerial bombardment of 
the type seen in summer 2006 or mainly diplomatic moves.  
In any crisis, the sponsor can claim to have no connection to the activities of its 
proxy, and if the global strategic environment is in its favor, this approach can drag the 
matter to a stalemate, at the very least. Here, an important variable favoring coercive 
diplomacy – opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation – works against the coercer. While 
                                                 
15 For a brief summary of Hezbollah-Iran ties see Borzou Daragahi, ‘The Roots of Hezbollah’s Clout Lie In 
Iran,’ The Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2006. 
16 Robin Wright, ‘Returning to Old Approach, U.S. Faces Risky Path Ahead,’ The Washington Post, July 30, 
2006, pg. A18.  
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striking the proxy might be acceptable for the coercer, it might also demonstrate its 
reluctance to strike the sponsor directly for fear of provoking a wider conflagration.  
The preceding discussion showed the complicated relationship between non-state 
actors, their state sponsors, and coercers. Thus, it is safe to suggest that a coercive equation 
of this sort has three components, not just the traditional coercer-target dyad. 
Coercive diplomacy through popular discontent 
Two recent examples, both concerning Lebanon, show how the concept of coercive 
diplomacy can possibly be expanded to include recent trends in global politics. In the first 
example, following the February 2005 assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, former Prime 
Minister of Lebanon, Washington put pressure on Syria to own up to its culpability in the 
assassination and more crucially, withdraw its troops from Lebanon. In the second 
example, the Israeli government launched an air bombardment of Hezbollah strongholds in 
Lebanon in summer 2005. These attacks also lead to considerable civilian casualties in the 
country, as Hezbollah targets are situated in the midst of populations. 
A variant of this strategy involves the coercer putting slow pressure on the target 
government and the population (turning of the screw variant of coercive diplomacy) so that 
the target population turns against its government. It is inherently a Type C variant in 
which the coercer seeks a change in the regime of the target. Admittedly this is a slow and 
risky process. For example, American pressures on the Iranian government risk uniting the 
country’s population even more behind the ruling regime, even though there is broad 
disenchantment with the clerics. On the other hand, as reports suggest in 2006, there is 
growing dissatisfaction among certain sections of the Palestinian people on the payrolls of 
the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government, which has been hit by a financial 
squeeze from international sponsors such as the European Union and the U.S.17 This also 
shows how internal characteristics of the target regime matter. If the target is relatively 
strong financially and is able to control the population, this variant of coercion is less 
                                                 
17 Ken Ellingwood, ‘Palestinians begin to direct blame inward,’ The Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2006.  
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likely to be successful. However, on a fledgling, fragmented regime, such coercion has a 
greater chance of success.   
Coercive diplomacy and international economics 
In this era of globalization, an increasingly important factor is how economic dynamics 
impact on coercive diplomacy. This became obvious during the Iraq and North Korea 
coercion cases, in which influential actors either provided economic support to the target or 
made their decisions at least partly for economic reasons. Of course, here we cannot 
underestimate the element of great power politics. In the Iraq case, part of the reason for 
French, German, and Russian opposition lay in the need to re-establish their own global 
identities, and to create a security framework that did not depend on the U.S. Nevertheless, 
commercial factors did impact in several cases.  
For the Iraq war, one motivation attributed to the Bush administration was that it 
invaded the country to protect its oil supplies in an age of sky-rocketing oil prices. The 
2002 U.S. National Security Strategy also talked of the need to protect fuel sources and 
supply routes. Even if such a motivation played only a tangential role in the Iraq conflict, it 
is fair to conclude that similar factors will increasingly loom large in a state’s decision-
making calculations. For example, China’s search for fuel sources has led it to alliances in 
various parts of the globe, including Iran and several African countries. In a coercive 
policy against Iran, it would therefore be very difficult for the U.S. to achieve key elements 
of coercive diplomacy – international support, and isolation of the adversary. Even though 
the U.S. has been pressing for restraints and hurdles to Iran’s international financial 
dealings, Tehran’s status as the fourth largest oil producer gives it enormous clout. 
Consequently, such economic realities become major constraints on U.S. coercive activity.  
A second element is the application of pressure through foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows. In the South Asia case, the threatened outflow of investment by multinational 
corporations was a factor considered by the Indian government. Admittedly, this tactic can 
have particular impact when applied against states that are experiencing high economic 
growth and cannot afford this kind of sudden disruption. Such a strategy would not have 
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had any effect against the Taliban’s Afghanistan, which was already in a dire economic 
situation. 
Identity, Preferences and Perceptions 
The chapter on the Taliban highlights the importance of accurate images of the adversary. 
The post-Cold War period has been characterized by increasing rivalries based on religion, 
ethnicity, culture, and language. This has come about as increasingly, populations are 
becoming aware of various levels of their identities. To take the Afghanistan case, various 
groups based there have multiple identities, based on religion (Islam), sect (Shia, Sunni), 
and ethnicity (Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, among others). This implies that every 
group/militia/political party will have a specific set of preferences based on these 
components of their identity.18
In any confrontation, a coercer will have to take into account these complexities 
and also try to determine the preference structure for each group. This is because each 
component of the group’s identity will have its own objectives which may not necessarily 
coincide with the preferences of the other components. For example, in June 1996, 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an ethnic Pashtun radical Islamic Afghan warlord, switched sides 
to rejoin the Tajik forces of Ahmed Shah Masood and those of Uzbek warlord Rashid 
Dostum, to combat the Taliban, an ethnic Pashtun group with a very conservative Islamic 
identity. Thus, here the common ethnic and religious identity was subordinated to personal 
ambition.   
As the theory of coercive diplomacy states, the assumption of pure rationality has 
to be reconciled with preferences rooted in religious, cultural, ethnic, and social traditions. 
According to one viewpoint, this impacts on strategic behavior in two ways. First, cultural 
specifications of one party can make it act in certain ways that the other party may not 
understand but which are rational from the perspective of the first party. Second, cultural 
                                                 
18 For a brief analysis of ethnic political divisions in Afghanistan, see Norman Friedman, Terrorism, 
Afghanistan and America’s New Way of War, (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2003), pg. 67-87. 
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issues can decide the objectives of one side which then give rise to appropriate methods of 
achieving those objectives.19
But as this dissertation, and especially the research on coercion on the Taliban 
shows, there are nuances to every position and attitude. While Pashtunwali was viewed as 
a rigid tribal code that would not tolerate any infringement, there were exceptions to the 
rules. For example, one Pashtun politician and tribal leader stated in 2004, the Pashtunwali 
norms of refuge (panaah) and hospitality (melmastia) would not apply to Al Qaeda, stating 
that “if anyone is going to be the cause of war for me, then his moral obligation is to 
leave.”20
After the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Taliban and 
Al Qaeda militants sought refuge among tribal populations on the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border. But the tribal people were being paid large amounts of money in exchange for food 
and shelter. It would be easy to assume this as part of the Pashtunwali creed, but as the 
politician mentioned above stated, “this is earning, not Pashtunwali.”21 This implies that 
adequate information about the adversary can help formulate effective strategies for 
coercion.  
The Iraq case highlighted the vital role played by information and intelligence in a 
coercive policy. Paradoxically, the lack of adequate information about potential post-
invasion insurgency had the effect of emboldening U.S. resolve to carry out the invasion, 
which should have simultaneously had a greater coercive effect. Since that backfired, it is 
crucial to ask how will this factor effect future coercive measures, both in the target as well 
as coercer? Potential target states can then learn the importance of ambiguity and keep the 
coercer in the dark about their future intentions.   
This information variable also includes adequate understanding of the adversary’s 
threat perceptions. As the Iraq case demonstrated, Saddam’s belief system and decision-
making structure did not allow him to place the U.S. at the top of his list of threats. While 
it would be tempting to label as irrational those beliefs in the adversary that do not 
correspond to the coercer’s, it is more crucial to understand the empirical evidence that 
                                                 
19 See Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, (New York, NY: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979),  
pp. 63-65. 
20 Eliza Griswold, ‘In the Hiding Zone,’ The New Yorker, July 26, 2004. 
21 Ibid. 
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leads the decision-maker in the target state to a certain policy option.22 Therefore, an 
important element of formulating a successful coercive strategy is understanding the 
target’s own perceptions of the coercer’s threats and demands and how much importance it 
(the target) places on them. 
It would be constructive to see how this analysis would apply to Kim Jong Il, who 
has been variously described as ‘irrational,’ ‘madman,’ etc. But it is entirely possible that 
his seemingly irrational resistance could be rooted in the belief that since a future regime in 
Pyongyang might not have a place for him or offer him any security, resistance and 
coercion would be preferable. 
Conclusion 
The flexibility of the components of the theory of coercive diplomacy allows us to test its 
propositions and conjectures on various contemporary cases. It highlights the flow of 
decisions in a crisis situation, as well as the motives behind them. The challenge now is to 
incorporate changing dynamics such the rise of non-state actors into its fold, to 
comprehensively demonstrate the circumstances in which coercion succeeds and fails.  
These salient features of contemporary coercive diplomacy reiterate one key 
objective of the coercer in any given situation – ensuring that the asymmetry of interests 
remains in its favor, because only then will the target be inclined to concede. Thus, 
whether through modifying objectives, or offering reassurances, or giving ‘carrots,’ the 
aim is to prevent the target’s fundamental interests from being violated. This is the most 
prominent element that has persisted through decades of research on coercive diplomacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 See for example Robert Jervis, ‘Understanding Beliefs,’ Political Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2006, pg. 
643. 
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